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INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this thesis is to give an account of 
spheres of influence in contemporary international politics 
with the ultimate intention of specifying the place they 
have had in international order. In this connection, the 
most important spheres of influence have been those of the 
Soviet Union and the United States. Neither of these two 
powers either publicly recognises the sphere of the other or 
uses the term "sphere of influence" to describe its 
relationship with states which are considered by other powers 
to be under its influence. Nevertheless, spheres of influence 
are part of the reality of international politics and the 
Soviet Union and the United States have both behaved as though 
they do recognise each other's sphere. Indeed, because of the 
way they have behaved it may be inferred that they have 
reached a tacit and reciprocal understanding as to the range 
of behaviour each will tolerate of the other with regard to 
their respective spheres of influence. It is principally 
through such understanding that spheres of influence 
contribute to international order.
The way in which such understandings contribute to 
international order is through providing guidelines by which 
powers may conduct their relations so as to advance perceived 
common interests. A basis for the perception of common 
interests in international order is provided by the fear of 
war, particularly nuclear war; by the fact of economic 
interdependence and by other things. But to achieve any 
degree of international order, states need to find guidelines 
which show them how they must behave if they are to advance 
their common interests; that is to say, they must articulate 
norms or rules and agree upon them. Such rules need not be 
formal or explicit but rather may have the status simply of 
operating procedures on unwritten rules of the game. The 
tacit understandings which have devolved from spheres of 
influence provide just such guidelines or rules. If the 
general principles of conduct embodied in them are conformed 
with, orderly relations between the powers which have spheres
vii
of influence may be achieved in some degree. This in turn 
has consequences for order throughout the whole international 
system which lead to the conclusion that, although the 
practices associated with them have both violated the 
requirements of international law and may be considered 
unjust, spheres of influence can be said, nevertheless, to 
have contributed to order in contemporary international 
politics.
The first part of this thesis defines the term "spheres 
of influence"; discusses the relationship of spheres of 
influence with some other concepts; and says something of the 
place they have had in the practice of states by referring to 
various historical examples. It shows how spheres of 
influence were once the subject of formal agreements and what 
the content of those agreements was and goes on, in the third 
chapter, to define what is meant by "tacit understanding".
Part two opens with an account of how each of the 
principal allied powers of the Second World War conceived of 
the place of spheres of influence in post-war order. The 
following chapter shows how, in spite of plans for, and the 
principles of, post-war order, the great powers were unwilling 
to trust their security to the United Nations organization and 
spheres of influence were consolidated. The last chapter in 
this part uses four examples to show how tacit understanding 
between the Soviet Union and the United States came about and 
what form it took.
The third and final section deals with the relationship 
between spheres of influence and both international law and 
international order. It does so by discussing, in the 
respective chapters, the nature of international law and the 
meaning of "international order" and then setting what is 
said of spheres of influence in that context.
PART I
THE CONCEPT OF SPHERES OF INFLUENCE
CHAPTER ONE
THE TERM AND ITS USE
A sphere of influence is a determinate region within 
which a single external power exerts a predominant influence, 
which limits the independence or freedom of action of 
political entities within it.
By way of an initial account of this definition, first 
of all, spheres of influence have identifiable geographical 
limits. All of the following examples either have been, or 
are, part or all of a sphere of influence: the region south
of the Mediterranean possessions of France, 'up to a line 
from Saye on the Niger, to Barruwa on Lake Tchad'; 'the 
portion of Turkey which drains into the Black Sea, together 
with the drainage valley of the Euphrates as far as Baghdad'; 
the valley of the Yangtze; 'the Caribbean', and finally the 
region bounded by the territorial limits of the socialist 
states of eastern Europe. Each of the regions in these 
examples has a different status. They include respectively 
one which, at the time, was not part of a recognised state or 
states; two which were parts of a state; one which is an 
ocean and the islands in it, together with the littoral states 
around it; and lastly, a region comprising a number of 
sovereign states. In short, the term 'sphere of influence' 
has referred to regions with different political status at 
different times and places. It is because of the need to 
allow for forms of political and social organization which 
fall short of statehood, as well as states, that the term 
'political entities' is used in definition. However, in 
contemporary international politics, it is normally sovereign 
states that comprise spheres of influence.
Secondly, that the influencing power is defined as 
'external' simply means that the influenced states (parts of 
states, territories or regions, as the case may be) do not 
fall within the national boundaries of the influencing power. 
Indeed, in some instances it has been far removed from 'its' 
sphere of influence. That the influencing power exerts
2'predominant influence' means that it prevails both over the 
entities in the region and against the influence of other 
comparable powers over the region. Some writers have gone 
beyond what is implied by the term 'predominance* and said 
spheres of influence entail a principle of 'exclusion'.^
That is to say, a sphere of influence is exclusive to the 
influencing power; all other powers being completely excluded. 
There is some degree of exclusion in spheres of influence, but 
it is not absolute; it does not extend to all activities of 
states and their nationals and varies from case to case.
Thirdly, the limitation of independence or freedom of 
action of political entities in a sphere of influence covers 
the range from direct action, such as armed intervention by 
the influencing power, to much less direct and more diffuse 
forms of influence. An example of the latter is the nature 
of Soviet influence in post-war Finland.
Having made these preliminary remarks, it is proposed to 
proceed by saying something of both the term 'spheres of 
influence' and terms to which it is closely related.
I.
Tne Term 'Spheres of Influence'.
The term 'spheres of influence' appears to have come
into usage, in diplomacy, only in the late nineteenth century.
Lord Curzon expressed his doubt as to whether a more momentous
early use of it could be traced than in the assurance first
given by Count Gortchakoff to Lord Clarendon in 1869, that
Afghanistan lay 'completely outside the sphere within which
2Russia might be called upon to exercise her influence'.
This dispatch from Gortchakoff had been occasioned by British 
apprehensions as to Russia's intentions with regard, not just
See G.W. Rutherford, 'Spheres of Influence: An Aspect of
Semi-Suzerainty', The American Journal of International Law, 
Vol. 20, No. 2 (1926), pp.300-25.
2 G.N. Curzon, Frontiers, The Romanes Lecture 1907 (London, 
Clarendon, 1907), p.42.
3to Afghanistan, but ultimately India. During the Crimean 
War the Russians had drawn up a plan for the invasion of 
India, and the rapid advance of Russia in Turkestan between 
1860 and 1870 led Lord Clarendon to open negotiations which 
eventually resulted in the Gortchakoff-Granville engagement. 
In that engagement, Afghanistan was conceded as being outside3the Russian sphere of influence.
Whatever the first use of the actual term might have 
been, it came "into vogue in connection with the scramble for4Africa". The scramble for Africa can be said to have begun 
with the Conference of Berlin of 1884-85 and it was after
5this "that the modern era of...spheres of influence began". 
The use of the term at that time was thought to constitute "a 
new departure in the vocabulary of diplomacy", and in its 
practical implications it was thought of variously as "one of7the rules in the great game of colonial aggrandisement" and 
by one later writer as "a new and hopeful expedient in the 
interest of peace".^
The Conference of Berlin was called together by 
Germany in concert with France. At the time Germany had 
no definite footing in Africa, but from then on played a9leading role. The purpose of the Conference was to reach 
an understanding on the Congo basin. In its General 
Act, the Conference agreed to freedom of trade for
G.N. Curzon, Russia in Central Asia in 1889 and the Anglo- 
Russian Question (London, Frank Cass, 1967), p.326.
4 Sir Charles Lucas, The Partition and Colonization of Africa
(Oxford, Clarendon, 1922), p.97.
5 M.F. Lindley, The Acquisition and Government of Backward 
Territory in International Law (New York, Negro Universities 
Press, 1969). Reprinted from the 1926 edition, p.209.
F.D. Lugard, The Pual Mandate (London, Blackwood, 1923),
p . 12.
7 J. Scott-Keltie, The Partition of Africa (London, Edward 
Standord, 1893), p.267.g Hannis Taylor, A Treatise on International Law (Chicago, 
Callaghan, 1901), p.271.
9 Lucas, op.cit., p.87.
4all nations within the region watered by the Congo and its
affluents and laid down rules as to occupation. The
question of occupation is of some interest in relation to
the development of spheres of influence. For occupation to
be "effective" it was considered necessary to secure "the
existence of a sufficient authority, in the territories
occupied, to ensure respect for acquired rights, and if
necessary for freedom of commerce and transit", where it had
been stipulated. Effective occupation was held to be the
test of validity for claims to territorial acquisition and in
Africa was limited to coastal areas. No definite rule was
laid down at the Conference as to "the basis upon which the
validity of claims to sovereignty in the interior should be
recognized". However, article six mentioned the exercise
of "sovereign rights or influence" or, in the words of Keltie,
"notice [was] made for the first time in any International Act
12of the obligation attaching to spheres of influence".
During the initial stages of the scramble for Africa
then, the term "spheres of influence" referred to the
intentions of European powers with respect to the interior
of Africa. What those intentions actually were is a question
of historical interpretation. Opinions range, on the one
hand, from those who would say the European powers desired
from the outset to acquire "vast territories which they were
13not able to occupy effectively at once" - to saying, as 
Robinson and Gallagher do, that:
Keltie, op.cit.f p.209.
Lugard, op.cit., pp.11-12.
^  Keltie, op,cit., p.209.
13 L. Oppenheim, International Law: A Treatise (London,
Longmans Green, 1947), Vol. 1, p.513.
5Far from laying down ground rules for the occupation 
of Africa, the statesmen at Berlin had no intention 
of playing that game. Despising colonial ventures 
in tropical Africa, they had extended their hands- 
off arrangements largely to avoid it. The last 
thing they wanted was to commit themselves to 
administering such comparatively unimportant places.14
On this interpretation, the agreement of the European powers
to lay out spheres of influence expressed their intention not
to be ensnared into the acquisition of territory through
mutual suspicion. Another approach again is suggested by
A.J.P. Taylor, who described Germany's initial actions in
15Africa as a move in Bismarck's European Policy. Whatever 
their individual motives or intentions were, the European 
powers, in effect, contrived to avoid conflict over territory 
by agreeing beforehand as to which areas each was to have as 
its own preserve. The term "sphere of influence" referred to 
such areas, and according to John Westlake, "spheres of 
influence result[ed] from mutual agreements of abstention 
made by two or more powers"
The New Cambridge Modern History, ed. by F.H. Hinsley 
(Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1962), Vol. XI, 
p.607. See also R. Robinson and J. Gallagher, Africa and 
the Victorians - The Official Mind of Imperialism (London, 
MacMillan, 1970).
15 A.J.P. Taylor, Germany's First Bid for Colonies 1884-1885} 
A Move in Bismarck's European Policy (London, MacMillan,
1938) .
Taylor argued that during 1884 and 1885 "Bismarck 
quarrelled with England in order to draw closer to France; 
and that the method of quarrel was the deliberately 
provocative claim to ownerless lands, in which the German 
Government had hitherto shown no interest. [Hence] ... the 
German colonies were the accidental by-product of an abortive 
Franco-German entente". p.6.
16 The Collected Papers of John Westlake on Public 
International Law, ed. by L. Oppenheim (Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 1914), p.191.
6In fact not all spheres of influence have resulted from 
agreements. It will later be shown, in important examples, 
not that spheres of influence have resulted from agreements, 
but rather that agreements have devolved from the existence 
of spheres of influence. The sphere of influence of one 
power or the respective spheres of two or more powers are 
quite distinct from an agreement or agreements as to such 
spheres. Indeed, spheres of influence and agreements as to 
them must not be confused. The question of agreements will 
be taken up in the next chapter; first, there are a number 
of terms closely related to that of "spheres of influence" 
which should be introduced.
II.
Terms Closely Related to "Spheres of Influence".
There are four terms which warrant consideration: (1)
spheres of action; (2) zones of influence; (3) spheres of 
preponderance; and (4) spheres of interest.
1. Spheres of Action.
There are instances in diplomatic papers pertaining to 
the first phases of the scramble for Africa, where the term 
"spheres of action" had the same meaning as "spheres of 
influence". Perhaps this may be taken to support Lugard*s 
comment that "the conception of a sphere of influence was a 
new departure in diplomacy", in that there was no definite 
term for the concept at that time. An example of the use of 
the term "spheres of action" is found in 1886, in a 
supplementary arrangement between Great Britain and Germany. 
The preamble stated the need for agreement in "separating 
and defining the spheres of action of Great Britain and 
Germany in those parts of Africa where the colonial interests 
of the two countries might conflict". Britain declared that 
on receiving the assent of the German Government, it was 
prepared to adhere to the arrangement by which both powers 
were excluded from extending their influence in mutually
7
1 7exclusive areas demarcated in the text. Not only did the 
arrangement speak of extending "influence", but it was of 
exactly the same form as agreements which used the term 
"sphere of influence" throughout.
Another example was an Anglo-French agreement of August
1890, in which the British government recognised "the spheres
of influence of France to the South of her Mediterranean
Possessions, up to a line from Saye on the Niger, to Barruwa
on Lake Tchad, drawn in such a manner as to comprise in the
sphere of action of the Niger Company all that fairly belongs
18to the Kingdom of Sokoto". The sphere of action of the
Niger Company amounted to a British sphere of influence as
the Royal Niger Company was virtually an agent of the British
Government. Under Royal Charter, it was "empowered to
exercise jurisdiction over all lands which had been acquired
by treaty from the natives". The Royal Niger Company
"greatly extended the sphere of Britain in the hinterland of
our coastal Protectorate [and] found itself more and more in
19conflict with the interests of other European powers".
And the more it found itself in conflict the more it 
embroiled Her Majesty's Government.
It may be concluded that the term "sphere of action" 
meant the same as "sphere of influence". As it happened use
21of the former term was soon superseded by use of the latter.
E. Hertslet, The Map of Africa by Treaty (London, Frank 
Cass, 1967), reprinted from the 1896 third edition, Vol. Ill, 
p.868, and British and Foreign State Papers3 1885-1886 
(London, William Ridgway, 1893), Vol. LXXVII, p.1049.
18 Hertslet, The Map of Africa by Treaty, Vol. II, p.739.
19 E.L. Evans, The British in Tropical Africa3 An Historical 
Outline (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1929), p.143.
20 Although 'action' does appear in Sir Llewellyn Woodward's 
account of Mr Churchill's 1944 proposals concerning the 
Balkans (see Chapter 4 below). Sir L. Woodward, British 
Foreign Policy in the Second World War, Vol. Ill (London, 
H.M.S.O., 1971), p.115.
82. Zones of Influence.
Both scholars and journalists sometimes use the term
"zones of influence" in such a way that it either means the
same as, or is closely related to, the term "spheres of
influence". From the press - "the policy of carving up zones 
21of influence" and "the Soviet Union's single minded
determination to maintain and enlarge its zone of influence
22in the Middle East" - are but two random examples. In the
Yearbook of World Affairs for 1973, an article entitled "Zones
of Influence" appeared and what it dealt with is what is meant
23here by "spheres of influence". Similarly, Professor R.A. 
Falk has written about what he calls "Zone II", in which he 
includes the countries of East Europe and of Central America. 
That is to say, countries referred to in this thesis as 
influenced states in the Soviet and American spheres of 
influence.
Besides Zone II, Falk distinguishes Zones I, III and IV. 
Zone I actors are the United States and the Soviet Union, 
which both subject the secondary states of Zone II to 
"supervisory domination". Zone III actors are also classed 
as secondary states, but ones "subject to no clear line of 
hegemonial subjection" by either of the two Zone I actors. 
"States which enjoy national autonomy in the sense of being 
reasonably free from the prospect of military interference 
by either Zone I actors are identified as Zone IV actors. 
France, Switzerland, Japan and Sweden are examples of states 
belonging in Zone IV".^
Andre Fontaine in The Guardian Weekly, Sept. 22, 1973.
22 Editorial, The Canberra Times, Oct. 17, 1973.
^  M.S. Vazquez, The Yearbook of World Affairs 1973, pp.301-15. 
24 R.A. Falk, 'Zone II as a World Order Construct', in J.N. 
Rosenau, V. Davis and M.A. East, The Analysis of International 
Politics, Essays in honour of Harold and Margaret Sprout (New 
York, The Free Press, 1972), pp.189-90.
9In most instances in which the term "zones of influence" 
is used, it has the same meaning as does "spheres of 
influence". A compelling reason for preferring "spheres of 
influence" is simply that it has a wider common usage.
3. Spheres of Preponderance.
This term was used in connection with British Policy in 
China at the time of the so-called "Scramble for Concessions". 
It had been a cardinal point of British policy that the 
integrity of China be preserved, but the course of events 
resulted in somewhat elastic notions of what constituted the 
preservation of integrity. Germany took the murder of two 
German missionaries, in November 1897, as a pretext for 
seizing Kiao-chou Bay. The British, being anxious as to 
German intentions, sent ships to Port Arthur but soon withdrew 
them in deference to Russia who had also sent ships there. An 
understanding with Russia as to China became urgent. With the 
principle of preserving the integrity of China in mind, Lord 
Salisbury had the idea that the basis of an agreement with 
Russia would be, not a partition of territory, but a partition 
of preponderance. In January 1898, he sent, to Sir N. O'Connor 
in St. Petersburgh, a dispatch setting out his plan. It is 
worth quoting in full.
Our idea was this. The two Empires of China and 
Turkey are so weak that in all important matters 
they are constantly guided by the advice of Foreign 
Powers. In giving this advice Russia and England 
are constantly opposed, neutralizing each other's 
efforts much more frequently than the real antagonism 
of their interests would justify; and this condition 
of things is not likely to diminish, but to increase.
It is to remove or lessen this evil that we have 
thought that [sic] an understanding with Russia might 
benefit both nations.
We contemplate no infraction of existing rights.
We would not admit the violation of any existing 
treaties, or impair the integrity of the present 
empires of either China or Turkey. These two 
conditions are vital. We aim at no partition of 
territory; but only a partition of preponderance. It 
is evident that both in respect to Turkey and China
J.E. Schrecker, Imperialism and Chinese Nationalism3 
Germany in Shantung (Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University 
Press, 1971), p.33.
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there are large portions which interest Russia much 
more than England and vice versa. Merely as an 
illustration, and binding myself to nothing, I would 
say that the portion of Turkey which drains into the 
Black Sea, together with the drainage valley of the 
Euphrates as far as Baghdad, interest Russia much 
more than England: whereas Turkish Africa, Arabia,
and the Valley of the Euphrates below Baghdad interest 
England much more than Russia. A similar distinction 
exists in China between the Valley of the Hoango with 
the territory north of it and the valley of the Yangtze.
Would it be possible to arrange that where, in 
regard to these territories our counsels differ, the 
Power least interested should give way to and assist 
the other? I do not disguise from myself that the 
difficulty would be great. Is it insuperable? I have 
designedly omitted to deal with large tracts in each 
Empire, because neither Power has shown any keen interest in them.26
This dispatch is instructive in more ways than one. In 
the first place, European powers delineated spheres of 
influence in countries, which in western terms were at two 
broadly different stages of development. On the one hand, 
there were those cases of which much of Africa was typical. 
Spheres of influence during the Scramble for Africa were 
generally mapped out in regions said to be territorium 
nullius. That is to say, tracts of "territory not subject to 
any sovereignty - either because it has never been so subject, 
or, having once been in that condition, has been abandoned". 
Lindley was of the opinion that for an area to be considered 
not territorium nullius,
It would appear, from general considerations, to be 
necessary and sufficient that it be inhabited by a 
political society, that is, by a considerable number 
of persons who are permanently united by habitual 
obedience to a certain and common superior, or whose 
conduct in regard to their mutual relations habitually 
conforms to recognised standards.27
2 6 Salisbury to Sir N. O’Connor, British Documents on the 
Origins of the War3 1898-1914 , ed. by G.P. Gooch and
H. Temperley (London, H.M.S.O., 1927), Vol. 1, p.8.
27 Lindley, op.cit., pp.10-23.
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Publicists of international law who dealt with such questions
fell broadly into those who, (1) recognized the sovereignty
of backward peoples, (2) those who gave a limited or
conditional recognition to sovereignty in backward peoples,
2 8and (3) denied sovereignty to backward peoples. In their 
actions European states tended to deny sovereignty to backward 
peoples and considered that there were no organized states or 
civilization in so-called backward territory. The delineation 
of spheres of influence in such places, in Africa, amounted to 
the first step in dividing territory among the European powers. 
That is to say, it was the first step in the process of 
colonization.
On the other hand spheres of influence were delineated 
in regions such as were the subject of Salisbury's dispatch, 
as part of what A.J.P. Taylor called "the struggle for the 
heritage of decaying states, themselves very often the relics 
of earlier epochs of imperialism". In the same place Taylor 
wrote:
It was not merely that the sovereignty of so-called 
backward peoples was denied; in important cases they were regarded as being entirely beyond the pale of international 
law. The American envoy, Caleb Cushing, argued that as China 
did not recognize the 'law of nations', civilized states need 
not be bound by legal considerations in their dealings with 
China.
From the greater part of Asia and Africa 
individual Christians are utterly excluded, either 
by the sanguinary barbarism of the inhabitants, or by 
their phrenzied bigotry, or by the narrow-minded policy 
of their governments; to their courts the ministers of 
Christian governments have no means of access except by 
force and at the head of fleets and armies; as between 
them and us, there is no community of ideas, no common 
law of nations, no interchange of good offices; and it 
is only during the present generation that treaties, 
most of them imposed by force of arms or by terror, 
have begun to bring down the great Mohammedan and Pagan 
Governments into a state of inchoate peaceful association 
with Christendom.
Cited by Tyler Dennett, Americans in Eastern Asia (New York, 
Barnes and Noble, 1941), p.164.
12
The struggle over the succession to the Turkish 
Empire had gone on since the end of the seventeenth 
century; but what distinguished the "Age of 
Imperialism" was that more of these decadent states 
came into the market and the process of absorption 
was rendered more and more difficult by the 
interference of some other European power .... It was 
owing to the rivalry of England and Russia that 
Persia and Afghanistan preserved their independence ... 
though Persia nearly lost it to Russia in the last 
years before 1914; and, thanks to the jealousy of all 
the powers, China preserved her independence, except 
for the loss of a few parts in what proved to be an abortive partition in 1898.29
In these latter areas, comprising what Europeans considered 
to be states, whatever influence was exerted or extended, was 
not in the form of territorial acquisition and colonization.
It was in the form of political and economic influence in the 
affairs of the state. Such was the case in Turkey, Persia 
and China, of which the first and third were the subject of 
Salisbury's dispatch. That Salisbury should have stressed a 
partition of preponderance as against territory, when in fact 
the distinction between the two was rather flimsy, reflects 
above all that a partition of territory would have been 
politically unacceptable. This was not the case with regard 
to so-called territorium nullius. Now since the term "spheres 
of influence" had come into use mainly in connection with the 
Partition of Africa, it is reasonable to conclude that the 
term had acquired the connotation of territorial acquisition. 
To whatever extent that was true, it was politically expedient 
for statesmen and governments to avoid using the term in 
certain cases. Particularly where states, in whatever 
condition of decay, were involved.
In this context, what did "preponderance" mean? In 
ordinary language it means superiority of power and influence 
and in spite of the fact that the word "interest" appears 
several times in the Salisbury dispatch, it can be argued 
that the condition of being "weak ... in all important matters 
[and] ... constantly guided by the advice of Foreign powers",
A.J.P. Taylor, Germany 's First Bid for Colonies> 1884-1885
(London, MacArthur, 1938), pp.1-2.
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goes beyond mere interest on the part of the foreign powers
and actually constitutes some sort of influence. Indeed,
according to Lord Balfour's niece and biographer, Salisbury
3 0aimed at creating spheres of influence in China. It is 
of course partly a matter of what is meant by interest. That 
Salisbury had in mind something distinct from spheres of 
influence, when he proposed a partition of preponderance, is 
doubtful. Certainly the policies pursued by the European 
powers in China, Central Asia and the Near East have since 
been thought of in terms of "spheres of influence". The 
concept was the same even if the term was not.
In proposing that Britain and Russia agree as to the 
areas in which each would exert its preponderance, Salisbury 
hoped this would bring in its train a lessening of conflict 
between the two countries in the pursuit of their respective 
interests and so benefit both nations. There was, in other 
words, the idea that allocating areas of preponderance was of 
mutual benefit in the relations of Great Powers. An 
agreement to partition preponderance, as Salisbury proposed, 
amounted to the same thing as an agreement as to spheres of 
influence.
4. Spheres of Interest
Many authors and statesmen have made no distinction
between the terms "spheres of interest" and "spheres of 
31influence", but in fact there is a distinct difference 
between them. Those who have made the distinction have not 
always done so out of regard for propriety in the use of 
language, but rather because the one term has been thought to
B.E.C. Dugdale, Arthur James Balfour (London, Hutchinson, 
1936), Vol. 1, pp.250-51.
31 An example is the "Curzon dispatch" of September 21, 1899, 
concerning Persia. In one paragraph it called for a 
recognition of British and Russian spheres of interest, while 
in the next it spoke of spheres of influence and so continued 
without making any distinction between the two. See British 
Documents on the Origins of the War3 1898-1914, ed. by G.P. 
Gooch and H. Temperley (London, H.M.S.O., 1929), Vol. IV, 
pp.356-63.
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32be more acceptable than the other. This section will first 
draw a distinction between the two terms and, secondly, say 
something as to why "interest" has been thought of as more 
acceptable than "influence".
In his 1907 Romanes Lecture, Lord Curzon asserted that
a "Sphere of Influence is a less developed form than a
Protectorate, but it is more developed than a Sphere of 
33Interest". He went on to say
Of all the diplomatic forms or fictions which have 
lately been described, it may be observed that the 
uniform tendency is for the weaker to crystallize into 
the harder shape. Spheres of Interest tend to become 
Spheres of Influence; Temporary Leases to become 
perpetual; Spheres of Influence develop into 
Protectorates; Protectorates to be the forerunners ofcomplete incorporation.^
This implies that there can be "interest" without "influence", 
the one being prior to the other; that the Persian Gulf might 
be a British sphere of interest without being a sphere of 
influence. Indeed it is in this way that the two terms may 
be distinguished. Whereas there may be "interest" where 
there is no "influence", it would make no sense to say there 
was "influence" but no "interest". Once influence is present 
the term "interest" is redundant. However, in practice the 
two may not be easy to distinguish.
As to the term spheres of interest being more acceptable, 
it was perhaps for this reason that Lord Balfour distinguished 
between the two terms when speaking in the House of Commons
That a different connotation has been, and continues to be, 
perceived in the two terms is attested to by a nineteenth 
century geographer, who thought the term "sphere of interest" 
to be "better" than the term "sphere of influence", and more 
recently by Mr George Ball, when he wrote that the United 
States Government tacitly recognizes concepts such as "spheres 
of influence" or, more accurately, "spheres of interest".
Why the one term was "better" or more "accurate" than the 
other was not stated by either author. See A.S. White, The 
Development of Africa (London, 1890) , reprinted in 1969 by 
Negro Universities Press, New York, p.225 and George Ball, 
'Slogans and Realities', Foreign Affairs, Vol. 47, No. 4 
(July 1969), pp.624-25.
33 Curzon, op.cit., p.42.
Ibid,, p.47.
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on April 29, 1898. Sir William Harcourt had just asserted 
that the principle of no partition of territory had been 
abandoned in China. In reply Lord Balfour said:
Spheres of influence we have never admitted, spheres 
of interest we have never denied. The distinction 
may be a fine one; but the House will observe that 
for us not to admit spheres of interest would have 
been a most fatal policy for British Commerce. We 
hold, we have always held, that, throughout the length 
and breadth of China, citizens of this country have 
equal commercial rights with citizens of all other 
countries.35
Even so he went on to ask, rhetorically, whether Sir William 
Harcourt and his supporters would sit by and see a port in 
the middle of the Yangtze Valley, together with concessions 
for railways leading to that port, pass into the hands of 
other Governments. There was, he said, no legal restraint 
preventing other countries from doing so, "but I am certain 
the right honourable Gentleman would think it an unfriendly 
act of any nation to pursue such a policy with regard to 
us . . . " . In other words Britain regarded the Yangtze Valley 
as its sphere of interest. But in practice mere "interest" 
was insufficient to prevent other nations from establishing 
influence and so for Britain to safeguard its interests in 
the Yangtze Valley it had to have influence.
Of Balfour's distinction between the two terms, G.F.
Hudson argued that Britain was, at the time, moving from
open-door to monopoly economics and so it was to "ease the
shock to the British public of so sudden a transition [that]
... Mr Balfour invented [the] hair-splitting distinction
between a 'sphere of influence' and a 'sphere of interest',
the latter being deemed to possess a virtue which was lacking
3 6in the former". The author of a more recent volume on 
British policy in China argued that whereas "spheres of 
interest"
The Parliamentary Debates, 4th Series, Vol. LVI (29 April 
1898), pp.1582-83.
o f:
G.F. Hudson, The Far East in World Politics (Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 1945), p.105.
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did not specifically violate the concept of the open 
door. Spheres of influence... implied a distinct 
economic and commercial exclusiveness, with a degree 
of political control over the area as well as an 
understood freedom to absorb the territory. This 
could not be admitted without altering the entire 
basis of the foreign treaty position in China.37
This same writer was of the opinion that Britain did not join 
the scramble for concessions "to oppose the other powers in 
their areas of special interest but to prevent those areas 
from becoming spheres of influence". In support of this he 
cited Balfour's statement which was quoted above.
In conclusion then, Curzon's distinction is the correct 
one according to lexical criteria, but this has not always 
been the consideration uppermost in the minds of either those 
writing about politics or politicians.
Next to be considered are two terms with distinct 
meaning, namely: "buffer zone" and "spheres of restraint".
III.
Terms With Distinct Meaning.
1. Buffer Zone.
Martin Wight defined a buffer zone as "an area occupied 
by a weaker Power or Powers between two or more stronger 
Powers", as to which it is in "the vital interest of each 
stronger Power to prevent the other from controlling". Each 
of the stronger powers, Wight continued, "will preserve this 
interest in one of two ways, according to its strength: 
either by seeking to establish its own control over the buffer
39zone, . .., or by maintaining its neutrality and independence".
L.K. Young, British Policy in China} 1895-1902 (Oxford, 
Clarendon, 1970), p.78.
^  Ibid., p.92.
39 Martin Wight, Power Politics (London, Royal Institute of 
International Affairs, 1949), pp.50-51. Martin Wight also 
wrote: "The most important buffer zone in the world is that
dividing Russia from the British Empire. Russia lies in the 
long curve of the British Empire rather like an egg in a 
spoon, but the two are separated by a layer of weak states 
stretching from the Near to the Far East: Turkey, Persia,
Afghanistan, and China with its autonomous dependencies, Tibet 
and Manchuria". p.52.
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In cases where powers have established control over what 
they regard as a buffer zone, such zones have coincided with 
spheres of influence. But precisely because buffer zones 
may be comprised of states which are neutral and independent, 
it is not the case that all buffer zones are spheres of 
influence and hence the two concepts must be distinguished.
An example of a buffer state over which two rival powers
agreed not to establish preponderant influence was Siam,
lying as it did between French Indo-China and the British
4 0Empire in India and Burma. An Anglo-French declaration of
January 15, 1896, concerning Siam and other matters, reserved
non-contiguous spheres of influence running along the Burmese,
Khmer and Loatian borders and agreed that in the region in
between, neither power would introduce armed forces, or
acquire special privileges. Nothing in the agreement was to
"hinder any action on which the two powers [were agreed as]...
necessary to uphold the independence of the Kingdom of 
41Siam". In other words, it was agreed that Siam would be42neither a French nor a British sphere of influence. For 
it to have been a sphere of either one or the other would 
have brought the two empires into friction. Similarly, the 
Anglo-Russian agreement of 1907, as to Persia, provided for 
a neutral zone between the British and Russian spheres of 
influence.
To reiterate, a buffer zone may coincide with a sphere 
of influence. It can, for instance, be argued that the states 
of eastern Europe are both a Soviet sphere of influence and 
are buffer states. But equally a buffer zone may include 
areas which are not spheres of influence. Conversely, a
See G.F. Hudson, op.cit., p.69.
 ^ Treaties and Agreements With and Concerning China 1894- 
1919, Ed., J.V.A. MacMurray, Vol. 1 (New York, Oxford 
University Press, 1921), p.54.
^  Mr Adam Watson suggested to me that Siam could have been 
described as a "sphere of non-influence" but the term serves 
no purpose which is not already served by the term "buffer 
zone" so long as the latter can refer to neutralized areas and 
areas which it is, or seems to be, agreed that no one power 
will have predominance.
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sphere of influence may be comprised of regions which cannot 
be regarded as a buffer zone. For these reasons the term 
buffer zone must be regarded as distinct from the term 
"spheres of influence".
2. Spheres of Restraint.
The term "spheres of restraint" implies a different 
political relationship between powerful and weak states 
than does the term "spheres of influence". Whereas spheres 
of influence are regions over which one power exerts 
predominant influence, such that the freedom of action of 
political entities within it is limited, a sphere of restraint 
may be regarded as an area in which no one power is 
predominant. In contrast to spheres of influence, there are 
so-called grey areas, in which Africa can be included, where 
the nature and extent of the involvement of each super-power 
is unclear. That is to say neither super-power is in any way 
sure of the extent to which it can act without coming into 
conflict with, or meeting opposition from, the other. There 
may be the danger of the two super-powers coming into 
conflict through being involved on opposite sides in a 
conflict between their respective clients, as for instance, 
in the Middle East. With regard to such regions it is 
thought to be important that each super-power exercise 
restraint in its actions. Rather than intervene unilaterally 
or become involved in other ways which might risk confronting 
the other, both should "restrain" themselves sufficiently to 
avoid conflict with each other.
Following a trip to Africa, Secretary of State Rogers 
said in February 1970
We have no desire for any special influence in 
Africa except the influence that naturally and 
mutually develops among friends .... We do not 
believe that Africa should be the scene of major 
power conflicts. We on our part do not propose to 
make it so.
Commenting on this statement, President Nixon declared that 
for restraint to be effective it had to be mutual. "Non- 
African powers should not seek, nor Africans provide, 
opportunities for exploiting local conflicts". Elsewhere he
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said the United States had "followed a deliberate policy of 
restraint in involvement in the political problems of 
Africa...".4"^ Thus, for Nixon, Africa was to be regarded 
as a sphere of restraint in which none of the great non- 
African powers should have, or attempt to establish, spheres 
of influence. For reasons such as these, spheres of 
restraint are quite distinct from, and should not be 
identified with, spheres of influence.
Having now defined the term and distinguished it from 
various other terms, spheres of influence will be considered 
in relation to the notion of frontiers. The reason for so 
doing is simply that "frontiers" are associated with, and 
important to, the concept of spheres of influence.
IV.
The Concept of "Frontiers" and Spheres of Influence.
In introducing his book, Asian Frontiers, Alistair Lamb 
said it could be argued that "as much as anything else, the 
'cold war' was concerned with the definition of the western 
limits of the Soviet empire". For the United States and its 
allies, "the main objective in such conflicts as the civil 
war in Greece in 1947 and the Berlin Crisis of 1948 was to 
prevent Soviet influence from spreading beyond the frontiers 
established during the concluding stages of the Second World 
War". What Lamb went on to say is of interest, both with 
regard to the relationship between the concepts of spheres 
of influence and frontiers, and for this thesis as a whole.
By 1960, the west - and probably the Soviet Union as 
well - had achieved the main political goal of the 
'cold war'. A stable line of demarcation (what Winston 
Churchill first dubbed, the 'iron curtain'), separated 
the Soviet sphere from that of the Western alliance 
dominated by the power of the United States of America. 
Stability was achieved in a number of ways: by Western
intervention in the civil war in Greece in 1947 and by 
Western non-intervention in anti-Russian rebellion in
For Mr Rogers and President Nixon's statements, see 'U.S. 
Foreign Policy for the 1970's. The Emerging Structure of 
Peace. A Report to Congress', February 9, 1972, D.S.B,,
Vol. LXVI, No. 1707 (February 13, 1972), pp.318, 364.
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Hungary in 1956; by confrontation short of war, as 
in Berlin in 1948; by physical measures of frontier 
control, like the Berlin Wall built in 1961; by 
agreement between the two sides to treat certain 
areas as neutral zones, as in the case of Austria 
in 1955. Once the major line of demarcation had 
been settled, the political evolution of the nation­
states of Europe could take place in a far less 
restrictive atmosphere than would otherwise have 
been possible. The loosening of the Soviet grip on 
Eastern Europe and the decline in the effectiveness 
of NATO are both direct consequences of the conversion 
of the 'iron curtain', from an uneasy cease-fire line 
into an integral part of the accepted frontier systemof Europe.^4
What is interesting about this passage is that it could 
as well have been written by someone writing about spheres 
of influence as about frontiers. But this does not mean 
there is no distinction between the two concepts. What, 
then, is a "frontier" and what is the relationship between 
frontiers and spheres of influence?
As it is to be used here the term "frontier" means
something different than is meant by the term "boundary". A
boundary, according to Alistair Lamb, is a "clear divide
45between sovereignties which can be marked on a map". That
being the case, it might be objected that a frontier and a
boundary are the same thing as, for instance, in the sense
of crossing the frontier between Bulgaria and Turkey. Indeed,
one meaning of the term frontier is that of being the
border or extremity of a country conterminous with that of
another. But it has also been used to refer to the front
line or foremost part of an army; to a barrier against 
46attack; and in the sense ascribed to it by Frederick Jackson 
Turner as a key concept for understanding American History,
4 4 Alistair Lamb, Asian Frontiers (Melbourne, Chesire, 1968),
pp.1-2.
45 Lamb, op.cit., pp.4-5.
The Oxford English Dictionary.
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that is, as the furthermost and expanding fringe of a
civilization. Or as Turner put it: "[t]he frontier is the
47line of most rapid and effective Americanization".
Similarly Professor Toynbee wrote of people, states or cities
which had, in the march of history, been exposed to
continuous external pressure as falling, "for the most part,
within the general category of ’marches' or frontier
provinces". In the same vein he wrote of Western civilization
as having experienced the heaviest external pressure along
"its eastward, or landward, frontier over against the
48barbarians of Central Europe". Frontier in these senses 
does not refer to the boundary of any one state or to 
anything necessarily material. It is as much an idea as it 
is a line.^
According to H. Duncan Hall, the conception of an 
international frontier grew out of continental expansion 
into the new world and that what is meant by it cannot be 
stated in a single sentence, but:
broadly speaking, it is the zone in which the great 
powers, expanding along their main lines of 
communication to the limits of their political and 
economic influence and defence needs, impinge upon 
each other in conflict or compromise .... once a 
great power becomes supreme in an area ..., that 
area can hardly be said to fall within the zone of 
the international frontier.
Frederick Jackson Turner, 'The Significance of the Frontier 
in American History' in Frontier and Section, Selected Essays 
of Frederick Jackson Turner (New Jersey, Prentice-Hall, 1961) , 
p. 39.
4 8 A .J . Toynbee, A Study of History, abridgement by D.G. 
Somervell (London, Oxford University Press, 1962), pp.111-12 
and p.116.
4 9 On the distinction between frontiers and boundaries, see 
Ladis D. Kristof, 'The Nature of Frontiers and Boundaries' in 
W.A. Douglas Jackson (ed.), Politics and Geographic 
Relationships (New Jersey, Prentice-Hall, 1964), pp.134-44. 
Kristof points out that whereas 'frontier' is not a legal 
concept 'boundary' is, in that boundaries define the legal 
territorial limits of sovereign states.
50 H. Duncan Hall, Mandates3 Dependencies and Trusteeship
(London, Stevens, 1948), p.3.
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Major powers, in carrying on their rivalry and defending 
their perceived interests, have often established 
international frontiers, sometimes thousands of miles from 
their national territories and boundaries. Frontiers 
demarcate the interests, but not necessarily the influence, 
of great powers; interests which they do not want each other 
to encroach upon. But, as has already been pointed out, for 
a power to secure its interests in a region it may need to 
bring that region under its influence.
The difference between frontiers and spheres of influence 
is that whereas the idea of a "frontier" can be understood 
with reference only to relations between two great powers, or 
the powers belonging to two civilizations, spheres of influence 
cannot be understood without reference to relations between 
influencing powers and the states they influence. In the 
practice of states, one of the functions fulfilled by spheres 
of influence has been the establishment of frontiers between 
the areas of great power interests, and to that extent the 
place that each concept has had in the language of diplomacy 
is similar.
One of the notable historical examples of spheres of
influence and frontiers as related concepts is provided by
British and Russian foreign policy in Persia. For Britain,
the future of Persia was ultimately connected with the destiny
of India. As early as 1838, Palmerston was "aiming at an
Anglo-Russian treaty which would make Persia serve as a
51defensive barrier for India". During the 1890s Russia 
achieved a near monopoly of loans to the Persian government 
and, in so doing, strengthened its political influence in 
Teheran so much that the British thought they would be edged 
out of Persia altogether. Consequently Britain made efforts 
to gain a greater share in the political and economic affairs 
of Persia. After 1898, it was spurred on in its efforts by 
the growing importance of the Persian Gulf as a source of
D.C.M. Platt, Finance, Trade, and Politics in British 
Foreign Policy (Oxford, Clarendon, 1968), p.220.
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fuel oil supplies for the Royal Navy. For reasons such as
these, trade and politics assumed increasing importance in
British policy, but it was probably the security of India
that remained the uppermost consideration; as it was with
52regard to Afghanistan.
Britain's concern for the security of India, together
with its rivalry with Russia, led to the conclusion, in 1907,
of an Anglo-Russian convention as to Persia. It had much the
same aim as the Afghan convention which the two powers
concluded, which was "to assure the perfect security of
their respective frontiers in Central Asia". In Article I of
that convention Russia recognized Afghanistan as being
outside its sphere of influence - "comme se trouvant en
5 3 .dehors de la sphere de influence russe ...". With Persia,
however, neither power conceded it as a whole to be either
in or out of the sphere of the other. Rather they demarcated
respective spheres of influence between which they left a 
54buffer zone. This they did without consulting Persia and
in spite of Sir Edward Grey's explanation that Britain had
not acted out of regard for a "forward policy pushed for the
purpose of extending British territory or influence [but] to
keep Persia as a buffer state and to maintain it as an
55independent country". In short, in order to secure a 
frontier between them, Russia and Britain both agreed tot and 
subsequently established spheres of influence.
Platt, op.cit., p.224. Of Persia Platt wrote:
Britain was a great Empire as well as a trading nation, 
the share of Persia in her world trade was always small, 
and the political and strategic issues in Persia seemed 
at the time, to be of crucial importance to British 
communications and the security of India. It was not, 
therefore, so surprising that when, as in the Anglo- 
Russian Convention of 1907, British political, financial 
and commercial interests seemed in conflict, it was 
commerce and finance which went to the wall.
For Persia, see also F. Kazemzadeh, Russia and Britain in
Persia3 1864-1914 (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1968).
53 Gooch and Temperley, op.cit., Vol. IV, p.542.
54 It was in a sense a buffer zone within a buffer zone.
55 Cited by Platt, op.cit., p.224.
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The treatment Persia received, after the Anglo-Russian 
convention was concluded, illustrates the subordinate place 
of influenced states in the machinations of influencing 
powers. Although both signatories had affirmed their 
intention to maintain the independence and integrity of 
Persia, and to allow equal facilities for trade to all 
nations, that was not what happened in practice. The two 
powers sent a joint note to the Persian government, declaring 
that they would refuse to sanction loans from other powers if 
these loans involved granting concessions to any other powers 
or their subjects "contrary to Russian or British political 
and strategic interests".5  ^ Persia protested, both about 
this and the Anglo-Russian agreement, whereupon Petrograd and 
London reacted by warning other powers against taking up 
Persia's cause.
Similarly they exercised considerable control over 
Persia's internal affairs, as is shown by the fate of Mr 
W. Morgan Schuster. Persia made various efforts to 
reorganize her archaic system of public administration.
These included the hiring of foreign nationals, such as 
Swedish officers for the police force and in 1911, Mr 
Schuster, a former official of the U.S. Government, was 
appointed Treasurer-General. Schuster considered himself to be 
in the service of an independent state and working for the 
interests of that state. Among other things he did not 
recognize the Anglo-Russian convention. His efforts were 
frustrated by the Russian reaction to his employing British 
subjects to carry out tasks on behalf of the Persian 
government in the Russian "sphere", ana subsequent demands 
for his dismissal under threat of Russia occupying Teheran.
Sir Edward Grey explained to the House of Commons that the 
interest of Great Britain dictated the support of the Russian 
ultimatum. Finally the Persian government yielded and 
dismissed Schuster. "When Mr Schuster had gone, Anglo-Russian
H.A. Gibbons, An Introduction to World Volition (New York, 
Century, 1923), p.182.
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harmony was not again disturbed, for Persia ceased to
struggle against the chains which bound her to her two
57formidable guardians". In this way The Cambridge History 
of British Foreign Policy summed up one example of the place 
influenced states have in the relationship between 
influencing powers.
Although the Anglo-Russia convention as to Persia both
demarcated spheres of influence and delimited the frontier
between the perceived interests of Russia and Britain, this
should not be construed to mean that spheres of influence
have been established only in order to mark out frontiers.
Lord Curzon thought of spheres of influence more as a means
to an end, an expedient in delimiting frontiers. But more
was involved in delimiting spheres of influence than merely
clarifying the frontiers of great powers. Indeed,
Harold Nicholson criticised Curzon's obsession with frontiers,
with territorial rather than social, economic or cultural
factors as being one of "those very misconceptions, those
very limitations of understanding, which in the post-war
period marred the full expression of his abilities and 
5 8faith". Spheres of influence have had political and 
economic causes distinct from concerns related to frontiers. 
Although they do in some cases appear to have been established 
in order to mark out a frontier, it should not be thought that 
this is the only reason for them. Moreover, the concept of 
"frontier" should not be divorced from what it is associated 
with in such a way as to give it an undeserved status.
Finally, two notions which were associated with both 
frontiers and spheres of influence were those of contiguity 
and hinterland. According to Curzon, the idea of hinterland 
was another application "of the doctrine of spheres of
The Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy, 1782-1919.
Ed., Ward and Gooch (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 
1923), Vol. Ill, p.112 and pp.420-22.
5 8 Harold Nicholson, Curzon: The Last Phase, 1914-1928
(London, Constable, 1934), p.37.
26
influence, resting the case for an advance of Frontiers on
59the ground of territorial contiguity". During the scramble
for Africa it was sometimes claimed that a power which was in
actual possession of certain territory had thereby acquired
rights over contiguous country, or the hinterland, which hadnnot yet been appropriated by another Power. However, the 
term "rights" in such cases exceeded its usual meaning. A 
claim to rights over contiguous country or hinterland often 
amounted to nothing more than a unilateral claim that such 
areas were in the sphere of influence of the power concerned. 
Claims were made not only with respect to the hinterland of 
actual possessions, but also with respect to the hinterland 
of spheres of influence which had merely been reserved.
When Stanley set out on his expedition for the relief of
Emin Pasha, supposedly beleaguered in Wadelai on the Nile, to
the North of the Albert Nyanza, he went by the Congo and was
expected to return by the east coast. This alarmed the
German East Africa Company as Stanley was financed by the
principal members of the British East Africa Company, formed
to develop the sphere retained for British influence to the
north of Kilimanjaro. The German Company feared, therefore,
that Stanley "might on his return make treaties that would
impinge upon the German 'Hinterland', and possibly cut that
61company off from Lake Tanganyika". On behalf of the German 
Company, the German Government approached the British 
Government; whereupon Salisbury instructed Malet to "inform 
the German Government that Her Majesty's Government takes the 
same view of the question as is entertained at Berlin, and 
are prepared to discourage British annexations in the rear of 
the German sphere of influence; on the understanding that the 
German Government will equally discourage German annexations
59 Lord Curzon, Frontiers, pp.43-44.
6 0 Lindley, op.oit., p.228.
^  Keltie, op.oit,, p.224.
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fl *?in the rear of the British sphere". Thus, it was expected 
that spheres of influence might be extended into the 
hinterland contiguous with them, which meant the frontier of 
the empire concerned would also be extended.
To summarise, while frontiers and spheres of influence 
are closely related concepts they are quite distinct. In a 
number of cases great powers have established spheres of 
influence in order to secure a frontier, but it would be 
wrong to conclude that they have been established with regard 
only to frontiers. Whereas spheres of influence cannot be 
understood without reference to the relationship between an 
influencing power and the states it influences, the idea of 
frontiers can be understood by reference only to powers with 
the status of influencing powers. This distinction will be 
tied, in Chapter Eight, to two aspects of spheres of 
influence in relation to international order. On the one 
hand, there is the question of whether order may be discerned 
in relations between influenced states in the same sphere of 
influence and in relations between those states and the power 
that influences them. For such relations the notion of 
frontiers, given that it refers to more than merely the 
boundaries of particular sovereign states, is not germane to 
understanding the place of spheres of influence in 
international order. On the other hand, there is the question 
of relations between influencing powers and, in this respect, 
it will be shown that frontiers are important for understanding 
the place of spheres of influence in international order.
V.
In conclusion, in this chapter a sphere of influence 
has been defined as a determinate region within which a single 
external power exerts a predominant influence, which limits 
the independence or freedom of action of political entities
6 2 British and Foreign State Papers (London, William Ridgway, 
1894), Vol. LXXVIII, 1886-1887, p.1048.
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within it. The nature of the relationship between states 
within a sphere of influence and the power which influences 
them distinguishes such states or entities from those which 
are not in a sphere of influence. States or entities within 
a sphere of influence are limited in the conduct of both 
their external and internal affairs in ways that other 
states are not, though other states may be limited for other 
reasons. That one power predominates over a sphere of 
influence does not exclude, but nevertheless warns off other 
powers of comparable status from the region. A sphere of 
influence is distinct from a sphere of interest since 
interest does not entail influence. The predominance of 
one power distinguishes spheres of influence from so-called 
spheres of restraint in which no one power predominates. 
Similarly it distinguishes spheres of influence from buffer 
zones in which no one power has established control.
Finally, spheres of influence are associated with but are 
distinct from frontiers. In some, but not all, cases, 
spheres of influence have been established in order to 
secure a frontier.
In the next chapter, the question of agreements and of 
unilateral declarations as to spheres of influence is taken 
up.
* * * *
CHAPTER TWO
UNILATERAL DECLARATIONS AND AGREEMENTS 
AS TO SPHERES OF INFLUENCE
The question arises as to how it is that a region comes 
to be regarded as being in the sphere of influence of a 
particular power. To this there is no one answer, for it 
varies from case to case. In some cases, that a region 
comes to be so regarded derives from a unilateral declaration, 
by the power concerned, that the region in question is in its 
sphere of influence. In other instances spheres of influence 
have been established as the result of mutual agreement 
between two or more powers, while in other cases again 
whatever agreement there is has come after spheres of 
influence have already been established. Such agreement need 
not be formal but rather may be informal or unspoken.
Moreover, that a unilateral declaration commands respect or 
that powers agree, either before or after the establishment 
of spheres of influence, may or may not be a reciprocal 
undertaking. Each of these possibilities will be discussed 
in subsequent chapters. This chapter will first discuss 
unilateral declarations and then formal agreements while the 
next will deal with informal or unspoken understandings.
I.
Unilateral Declarations.
The term "sphere of influence" has been widely used to 
describe the relationship between the United States and the 
regions embraced by the Monroe Doctrine. Indeed, the Monroe 
Doctrine may be taken as the most notable example of a 
unilateral declaration, by a power, that a particular region 
should be regarded as its sphere of influence. Though 
President Monroe's message of December 2, 1823, did not 
contain the term "sphere of influence", what was said of the 
relationship between the United States and the regions in 
question, together with the subsequent practice of the United 
States, is suitably described by it.
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The Monroe Doctrine had its origins in the course of 
events in Europe which followed the French Revolution; the 
subsequent revolutions which took place in the Spanish 
colonies in the Americas; and in American apprehensions as 
to British and Russian intentions.^" If was enunciated in two 
widely separated passages of President Monroe's message. The 
first, in the course of discussing America's relations with 
Russia, laid down the principle that:
the American continents, by the free and independent 
condition which they have assumed and maintain, are 
henceforth not to be considered as subject for future 
colonization by any European power.
In other words, European powers were in principle, henceforth
excluded from controlling any part of the American continents.
This part of the doctrine was related to the principle of No
Transfer, which dated from 1811, when a resolution of Congress
proclaimed there should be no transfer of territory, or
colonies, from one European power to another or from an
American state to a European power. Behind this was the idea
that the transfer of neighbouring colonies from a weak nation
like Spain to a stronger one like Great Britain or France
might have unfavourably altered the balance of power in the 2region. When Polk reasserted the doctrine in 1845, he 
denied the applicability of the European balance of power 
principle to the North American continent and said the 
European powers would not be permitted to interfere with the 
Union of portions of the continent with the Confederacy 
because they thought "it might disturb the 'balance of power',3which they may desire to maintain upon the continent". In
See W.A. Phillips, The Confederation of Europe (London, 
Longmans Green, 1920), 2nd ed., pp.219-57; L.A. Lawson, The 
Relation of British Policy to the Declaration of The Monroe 
Doctrine (New York, Columbia, 1922), Passim.; and S.F. Bemis, 
John Quincy Adams and the Foundation of American Foreign 
Policy (New York, Knopf, 1949) .
2 J.A. Logan, No Transfer, An American Security Principle (New 
Haven, York, 1961), p.6.
3 Dexter Perkins, Hands Off, A History of the Monroe Doctrine
(Boston, Little Brown, 1948), p.79.
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saying this he may or may not have had in mind that 
disturbance of whatever balance of power there was on the 
continent could have undermined American predominance.
The second relevant passage stated:
we should consider any attempt on their [the European 
powers] part to extend their political system to any 
portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace 
and safety. With the existing colonies and 
dependencies of any European power we have not 
interfered and shall not interfere with the 
governments who have declared their independence and 
maintained it, and whose independence we have, on 
great consideration and just principles, acknowledged, 
we could not view any interposition for the purpose of 
oppressing them, or controlling in any other manner 
their destiny, by any European power in any other 
light than as the manifestation of an unfriendly 
disposition towards the United States.4
About this there are three points. First, as to the European 
powers extending their "political system" to the Americas; 
that meant at the time "Monarchism" which was regarded as 
inimical to American democracy. After the Bolshevik 
revolution, but particularly after the Second World War, the 
extension of the political system of other powers meant 
Communism. To the extent that Governments of the United 
States have prevented either the formation or the survival of 
Communist governments in Latin America, the doctrine of 18235can be said to have survived.
Second, as to the statement that the United States would 
not interfere with governments which had declared their 
independence and maintained it and that attempts by a European 
power to control the destiny of an American State would be 
considered an unfriendly act towards the United States, this
 ^Ibid., p.28.
5 The Monroe Doctrine has been recently summed up as meaning 
in contemporary international politics that "the domination or 
control of the political institutions of any American State by 
the international communist movement, extending to this 
hemisphere the political system of an extra-continental power, 
would constitute a threat to the sovereignty and political 
independence of the American states, endangering the peace of 
America", T.M. Franck and E. Weisband, Word Politics, Verbal 
Strategy among the Superpowers (New York, Oxford, 1972), p.57.
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referred to the former Spanish colonies and to any 
European power that might attempt to restore Colonial rule.
In later times the United States itself has interfered with 
the governments of other American states, in effect because 
it has deemed those governments to have lost their 
independence. That is to say, "independence" as it is 
conceived by the United States.
The so-called Platt Amendment to the Army appropriation 
Bill of 1901 was the first occasion on which the United 
States Government asked for and received recognition of its 
right to interfere in the affairs of an American State.
The Platt amendment concerned Cuba and "stipulated that
while ... American forces were to withdraw from the island,
the government of Cuba should consent to the exercise of an
American right of intervention 'for the preservation of Cuban
independence, the maintenance of a government adequate for
the protection of life, property [American owned], and
individual liberty, and for discharging its obligations with
£respect to Cuba ' " . This required that the Cuban government 
consent to U.S. intervention should it be considered 
by the United States to be incompetent. In short, the United 
States reserved for itself a right to determine the government 
of Cuba. At later times it has seen fit to so regard the 
governments of other states in the region.
Thirdly, what has already been said relates to the 
expression "dangerous to our peace and safety". For the 
United States the Caribbean region was and still is considered 
central to its peace and safety. In 1923, Secretary of State 
Charles E. Hughes said disturbances in the Caribbean were of 
special interest to the United States in that it wanted to be 
sure its own safety was free from menace. On that account, 
he went on to say, it was the policy of the United States 
Government "to make available its friendly assistance to
 ^Perkins, op.oit., p.231 and see R.E. Ruiz, Cuba, The Making 
of a Revolution (New York, Norton, 1970), p.24.
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promote stability in those of our sister republics which are
specially afflicted with disturbed conditions involving their7own peace and that of their neighbours". At times the same 
idea has gone beyond the peace and safety of the United 
States to that of it being "policeman of the West", as was 
spelt out by Theodore Roosevelt in 1904. Roosevelt declared 
that if a nation showed that it knew how to act with decency 
in industrial and political matters and if it kept order and 
paid its obligations, then it need not fear interference from 
the United States. But "[b]rutal wrong-doing, or an impotence 
which results in a general loosening of the ties of civilized 
society, may finally require intervention by some civilized 
nations, and in the Western Hemisphere the United Statesgcannot ignore this duty".
However, it was arguably considerations of "peace and 
security" which remained foremost in the official mind of the 
United States government, as was suggested by Article 21 of 
the Covenant of the League of Nations. Article 21 was 
insisted upon by the United States and required that nothing 
in the Covenant of the League would "be deemed to affect the 
validity of international engagements such as treaties of 
Arbitration, or regional understandings like the Monroe9Doctrine for securing the maintenance of peace".
With respect to these three points, it will be shown that 
the United States has interfered in the affairs of American 
States because it has perceived those states as either being 
or in danger of falling, under the influence of extra­
continental powers. In turn this has been perceived as a 
threat to the peace and safety of the United States. Thus, 
interference has been explained as necessary for the peace 
and safety of the United States. Further, implicit in all of
7 Perkins, op.cit., p.335.
8 Ibid,, p.239.
 ^Ibid,, pp.294-96.
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this is the interplay between the two distinct aspects of 
spheres of influence in international politics. On the one 
hand, the relationship between the influencing power - in 
this case the United States - and the states it influences 
and on the other hand, the relationship between the influencing 
power and whichever extra-continental power causes it to 
perceive a threat. Of this more will be said in due course.
In conclusion, the Monroe Doctrine is an example of a 
unilateral declaration as to spheres of influence. Of this 
and other cases it must be observed that a mere unilateral 
declaration as to how a particular region should be regarded 
by other powers does not mean that those other powers will 
necessarily so regard the region in question. Indeed, Great 
Britain, for instance, stated that it did not accept the 
Monroe Doctrine. Clarendon argued that it could "only be 
viewed as the dictum of the distinguished personage who 
delivered it: ... Her Majesty's Government cannot admit that
doctrine as an international axiom which ought to regulate 
the conduct of European States". Similarly, when the 
Doctrine gained new prominence during the later decades of the 
century, Salisbury informed Secretary of State Olney that "no 
nation, however powerful, [is] competent to insert into the 
code of international law a novel principle which has never 
been recognized before, and which has not since been accepted 
by the government of any other country".^
However, even though a power states that it does not
accept a unilateral declaration, the power which made the
declaration may nevertheless come to believe its claims have
been accepted, for it is very often deeds rather than words 
12which count. The longer the time which passes without 
anything happening to cause the power which made the
The Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy, 1783-1919, 
ed. by A.W. Ward and G.P. Gooch (Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 1923), Vol. II, p.273.
11 Ibid,, Vol. Ill, p.224.
12 This is discussed in the next chapter.
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declaration to think otherwise, the more likely it is to 
believe that its claims have been accepted. If they are 
indeed accepted, it may or may not be for reasons of 
reciprocity. That is to say, other powers may accept the 
implications of a unilateral declaration in the expectation 
that the power which issued the declaration will similarly 
accept their own claims. Once a unilateral declaration seems 
accepted, the region to which it refers may become the subject 
of either explicit agreement or of tacit understanding between 
the power from which it emanated and one or more powers of 
comparable status. In Chapter Six it will be shown how the 
region to which the Monroe Doctrine refers may be seen as the 
subject of a tacit understanding between the United States and 
the Soviet Union as to spheres of influence.
Next to be considered are formal agreements as to spheres 
of influence.
II.
Formal Agreements.
There is some evidence of agreement as to spheres of
interest if not spheres of influence in antiquity. Polybius
cites as the first treaty between Rome and Carthage an
agreement concluded in 509 B.C. which stated that "the Romans
and their allies [would] not ... sail with long ships beyond13the fair promontory* unless forced by storm or by enemies".
In the event that they were forced beyond the promontory they 
were not to trade, whereas they could trade with the rest of 
Africa and Sardinia, provided it was on equal terms with 
Carthage. For their part the Carthaginians undertook not to 
attack certain towns subject to Rome. The treaty represented 
an early attempt to delineate the respective interests of the 
two states."^ In a later treaty of 348 B.C., the Carthaginians 
were concerned with preserving their monopoly of trade in the
Cape Farina, or as Polybius had it, that lying in front of 
Carthage to the North.
1 Polybius, The Histories, Trans. W.R. Paton (London, 
Heinemann, MCMXII), Vol. II, Bk. Ill, p.55.
^  B.H. Warmington, Carthage (Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1960) , 
pp.169-7 0.
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Western Mediterranean and in "return for the Roman acceptance 
of exclusion from these waters the Carthaginians renounced 
any intention of gaining a foothold in Latium and recognized 
it as the Roman sphere of interest". Thus these early 
treaties have been described as being ones which established 
"reciprocal spheres of interest, with heavy maritime
“I /Trestrictions laid upon the Romans Even if interest
did not extend to influence, the idea that one power should
have predominance in a particular region is common to all
17agreements as to spheres of influence.
Whatever the origins of agreement as to spheres of
influence might have been, the best known example from history
is the Treaty of Tordesillas of 1494, which resulted from
disagreement between Spain and Portugal as to the so-called
Alexandrian Bulls of the previous year. After Columbus's
first voyage Spain obtained from Pope Alexander VI, four Papal
Bulls commonly known as the Alexandrian Bulls. The most
important was InterCaetera or the 'bull of demarcation' of 
1828 June 1493, which a contemporary writer has called the
19most grandiose attempt ever to create spheres of influence.
The Cambridge Ancient History, ed. by S.A. Cook, F.E. Adcock 
and M.P. Charlesworth (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 
1928), Vol. VII, p.586.
A. Nussbaum, A Concise History of the Law of nations (New 
York, MacMillan, 1947), Rev. ed., p.ll.
17 Neither the Cambridge Ancient History nor Nussbaum make any 
distinction between spheres of interest and spheres of 
influence and it is as likely as not that by the former they 
meant the latter. Either way the point remains that one power 
having predominance in a particular region is common to all 
agreements as to spheres of influence. On the distinction 
between the two terms see Chapter One, pp.13-16.
18 The New Cambridge Modern History, ed. by G.R. Potter 
(Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1957), Vol. I, p.79. 
Note: This volume is inconsistent as to whether there were
four or rather six Bulls. See p.79 and p.430.
19 Trygve Mathisen, The Functions of Small States rn t h e  
Strategies of Great Powers (Oslo, Universitets Forlaget, 1971),
p. 68.
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It divided the actual and the future discoveries and
conquests of Spain and Portugal by drawing a vertical line
from the North to the South Pole, "a hundred leagues West of
the Azores and Cape Verde Islands and provided that the land
and sea beyond the line should be a Spanish sphere of
exploration". The fourth Bull, Dudum Siquidem, extended the
previous grants to include "all islands and mainlands
whatever found or to be found ... in sailing or travelling
towards the west or south, whether they be in regions
occidental or meridianal and oriental or of India". However,
the King of Portugal objected to the division as it was set
out in the Bulls and to the indefiniteness of the line. The
dispute led to so much ill-feeling as almost to produce a 
20state of war. Portugal appealed to the Pope, a Spaniard, 
but upon failing to move him opened direct negotiations with 
Ferdinand and Isabella. These resulted in the Treaty of 
Tordesillas, signed in 1494. It relocated the lines of 
demarcation and as it turned out, gave the Portuguese the 
true route to India and Brazil.
In later times the Portuguese invoked the Treaty when
they thought their interests were being threatened by the
Spaniards. In 1580, for example, when Spain appeared to be
encroaching on Portuguese trade with Japan, Portugal asserted
that the Treaty of Tordesillas had accorded her exclusive
21rights to Japan. However, the nature of rights invested
by either the Papal Bulls or the Treaty of Tordesillas was a 
subject of dispute among legal scholars, both then and in 
later times. The Dominican jurist, Francisco de Vitoria, 
thought the Pope was powerless to grant to Spain or Portugal 
any sovereignty over the people of the Indies or any control 
over the navigation of the seas. He argued, and in this he 
foreshadowed international lawyers of the nineteenth century,
The Cambridge Medieval History, ed. by C.W. Previte-Orton 
and Z.N. Brook (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1936), 
Vol. VIII, pp.492-93 and The Hew Cambridge Modern History, 
op,ait., Vol. I, pp.430-31. The line demarcated by the Treaty 
of Tordesillas was subsequently given Papal authority.
21 C.R. Boxer, The Portuguese Seabourne Empire 7415-1825
(London, Hutchinson, 1969), p.64 and see p.86 on Tordesillas 
and Brazil.
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that the only valid claim to sovereignty must rest on
22effective occupation of territory previously vacant. This
2 3was a requirement borrowed from Roman law. Writing sometime
after Vitoria, Grotius also denied that the Pope had
jurisdiction over the New World, but unlike Vitoria he did so
because he regarded infidel nations as being outside the24Christian Church.
The Alexandrian Bulls and the Treaty of Tordesillas can 
be said to have been aimed at limiting conflict between Spain 
and Portugal as to territory, which was likely to arise as 
the two powers expanded into the new world. Both the Bulls 
and the Treaty concerned only Spain and Portugal and whichever 
states were willing to submit to Papal authority. Whether or 
not they prevented conflict and whatever the position of third 
powers, the idea of powers agreeing to divide influence for 
the sake of their mutual peace is common to all later 
agreements as to spheres of influence. Indeed, it is entirely 
appropriate that the Treaty of Tordesillas accompanied the 
beginning of European expansion, for it was as an adjunct of 
European expansion into Africa and Asia, in the late 
nineteenth century, that formal agreements as to spheres of 
influence had their heyday.
With respect to agreements as to spheres of influence in 
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, M.F. Lindley 
distinguished three main types of agreement. First, there 
were agreements between the colonizing powers themselves.
These agreements generally amounted "to a promise on the part 
of each of the parties to it to abstain from doing anything
The New Cambridge Modern History, ed. by R.B. Wernham 
(Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1968), Vo]. Ill, 
pp.159-60.
2 3 Nussbaum, op.cit., p.67. See also T.A. Walker, A History 
of the Law of Nations (Cambridge, 1899), Vol. 1, pp.160-61.
See H. Taylor, A Treatise on International Public Law (Chicago, 
Callaghan, 1901), p.222.
24 C.H. Alexandrowicz, An Introduction to the History of the 
Law of Nations in the East Indies (Oxford, Clarendon, 1967), 
p. 47.
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that might lead to the acquisition of sovereign rights within
25the sphere allotted to the other". This form of agreement, 
Lindley pointed out, embodied the principle of the Alexandrian 
Bulls and the Treaty of Tordesillas. From the period 
immediately following the Conference of Berlin a typical 
agreement of this kind was one concluded between the British 
and German Governments, with respect to the Sultanate of 
Zanzibar and the East African Mainland opposite. The 
agreement specified a line of Demarcation and included a 
clause on Mutual Engagements to respect Spheres of Influence, 
which read:
Germany engages not to make acquisitions of territory, 
accept Protectorates, or interfere with the extension 
of British influence to the north of this line; and 
Great Britain makes the same engagement as regards the 
territory lying to the south of this line.26
There were many agreements of this kind concluded from 1885
onwards and they generally had as one of their objects,
according to a German-French Protocol, "to regulate in a
spirit of mutual good intelligence the relations which may
drive between them from the extension of their respective
27rights of sovereignty or Protectorate". Under these
agreements, each of the parties was "under a legal duty to
refrain from interfering where it [had] promised to leave the
other a free hand". As to third parties, there was no legal
restraint on "establishing political relations with, or
acquiring, a given territory, merely because that territory
[had] been acknowledged by one power to be within the sphere
2 8of influence of another". However, it was clear that for 
a third party to encroach on the sphere of influence of other
M.F. Lindley, The Acquisition and Government of Backward 
Territory in International Law (New York, Negro Universities 
Press, 1969), p.207.
E. Hertslet, The Map of Africa by Treaty (London, 1896),
3rd Edition. Reprinted by Frank Cass, London, 1967. Vol. Ill, 
p.883. See also British and Foreign State Papers, Ed. by E. & 
E.C. Hertslet (London, William Ridgway, 1893), Vol. LXXVII, 
1885-1886, p.1130.
^  Hertslet, The Map of Africa by Treaty, Vol. II, p.653 and 
Lindley, op.cit., p.210.
2 R Lindley, op.cit., p.212.
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29powers would be an unfriendly act. Even in the absence of
an agreement, a power was apt to take umbrage at signs of
encroachment on what they considered their sphere of
influence. Thus, Sir Edward Grey used the phrase "an
unfriendly act" when he warned France about penetration of
? 0the Nile Valley.
A second kind of agreement was where one of the parties
recognized that the other had "a special interest in the
territory or some definite part of the territory of a single
third state". Such territory was sometimes called a "sphere
of interest" rather than a "sphere of influence". These
agreements served to make intentions explicit in the manner
of the assurance Count Gortchakoff gave to Lord Clarendon
that Afghanistan lay 'completely outside the sphere within
which Russia might be called upon to exercise her influence'.
Other examples include the recognition of Japanese interest
in Korea, by Russia in 1898 and by Britain in the Anglo-
Japanese agreement of January 1902; many of the agreements
reached between European powers as to China; the 1907 Anglo-
Russian agreement to Persia and the earlier Anglo-French
31declaration concerning Siam.
Of the Anglo-French declaration concerning Siam, it was 
suggested above that it represented not just one power 
recognizing the other to have an interest in the territory, 
or part of the territory, of a single third state, but rather 
that both had an interest in that state. The interest of 
each was that the other should stay out of Siam and indeed, 
according to G.F. Hudson, the country remained independent 
"because of the need of two rival imperialist Powers for a 
buffer state and the difficulty of making partition of a
W.E. Hall, A Treatise on the Foreign Powers and Jurisdiction 
of The British Crown (Oxford, Clarendon, 1894), p.229.
30 H.W.V. Temperley and L.M. Penson (eds.), Foundations of 
British Foreign Policy from Pitt (1782) to Salisbury (1902) 
(Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1938), p.503.
31 Lindley, op.cit., pp.217-25.
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country with such an emphatic geographical and national 32unity". But this should not disguise the fact that the
declaration did include a reservation of non-contiguous
3 3spheres of influence.
A third kind of agreement in which the term was used was
those cases where a power was interested "in a part of the
territory of a somewhat advanced state" and made an
arrangement with the state itself. This often took "the form
of an undertaking on the part of the state not to dispose of
the territory, or not to dispose of it to any state except
the interested power". Again, such agreements were sometimes
said to create or be about a "sphere of interest" rather than
34a "sphere of influence". A term often used to describe
agreements of this kind was "non-alienation"; particularly in
many of the conventions European Powers concluded with China.
For example, in 1898 France informed China that "with the
purpose of assuring the relations of neighbourliness and
friendship between China and France;" it "would attach
particular value to receiving from the Chinese government an
assurance that it will not cede to any other Power all or a
part of the territory" bordering on Tongking. The Chinese
government assured the French that those provinces "must
always be administered by China and remain under her 
35sovereignty". Similarly, Russia had proposed the
construction of railways northward and northwest from Peking.
The Chinese explained the difficulty they felt in acceding to
the proposal, but "stated clearly that no other government
3 6would be allowed to construct such a railway". Britain, in
G.F. Hudson, The Far East in World Politics (London, Oxford 
University Press, 1945), pp.69-70.
J.V.A. MacMurray, Treaties and Agreements with and 
Concerning China: 1894-1919 (New York, Oxford University Press,
1921), Vol. I, pp.54-55.
34 Lindley, op,cit.r p.207 and pp.225-27.
35 MacMurray, Treaties and Agreements, op.cit., p.123.
36 Ibid., p.207.
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February 1898 received the "definite assurance that China
will never alienate any territory in the provinces adjoining
the Yang-tsze to any other Power, whether under lease,
37mortgage, or any other designation".
Non-alienation agreements in relation to spheres of
influence also were not unknown among the European Powers
themselves. An Anglo-Portuguese treaty of 11 June 1891, which
defined the respective spheres of influence of the two
countries in Africa included a clause on Mutual Rights of
Pre-emption in [the] event of cessions. Portugal and Britain
agreed "that in the event of one of them proposing to part
with any of the territories to the south of the Zambesi-
assigned by these Articles to their respective spheres of
influence, the other shall be recognized as possessing a
3 8preferential right to the territories in question ...".
In summary, each of these three main forms of agreement
had virtually the same content. Each recognised that one
power had predominant interest or influence in a particular
region. The recognition of such interest or influence had,
as its purpose, the regulation of relations between the powers
concerned in so far as such relations might be affected by
that region. Such agreements bound the powers which were
party to them but did no more than warn off unfriendly third
parties. In these respects the formal agreements as to
spheres of influence of the past had ends in common with the
understandings of contemporary international politics. But
it is with this that the similarity ends. Although there are
traces of agreement as to spheres of influence in Article 21
of the Covenant of the League of Nations; in the Kellogg- 
3 9Briand Pact and in the provision for regional arrangements
37 Ibid., p.104.
18 Hertslet, op.cit., Vol. Ill, p.1020.
3 Q Although the Kellogg-Briand Pact contained no reservations, 
various statements were made which would have provided grounds 
for them. The United States, for instance, insisted that the 
Pact left the Monroe Doctrine untouched. See A. Zimmern, The 
League of Rations and the Rule of Law 3 1918-1935 (London,
MacMillan, 1939), pp.401-02.
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in the Charter of the United Nations; the importance of 
spheres of influence in contemporary politics does not lie 
in any degree of recognition they have found in such 
instruments. Moreover, the way in which a region comes to be 
regarded as being in the sphere of influence of a particular 
power is in contemporary international politics considerably 
more complex than was the case in the formal agreements of 
the past. It is with the nature of such understandings and 
with the reasons for calling them "understandings" rather 
than "agreements" that the following chapter is concerned.
* * * *
CHAPTER THREE
 ^ TACIT UNDERSTANDING
Agreements as to spheres of influence of the kind 
discussed in the preceding chapter belonged to the period 
when European powers were ascendant and could conduct their 
relations with respect to non-European entities without 
treating those entities as having rights which European 
states had a duty to observe. "The European states did not 
accord the tribes or constituted states in Asia and Africa 
the privileges they allowed each other. The Euro-centered 
system treated as equals only those states outside Europe 
capable of imposing respect for their existence and their 
rights by force". Once non-European states became 
influential in international politics, formal agreements as 
to spheres of influence were no longer an acceptable practice.
In contemporary international politics such agreement, or 
understanding, as exists over spheres of influence is tacit. 
However, while there are now no longer formal agreements as 
to spheres of influence, it should not be overlooked that 
there are treaties such as The North Atlantic Treaty; The 
Warsaw Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance; 
and the provision for regional arrangements in the Charter of 
the United Nations, which have some bearing upon spheres of 
influence. Moreover, in saying that tacit understandings have 
replaced formal agreements, it should not be thought that 
they are a new phenomena. Indeed there have probably been 
tacit understandings for as long as there have been social 
relations.
Raymond Aron, The Imperial Republic (New Jersey, Prentice- 
Hall, 1974), p.2.
2 See for instance H. Grotius, De Jure Belli ac Pads, 1646 
ed. Trans. F.W. Kelsey et al., Carnegie Classics of 
International Law (New York, Oceana, 1964), Bk. Ill, Chapter 
XXIV and Vol. II, Chapter XIV on alliances "tacitly renewed". 
Also Wolff who wrote of things "tacitly included in 
agreements", Jus Gentium Methodo Scientifica Pertractatum,
1764 ed. Trans. J.H. Drake, Carnegie Classics of International 
Law (New York, Oceana, 1964), Paras. 559-61.
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Since a major aim of the present work is to determine 
the place of understandings in relation to spheres of 
influence, it is necessary to give an account of what is 
meant by the term "tacit understanding". This chapter seeks 
to define tacit understanding; deal with notions prior to that 
of tacit understanding; say how tacit understanding is reached 
and finally to say why the terms "tacit understanding" and 
"tacit agreement", which are often used synonymously, should 
be distinguished.
I.
A tacit understanding between two states is one which 
seems implicit in the actions of each with respect to that 
which there is said to be an understanding and about which 
they either cannot or will not communicate. The reason for 
defining a tacit understanding as one which seems implicit is 
that, in the absence of formal agreements as to spheres of 
influence, the point of departure must be that two or more
3states sometimes act as if there is an unstated understanding. 
But to say that states sometimes act as if there were an 
unstated understanding between them is distinct from saying 
there is an understanding. To demonstrate that states act as 
if there were an understanding is not necessarily to show 
there is understanding. In practice it may be possible only 
to demonstrate that states act as if there were an 
understanding. Indeed, in later chapters "acting as if there 
were an understanding" will be taken as a prima facie case 
for there being an understanding. Finally, it should be 
observed that this falls short of knowing there is 
understanding.
See Hedley Bull, 'The Scope for Soviet-American Agreement' 
(London, The Institute for Strategic Studies; Adelphi Papers, 
No. 65, February 1970), p.4. Bull argues that the most which 
can be said of the Soviet Union and the United States with 
respect to "the spread of nuclear weapons, the recognition of 
spheres of influence and the containment of conflict in 
various parts of the world, [is that] they sometimes act as 
if there is an unstated understanding about their station and 
duties".
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The definition of "tacit understanding" just given is 
intended to have a meaning distinct from that which some 
other authors have attached to the term. It is, for 
instance, sometimes used with reference to cases where an 
understanding, a bargain or an agreement is struck through 
communication between the parties which is specific to the 
matter at hand, but which does not result in a public and 
written agreement. In such cases it might be more 
appropriate to speak of a "gentlemens' agreement" rather than 
a "tacit understanding". An example of such an arrangement 
has been presented in detail by Janos Radvanyi and it is 
useful in helping to distinguish the meaning of tacit
4understanding which this chapter seeks to articulate.
After the 1956 'revolution' in Hungary, the United 
States government did not resume "normal" diplomatic relations 
with the Kadar regime. Largely due to obstruction from the 
United States, the credentials of the Hungarian representatives 
to the United Nations were not recognized. Moreover, until 
after the Cuban missile crisis the United States was 
instrumental in perpetuating "the Hungary Question" in U.N. 
debates. The Hungarian government wanted to resolve these 
matters but needed the support of the United States to do so. 
For its part, the United States insisted that before anything 
could be done to improve its relations with Hungary, to help 
in removing the Hungary Question from U.N. debates and to 
recognize credentials, the Hungarian Government would have 
to grant amnesty to all the Hungarian citizens who became 
political prisoners in 1956. However, the Hungarian 
Government considered that this requirement by the United 
States was tantamount to interfering in the internal affairs 
of Hungary. Thus, on the one hand the United States would 
not consider improved relations before an amnesty, while on 
the other the Hungarians insisted there would be no amnesty 
before improved relations.
Janos Radvanyi, Hungary and the Superpowers, The 19 56 
Revolution and Realpolitik (Stanford, Calif., Hoover 
Institute, 1972). This volume deals with the period from the 
Hungarian Revolution of 1956 to immediately after the Cuban 
Missile Crisis. In the latter part of this period Radvanyi 
was Hungarian Charge d'Affaires in Washington.
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In an effort to overcome this deadlock, the Hungarian
Charge d'Affaires in Washington suggested to State Department
officials that Hungary might declare a general amnesty "if
she could be assured that the U.S. government would take
concrete measures to drop the Hungarian Question from the 
5agenda" of the United Nations. The Hungarian asked for a 
written reply and subsequently obtained a memo from the 
Assistant Under-Secretary of State's "verbal statement" on 
the matter. The "memo" simply stated
1. It was hoped the Hungarian government would 
either take convincing public steps or would issue 
an authoritative statement giving assurance that 
the consequences of the 1956 events would be 
erased.
2. The government of the U.S. would exercise its 
influence at the United Nations to end the debate 
on the Hungarian Question and to have the 
credentials of the representatives of the Hungarian 
government recognized.
According to Radvanyi, this was "the basis for a tacit 
understanding between the U.S., the Soviet Union and 
Hungary".5 6
The memo was handed over on 20 October 1962, and the 
proposals it recorded depended, Radvanyi says, on the outcome 
of the Cuban missile crisis. It is argued by Radvanyi that 
the missile crisis was a set-back for the Soviet Union. In 
the wake of the crisis Khrushchev met Kadar and the Russian 
said he thought it would be "in the interest of the Socialist 
"Commonwealth" to work for a temporary relaxation of 
international tensions". Khrushchev intimated that "the 
Soviet Union would adopt a more flexible position in the on­
going nuclear test ban talks with the Americans". Kadar then 
informed Khrushchev of the state of Hungary's negotiations 
with the United States and the two decided that a 
conciliatory move by Hungary would be useful in the current 
international climate. It was decided that, at the Hungarian
5 Ibid., p.116.
 ^Ibid,, p.xvi.
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Party Congress due to meet on November 20, Kadar should 
announce that more than ninety five percent "of the persons 
sentenced for "counter-revolutionary crimes" had been 
released, and that a further amnesty would follow if the 
Hungarian Question was dropped from the U.N. General Assembly 
agenda".^
Following this announcement, the State Department did 
successfully support dropping the Hungary Question, and the 
credentials of the Hungarian representatives were 
subsequently accepted. For Radvanyi this was the result of 
the "tacit understanding" between himself and the State 
Department, based on the memo he had received.
Without once alluding to the tacit understanding 
between the parties directly involved, the 
Americans, the Hungarians, and the Soviets 
conducted themselves strictly in accordance with 
the principles of Secret diplomacy.8
From this it is quite clear that what Radvanyi has called a 
tacit understanding was reached by discussion between the 
parties concerned. The discussion and the memo already made 
the understanding more than "tacit". Although there was no 
public or written agreement, what each expected of the other 
was made explicit in private and was specific to particular 
ends. For this reason, Radvanyi's use of the term, and other 
similar meanings, are distinct from the definition given above, 
which allows for understanding as to matters about which the 
parties concerned either cannot or will not communicate. It 
is how the "understandingn is reached that distinguishes a 
"tacit understanding" from other types of understanding or 
agreement. And to this must be added a second defining 
characteristic, which is the residual and indissoluble doubt 
as to whether an agreement exists at all.
Having now stated what is not meant here by "tacit 
understanding" and suggested that the way in which such
Ihid., p.141. 
Ibid., p.144.
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understandings are reached is important, it remains to say 
something about how they are reached. To do so it is first 
necessary to deal with the two prior notions of "precedent" 
and "expectations". Prior because precedent is a source of 
expectations and in turn it is upon precedent and 
expectations that tacit understanding rests. A grasp of the 
notion of tacit understanding depends upon a grasp of the 
notions of precedent and of expectations.
1. Precedent and Expectations.
To speak of a precedent is to speak of a previous case 
as an example or guide for reasoning about subsequent cases.
In terms of international politics, precedent may be taken 
as referring to whatever past actions of a state, in 
particular circumstances, may be useful in helping an 
observer anticipate its actions in either present or future 
similar circumstances. Precedent is of the past and may in 
a broad sense refer to the course of history, but here the 
term will have a more limited scope. In some circumstances 
it may have a formal connotation as it does in law, but it 
also has an informal connotation which is the primary 
interest in the present context. While precedent is 
retrospective, expectations are of the future. With respect 
to international politics, the term "expectations" may be 
taken as referring to what the decision makers of one state 
consider to be the probable future behaviour of another 
state in a particular set of circumstances and precedents 
are an important source of such expectations.
Precedent is a source of expectation when the past 
actions of a state, in certain circumstances, are thought by 
another state to be a guide to its likely behaviour in present 
or future similar circumstances. Thus when State A wants to 
ascertain what B's course of action is likely to be, A takes 
into account the past actions of B in similar circumstances. 
The expectations so formed are A's and they derive from A's 
observations of B. However, precisely because the action a 
state chooses often depends on the probable reaction of other 
states, B's likely course of action might depend upon its
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estimation of the reaction it will provoke/ or has either 
provoked or failed to provoke/ from A in past instances. In 
other words, the precedent A draws upon in forming its 
judgement may be one to which it has contributed.
Forming expectations, then, often involves a process of
replication. As individuals in relationships with other
individuals and groups "we may acquire ... expectations, or
correct or corroborate whatever expectations we already have,
by putting ourselves in the other fellow's shoes, to the best9of our ability". Similarly if State A is contemplating an 
action which will be undertaken only if State B's reaction is 
likely to be x and not y, decision makers in A will try to 
predict the most probable reaction of B. In short, A's 
expectations of B will include an estimation of B's 
expectations of A. The process of replication, it must be 
noted, is not an interaction between two states, but rather 
a process in which decision makers in one state work out the 
consequences of their beliefs about the world; a world they 
believe to include decision makers in other states, also 
"working out the consequences of their beliefs".^ The 
expectations which are so formed are the expectations of one 
state, but they refer to other states.
When a state chooses one course of action rather than 
another, such as abstaining from activities in the sphere 
of influence of another power, it sets a precedent from which 
that other power may form the expectation that it will 
continue to abstain. Conversely, when a power takes action 
in "its own" sphere of influence in certain circumstances, it 
sets or perpetuates a precedent. When, for example, the rule 
of the communist party broke down in Hungary in 1956, the 
Soviet Union intervened to restore party rule. The United 
States neither before nor after the Soviet invasion extended 
any material or military support to the Hungarian rebels.
This arguably resulted in the Soviet Union expecting that it
9 David K. Lewis, Convention: A Philosophical Study
(Cambridge, Mass., Harvard, 1967), p.27.
10 Ibid., p.32.
51
could in future intervene in Eastern Europe without drawing 
in the United States.^ The United States in turn would 
expect further intervention by the Soviet Union in similar 
circumstances and also that the Soviet Union would expect not 
to be opposed. In effect, the degree to which expectations 
are thought to be more probable than not, depends upon the 
precedents there are for having them.
There may be only one precedent or there may be several. 
When there is more than one precedent, the sum of such 
precedents may present a coherent pattern. Each new action 
which conforms to previous experience adds to the experience 
of general conformity and strengthens expectations as to 
future occasions.
Our experience of general conformity in the past 
leads us, by force of precedent, to expect a like 
conformity in the future. And our expectations 
of future conformity is a reason to go on conforming ....
Finally, it should be noted that decision makers are 
never presented with exactly the same problem twice; for 
when presented with a problem a second time, they have the 
precedent of the first occasion from which to draw their
Indeed, the decision to intervene in Hungary may have 
been based on earlier precedents, such as the absence of 
Western support for the 1953 uprising in East Germany.
12 Lewis, op.cit., p.42. What is more, this force of 
precedent may create a rule in the tradition of the common 
law or of custom and convention in the foundation of law.
Roger Fisher has argued that "[a] single nation may create 
a norm by a uniform course of conduct which conforms to that 
norm, even though the implied rule which it is respecting is 
never made explicit. A series of precedents creates a rule. 
The more years that go by without manoeuvering near the 
Soviet border, the more unusual and hence provocative such 
an act would be. A pattern of conduct may tie a country's 
own hands". R.D. Fisher, 'Constructing Rules that Affect 
Governments', in D.G. Brennan (ed.), Arms Control, 
disarmament and National Security (New York, George Braziller, 
1961), p.61. See also L.L. Fuller, Anatomy of the Law 
(Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1971), Part 2, 'The Sources of Law', 
passim.
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expectations. Suppose, for instance, the Soviet Union did 
not know, when it invaded Hungary in 1956, whether or not 
that action might result in armed conflict with the United 
States. When, in 1968, a decision had to be made about 
invading Czechoslovakia, there was the precedent of Hungary 
upon which the Soviet Union could base some of its 
expectations about the likely response of the United States. 
Similarly, the United States could have expected a Soviet 
invasion on the basis of the events of 1956.
Expectations are derived not only from acts such as
armed intervention and other acts of force, but also from
verbal acts or pronouncements and from non-verbal symbolic
acts. Jeremy Stone has defined "a dialogue" between states
"as an exchange of acts whose intended purpose or effect is
to influence future behaviour. The acts might or might not
be words; other acts can be as significant. The exchange
might or might not be immediate; the response could be
13years in coming". Both verbal and non-verbal acts may be
purposely deceptive, ambiguous or clear and accurate. An
example of deception which at the same time illustrates that
"the language of diplomacy does not necessarily consist of
words, spoken or written", was the way in which the
Byzantines sought to impress the representatives of foreign 
14powers.
If the visitors represented powerful neighbours, 
care was taken to conceal from them the wealth of 
the capital and the beauty of its women, and to 
display the number and splendor of its troops and 
the height and solidarity of its ramparts.
Military reviews were held in their presence, and
Jeremy J. Stone, Strategic Persuasion, Arms Limitations 
Through Dialogue (New York, Columbia, 1967), p.3.
14 Stephen Gaselee, The Language of Diplomacy, The Gregynog 
Lectures, 1938 (Cambridge, Bowes and Bowes, 1939), p.3.
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the same soldiers, with different arms and ensigns, 
were made to pass repeatedly before them, with 
instructions to look as warlike and ferocious as 
possible.
A further example of non-verbal communication was the Truman
Administration's gesture of support for Turkey in sending
the body of the deceased Turkish Ambassador home aboard the
USS Missouri. At the time Turkey was under pressure from
the Soviet Union which was making demands concerning the
Straits of the Dardanelles and the Montreux Convention.
Sending the ambassador's body home by warship was perhaps a
way of suggesting to the Soviet Union that the United States
16might resort to force in support of Turkey.
As to verbal acts, words may communicate the intentions
of states - either purposely or coincidentally - by modes
which range from formal diplomatic negotiation through
deliberate informal talks; speeches and statements by
politicians, pressure groups and lobbyists, columnists and
scholars; press conferences; inspired leaks; hints to third
countries; down to silence. That is to say, the failure to17deny rumours or to protest against some outrage. Some if 
not all of these modes have a bearing upon tacit understanding 
as to spheres of influence.
In regard to the consideration of spheres of influence 
what is the relationship between verbal acts and other actions 
that are connected with them? Are verbal acts alone
From David Jayne Hill's History of Diplomacy in the 
International Development of Europe, Vol. I, p.106. Cited 
by Gaselee, ibid,, p.15. For further treatment of the use 
of deception see Robert Jervis, The Logic of Images in 
International Relations (Princeton, Princeton University 
Press, 1970).
“I r D.S. McLellan, 'Who Fathered Containment? A Discussion',
International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 17, No. 2 (June 1973), 
p.217.
17 According to Jeremy Stone a 'dialogue' "includes those 
internal but public discussions of ours that we presume to be 
read by the Soviets and, symmetrically, it includes theirs.
It includes what we say directly to the other side and what 
we hear. It includes the meaningful actions of the two sides". 
Op.cit,, p.ix.
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important, other acts alone or rather a mixture of the two? 
With this in mind two classes of statement should be 
considered as contributing to expectations as to spheres 
of influence.
In the first class are statements made before an event. 
Prior to the invasion of Czechoslovakia, there was a great 
deal of speculation as to the intentions of the Soviet Union. 
Various reports emanating from the Soviet Union, such as the 
one that caches of American arms had been found in 
Czechoslovakia, made it appear as though the Soviets were 
trying to "implicate the United States in efforts to promote 
Czechoslovakia's defiance of Moscow". The United States 
Government was concerned to avoid any suggestion that it was 
supporting or might support Czechoslovakia. Some eighteen 
days before the invasion, it was reported that American and 
West German diplomats had "recently agreed that troops of 
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in West Germany should 
be kept as inconspicuous and stationary as possible during 
the tension to avoid any appearance of saber-rattling". The 
same article ascribed Dean Rusk as having "told his chief 
aids that whatever happened the United States would stay on 
the sidelines". The article also said:
Officials are inclined to regard the eastern 
European nations as a legitimate Soviet sphere 
of influence; there is little desire to attempt 
to improve United States relations with the 
one-time Soviet satellites at the expense of 
relations with the Soviet Union.^
To whatever extent articles such as this are an accurate 
guide to the official mind, it can be argued that there are, 
at times, clear indications upon which a power can form 
expectations as to the likely response of another to its 
actions. In this case, the United States expected some form
The New York Times, July 22, 1968, p.l, column 2. See 
also 'Rusk Concerned Over Czech Crisis', The New York Times, 
July 24, 1968, p.13.
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of Soviet action against the regime in Czechoslovakia. On 
the basis of public statements made and reported in the 
United States, the Soviet Union could have reasonably 
expected to be able to act in Czechoslovakia without drawing 
in the United States. This should not be taken as argument 
for a causal connection between the pronouncements of the 
United States and Soviet actions. Though one might guess 
that the Soviet Union did indeed take account of what was 
being said in the United States before the event.
In the second class there are statements made after an 
event. After the first Soviet invasion of Hungary in 
October 1956, a columnist in the New York Times reported 
that while the United States
would be sympathetic to a free regime in Hungary ... 
Washington officials do not want to offer a major 
provocation to the Soviet Union through recognition 
of a Hungarian government unfriendly to Moscow.
Such a provocation possibly could lead to war,it is felt here.
Nevertheless, following the second invasion in November, 
reports had it that
some officials had suggested several days 
[previously] that the U.S. could have exerted some 
deterrent influence on the Soviet Union by some 
demonstrative movements of the Strategic Air Force, 
and by cancellation of military leaves. But these 
ideas did not gain Administration favour, and there 
was no evidence that they were discussed at 
President Eisenhower's conferences during the day.^O
President Eisenhower himself condemned the Soviet action but 
indicated that "he planned no dramatic unilateral action by 
the United States on either Hungary or the Middle East". He 
added that events in Hungary had "disturbed the American 
people" .. .
The New York Times, 27/10/56. Note: The first invasion
was on 24 October. Troops withdrew on 28 October and invaded 
for a second time on 4 November. See discussion below in 
Chapter 6.
The New York Times, 6/11/56.20
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Eut I must make one thing clear: the United
States doesn't now, and never has, advocated open 
rebellion by an undefended populace against forces 
over which they could not possibly prevail. ... we 
have never in all the years that I think we have 
been dealing with problems of this sort urged or 
argued for any kind of armed revolt which could 
bring about disaster to our friends.21
Now it can be argued that press reports and utterances 
such as these would have confirmed whatever expectations 
the Soviet Union already had or that they created 
expectations for the future. No doubt they did, but were 
such pronouncements or verbal acts the only or the most 
important source of Soviet expectations? How important are 
words alone?
The importance of statements made after events and for
that matter during events, has been argued by Franck and
22Weisband in their monograph Word Politics. It is their 
argument that the justifications used by those who have 
committed an action are a source of expectations. Not only 
are they a source of expectations, but that in some cases 
they appear to authorize another power to undertake actions 
similar to the ones being justified. The Brezhnev Doctrine, 
they argue, is no more than a Soviet version of
official U.S. pronouncements made during the covert 
overthrow of the Government of Guatemala, the Cuban 
Missile Crisis, and the invasion of the Dominican 
Republic. Thus the Soviets were able to claim, 
credibly, that the principles upon which they were 
acting were those we ourselves had devised to 
justify our conduct in the Americas, and that by 
our rhetoric we had implicitly signalled our consent 
to their application in the case of Czechoslovakia.23
The cumulative effect of the U.S. pronouncements 
[was] to appear to authorize the Soviet Union to do 
exactly what it did in Czechoslovakia in 1968.24
November 14 Press Conference, The New York Times, 15/11/56.
22 T.M. Franck and Edward Weisband, Word Politics, Verbal 
Strategy Among the Superpowers (New York, Oxford University 
Press, 1972).
^  Ibid., p.6.
Ibid., p.8.
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The Russians, observing us and evaluating us,
had every reason to know that we would do nothing.25
To say, as they do, that the Brezhnev Doctrine "echoes'' 
the pronouncements of the United States suggests a causal 
relation. An echo has after all, a source to which it is 
causally connected. But Franck and Weisband do not go so 
far as to argue for a causal connection. Rather what they do 
is argue for the primacy of verbal over other acts. In 
effect they advance a revisionist thesis of sorts which lays 
culpability at the feet of the United States, in virtue of 
what it has said on various occasions. Had the United States 
said something other than it did after its other forms of 
action with regard to Guatemala, Cuba and the Dominican 
Republic, then possibly the Soviet Union might have been less 
inclined to invade Czechoslovakia. In this way they appear 
to place more burden on the words used by the United States 
than on the fact that it did not intervene, for instance, in 
East Germany in 1953 and in Hungary in 1956. Thus, an 
important question raised by them is whether it is verbal or 
rather other acts that are the most influential source of 
expectations.^
^  Ibid., p.4.
2 6 It must be noted that the emphasis here on 'expectations' 
is a matter of perspective, for Franck and Weisband are not 
writing about expectations as such, but ultimately about 
legitimacy. Part of their argument is that actions such as 
armed intervention must be explained and the explanations 
the United States have given confer legitimacy upon similar 
actions by the Soviet Union. "The Russians were able to 
point out that in Czechoslovakia they were merely applying 
the principles of conduct the United States had evolved in 
relation to Latin America". Word Politics, p.32. (For a 
discussion of legitimacy relevant to this see R.A. Fa2k,
'Zone II As A World Order Construct', in J.N. Rosenau et al., 
eds., The Analysis of International Politics (New York, The 
Free Press, 1972).) The weakness of Franck and Weisband's 
argument as a whole lies in the notion that if the United 
States behaved and explained its behaviour differently with 
respect to Latin America, so also would the Soviet Union with 
respect to Eastern Europe.
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With respect to spheres of influence it will be argued 
that other acts are equally, if not more, important. That is 
because statements, such as the justifications given for 
intervening in the Dominican Republic, reach not just one 
listener but a mixed audience. What the United States might 
want the States of Latin America to believe is not 
necessarily what it wants the Soviet Union to believe. 
Similarly, what a government wants to tell its domestic 
audience is not necessarily what it wants to tell allies or 
enemies. It is difficult to know how much weight should be 
given to words, but they should not be a priori given more 
importance than other acts. In most cases it will be a 
conjunction of verbal and non-verbal acts that contribute to 
the expectations of states. The words of a state which has 
been known to act in accordance with them are more likely to 
be believed than are the words of a state which has not so 
acted. It is past actions of a non-verbal kind which lend 
words or verbal acts credibility. A bandit who has been 
known to shoot is more likely to be believed when he 
threatens to shoot than one who has never been known to shoot.
By definition expectations always precede the actions
to which they relate; actions which might merely consolidate
expectations already held or which might perhaps offend old
expectations and give rise to new ones. Or which might
confuse expectations and set no particular pattern on which
assessments of probability might be based. In international
politics, expectations which prove correct on a number of
occasions constitute "stable expectations" and these provide
guidelines by which states can act. " [S]table expectations
tend to fix a norm for the behaviour of individual states.
The violation of these expectations leads to a destabilizing
response, and so these expectations provide a measure by
27which to assess and guide behaviour". For states with a 
common interest, such as avoiding nuclear war, guidelines
R.A. Falk and S.H. Mendlovitz (eds.), The Strategy of 
World Order, Vol. II, International Law (New York, World Law 
Fund, 1966), p.2.
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are of considerable importance in that they help keep the 
behaviour of the states concerned within mutually tolerable 
limits. What is more, it is upon stable expectations and 
regard for the contribution they make to common interests, 
that tacit understanding rests.
With regard to common interest David Hume wrote
When this common sense of interest is mutually 
expressed, and is known to both, it produces a 
suitable resolution and behaviour. And this may 
properly enough be called a convention or 
agreement betwixt us, though without the 
interposition of a promise; since the actions of 
each of us have a reference to those of the 
other, and are performed upon the supposition 
that something is to be performed upon the other
This idea of the actions of each having a reference to 
those of the other and of being performed upon the 
supposition that something is to be performed by the other, 
is the essence of tacit understanding and of how it is 
reached. It is this which is to be considered next.
II.
1. How Tacit Understanding is Reached.
What is to be argued here is that tacit understanding 
is the result of consciously contingent unilateral acts. 
Certain acts or the conspicuous absence of certain acts 
together with the response or lack of response to those acts 
are what make up a tacit understanding. The idea of tacit 
understanding in relation to international politics has had 
its fullest discussion in literature on arms control and
David Hume, A Treatise on Human Nature, ed. L.A. Selby- 
Bigge (Oxford, Clarendon, 1951), p.490.
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2 9limited war. For this reason it is useful to explain how 
tacit understanding is reached by considering some of that 
literature.
Schelling has argued for the importance, in arms 
control and in limited war, of clear limits. He writes
any kind of restrained conflict needs a 
distinctive restraint that can be recognized by 
both sides, conspicuous stopping places, 
conventions and precedents to indicate what is 
within bounds and what is out of bounds, ways of 
distinguishing new initiatives from just more of the same activity.30
A limit may be an obvious geographical division, such as a
river; or in the case of weapons, it may be the distinction
between "conventional" and nuclear weapons. "No" nuclear
weapons is a distinctly different proposition from "some"
nuclear weapons. "There is a simplicity, a kind of
virginity, about all-or-none distinctions that differences
31of degree do not have".
With regard to the Korean War, Halperin asserted that
"the most dramatic limit ... was that neither side used its
atomic weapons". According to Brodie, there were four
reasons why these weapons were not used by the United 32States. Firstly, the American chiefs of staff thought
See T.C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge, 
Mass., Harvard University Press, 1960); T.C. Schelling,
Arms and Influence (New Haven, Yale, 1967); T.C. Schelling, 
'Reciprocal Measures for Arms Stabilization', Daedalus,
Vol. LXXXIX, No. 4 (Fall 1960); T.C. Schelling, 'Signals and 
Feedback in the Arms Dialogue', Bulletin of the Atomic 
Scientists, XXI (January 1965); and T.C. Schelling and 
M. Halperin, Strategy and Arms Control (New York, The 
Twentieth Century Fund, 1961). In particular see Arms and 
Influence, pp.131-41.
30 Schelling, Arms and Influence, p.135.
^  Ibid., p.132.
32 Bernard Brodie, Strategy in the Missile Age (New Jersey, 
Princeton University Press, 1959), p.319.
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that the war was a Soviet diversion and the then relatively
limited stockpile of nuclear weapons should be saved for a
major action against the Soviets. Secondly, both Halperin
and Brodie point out that the tactical uses of nuclear
34weapons were not understood at the time. But even if the 
uses had been understood, that is not to say nuclear weapons 
would have been used. Thirdly, there was strong feeling 
against the use of atomic weapons. "American allies, 
particularly the British, were strongly and emotionally
3 5opposed to the use of atomic weapons in the Korean War".
Fourthly, it seems the Americans feared that if they used
atomic weapons, the Soviet Union might use the few they had
3 6at the time for retaliatory blows against Pusan or Japan.
The second of these reasons may be related to what Schelling 
has written about "tacit bargaining" once a war has broken 
out. That is to say, if nuclear weapons were used 
"tactically", a strategy should be adopted which aims at 
keeping the war within certain limits. The third reason is 
clearly related to the question of limits, the argument that 
"none" has a clarity that is lacking in "some". How is all 
this related to unilateral acts and to lending definition to 
"tacit understanding"?
Firstly, if the United States does not cross the Yalu 
River and does not use nuclear weapons, it is the result of 
a unilateral decision. Not using nuclear weapons is in 
itself a conspicuous and unilateral act. But the one side 
not using nuclear weapons is contingent upon the other side 
not using them.
R.E. Osgood writes, "the Truman administration was never 
sure that the Korean War was not a premeditated prelude to a 
general Soviet attack on the West". Limited War (Chicago, 
University of Chicago Press, 1957), p.180.
34 See M. Halperin, Contemporary Military Strategy (London, 
Faber, 1967), p.96 and his earlier and better Limited War 
(New York, John Wiley, 1963), Chapter 3.
35 Brodie, op.oit., pp.410-11.
3 6 Ibid., pp.319-32 and M. Halperin, Limited War, op.oit., p.48.
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The decision not to use nuclear weapons is really a 
decision not to initiate the use of nuclear weapons. It is 
reasonable to assume this is understood by both sides.
Thus, the unilateral act or decision is not independent of 
other actors, but indeed contingent upon those other actors. 
"Unilateral" in this case has the meaning of being something 
each actor can understand for himself without the others 
having to spell it out. The decision as to whether or not 
to use nuclear weapons is up to the one nation, but normally 
that decision would be founded on the expectations of Country 
A as to whether Country B will also not use nuclear weapons 
as long as A does not. If one used nuclear weapons the other 
probably would. In short it is being argued here that the 
distinction between nuclear and conventional weapons is 
adhered to because of self-restraint that is consciously 
contingent on other nations' behaviour. Moreover, the 
expectation that nuclear weapons will not be used will be
more persuasive if it seems to rest on the enemy's 
own self-interest, on his understanding that if 
he abstains we may too, but only if he does.37
Halperin seems later to have argued a different case.
He has said that in limited war "limits are carried out, not
because of any agreement, whether tacit or formal, between
the countries concerned, but because of decisions made
3 8within various countries". The limits result from domestic 
decision-making processes. Some limits, Halperin adds, are 
symmetrical, in which case both sides refrain from doing the 
same thing. Others are not symmetrical, "one side refrains 
from doing something the other side is doing". Presumably 
in the hope that the other will cease whatever it is doing.
But what does it mean to say limits are carried out 
"because of decisions made within various countries" and not 
because of any "tacit" or formal understanding? Halperin's 
argument requires a coincidence of perceived interest in 
each of two states independently of the other. But a state
37 Schelling and Halperin, Strategy and Arms Control, p.78.
3 8 Halperin, Contemporary Military Strategy, p.96.
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does not simply formulate what it perceives as its interests 
without regard to other states. When one state refrains 
from doing something, such as using nuclear weapons, or for 
that matter, when it decides to use one weapon rather than 
another, it has regard for the consequences its choice will 
have for its relations with another state. Decision-makers 
are conscious of how their actions (which can include not 
doing something) will be interpreted and of the effect they
3 9will have on other states and so ultimately upon themselves.
In summary, the decisions and actions we have been talking
about are unilateral and in one sense Halperin is correct to
say limits are carried out "because of decisions made within
various countries". However, a decision made within one
country is made with the knowledge that its outcome is
contingent upon the response of one or more other countries.
Decision-makers in those other countries are by the same
token aware that their choices are also contingent. It may
be concluded that to the extent two parties understand their
decisions are contingent upon each other's behaviour, then
that understanding on both their parts represents a tacit
understanding between them. Ultimately the choices which
are made unilaterally depend on this "tacit understanding".
That being the case, Halperin is wrong to say limits do not
4 0depend upon "any agreement, whether tacit or formal".
Another subject in the literature on arms control which 
sheds light on tacit understanding is that of so-called 
coordination problems. Schelling has analysed what he calls 
"tacit coordination", both where there are 'common interests' 
and 'divergent interests'. In a coordination problem, the 
parties wishing to reach a common goal cannot act with a
Reference should be made here to Schelling's definition of 
"tacit bargaining" as being that "in which adversaries watch 
and interpret each others behaviour, each aware that his own 
actions are being interpreted and anticipated, each acting 
with a view to the expectations that he creates". See The 
Strategy of Conflict, p.21.
4 0 For a discussion of limits in relation to tacit 
negotiation in limited war see The Strategy of Conflict, 
pp.74-77.
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view to the expectations that they create. The example 
Schelling gives of tacit coordination where there is common 
interest is that of two parachutists who land at different 
places within a given area, have identical maps and without 
prior arrangement must guess a meeting place. Schelling 
concludes that in situations such as this "people can often 
concert their intentions or expectations with others if each 
knows that the other is trying to do the same". This 
usually requires that the parties must "mutually recognize", 
as was previously argued, some unique signal or limit that 
coordinates the expectations of each other. Divergent 
interests enter into such "tacit" bargaining when the 
parachutists both dislike walking, in which case the one 
closest to the "obvious" place to meet is at an advantage. 
Here the "conflict gets reconciled - or perhaps one should 
say ignored - as a by-product of the dominant need for 
coordination".^
In the case of the parachutists, the action each takes
is unilateral but is informed by the over-riding interest
each has in the need to meet. But what, if anything, impels
states to coordinate? What informs and sets the guidelines
for the actions of a state? It was suggested above that it
was common interest and indeed it may be argued that the two
super-powers, which will be the focus of this study, have a
common interest in avoiding nuclear war. As Raymond Aron put
it, there is a "statutory complicity that now links them in42their efforts to avoid a thermonuclear apocalypse". From 
this common interest the reason for reaching tacit 
understanding as to spheres of influence is derived. Each 
super-power understands and understands that the other 
understands the importance that each attaches to its sphere 
of influence. Contemporary spheres of influence include 
regions which each influencing power regards as vital 
interests, that is to say interests for which it would be 
prepared to go to war. That being the case the common
^  The Strategy of Conflict, pp.54-59.
4 2 Raymond Aron, The Great Debate (New York, Anchor, 1965),
p. 7.
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interest both have in avoiding nuclear war is served by
respecting each other's sphere of influence. Thus an editor
of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists argued that the
United States and the Soviet Union have a common interest in
avoiding border disputes and other regional conflicts which
could involve them in war. To this end he proposed that
"[t]he United States should offer to recognize de facto all
existing regimes and borders, in exchange for Soviet
cooperation in liquidating all conflicts on the basis of 
4 3status quo"; which amounts to a plea for the recognition 
of spheres of influence. In sum, the coordination problems 
discussed by Schelling draw attention to the fact that tacit 
understanding has a basis which informs the consciously 
contingent actions of each state.
In summary, it has been argued that a tacit
understanding between two states is one which seems implicit
in the actions of each with respect to that which there is
said to be an understanding and about which they either
44cannot or will not communicate. The actions of each which 
imply understanding are unilateral but are consciously 
contingent. That is to say, a state acts or indeed does not 
act at all, as the case may be, with regard to one or more 
other states. The understanding between them is a 
coincidence of the separate understanding each has which is 
such that they are able to act in mutually acceptable ways. 
Each understands independently of the other the consequences 
certain of their unilateral acts will have upon each other. 
Thus, when A will refrain from doing X if A expects B will 
also refrain from doing Y, and each understands this to be
E. Rubinowitch, 'Editorial', Bulletin of the Atomic 
Scientists, Vol. XXI (January 1965).
44 However, it should not be overlooked that while 
influencing powers cannot or will not communicate directly 
with each other as to spheres of influence; some of their 
unilateral pronouncements convey information to each other. 
The Johnson Doctrine and the doctrine of 'Socialist 
Internationalism', for instance, are separate ways of laying 
verbal claims to spheres of influence and as such may be part 
of a tacit understanding. See Chapter 6 below.
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the case, it can be said that there is an unspoken or tacit, 
mutual understanding of the situation impinging on each. 
Finally, that there is such understanding can be inferred 
from the actions of each.
III.
Having now made the nature of tacit understanding quite 
explicit, it must be distinguished from tacit agreement. 
"Understanding" is often used as a synonym for "agreement", 
but with regard to spheres of influence there is a good 
reason for distinguishing between the two terms. Although 
influencing powers may well have a tacit understanding as to 
how they should conduct their relations with respect to each 
others' sphere of influence, this does not necessarily mean 
they are in agreement as to the fact of each others' spheres. 
At the same time as the actions or lack of actions of each 
may imply that they acquiesce in each others' spheres, this 
does not mean they have reached an agreement about spheres 
of influence as such.
An example of tacit understanding in domestic society, 
which helps bring out the distinction being made here, occurs 
in Hunter S. Thompson's account of the Oakland Chapter of 
the Hell's Angels.
There was a basic difference between the kind of 
pressure the Angels got in Oakland and the kind they 
felt elsewhere. In Oakland it was not political, 
not the result of any high-level pressure or policy 
decision - but more of a personal thing, like arm 
wrestling. Barger and his people get along pretty 
well with the cops. In most cases, and with a few 
subtle differences, they operate on the same 
emotional frequency. Both the cops and the Angels 
deny this. The very suggestion of a psychic 
compatibility will be denounced - by both groups - 
as a form of Communist slander. But the fact of the 
thing is obvious to anyone who has ever seen a 
routine confrontation or sat in on a friendly police 
check at one of the Angel bars. Apart, they curse 
each other savagely, and the brittle truce is often 
jangled by high-speed chases and brief, violent
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clashes that rarely make the papers. Yet behind the 
sound and fury, they are playing the same game, and 
usually by the same rules.^5
While the police and the Angels each understand how to 
behave with respect to each other, this does not mean that 
they have sat down together and "agreed" on the provisions 
of their brittle truce. Moreover, the residual doubt 
remains that one of the two groups will cease to play the 
same game. It is similarly the case with understanding as 
to spheres of influence.
IV.
The idea of either agreement or even understanding
concerning spheres of influence is formally denied in the
language of both super-powers. Two days after the invasion of
Czechoslovakia, Secretary of State Rusk asserted that "[t]he
U.S. government has never entered into any 'sphere of
influence' agreements or understandings with anyone anywhere
in the world. There has been no discussion of any such idea
in connection with recent developments in Czechoslovakia,
nor has any government attempted to elicit from the United
4 6States, any such understanding". Soviet writers have also
4 7denied the idea of understanding as to spheres of influence.
Such denials have been issued, as was Mr Rusk's 
statement, close upon the very actions and responses or 
lack of responses to them, from which tacit understanding 
may be inferred. They perhaps reflect that there is no 
agreement but only understanding as to appropriate behaviour. 
They should not, however, obscure the fact that although 
there may be no more than understanding as to consciously
Hunter S. Thompson, Hell's Angels (Harmondsworth, Penguin, 
1967), p.46 footnote.
46 See Keesing's Contemporary Archives, October 26 - 
November 2, 1968.
47 A. Sovetov, 'The Present Stage in the Struggle Between 
Socialism and Imperialism', International Affairs (Moscow,
11 November 1968), p.9.
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contingent behaviour, such behaviour may become the subject 
of agreement. Moreover, such behaviour, the practices from 
which tacit understanding is inferred, may eventually 
become an accepted norm of international politics, in the 
tradition of customary law. ^
In Part II it will be shown that at the close of World 
War II, the Soviet Union and the United States were in 
disagreement as to spheres of influence. Yet each 
consolidated a sphere of influence and a tacit understanding 
developed. Chapter Four deals with the place of spheres of 
influence in relations between the allied powers and in 
plans for post-war order during World War II. Chapter Five 
deals with the consolidation of spheres of influence and 
Chapter Six with the actions of the United States and the 
Soviet Union from which it may be inferred that there is a 
tacit understanding of the kind explained above.
* * * *
48 See Lon L. Fuller, Anatomy of the Law, op.oit., Part II.
PART II
SPHERES OF INFLUENCE IN 
CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL POLITICS
CHAPTER FOUR
WORLD WAR II AND PLANS FOR POST-WAR ORDER
One theme indispensable to an understanding of the 
Cold War is the contrast between two clashing views 
of world order: the "universalist" view, by which
all nations shared a common interest in all the 
affairs of the world, and the "sphere-of-influence" 
view, by which each great power would be assured by 
the other great powers of an acknowledged 
predominance in its own area of special interest.
The universalist view assumed that national security 
would be guaranteed by an international organization. 
The sphere-of-interest view assumed that national 
security would be guaranteed by the balance of power. 
While in practice these views have by no means been 
incompatible (indeed, our shaky peace has been based 
on a combination of the two), in the abstract they 
involved sharp contradictions
The conflict in post-war international politics between 
these two views had its origins in the Second World War.
Each of the allied powers had different ideas as to the place 
of spheres of influence in post-war order and when it became 
apparent that spheres of influence would be a legacy of the 
war, the allies began to clash. During the war and for a 
time at the end of it, the contradictions between the allied 
powers were obscured by the principles and common aims to 
which each subscribed. These were set out in the Atlantic 
Charter, the Declaration of the United Nations and later in 
the Four Power Declaration of General Security. Of these 
the Atlantic Charter was the most important.
It was initiated by the United States and was proclaimed
in August 1941 at a meeting between Churchill and Roosevelt.
The Soviet Union was not represented but gave its approval
the following month at a general meeting of representatives
of the Allied Governments. The Atlantic Charter was the
first general statement of aims which all the allies endorsed
and of particular importance were its first, second and third 
2principles. The first asserted that the states adhering to
A.M. Schlesinger Jnr., 'Origins of the Cold War', Foreign 
Affairs, Vol. 46, No. 1 (October 1967), p.26.
For the text of the Atlantic Charter, see Appendix A.2
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the charter sought no aggrandisement, whether territorial 
or other. The second declared their opposition to 
territorial changes without the freely expressed wishes of 
the people concerned; while the third declared respect for 
"the rights of all peoples to choose the form of government 
under which they will live; and [the] wish to see sovereign 
rights and self-government restored to those who [had] been 
forcibly deprived of them". Each of these principles 
conflicted with the practices associated with spheres of 
influence and it was these principles that Roosevelt and 
Churchill were later accused of having violated in their4concessions to the Soviet Union at Yalta. Nevertheless,
for the United States as its initiator, the Atlantic Charter
"provided a broader and more definite basis for comprehensive
preparation of post-war policy...as well as a statement of
basic principles and fundamental policies to which
5international opinion could rally". More than that, it 
became the lynchpin of United States policy and planning.
The Declaration of the United Nations was intended to 
supplement the Atlantic Charter by committing signatories to 
the war aims set out in the Atlantic Charter. Primarily it 
was a "manifesto of military alliance, with a general 
statement of the principles which would govern the policy7and mutual relations of the Allies after the war". Neither 
the Charter nor the Declaration were legal agreements.
Llewellyn Woodward, British Foreign Policy in the Second 
World War (London, HMSO, 1971), Vol. II, p.202.
4 J.L. Snell (ed.), The Meaning of Yalta (Baton Rouge, 
Louisiana State University Press, 1956), p.10.
5 Harley Notter, Post-War Foreign Policy Preparatzon 1939- 
1945 (Washington, U.S. Department of State, Office of Public 
Affairs), p.51.g On the importance of the Atlantic Charter principles in 
United States policy, see L.E. Davis, The Cold War Begins3 
Soviet-American Conflict over Pastern Europe (Princeton, 
Princeton University Press, 1974), passim.
Woodward, op.cit., p.219.7
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In endorsing the principles set out in the two 
documents, Britain, the United States and the Soviet Union 
were seemingly in agreement as to what should be the basis 
of their post-war relations. Both the Charter and the 
Declaration raised hopes and expectations as to the prospect 
of cooperation, and particularly of continued Soviet 
cooperation. But by the end of the war hopes for cooperation 
were dispelled due to a large extent to the attitudes each 
of the three great allied powers had as to spheres of 
influence.
The purpose of this chapter is, primarily, to place the 
idea of spheres of influence in the context of the post-war 
plans of each of the great allied powers. Its second and 
subsidiary purpose is to outline what happened to pave the 
way for spheres of influence to become a legacy of the war.
I.
The United States.
When Secretary of State Cordell Hull attended the 
Foreign Minister's Conference held in Moscow in October 
1943, his primary interest was in strengthening the basis 
for post-war cooperation between the Great Allied Powers.
To that end the American delegation proposed, and had 
accepted at the conference, the Four Power Declaration of 
General Security, which had been drawn up by the State 
Department. The Declaration stated that the signatories 
recognised the "necessity of establishing at the earliest 
practicable date a general international organization, based 
on the principle of the sovereign equality of all peace-gloving states". Upon his return from Moscow, Hull declared 
that when the provisions of the Declaration were carried into 
effect there would no longer be any need "for spheres of 
influence, for alliances, for balance of power or any other
W.H. McNeill, America3 Britain and Russia3 Their 
Cooperation and Conflict3 1941-1946 (London, Oxford, 1953),
pp.330-31.
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of the special arrangements through which, in the unhappy
past, the nations strove to safeguard their security or to
9promote their interests".' Similarly, on November 18, 1943, 
he told a joint session of Congress that "[a]t the end of 
the war, each of the United Nations and each of the nations 
associated with them will have the same common interest in 
national security, in world order under law, in peace, in 
the full cooperation of the political, economic, and social 
welfare of their peoples, ...in the principles and spirit of 
the Atlantic Charter and the Declaration of the United 
Nations. The future of these indispensable common interests 
depends absolutely upon international cooperation. Hence, 
each nation's own primary interest requires it to cooperate 
with others".10
The ideas expressed by Hull corresponded with the 
United States' vision of post-war order. Universalism was 
dominant. World order was to be founded on cooperation and 
international organisation in which there was no place for 
spheres of influence and the balance of power. What is of 
interest, therefore, with regard to the United States is why 
spheres of influence were thought to be antithetical to the 
universalist conception of world order.
Though not a Wilsonian in every respect, Roosevelt was 
the heir to the liberal programme for world order. In the 
first place this programme was opposed to colonialism and 
upheld the ideal of self-determination for all dependent 
peoples. Second, it disclaimed economic nationalism and 
held that barriers to free trade had been one of the reasons 
why order broke down after World War I.^  Free trade was 
conceived of as essential for a lasting peace. Moreover, it 
was linked to self-determination in that self-determination 
was seen as a prerequisite to free trade. Third, power
Cordell Hull, The Memoirs of Cordell Hull (London, Hodder 
and Staughton, 1948), Vol. II, p.1648.
^  Cited by Notter, op.cit., p.199.
 ^See R.N. Gardner, Sterling-Dollar Diplomacy (Oxford, 
Clarendon, 1956), Chapter 1.
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politics was considered immoral and to be replaced by a
democratically controlled diplomacy. Finally, an
international organisation with economic and military force
behind it was thought to be essential. It was believed that
the future security and welfare of the United States would
be dependent on the security and welfare of the entire world 
12community. This in turn would be dependent upon self- 
determination, free-trade, an end to power politics and an 
effective international organisation. In this programme lay 
the objections to spheres of influence.
To begin with, Roosevelt seemed to treat spheres of
influence as a species of imperialism, as "another means of
one people to dominate another and [as]...incompatible with
13the kind of post-war world he wanted". By the time of the
Atlantic Conference he had decided not to help Britain retain
or regain her colonies. Roosevelt told Churchill he did not
believe they could "fight a war against fascist slavery, and
at the same time not work to free all peoples all over the
world from a backward colonial policy... The structure of
peace demands and will get equality of peoples. Equality of14peoples involves the utmost freedom of competitive trade". 
This resulted in disagreement between Churchill and himself 
as to how the Atlantic Charter should be interpreted.
Whereas Roosevelt declared that it applied to the entire 
world, Churchill insisted that it applied only to Europe.
But what is important here is just that spheres of influence 
were linked with colonies and so seen as having no place in 
the new practice of international politics.
The second objection arose from the idea that free 
trade was essential to a lasting peace. It was thought that 
free trade was the only means whereby every nation could 
achieve satisfactory economic and social conditions. And
12 Willard Range, Franklin D. Roosevelt's World Order
(University of Georgia Press, 1959), p.180.
Ibid., pp.106-07.
14 Elliot Roosevelt, As He Saw It (New York, Duell, Sloan 
and Pearce, 1946), p.37.
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only if all nations had satisfactory economic and social
conditions would each nation be secure. In other words,
international security had to be achieved on the economic
and the political level at the same time and all major
15nations had to participate in building the new world.
Both Roosevelt and Hull had the idea of instituting the new 
deal on a global scale, or as Willard Range has it,
Roosevelt's ambitions sprang from "a desire to export to 
all the world the economic and social goals and techniques 
that had done so much to raise standards of living...during 
[his] administration in particular".16
This belief in economic policy as the keystone of
"peace and security" was expressed in statements Cordell
Hull made during the war and in the work of the committees
which were formed to study and formulate proposals for
post-war organisation. Indeed, it was thought that planning
for post-war economic order was possible whereas it was not
feasible with regard to military and political matters. As
early as January 1940, a State Department sub-committee on
Economic Problems declared that the general goals of the United
States economic policy "could be more clearly defined than
could [its] objectives in the political and territorial 
17fields". During May of the following year, in a radio
address on post-war organisation, Hull said it was "none too
early to lay down at least some of the principles by which
policies must be guided at the conclusion of the war, to
press for a broad program of world economic reconstruction
and to consider tentative plans for the application of these 
18policies". Similarly, at the third meeting of Ministers
L.C. Gardner, Economic Aspects of New Deal Diplomacy
(Madison, University of Wisconsin Press, 1964), p.261.
16 Range, op.cit., p.137.
17 Notter, op.cit., p.23.
^  Ibid., p.46. %
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of Foreign Affairs of the American Republics, the United
States was instrumental in having it resolved that "[a] new
order of peace must be supported by economic principles
which will ensure equitable and lasting international trade
19with equal opportunities for all nations". What is more,
the order referred to in such statements was to be served
by an international agency which could, by force if
2 0necessary, keep the peace among nations. In short, it was 
thought that the interests of peace would best be served by 
a universal system based on an integrated world economy and 
on the United Nations rather than by the traditional state 
crafts of spheres of influence and balance of power. For this
reason more attention was given to the restructuring of the
international economy than to the strategic and territorial
21balance of the post-war world. Also, as has already been 
mentioned, it was thought that planning was possible in this 
area and not in others.
With regard to these plans for a new economic order two
points should be borne in mind. First, in the idea of an
integrated world economy there was implicitly the notion of
a harmony of interests among weak and powerful nations alike.
But if the interests of all nations were harmonious, the
implication would be that there is no exploitation between
them, that no one nation benefits at the cost of another.
This alone would have meant spheres of influence were in
conflict with universalist aims, for spheres of influence
22entail some form of dominance of the weak by the strong.
^  Ibid,, p.70.
^  Ibid., p.94.
21 See R. Gilpin, 'The Politics of Transnational Economic 
Relations', International Organization, Vol. XXV, No. 3 
(Summer 1971), p.409.
2 2 United States officials apparently failed to perceive that 
the harmony of international free trade in which they believed 
might itself be imperialistic. To whatever extent it was, 
the difference between universalism and spheres of influence 
might not have been as significant as they imagined.
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Second, there is the argument that American universalism was
no more than an approach to the problem of post-war order
23developed to safeguard American interests. Revisionist 
scholars of the Cold War argue that the United States 
promoted a liberal trade system, not for the promotion of 
peace and security as such, but rather for the sake of
24markets beneficial to the economy of the United States.
Thus it is argued that the United States opposed spheres of
influence because they shut off markets and that "the cold-
war evolved as the Soviet defensive response to the American
effort to expand economically into the Soviet sphere of 
25influence". But whatever the motives of United States 
policy were, the point remains that in its declared policy 
it was in principle opposed to spheres of influence.
A third objection to spheres of influence was that the
relationships entailed by them were part of "power politics"
which was considered inimical to the aim of collective
security. It was thought that power politics was neither a
moral nor a reliable way to achieve a lasting peace. A State
Department Sub-committee on Territorial Problems concluded
"that the initial interests of the United States lay in
following a 'diplomacy of principle' - of moral
2 6disinterestedness instead of power politics". In practice
For this argument, see G. Lundestad, The American Non- 
Policy Towards Eastern Europe 1943-1947 (Oslo, Universitets 
Forlaget, 1975), pp.40-41.
24 See, for instance, the arguments of Gabriel Kolko, The 
Politics of War, Allied Diplomacy and the World Crisis of 
1943-1945 (London, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1969); also 
Lloyd Gardner, Economic Aspects of New Deal Diplomacy, op. 
cit., p.173. For a critique of Kolko and other revisionists, 
see J.L. Richardson, 'Cold-War Revisionism: A Critique',
World Politics, Vol. XXIV, No. 4 (July 1972) and R.J. Maddox, 
The New Left and the Origins of the Cold War (New Jersey, 
Princeton University Press, 1973).
Gilpin, op.cit., p.409.
Cited in Notter, op.cit., p.123.26
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this meant not only that words or terms which suggested
27power politics were avoided, but more importantly that the 
United States repeatedly postponed matters of political and 
territorial settlement during the war. The United States 
objected to any claims or proposals by either Britain or the 
Soviet Union which suggested spheres of influence on the 
grounds of being power political which would have no place in 
the post-war world. Indeed, it was intended, as Hull said on 
his return from Moscow, that the establishment of a universal 
organisation would end the need for spheres of influence and 
for other devices of power politics which had in the past 
failed to keep the peace. In place of power politics, there 
would be collective security under the control of a universal 
organisation.
Notwithstanding this it is interesting that Roosevelt's
initial ideas for collective security allowed the great
powers a role in which the political relationship between
them and weaker states might have been very much like the
relationship entailed by spheres of influence. Roosevelt's
plans centered at first on the idea of two policemen, and
then later four, to be responsible for order among nations.
At the time the Atlantic Charter was signed, the President
thought the future political and moral order could be
assured by the United States and Great Britain alone, "simply
because they would be able to dominate the peace settlements,
and have the power to suppress aggression; they were to act
2 8as the two policemen...". By March 1943, at which time 
Eden visited Washington, the number of policemen had grown 
to four. An organisation was envisaged in which "the real
For instance, a British proposal, put forward at the 
Foreign Ministers' Conference in Moscow, entitled 'The 
Question of Joint Responsibility for Europe as Against 
Separate Spheres of Influence', was later changed at American 
insistance to read "...as Against Separate Areas of 
Responsibility". See Herbert Feis, Churchill, Roosevelt and 
Stalin (New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1970), p.212.
28 Feis, op,cit., p.21.
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decisions should be made by the United States, Great Britain,
Russia, and China, who would be the powers for many years to
2 9come that would have to police the world". Later still 
the idea changed to a collective security system under the 
guardianship of five big powers, with France being the 
additional power.
It has been observed, by Louis Fischer among others, 
that Roosevelt's concept of the four policemen ignored the 
major problem of who would police the policemen. Not only 
would a third power have been unable to police the United 
States and the Soviet Union, but also they were unlikely to 
have been able to police each other. The alternative,
Fischer argued, was "for each superpower to recognize the 
other's sphere of influence and shut an eye to the 
depredations of each in its segment of the planet". For 
Fischer the idea of the four policemen was merely that of 
spheres of influence under a different guise. Similarly, 
in notes concerning a meeting he had with Roosevelt just 
after the President's return from the first Quebec 
conference in 1943, Cardinal Spellman wrote that it was 
"planned to make an agreement among the Big Four.
Accordingly the world will be divided into spheres of 
influence: China gets the Far East; the U.S. the Pacific;
Britain and Russia, Europe and Africa. But as Britain has 
predominantly colonial interests it might be assumed that 
Russia will predominate in Europe". At least one scholar 
of the diplomacy of World War II has taken this as evidence 
that Roosevelt expected a Soviet sphere of influence in
Ibid,, p.121. On Roosevelt's ideas as to collective 
security and his differences from Wilson's ideas, see R.A. 
Divine, Roosevelt and World War II (Baltimore, Penguin, 1969), 
pp.58-65.
30 Louis Fischer, The Road to Yalta (New York, Harper and Row, 
1972) , p.141.
31 R.I. Gannon, The Cardinal Spellman Story (New York, 
Doubleday, 1962), p.222.
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32Europe. He may well have done, but this does not 
necessarily follow from the idea of the four policemen.
Roosevelt thought of the relationship between each of 
the policemen, and the states for which they were to be 
responsible, not in terms of the relationship that obtains 
between an influencing power and the states it influences, 
but in terms of being "good neighbours". A power 
acting as a policeman rather than as an influencing power 
would have acted in the interests of the world community and 
with the explicit approval of the other great powers, but as 
an influencing power it acts in accord with its own perceived 
interests and without the explicit consent of other great 
powers. Whereas small states could live in independence and 
peace under a general organisation in which the great powers 
acted together, in a sphere of influence they could perhaps 
live in peace and security but not independence. Although 
it might in practice have amounted to the same thing, the 
idea of spheres of influence can be distinguished from that 
of the Four Policemen. It cannot be assumed that Four 
Policemen meant spheres of influence in Roosevelt's mind.
To summarise so far, it has been argued that American 
opposition to the idea of spheres of influence had three 
main interrelated sources. With reservations as to 
Roosevelt's ideas concerning collective security, the 
intellectual origins of this opposition were Wilsonian and 
had as their lynchpin a belief in the necessity of universal 
organisation for the maintenance of peace. It was hoped that 
under such an organisation relations between states could be 
freed from what were regarded as the undesirable practices of 
"power politics", such as reliance on the balance of power 
and the relationships entailed by spheres of influence. It 
was thought that a necessary condition for the success of
Geoffrey Warner, 'From Teheran to Yalta: Reflections on
FDR's Foreign Policy', International Affairs, Vol. 43, No. 3 
(July 1967), p.533.
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universal organisation was an integrated world economy with 
free access to markets for all states. This was one reason 
why colonialism had to come to an end, for it safeguarded 
restrictive trade practices and stood in the way of 
establishing the kind of economic structure necessary for a 
successful international organisation. Spheres of influence 
were regarded as part of colonialism and as contributing to 
closed markets. Thus, for universalists, spheres of influence 
had no place in post-war order which was to be informed by, 
and based upon, the principles of the Atlantic Charter.
However, although official United States policy was to
oppose spheres of influence and promote universal order,
there was no recognition in Washington that America might
aspire to having a sphere of influence in the Western
Hemisphere. It was only other powers that were seen as
having or wanting spheres of influence. "If universalism
meant opposition to spheres of influence, it was to spheres
of influence beyond the hemisphere". The Monroe Doctrine
was not seen in terms of the spheres of influence to which
they objected. The relationship between the United States and
the countries of Latin America was apparently not conceived of
as "analogous to the types of arrangements desired by either
the Soviet or British governments. During a meeting of the
Sub-committee on European Organization in February 1944, the
members concluded that the Monroe Doctrine was the product of
a liberal ideology and had not been imposed upon the smaller
states by a great power. While the establishment of spheres
of influence generally included exploitation and domination
of the countries within, in the case of the United States
only a 'moderate and limited' use had been made of the Monroe
34Doctrine for such purposes"*
R.W. Tucker, 'The United States' in S.L. Spiegel and 
K.N. Waltz (eds.), Conflict in World Politics (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts, Winthrop, 1971), pp.22-23.
^  Davis, op,cit., p.143.
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Having now considered the sources of opposition to
spheres of influence, it should not be overlooked that there
were American officials who were favourably disposed to the
idea of spheres of influence. During the war and in the
immediate post-war period there seem, according to Arthur
Schlesinger, to have been only three such officials:
Henry L. Stimson, the Secretary of War; George Kennan, in
the American Embassy in Moscow; and Henry A. Wallace,
35Secretary of Commerce until his dismissal in 1946. It has
been suggested that up to the time of the Yalta Conference
in February 1945, Kennan was perhaps the one dissenting voice
3 6in the United States Government. As will be seen presently,
the United States Government was opposed in principle to any
agreement between the British and Soviet Governments which
would result in spheres of influence and it refused to
approve of any agreement beyond strict military arrangements.
Consequently it ignored the Anglo-Soviet agreement as to the
Balkans which resulted from Churchill's visit to Moscow in
October 1944. With regard to this policy of refusing to
countenance any such division, Kennan wrote to Charles E.
Bohlen during the Yalta Conference and asserted that he
failed to see why the United States should associate itself
with a policy "so hostile to the interests of the Atlantic
community as a whole, so dangerous to everything which we
need to see preserved in Europe. Why could we not make a
decent and definitive compromise with it - divide Europe
frankly into spheres of influence - keep ourselves out of
37the Russian sphere and keep the Russians out of ours?'
Kennan doubted the soundness of the idea of post-war 
organisation based on cooperation between the Allied Powers.
35 Schlesinger, op,ait., p.28.
3 6 Davis, op.ait., p.159.
37 Charles E. Bohlen, Witness to History (New York, Morton, 
1972), p.175. Cited by Davis, op.ait., p.159.
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In his Memoirs he argued that it was not true that peace
depended on intimate collaboration with the Russians. "All
that was really required to assure stability among the great
powers was 'the preservation of a realistic understanding of
the mutual zones of vital interest'. This, too, the Russians 
3 8understood". For Kennan no international organisation 
could take the place of "a well conceived and realistic 
foreign policy" and legalistic formulas for the regulation 
of international life could not be expected to bring an end 
to long established historical practices. Hence, he 
commented that plans for post-war organisation completely 
ignored "the time honoured conception of the puppet state 
which underlies all political thought in Asia and Russia, 
and occasionally appears in Eastern and Central Europe as 
well". With regard to these matters Kennan differed 
greatly from Cordell Hull and from his colleagues in the 
State Department.
Henry A. Wallace voiced his dissent somewhat later. 
During the first half of 1946 Wallace became concerned about 
the deterioration in relations between the Soviet Union and 
the United States and the effect that the policies being 
adopted by the Truman Administration were having on those 
relations. Consequently in July he wrote a long and 
controversial letter on the matter to President Truman. In 
part Wallace said the United States' concern for 
"establishing democracy in Eastern Europe, where democracy 
by and large [had] never existed", seemed to the Soviet 
Union to be "an attempt to re-establish the encirclement of 
unfriendly neighbours which was created after [World War I] 
and which might serve as a springboard of still another 
attempt to destroy her".^8 The editors of the British
38 G.F. Kennan, Memoirs 1926-1950 (London, Hutchinson, 1968), 
p.249.
39 Ibid., pp.218-19.
The New Statesman and Nation (September 28, 194G), p.225.
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journal The New Statesman and Nation took the thrust of
Wallace's letter to be "that the existence of spheres of
influence in which each Great Power has a paramount interest
should be frankly recognised - not least by the U.S.A.,
which [had] based its foreign policy on this principle for
a hundred years. For America to claim this principle for
herself and to deny it to Russia", they continued, was
"tantamount to putting the whole world under the Monroe 41Doctrine". In his Madison Square Speech in September 1946, 
Wallace asserted that the United States should recognise that 
it had
no more business in the political affairs of Eastern 
Europe than Russia has in the political affairs of 
Latin America, Western Europe, and the United States... 
Whether we like it or not, the Russians will try to 
socialize their sphere of influence just as we try to 
democratize our sphere of influence... The Russians 
have no more business stirring up native Communists to 
political activity in Western Europe, Latin America 
and the United States than we have in interfering with the politics of Eastern Europe and Russia. 2^
Wallace emphasised "political" affairs for he believed at
the same time that the United States could not permit "the
door to be closed to [its] trade in Eastern Europe --  The
most that the United States and Britain can hope to get out
of the Balkan States in the long run is the open door to
4 3trade and invest with safety". In this respect his views
had much in common with the universalists and perhaps his
44differences with them have been exaggerated.
Like Kennan and Wallace, Stimson, whom Schlesinger 
described as "a classical balance-of-power man", saw the
41 Ibid., p.217.
4 2 H.A. Wallace, Toward World Peace (New York, Reynal and 
Hitchcock, 1948), pp.9-10. See also N.D. Markowitz, The Rise 
and Pall of the People's CenturyHenry A. Wallace and 
American Liberalism 1941-1948 (New York, Free Press, 1973), 
pp.17 8-8 5.
4 3 H.A. Wallace, op.cit., pp.65-66.
44 For the view that Kennan1s, Wallace's and Stimson's 
differences with universalism are easily exaggerated, see 
Gier Lundestad, op.cit., pp.73-75.
acceptance of a Soviet sphere of influence in eastern Europe
4 5as a means of avoiding conflict with the Soviet Union.
But of the three Kennan was the one nearest to holding a 
conception of world order based on spheres of influence. 
Finally, in the context of the universalist opposition to 
spheres of influence, Roosevelt's notion of the four 
policemen, and those few who did favour the acceptance of 
spheres of influence of some sort, it is of interest to 
mention the ideas set out by Walter Lippmann in his US War- 
Aims , written in 1944.
Like those who believed in universal organisation, he
saw no chance for the small states of Eastern Europe to
recover and maintain their independence under a balance of 
46power. But, unlike the universalists, he did not believe 
world order could be constituted out of an association of 
the sixty or more individual nations there were at that time. 
World order, Lippmann argued, could be achieved through a 
composition "of the great regional constellations of states 
which are the homelands, not of one nation alone but of the 
historic civilized communities"
Within each constellation there would be one Great Pov/er
and the relationship between that power and the small powers
around it would be one of "Good Neighbours". By this he
meant a relationship "in which small states and a great one
in the same area of strategic security become allies in peace 
4 8and in war". Peace would depend upon each Great Power
4 9coming to rest in its "orbit", and it would be a mark of 
aggression "for any state to reach out beyond its own 
strategic orbit for an alliance with a state in another
On Stimson, see Lundestad, loc.cit., and Schlesinger, 
op.cit. , p.28.
4 6 Walter Lippmann, US War Aims (Boston, Little Brown, 1944), 
p. 33.
47 Thirl. , pp. 78-80.
4 ^ 1 bid. , p.83.
4 9 Thiel. , p . 91.
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50orbit". The constellations, rather than individual states,
51would participate in universal society. This, Lippmann
thought, was a realistic proposal for it was hopeless to
think of delegating "responsibility to a world society which
does not yet exist or has just barely been organized".
Constellations would be building on the power which was
already organised to win the war. "The organized power which
52wins the war must be used to win the peace".
Lippmann's idea of constellations resembles aspects of 
both Roosevelt's four policemen idea and the concept of 
spheres of influence. He seemed to be calling for a world 
in which the great powers would exercise a form of benevolent 
hegemony in their respective 'orbits' and in which each would 
recognise the hegemony of the other. Not going beyond each 
others' orbit would seem much the same as respecting each 
others' sphere of influence and agreeing that this was a 
desirable state of affairs. He obviously thought there would 
not be undue restrictions upon the independence of the small 
states in each constellation and so considered the concept 
distinct from that of spheres of influence. In anticipation 
of criticism of his proposals, Lippmann acknowledged it might 
be objected that his proposals would mean the world "be 
divided up into spheres of influence each dominated by a great 
power, and that the huge constellations of states may become 
rivals and enemies". His answer was that such groupings 
already existed and the world could not be organised by 
ignoring or condemning them. "On the contrary", he wrote, "I 
believe that only by perfecting these regional groupings can 
we hope to make any progress towards stabilizing international 
relations" .
50 Ibid., p.136.
51 Ibid., p.187.
52 Ibid., p.164. 
Ibid., pp.187-88 .
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Having now considered the United States, what of the 
place of spheres of influence in British planning during 
the war?
II.
Great Britain.
When Churchill went to meet Roosevelt in Placentia Bay
in August 1941, he did not do so with the idea of a joint
declaration in mind. The matter had not arisen in talks
with Mr Eden, in deliberations in Cabinet, or in talks with
Sir Alexander Cadogan on the way to Placentia Bay. Unlike
American officials and leaders, "the whole idea of any
discussion of war aims was inimical to Mr Churchill. He was
content to leave the definition of Allied objectives to a
moment when victory should be nearer than it seemed in 
54August 1941". Churchill gave only a vague and secondary
role to an overall world organisation and had not entertained
the idea of a joint declaration of war aims until it was
55proposed by Roosevelt.
Once the proposal was made, Mr Churchill acted promptly 
and had a draft prepared by the next morning. An initial 
point of contention arose over the revised draft President 
Roosevelt presented as a basis for discussion. The fourth 
clause of the American revision required that all peoples 
should have "access, without discrimination and on equal 
terms, to the markets and to the raw materials of the world... 
needed for their economic prosperity". Churchill felt this 
did not safeguard Britain's obligations under the Ottawa 
Agreement and, furthermore, might prejudice the future of 
Imperial Preference. Accordingly, he wanted further
J.W. Bennett and A. Nicholls, The Semblance of' Peace 
(London, MacMillan, 1972), p.37.
55 L. Woodward, British Foreign Policy in the Second World War
(London, HMSO, 1971), Vol. II, p.l98ff. See also E.J. Hughes, 
'Winston Churchill and the formation of the United Nations 
Organization', Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 9, Mo. 4 
(October 1974) .
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amendment. The matter was discussed in Cabinet, which
shared Mr Churchill's anxiety to safeguard Imperial
Preference so as "to prevent British markets from being
undercut by countries like Japan with a low standard of 
5 6living". It is not difficult to understand how American 
leaders might have linked this procrastination to the concept 
of spheres of influence.
Even once the Atlantic Charter was agreed to, the
British had reservations. Concerning Point Two, which
related to territorial changes and self-determination, the
Foreign Office expressed doubt as to "whether American
opinion understood the complexity of the political and
geographical problems involved in the question of 'self-
determination' in Europe". In the same document, the Foreign
Office foresaw Soviet absorption of the Baltic States after
the war and thought Britain "might be compelled to recognize
the facts". The United States, it said with percipience,
"would also tolerate the facts, but might refuse to give them
57formal recognition on moral grounds...". This was 
indicative of the difference between the British and the 
American approach to questions of post-war order and 
organisation. The difference came into the open over the 
question of territorial concessions beyond pre-war boundaries 
and especially over the British proposal for "taking the lead" 
in certain countries.
Late in 1941, the United States Ambassador to Britain
presented Mr Eden with a telegram which expressed the
persistent American concern that, for the duration of
hostilities, none of the allies should enter into commitments
5 8regarding specific terms of post-war settlement. The
56 L. Woodward, op.cit., p.201.
57 Ibid., p.205.
5 8 The Memoirs of Cordell Hull, op.cit., p.1166.
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United States had understood that during his forthcoming 
visit to Moscow, Mr Eden would be confronted with specific 
territorial demands. So he was, but he assiduously resisted 
Soviet demands for an agreement as to certain post-war 
boundaries on the grounds that he could not breach faith 
with the United States. On studying accounts of Eden's visit, 
Hull sent a memorandum to the President which once again 
argued the importance of not recognising any territorial 
changes made since the outbreak of the war. It was feared 
that any moves toward recognition might "hamper the 
proceedings of the post-war peace conference". Specifically, 
the memorandum said
If the British Government, ..., with the tacit or 
expressed approval of this Government, should 
abandon the principal of no territorial commitments 
prior to the peace conference, it would be placed 
in a difficult position to resist additional Soviet 
demands relating to frontiers, territory, or to 
spheres of influence, which would almost certainly 
follow whenever the Soviet Government would find itself in a favourable bargaining position. 9^
Thus, Great Britain had to deal, on the one hand, with Soviet 
demands for the recognition of boundaries and, on the other 
hand, with American refusals to allow any such 
"concession". It was in these circumstances that Britain 
framed its proposal, in 1944, for "spheres of influence", or 
"taking the lead", for the duration o£ the war.
At the Teheran Conference in 1943, Churchill favoured a 
joint Anglo-American operation in the Mediterranean and 
Balkan regions. That he did so was largely a matter of 
strategic opportunism. At that time there was "no question 
whatever of 'forestalling' the Russians, or conducting a 
strategy based on political foresight. The attention of all, 
soldiers and statesmen alike, was riveted on helping the 
Russians and winning the war; and there was, in 1943, no other
59 Ibid., p.1169.
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theatre where this could be done".^ However, neither 
Roosevelt nor Stalin were willing to support any operations 
which would detract from the overriding aim of launching 
operation OVERLORD, the invasion of North-West Europe planned 
for 1 May 1944. The Mediterranean theatre was regarded as 
subsidiary and ancillary to operation OVERLORD. One of the 
implications of this war was that the absence of British and 
American troops in the Balkans made them very much the domain 
of the advancing Soviet Army. Consequently, according to his 
own account, Churchill thought that "the advance of the Soviet 
armies in Central and Eastern Europe in the summer of 1944 
made it urgent to come to a political arrangement with the 
Russians about these regions. Post-war Europe seemed to be 
taking shape".^ Early in May 1944, he sent a minute to Eden 
asking whether Britain was "going to acquiesce in the 
Communisation of the Balkans and perhaps of Italy" evidently 
in the belief that some way of stalling Soviet influence had 
to be found. On May 18, Mr Eden and the Soviet Foreign 
Minister discussed their respective interests in Romania and 
Greece and, after this, Britain began to press for American 
approval of an Anglo-Russian arrangement. Halifax raised the 
matter with Hull on May 30, but predictably the Secretary of 
State was flatly opposed to the idea. The following day, 
Churchill informed Roosevelt that it had been suggested to 
the Russians "that we should agree between ourselves as a 
practical matter that the Soviet Government would take the 
lead in Rumanian affairs, while we would take the lead in 
Greek affairs...". Aware of the American aversion to any 
suggestion of spheres of influence, the Prime Minister 
emphasised that Britain was not aiming to cut up the Balkans 
into areas of influence, and that the arrangement was to 
apply only to war conditions. On June 8, the State Department
Michael Howard, The Mediterranean Strategy in the Second 
World War (London, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1968), p.36.
^  W.S. Churchill, Triumph and Tragedy (London, Cassell, 1954), 
p. 63.
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received another note from Churchill in which he stressed
once again that there was no question of spheres of influence
being involved. It was a matter of getting the war over:
"No fate could be worse for any country than to be subject in
these times to decisions reached by triangular and
quadrangular telegraphing". Whether or not expedition of the
war was his true purpose, Churchill wanted Roosevelt to
believe the arrangement was nothing more than an aid to the
war. But it is interesting that he alluded to an American
sphere of influence by saying "we follow the lead of the
6 2United States in South America as far as possible". In 
saying this, the Prime Minister cannot have been unaware of 
the historical connotations involved in alluding to the 
relationship between the United States and South America.
6 3A few days later Roosevelt replied and stressed once 
more the persistent fear that the "natural tendency for such 
decisions to extend into the political and economic fields 
would be strengthened by the agreement prepared by the 
British".^ Moreover, it would surely lead to spheres of 
influence. Exasperated, Churchill cabled again, this time 
complaining about "mediocre officials", an obvious reference 
to the State Department, and argued the case as forcefully as 
he could. As it happened Hull was away and, without 
consulting the State Department, Roosevelt agreed to a trial 
period of three months. He added, "We must be careful to 
make it clear that we are not establishing any post war 
spheres of influence". Of this Churchill wrote, "I shared 
his view", and he asked Eden to make it clear to Molotov,
^  Ibid., pp.64-65.
6 3 June 10 according to Hull and June 11 according to 
Churchill.
The Memoirs of Cordell Hull, op.oit., p.1954.64
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"that the reason for the three months limit is in order that
one should not prejudge the question of establishing post-
65war spheres of influence".
That the question was not one to be "prejudged" was 
indicative of the situation in which Britain found itself.
On the one hand, there was the United States which apparently 
did not want spheres of influence and, on the other hand, 
there was the Soviet Union which, as will be shown presently, 
did want a sphere of influence. In these circumstances, 
instructing Eden to tell Molotov that Britain did not want to 
prejudge the issue perhaps amounted to suggesting that the 
possibility of coming to an arrangement as to spheres of 
influence was not closed.
This was roughly how matters stood until September when
the question arose as to whether Britain "should try to
extend the proposed arrangement for a division of influence
to the Balkans as a whole". It had arisen over the Soviet
attempt to obtain the status of co-belligerent for Bulgaria.
Eden cabled Churchill, who was at the time in Quebec, saying
that the Foreign Office and he were of the opinion that
Britain ought not to bargain over Bulgaria. Soviet
predominance in Finland and Romania could be allowed as their
frontiers adjoined those of the Soviet Union, but Bulgaria
was another matter since it bordered on Greece, Yugoslavia 
6 6and Turkey. Churchill agreed with this and yet, when he
Triumph and Tragedy, p.67. When Hull resumed duties he 
was ignorant of the President's action and sent the British 
Embassy a memorandum of arguments against the idea of an Anglo- 
Russian Agreement. He said Churchill's telegram of May 31 
indicated that this government would have been faced with a 
concluded spheres of influence agreement between the British 
and Russians "if the latter had simply agreed without raising 
the question of our position". See Hull, p.1456. See also a 
State Department briefing book paper for Yalta which stated 
that, with regard to the three month trial period, the United 
States Government "would wish to make known its apprehension 
lest the proposed agreement might, by the natural tendency of 
such arrangements, lead to the division in fact of the Balkan 
region into spheres of influence". U.S. Department of State, 
Foreign Relations of the United States> Diplomatic Papers3 
lD4[)y The Conference at Malta and Yalta (Washington, D.C.,
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1955), p.105.
66 E.L. Woodward, op.cit., Vol. Ill, pp.140-41.
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went to Moscow in October, it would appear that he did so 
with the idea of extending the Anglo-Soviet arrangement for 
a division of influence to the Balkans as a whole.
Churchill's account of his meeting with Stalin, at which 
they "agreed" on respective percentages of interest in the 
Balkans, is perhaps the most widely quoted passage in accounts 
of the diplomacy of the Second World War. It is commonly 
thought that at that meeting Stalin and Churchill divided the 
Balkans into spheres of influence, not just for the duration 
of the war, but for the post-war world as well. however, it 
is highly unlikely that in circumstances such as those which
The percentages were as follows: Romania, Russia 90%, the
others 10%; Greece, Great Britain (in accord with the U.S.A.) 
90%, Russia 10%; Yugoslavia, 50-50%; Hungary, 50-50%;
Bulgaria, Russia 75%, the others 25%. After the meeting 
Churchill drafted, but did not send, a letter to Stalin in 
which he confirmed the arrangements. Triumph and Tragedy, 
p.198. Of Churchill's not sending the letter, Averell 
Harriman, who was in Moscow at the time, has recently said: 
"It's very interesting that he publishes the letter in his 
book and says that he never sent it for some reason or other. 
The reason was that I told him that Roosevelt would repudiate 
it if he sent it. Roosevelt didn't want to have any spheres 
of influence, we wanted to have an overall agreement". See 
The Listener, October 17, 1974, p.488. According to Kolko, 
Churchill did send a draft of the previous day's discussion 
and Stalin "carefully struck out phrases implying the 
creation of spheres of influence, a fact Churchill excluded 
from his memoirs". G. Kolko, The Politics of War (London, 
Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1969), p.145. While Churchill did 
not mention sending a draft to Stalin, it is not clear what 
Kolko's evidence is that he did, let alone for Stalin 
striking out phrases that implied spheres of influence.
A curious sequel to the percentages agreement was 
Molotov's quibbling on the two days following. On October 10 
he proposed various percentages all giving the Soviet Union 
a marginally greater percentage than Churchill had proposed. 
"Mr Eden said that he was not concerned with percentages, but 
that the British Government wanted a greater share of 
responsibility than they had in Romania". Woodward, op,ait., 
Vol. Ill, p.150. The following day Molotov proposed further 
figures which varied as little as 5 and 10 per cent from 
those he had suggested the previous day.
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obtained at that stage of the war that the Balkans could 
have been "divided", as it were, at a single meeting. The 
amount of influence Britain and the Soviet Union were to 
have was surely ultimately settled by other means. The 
interesting question with regard to British policy is not so 
much whether the Balkans were divided as a result of the 
Moscow meeting, but rather what it was that Churchill hoped 
to gain by the percentages agreement. What was its purpose?
In a dispatch he sent to Cabinet on October 12,
Churchill said the percentages were intended "to express the 
interest and sentiment with which the British and Soviet 
Governments approach the problems of these countries - and 
so that they might reveal their minds to each other in some 
way that could be comprehended". It did not commit the United 
States; it was "only an interim guide for the immediate war­
time future" and did not "attempt to set up a rigid system of 
spheres of interest".^ But did Churchill really believe 
that the percentages indicated relative interest in each 
country only for the duration of the war?
By the time he went to Moscow, Churchill thought there 
was a great danger that the Soviet Union would extend 
hegemony over much of Europe before the international 
organisation the United States wanted could be established.
It is very likely that Churchill thought it important to 
restrict the spread of the Soviet Union out of consideration 
for the balance of power. In 1944 Britain was not able, even 
if it had been willing, to oppose the Soviet Union. Neither 
it nor the United States had the military resources in the 
Mediterranean and the Balkans which would have enabled them 
to share in the control of south-eastern Europe. That 
being the case, the percentages agreement was not so much a 
matter of creating spheres of influence as an attempt to
68 Triumph and Tragedy, pp.202-03.
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stabilise the status quo. It was "not a matter of dividing
the Balkans between Britain and Russia, but of preventing
the Soviet Union from extending its influence over the whole 6 9penninsula". For Lord Strang the percentages agreement 
"was evidence that [Britain] feared Soviet expansion in 
Eastern Europe and the Balkans, but hoped to make the best 
of it by limiting it to areas where Soviet military power 
was predominant".^
The idea of "taking the lead", the purpose of the 
percentages agreement then, was to make it known to Stalin 
that regardless of American opposition, Churchill was willing 
to concede to the Soviet Union spheres of influence which 
they were in any case almost certain to have. By conceding 
these areas to the Soviet Union some sort of quid pro quo 
might be possible whereby Britain would retain some degree 
of control over the course of events in the Balkans, but 
particularly in Greece and Yugoslavia. Even some semblance 
of a balance of power might have been maintained.
In summary, unlike American officials and leaders, 
Churchill was sceptical about the prospects for post-war 
cooperation with the Soviet Union. Rather than believe that 
the formation of a universal security organisation would 
bring an end to power politics and to the practices 
associated with it, he thought in terms of power politics. 
Indeed, it is reasonable to conclude that by October 1944, 
Churchill saw the recognition of spheres of influence as one 
way, possibly the only way, of achieving British war aims in 
the Balkans and in the Mediterranean region.
What now of the Soviet Union?
C. Wilmot, The Struggle for Europe (London, Fontana, 
1959), p.730. See also Kolko, The Politico of War, op.ait., p.140.
70 Lord Strang, ’Prelude to Potsdam', International Affairs, 
Vol. 46, No. 3 (July 1970), p.453. Lord Strang was the 
British representative on the European Advisory Commission 
from 1943-45 and from 1945-47 the political advisor to the 
Commander in Chief of the British forces of occupation in 
Germany.
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The Soviet Union.
In June 1930, Stalin told the sixteenth Congress of the
CPSU that the Soviet Union did not want a single foot of
foreign territory, but neither would it surrender a single
foot of its territory. "This," wrote Isaac Deutscher, "was
the leitmotif of Stalin's foreign policy until 1939".7  ^ In
August of that year the Soviet Union and Germany signed a
non-aggression pact which was supplemented by a secret
protocol dividing Eastern Europe into spheres of influence.
With the non-aggression pact, "[t]he era of Russia's
territorial expansion [began]. Stalin's immediate motive was
the search for security - it was not stated what was meant by
'spheres of influence', but it was taken for granted that
this implied any form of domination, including plain 
72possession".
The search for security, of which the non-aggression 
pact was a part, had its origins in the years immediately 
after the civil war in Russia. It was then that France built 
a system of alliances with Poland, Romania and Czechoslovakia 
which had the dual purpose of containing the potential menace 
from the east and of guarding against any revival of German 
militarism. The Soviet Union sought to counterbalance this 
cordon sanitaire and so "improvised a diplomatic doctrine 
which aimed at restoring a temporary European balance of power 
that would strengthen [its] position vis-a-vis the capitalist 
world". In this it had a common aim with Britain in that 
neither power wanted the continent to be dominated by a single 
military power.
With the rise of fascism in Germany the Soviet Union 
sought ways to secure its western frontier. In 1934, Stalin 
began to cast about for protective alliances. At first
71 Isaac Deutscher, op.cit., p.406.
72 Ibid., p.429.
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through the idea of a regional, eastern European system
including Germany, and then with the Western powers against
Germany. By 1937 Stalin was disillusioned with the prospect
of an alliance with the West. With regard to Germany the
choice seemed to Stalin to be that of either opposing it
with force or of coming to some sort of accommodation with
Hitler. Munich and the partition of Czechoslovakia gave the
problem fresh importance. Germany feared France and Britain
joining with the Soviet Union and wanted to neutralise the
Soviet Union and spike its negotiations with France and
Britain. Aware of this, Stalin made it known to the Germans
that he was willing to make a deal and at the same time
strung out the negotiations with France and Britain in order
to frighten Germany into an agreement. In turn the Germans
hinted to the Soviet Union that they would "pay for Soviet
neutrality, in the event of a German-Polish war, by turning
over to the Soviet Union considerable areas of eastern 
7 3Europe". With this knowledge the Soviet Union asked France 
and Britain for similar concessions but both powers felt they 
could not purchase an alliance at the price of their Polish 
allies or of the Baltic States. Hitler, on the other hand, 
had no such inhibitions and so the non-aggression pact was 
negotiated and signed. The concessions it granted to the 
Soviet Union became considerably important in Soviet aims for 
the post-war world.
In the interval between the initiation of the non­
aggression pact and the German invasion of the Soviet Union, 
Soviet forces annexed the Baltic states, the portion of 
Poland set down in the secret protocol, and as a result of 
the Winter War, the portions of Finnish territory it had 
desired. By 1941 the Soviet Union had redefined its
G.F. Kennan, Russia and the West under Lenin and Stalin
(London, Hutchinson, 1961), p.327. See also G.F. Kennan, 
Soviet Foreign Folicy 1917-1941 (New York, Van Nostrand, 
1969), pp.98-106.
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boundaries and once Germany invaded it, Stalin pressed the 
allies to recognise the 1941 boundaries. The United States, 
and Britain at its insistance, invoked the Atlantic Charter 
principles and held to the view that territorial matters had 
to wait until the end of the war. However, when relations 
with the Soviet Union became strained over the delay in 
opening the second front, Churchill thought that "the 
increasing gravity of the war [suggested] ... that the 
principles of the Atlantic Charter should not be construed 
so as to deny Russia the frontiers she occupied when Germany 
attacked her" . ^
The most contentious boundary was Poland's eastern 
frontier, which the Soviet Union insisted should be the 
Curzon line. In the minds of officials like Cordell Hull, 
a reapportionment of territory, such as was involved in 
accepting the Curzon line, was the same thing as the 
establishment of a Soviet sphere of influence. But annexing 
territory is quite distinct from establishing a sphere of 
influence which entails a particular form of relationship 
between one state and another. Soviet claims to territory 
and the desire to have those claims accepted would not 
necessarily have amounted to the acceptance of spheres of 
influence. This is not to say the Soviet Union did not have 
ambitions for a sphere of influence. Its ambitions seem to 
have varied from case to case. With respect to the Baltic 
states the aim was for a sphere of influence from the outset. 
In other cases, it was at first probably for not less, but not 
more than, territory. Nevertheless, as the war progressed 
territorial ambitions as such were displaced by designs for 
a sphere of influence. However, once again, this does not 
mean the Soviet Union knew exactly what degree of influence
W.S. Churchill, The Hinge of Fate (London, Cassell, 1950), p.327.
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75it wanted or when it would seek to establish it. Other 
than the vague outline it is not clear what the Soviet Union 
had in mind.
The Soviet Union, as has already been mentioned, first
began pressing territorial claims on the allies when Mr Eden
visited Moscow in December 1941. During the previous month,
the Soviet Government had disclaimed "the seizure of foreign
territory, the subjugation of foreign peoples, whether it
concerns the peoples and territories of Europe, or the peoples
and territories of Asia, including Persia". It did not, it
said, "have such war aims as forcing its will and regime upon
7 6the Slavonic or any other enslaved peoples of Europe...".
But in his meeting with Mr Eden, Stalin unfolded plans for a
post-war settlement which contradicted the previous Statement.
He proposed a secret protocol covering various territorial
77arrangements which Mr Eden firmly refused. Stalin's 
proposals were indicative of his ultimate aims; he wanted to 
fulfil the hopes for establishing a buffer zone, that had 
been raised by the Nazi-Soviet pact and indeed this was 
partially fulfilled before Germany launched its attack. 
Eventually this meant ensuring that the States along the 
western frontier were enclosed in a Soviet sphere of 
influence.
As late as April 1944, when the Red Army had re-occupied 
practically all the territory which had formed part of the 
Soviet Union before the outbreak of war in 1939, the Soviet 
Government "tried to reassure the Western Powers that they 
were sincere in their previous opposition to exclusive spheres 
of influence in enemy territory in Europe and that they were 
ready to carry out an agreed policy in the countries which
See V. Mastny, 'Spheres of Influence and Soviet War Aims 
in 1943', in S. Sinanian, I. Deak and P.C. Ludz (eds.), 
Eastern Europe in the 1970’s (New York, Praeger, 1972), 
pp.87-107.
^  Woodward, op.cit., Vol. II, p.221.
77 See Woodward, Vol. II; I. Maisky, Memoirs of a Soviet 
Ambassador> The War 1939-43, Trans. A. Rothstein (London, 
Hutchinson, 1957); and A.J. Eden, The Reckoning (London, 
Cassell, 1965).
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would soon fall within Soviet occupation". Concerning
Romania, for instance, Molotov said the Soviet Government
wanted neither territory nor to change the existing social 
7 8order. At the same time Stalin spoke of Allied solidarity
7 9built on "vital and lasting interests". It may be asked
then whether Stalin, in bargaining for a "sphere of
influence", or buffer zone, had in mind the complete
communisation of 'his' sphere. Deutscher argues that Stalin's
"actions show many strange and striking contradictions which
8 0do not indicate that he had any revolutionary master plan".
Similarly, well into 1944 the British Foreign Office had
difficulty in interpreting Russian policy. It was unsure
whether what the Soviet Union said reflected a genuine
uncertainty about her position vis-a-vis the western allies,
or whether it merely hid "a realist and 'imperialist' policy
intended to secure for the USSR the future domination of 
81Europe". If Djilas was accurate in reporting Stalin as 
having said, "this war is not as in the past; whoever 
occupies a territory also imposes on it his own social system. 
Everyone imposes his own system as far as his army has the 
power to do so", Stalin, while perhaps not having a master
8 2plan, did expect to "communise" a Soviet sphere of influence.
It has already been mentioned that, at the Teheran 
Conference, Churchill argued for joint Anglo-American 
operations in the Mediterranean and Balkan regions. While
Woodward, Vol. II, p.104.
7 9 J.V. Stalin, On the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet 
Union (Moscow, Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1945), p.139.
80 Ibid. , p .552.
81 Woodward, op.cit., Vol. Ill, p.106.
8 2 M. Djilas, Conversations with Stalin (Harmondsworth,
Penguin, 1963), p.90.
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this was a matter of strategic opportunism, it is very
likely that Churchill had by then recognised "that strategic
decisions during the final phase of the war [would]... affect
8 3the shape of the post-war world". Without the presence of
British and American troops in the Balkans, there would be
nothing to offset Soviet control; the Red Army would have a
free hand. According to Isaac Deutscher the affirmation at
Teheran that any Mediterranean strategy was subsidiary to
Operation OVERLORD represented "Stalin's supreme triumph.
Perhaps only he and Churchill were aware of its
implications. Europe had now been militarily divided in
two ... an old dream of Russian diplomacy - the dream about
bringing the Balkans under Russian influence - was coming 
84true". There can be little doubt that as its armies 
advanced this became increasingly apparent to the Soviet 
Union, and so probably helped clarify its aims for the post­
war world. In the end these aims were informed by the idea 
that "the interest of the Soviet Union, her ability to 
rebuild her shattered economy and to avoid any threat to her
Western regions required complete... dominance of Eastern
8 5Europe and [perhaps] predominance in the continent".
To summarise, the burden of the argument has been that 
irrespective of when one policy rather than another was 
decided upon, towards the end of the war, the lynchpin of 
Soviet plans for post-war order was hegemony over central-east 
Europe and the Balkans. A Soviet sphere of influence 
comprised of a "glacis" of "friendly" states was perceived to 
be the prerequisite for Soviet security. Britain and the 
United States appreciated that the Soviet Union would require 
friendly governments along its borders but perhaps failed to
A .B. Ulam, Expansion and Coexistence 3 The History of Soviet 
Foreign Policy 1917-1967 (New York, Praeger, 1968), p.357.
84 Isaac Deutscher, op.cit., p.494.
8 5 Ulam, op.cit., p.368.
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recognise what the term "friendly" meant for Stalin. In a 
telegram he sent to Washington on September 20, 1944,
Harriman asserted that the Russians had "in mind something 
quite different from what we mean when they insist on having 
'friendly governments' in their neighboring countries... to 
put it in terms that we would understand, I believe that it 
is their intention to have a positive sphere of influence
O £over their Western neighbors and the Balkan countries...". 
Indeed, as far as the Soviet Union was concerned, its 
integrity in the post-war world would be secured only by 
control of the small states along its western borders. This 
was not compatible with the principles of the Atlantic 
Charter and was bound to bring the United States and the 
Soviet Union into conflict. In particular it meant that as 
long as the Soviet Union felt unable to rely, for its 
security, on a universal organisation, the traditional methods 
of international politics would take precedence.
So much for the place of spheres of influence in the 
post-war aims of each of the Big Three allied powers. How 
was it that spheres of influence became a legacy of the war? 
What, in spite of public disagreement, was there to suggest 
an incipient tacit understanding as to spheres of influence?
IV.
In the first place the formation of post-war spheres of 
influence in Europe was very much a matter of which of the 
Allied powers occupied particular regions. As has already 
been suggested the absence of British and American troops in 
the occupation of Romania, for example, meant the Soviet 
Union had predominant control. Similarly Britain and the 
United States had control of Italy and Greece. Coupled with 
this, in the second place, was the exclusion of the Soviet 
Union from the Control Commission in Italy and subsequently 
of the United States and Great Britain in Bulgaria, Hungary 
and Romania.
A .W . Harriman, America and Russia in a Changing World
(New York, Doubleday, 1971), p.34.
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In May 1943 Mr Eden argued in a Cabinet paper that some
sort of agreement on the administration of armistices "would
be necessary if...the signature by the Soviet Union of a
separate armistice and the organisation of a separate Russian
8 7system in Eastern Europe" were to be avoided. It was
subsequently proposed that "the administration of any
armistice should be placed in the hands of an Allied
Armistice Commission, the President to be alternatively a
representative of the United States, U.S.S.R. and the United
Kingdom". Armistice Commissions were set up but in Italy
the Soviet Union did not obtain effective participation. Not
only did this mark the first, "and possibly the decisive step
in the process which led to post-war Italy becoming a member
of the Western camp", it was also a precedent for Eastern 
8 8Europe. "Having excluded Russia from any but nominal
participation in Italian affairs", wrote W.H. McNeill, "the
Western Powers prepared the way for their own exclusion from
8 9any but a marginal share in the affairs of Eastern Europe". 
Thus, the division of Europe was contributed to, if not begun 
by the exclusion of the Soviet Union from effective 
participation in the Control Commission in Italy.
Just as the Soviet Union had no effective role in the 
Control Commission in Italy, Britain and the United States 
had no effective part in implementing the armistice in 
Romania. This, however, was not because of Soviet actions 
alone. American officials approved of Soviet proposals for 
the Romanian surrender and although the State Department 
thought the United States should maintain an interest and 
was not willing to grant the Soviet Union complete 
independence of action, it recognised the "Soviet Union's
E.L. Woodward, British Foreign Policy in the Second World
War (London, H.M.S.O., 1962), pp.443-44.
8 8 Geoffrey Warner, 'Italy and the Powers, 1943-49', in S.J. 
Woolf (ed.), The Re-birth of Italy, 1913-1950 (London, 
Longmans, 1972), pp.32-37.
89 W.H. McNeill, op.cit., p.310. Cited by Geoffrey Warner,
ibid.
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90primary interest in Rumania". State Department officials
hoped that when the time came "an inter-Allied council or
mission would be created in Rumania to prevent the
91establishment of a Soviet sphere of influence". When 
Romania did sue for peace the United States approved the 
Soviet armistice terms and
did not object to Soviet insistence that the 
Soviet military commander exercise complete control 
in the functioning of the Allied Control Commission.
No doubts existed as to what the United States 
had agreed to in approving these Soviet terms.
Ambassador Harriman reported that the Russians 
believed "that we lived up to a tacit understanding 
that Rumania was an area of predominant Soviet 
interest in which we should not interfere".
In view of this it is interesting that a briefing paper 
prepared for the Yalta Conference stated that the State 
Department did not accept that the evidence at hand supported 
the fear expressed by a group of prominent Romanian leaders 
"that the Soviet Union's... policies in Rumania [were] aimed
93at the eventual domination and annexation of that country".
The United States also took no significant part in
armistice arrangements in Bulgaria and Hungary. As to
Bulgaria the State Department stated that "the U.S.
Government does not expect or desire a responsibility or
participation fully equal with that of the Soviet Government
94in the Control Commission for Bulgaria". Similarly with 
regard to Hungary a briefing paper asserted that "the United 
States would not, of course, take the position of supporting
Memorandum by Cloyce K. Huston of the Division of Southern 
European Affairs, April 11, 1944, U.S. Department of State, 
Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers,
1944, Europe, Vol. IV (Washington, D.C., U.S. Government 
Printing Office, 1966), p.172. Cited by Davis, op.ait,, p.166. 
All future citations of the Foreign Relations of the United 
States will simply refer to FRUS, followed by the year and/or 
volume and page number(s).
91 Lynn Davis, The Cold War Begins, op.cit., p.167.
92y Ibid.
93 FRUS, 1945, Malta and Yalta, p.248.
94 FRUS, 1945, Malta and Yalta, p.240.
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Hungary against the Soviet Union". The United States 
government, it continued, "recognizes that the Soviet
9 5Union's interest in Hungary is more direct than ours".
In short, in its policies toward Romania, Bulgaria and
Hungary the United States government "in effect acceded to
Soviet predominant post-war political, military, and
economic influence in these three countries". What is more,
during 1944 the United States seemed to have two
contradictory policies toward Eastern Europe. "While
opposed in principle to the establishment of spheres of
influence in Europe, the United States government, by its
actions and inaction, in effect granted the Soviet Union such
96a sphere of influence in Eastern Europe". The alternatives
were for the United States either publicly to accept a Soviet
sphere of influence or to "promote the Atlantic Charter
principles through more active intervention in the internal
97affairs of" the countries concerned. But as it did neither 
it might well have been inferred by the Soviet Government 
that in spite of what the United States Government was saying, 
it in fact was acquiescing in Soviet control.
Together with the matter of participation in the Control 
Commissions and the inaction of the United States as the 
power publicly opposed to spheres of influence, the Churchill- 
Stalin percentages agreement also contributed to the 
impression that there was a mutual acquiescence in spheres 
of influence. Not only did Britain and the United States 
take no effective part in what happened in Romania, Hungary 
and Bulgaria, from which the Soviet Union might have inferred 
that the Churchill-Stalin arrangement was being observed, but 
also Stalin deliberately gave no support to the activities of 
Communist groups in Greece. Indeed the Soviet Union remained
FRUS, 1945, Malta and Yalta, p.245. 
^  Lynn Davis, op.cit., p.170.
^  Ibid., p.170.
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silent when British occupation forces suppressed the uprising
led by the Communist ELAS party. Not only did it remain
silent, if Djilas is accurate, Stalin thought "the uprising
98m  Greece must be stopped, and as quickly as possible". 
Stalin, argued one writer, "tactfully remained silent, true 
to his recent bargain regarding spheres of influence". It 
is more likely than not that Stalin took the percentages 
agreement at face value and expected that by not aiding the 
communists in Greece the Soviet Union would accordingly be 
left to consolidate its control in Eastern Europe unimpeded 
by its allies.
V.
In summary, each of the three great allied powers 
differed as to how they regarded spheres of influence and as 
to how they thought a lasting peace could be achieved. The 
United States was committed to the idea of a new economic 
order dependent upon a general security organisation. 
International politics was to be a matter of principle and 
not of power politics. In the new order spheres of influence 
would have no place. The United States refused to consider 
Soviet claims to territory before the post-war settlement 
because it saw the fulfilment of such claims as leading to 
spheres of influence. Great Britain on the other hand was 
more flexible. It was more willing to countenance Soviet 
claims to territory, and it was from deference to the United 
States that she refused to accommodate those claims. Unlike 
United States officials, Churchill was sceptical of the 
prospects for post-war cooperation and thought in traditional 
terms of restoring a balance of power in Europe. In 1944, 
when he went to Moscow and suggested respective percentages
98 Conversations with Stalin, op,cit., p.141.
99 J.L. Snell (ed.), The Meaning of Yalta, op.cit,, p.97. It 
should be noted, however, that some authors claim Stalin 
launched a propaganda campaign against Britain through 
indirect channels. In particular through Radio Belgrade.
For this argument, see S. Morrell, Spheres of Influence (New 
York, Duell, Sloan, Pearce, 1946), p.137.
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of interest for Britain and the Soviet Union in the Balkans 
and Greece, it was as much as anything else an attempt to 
maintain some British influence and a semblance of the 
balance of power. The Soviet Union wanted to establish a 
buffer zone along its western boundaries and sought to do 
so by fostering governments which it regarded as "friendly". 
The absence of any willingness by the United States to 
accept a Soviet sphere of influence which, had it been 
present, might have allowed the Soviet Union to endure non­
communist governments on its frontiers, ultimately meant the 
establishment of communist governments in eastern Europe.
These differences between each of the allied powers were 
muted by their common war aims and by the principles to which 
all subscribed, but as the war drew to a close they became 
increasingly apparent. Of most importance for the post-war 
world was the difference between Soviet and United States 
aims.
When Britain and the United States occupied Italy, the 
Soviet Union was excluded from effective participation in 
the administration of the armistice. Whether or not the 
Soviet Union saw this as a precedent for it to exclude 
Britain and the United States in the countries it occupied, 
that is what it did. But what is more important here is that 
the United States was content to allow the Soviet Union to 
exercise virtually complete control over the armistice in 
those countries. The United States did not demand an 
increased role in administering the armistice arrangements 
in Bulgaria, Romania or Hungary. It is reasonable to think 
that this might have suggested to Soviet leaders that the 
United States was acquiescing in a Soviet sphere of influence. 
And further, since the Soviet Union had been excluded from 
effective participation in Italy, it might have been thought 
that a division of Europe into spheres of influence was under 
way. In keeping with this the Soviet Union dissociated itself 
from the communist-led uprising in Greece. In sum, the 
acquiescence in regions of predominant control which began 
even before the war ended can be seen as the beginning of
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tacit understanding as to spheres of influence. But if it 
were so perceived by the Soviet Union, it was not by the 
United States. The United States argued that influence of 
the kind the Soviet Union was exerting conflicted with the 
Atlantic Charter principles and with the vision of order to 
which it was committed.
The next chapter deals in more detail with the ways in 
which there was acquiescence and with how, in spite of 
declared United States policy, both the Soviet Union and the 
United States consolidated spheres of influence in the 
post-war world.
* * * *
CHAPTER FIVE
THE CONSOLIDATION OF SPHERES OF INFLUENCE
The agreement as to principle and the hope for 
cooperation expressed in the Atlantic Charter continued into 
the last year of the war. But beneath the surface of 
cooperation spheres of influence were becoming a reality 
which increasingly divided the allied powers. Eastern Europe 
was becoming a Soviet sphere of influence which the United 
States was reluctant to accept and which it regarded as a 
violation of the Atlantic Charter principles. There was no 
agreement between the Soviet Union and the United States as 
to the political future of eastern Europe and once this was 
acknowledged, each power consolidated the spheres of 
influence that had already formed. The Soviet Union 
tightened its control over eastern Europe and the United 
States sought to restrict Soviet influence on the continent 
to eastern Europe. In the western hemisphere the United 
States asserted its predominance over Latin America and 
consolidated what had long been its sphere of influence.
This chapter first sets out the principles which came 
after, and added to, the Atlantic Charter together with what 
happened to challenge them. Second, it deals with the 
Truman Doctrine and the Marshall aid program in relation to 
the consolidation of the Soviet sphere, and thirdly with the 
relationship between the United States and Latin America.
I.
In February 1945, the allied powers met at Yalta and 
reached agreement on the principles that were to determine 
the nature of the government of the ex-satellite and 
liberated countries. Foremost among the documents which 
resulted from the conference was the declaration On 
Liberated Europe, It was drawn up by the State Department 
and enjoined the peoples of liberated Europe "to create 
democratic institutions of their own choice". This, it 
stated, was "a principle of the Atlantic Charter [which had 
laid down] the right of all people to choose the form of
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government under which they will live". By the Declaration
the Soviet Union, the United States and Great Britain each
undertook to assist, if conditions so required, in the
formation of "interim governmental authorities broadly
representative of all democratic elements in the population
and pledged to the earliest possible establishment through
free elections of governments responsive to the will of the
people...". The Declaration further stated that the three
powers reaffirmed their faith in the principles of the
Atlantic Charter and their pledge in the Declaration of the
United Nations. It was intended also that the Declaration
would establish the principle of joint tripartite
2responsibility in eastern Europe.
In the protocol of the conference the three powers
proclaimed a common desire for Poland to be "strong, free,
independent and democratic". Accordingly, it was agreed that
the Provisional Government, led by the so-called Lublin
Poles, was to be reorganised on a broad democratic basis
with the inclusion of democratic leaders from Poland itself
and from Poles abroad. The new government was to be known
as the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity and
it was to be pledged to holding "free and unfettered
elections as soon as possible on the basis of universal
3suffrage and secret ballot".
Similarly, the principle of free elections was agreed 
upon for Yugoslavia. It was to be recommended to Marshall 
Tito and to Dr Subasic that the Tito-Subasic agreement, 
which had stipulated that free elections for a 
constitutional assembly would be held within three months
1For the text of the Declaration on Liberated Europe, see 
Appendix B.
2 See M.F. Herz, Beginnings of the Cold Wav (Bloomington, 
Indiana University Press, 1966), p.85.
 ^ See Appendix A, D.S. Clemens, Yalta (New York, Oxford 
University Press, 1970).
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of the liberation of the whole country, be put into effect.
The concern with free elections in both these cases and the 
emphasis placed upon them in the Declaration on Liberated 
Europe reflected American and to a lesser extent British 
fears that the Soviet Union would impose Communist 
governments in eastern Europe and the Balkans.
Finally, a communique issued at the end of the
conference asserted a common determination to maintain the
cooperation which had developed during the war. Only
through such cooperation, it stated, would a secure and
lasting peace be achieved. This, together with the
Declaration on Liberated Europe and the stipulations in the
Protocol of the conference concerning specific countries
such as Poland and Yugoslavia, seemed to settle conflict
between the Allies as to the political future of eastern
Europe and to offer hope for cooperation between the three
great powers. Soviet acceptance of the Declaration on
Liberated Europe appeared to resolve the "potential conflict
which had existed between the United States commitment to
the Atlantic Charter principles and Soviet intentions to
establish a sphere of influence in eastern Europe through
5the creation of friendly governments". Thus, in much the 
same terms as Cordell Hull had used upon his return from 
Moscow in 1943, Roosevelt told the Senate that the Crimean 
conference "was a successful effort by the three leading 
nations to find a common ground for peace. It spells - and 
it ought to spell - the end of the system of unilateral action, 
exclusive alliances and spheres of influence, and the balance 
of power and all other expedients which have been tried forgcenturies and always failed".
4
H. Feis, Churchill, Roosevelt and Stalin (New Jersey, 
Princeton University Press, 1957), p.543. Note - Tito was 
leader of the resistance forces in Yugoslavia and Subasic 
head of the anti-communist Yugoslav government in exile.
5 L.E. Davis, The Cold War Begins (New Jersey, Princeton 
University Press, 1974), p.201.
g Quoted by M. Donelan, The Ideas of American Foreign Policy
(London, Chapman and Hall, 1963), pp.19-20.
Ill
After Yalta the next occasion on which the leaders of
the big three met to discuss the problems of the ex-satellite
and liberated countries was in July at Potsdam. In the four
months between the two conferences the conflict between what
was happening in eastern Europe and the principles to which
the allied powers subscribed became increasingly apparent to
the United States. However, once more the conflict did not
become an open breach. In the Protocol of the conference it
was noted that the Polish Provisional Government had agreed
to holding free and unfettered elections as soon as possible.
As to Romania, Bulgaria and Hungary, where events had most
seemed to challenge the Declaration on Liberated Europe, it
was merely agreed that a Council of Foreign Ministers be
delegated to the task of drawing up treaties of peace and
of proposing settlements for territorial questions. No
mention was made in the Protocol of the allied commitment
to the principles of the Declaration or to the necessity of
joint Allied consultation and supervision of the holding of
free elections in eastern Europe. Nevertheless, "President
Truman interpreted the Potsdam agreements as a reaffirmation
of the Allied commitment to the principles of the Declaration7on Liberated Europe". In his report to the Nation he stated 
that the declarations concerning Romania, Bulgaria and 
Hungary issued at Potsdam meant "[t]hese nations are not to0be the spheres of influence of any one power". Thus, while 
allied conflict as to the political future of eastern Europe 
was not solved at Potsdam, there continued to be the 
appearance of commitment by each of the three powers to the 
principles of the Declaration on Liberated Europe. It may 
be that there was a genuine difference in interpretation of 
the same principles rather than a sham commitment; but either 
way it was not until later in the year that the conflict 
became public and explicit.
Between the Yalta and Potsdam conferences the United 
Nations conference was convened in San Francisco and the
L.E. Davis, op.cit., p.297.
8 Cited in ibid., p.298.
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Charter of the United Nations Organisation drawn up. The
Charter was of immediate importance insofar as it contributed
to the hope of continued cooperation. Although, as with the
Declaration on Liberated Europe, "the imminence of peace, or
at least of armistice, was only too obviously loosening the
bonds of the wartime coalition and endangering that Unity of
the Big Three which everyone agreed to be indispensable for
9the establishment of world order".
In the longer term the Charter was, and is, important for 
the bearing its principles and provisions have had on the 
way spheres of influence have been regarded. Foremost in 
this respect are Articles 2(1), 2(4) and 52. Article 2(1) 
laid down the principle of sovereign equality for all members 
of the Organisation while Article 2(4) states that: "All
members shall refrain in their international relations from 
the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity 
or political independence of any state, or in any other 
manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations". 
Spheres of influence are not consistent with the principle 
of sovereign equality. Influencing powers have used force 
against the territorial integrity and political independence 
of the states they influence and have accordingly been 
judged to have contravened the Charter. For a power to 
admit to an understanding as to spheres of influence with an 
influencing power that does use force would be to condone 
contravention of the Charter. The need to appear to uphold 
the Charter is, therefore, a primary reason for 
understandings as to spheres of influence not being openly 
acknowledged and indeed often denied.
Article 52, like Article 21 of the Covenant before it, 
provided for regional arrangements. It states in part that 
"Members of the United Nations entering into such 
arrangements or constituting such agencies shall make every 
effort to achieve pacific settlement of local disputes 
through such regional arrangements or by such regional
H.G. Nicholas, The United Nations as a Political 
Institution (London, Oxford University Press, 1967), 3rd ed., p. 9.
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agencies before referring them to the Security Council".
In practice influencing powers have used this provision to 
argue that actions they have committed which have limited 
the political freedom of the states they influence are 
beyond the competence of the United Nations.
What was the underlying reality which was to bring this 
about and which ended the hopes for cooperation?
II.
In the previous chapter it was argued that at the close 
of the war the aim of Soviet foreign policy with regard to 
eastern Europe was to establish a sphere of influence if for 
no other reason than to have and control a buffer zone.
This was not peculiar to Soviet Russia for it had also been 
an aim of Imperial Russia. However, this did not exclude 
the possibility that Soviet aims were at the same time 
revolutionary. There was not necessarily any contradiction 
between Soviet policy being a continuation of the 
imperialism of the Tsars and it being revolutionary in 
purpose. Indeed Isaac Deutscher argued that in the closing 
phases of the war it became almost impossible to disentangle 
the revolutionary and traditional strands of Stalin's 
policy.^ This meant that while Britain and the United 
States might not have objected to a Soviet buffer zone or a 
sphere of influence of some sort, they did object to the 
way the Soviet Union was establishing one and to the form it 
took. For the Soviet Union, "friendly governments" along 
its western borders seemed to mean communist governments. 
Thus, "[w]hat seemed an elementary precaution to safeguard 
the security of the Soviet Union to one side seemed Communist 
duplicity and aggression to the other; and in the face of 
this stubborn contradiction of views, the Grand Alliance 
gradually dissolved into rival, hostile parts".^
Isaac Deutscher, Stalin (Harmonds^orth, Penguin, 1966), 
p.516.
^  W.M. McNeill, America, Britain and Russia - Their 
Cooperation and Conflict, 1941-1946 (London, Oxford, 1953), 
p.879.
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The establishment of communist governments in the
states of eastern Europe came about in three stages, the
12length of which varied from case to case. First there 
was a period of genuine coalition during which several 
parties, each with a different social basis and ideology 
competed openly and in conditions where there was freedom 
of expression and of the press. This period lasted until 
January 1945 in Bulgaria and March of the same year in 
Romania. In Hungary it lasted until February 1947 and in 
Czechoslovakia until February 1948. The second, succeeding 
phase, was one of bogus coalition. That is to say, the 
governments concerned still contained non-communist parties, 
but these were represented by people chosen by the communists 
rather than their own parties. While opposition was 
tolerated it became increasingly difficult. The peasant and 
bourgeois parties were gradually excluded from power and the 
communist party directed its activities towards gaining 
absolute control. Such was the state of affairs in Poland 
from liberation until the end of autumn 1947. In Bulgaria 
and Romania it lasted until spring 1945 and autumn 1947 
respectively and in Hungary until spring 1947.
Czechoslovakia leaped almost directly from a genuine 
coalition government to the third stage, which began in 
February 1948. This third stage took the form of monolithic 
regimes in which 'a single communist-managed "front", with 
one hierarchy, one centralized discipline and one 
organization' assumed power. In bringing this about there 
was generally an 'enforced fusion of well-purged Social 
Democrats with Communists in a United Workers' Party'. 
Governments of this type were established in Yugoslavia and 
Albania in 1945, while in the other countries mentioned, it 
was achieved by the end of 1948.
Thus by the time the Yalta conference assembled Soviet 
influence was well established in Bulgaria and Romania and
The three stages distinguished and the discussion which 
follows in this paragraph is a summary of H. Seton-Watson,
The East European Revolution (London, Methuen, 1950), pp.169- 71. See also Chapter 8 passim, and W.H. McNeill, America, 
Britain and Russia, op.cit., p.733ff.
1115
to a lesser degree in Hungary and Poland. In Hungary the
Soviet Chairman of the Control Commission had the major
share in determining policy. By the end of February, a
communist dominated government was in power in Romania and
in Bulgaria where American and British members of the
Control Commission complained of not being able to find out
13what was being done in their name. Shortly after the
Yalta conference an American official reported that the
Bulgarian Prime Minister saw the world "as largely divided
between three great powers and their respective spheres of
influence". The Balkans, he apparently thought, fell
squarely within the Soviet sphere of influence and he
considered it unrealistic to accept the view that spheres
of influence were outmoded in a world where two such
disparate systems as the Western and the Soviet had to find
14a way of existing side by side. The Bulgarian Prime
Minister was perhaps an example of one who, in Stalin's
words, "demonstrated by deeds their friendly attitude to the
Soviet Union and was willing honestly and sincerely to
15cooperate with the Soviet state".
During the Yalta conference Stalin implied that "Poland 
was an unrecognized sphere of influence". He compared 
Poland with France and argued "that de Gaulle had not been 
elected, and yet the Soviets had recognized his government 
[therefore] ... there should be reciprocal treatment for the 
Soviet sphere of influence". At the same time he referred 
to Greece and in so doing appeared to be "reminding Churchill 
that the British sphere of influence was safe because [he]
“I rpermitted it to be". This reference to the percentages
Feis, op.cit., pp.416-19.
FRUSj The Conference of Berlin (Potsdam), 1945, Vol. II, 
p.729.
15 Cited by M.F. Herz, op.cit., p.101.
1 r D.S. Clemens, op.cit., pp.198-99. See also a Soviet 
transcript of the meeting in International Affairs (Moscow) 
(July 1965), p.118.
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agreement of the previous year was significant in that 
whereas from Yalta onwards Britain claimed it was superceded 
by the Declaration on Liberated Europe, Stalin apparently 
thought of it as more permanent.
Stalin referred to Greece again in a letter he sent to 
President Truman. When Molotov met Truman on his way to 
San Francisco, the President upbraided him over the 
situation in Poland. Truman handed Molotov a memorandum to 
which Stalin replied by saying that the Soviet Union had not 
been consulted when the Governments of Belgium and Greece 
were formed. Moreover, it did not
claim the right to interfere in those matters 
because it realizes how important Belgium and Greece 
are to the security of Great Britain.... I cannot 
understand why in discussing Poland no attempt is 
made to consider the interests of the Soviet Union 
in terms of security as well. To put it plainly, 
you want me to renounce the interests of the 
security of the Soviet Union, but I cannot proceed 
against the interests of my country.^
Stalin was claiming both a sphere of influence and suggesting 
that there be reciprocity.
During the four months between the Yalta and Potsdam
conferences it became increasingly apparent that the holding
of free elections and the establishment representative
governments agreed to in the Declaration on Liberated Europe
was unlikely in eastern Europe. "Organized Communist parties
were increasing their influence and dictatorial regimes were
being established. Moreover, the Soviet Union was using the
Allied Control Commissions and the occupying Red Army to
18enforce total Soviet political control". As to Poland, for 
instance, the Soviet Union appeared to regard the Polish 
Provisional Government of National Unity, which was to have 
been established after Yalta, as no more than a matter of
17 Quoted by M.F. Herz, op.cit., pp.97-98.
18 L.E. Davis, op.cit., p.255.
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continuing the Warsaw Government dominated by the Lublin19Poles. In April the Soviet Union signed a treaty of 
mutual assistance with this Polish Provisional Government 
thereby both lending it legitimacy and making it all the 
more unlikely that the Yalta accords on Poland would be 
carried out.
At the Potsdam conference, the Soviet Union had two 
main goals. It wanted agreement as to extracting 
reparations from Germany and it wanted to secure British and 
American recognition of the new regimes established in 
eastern Europe. At the same time it wanted to win as many 
concessions as it could in aid of establishing a security 
zone to the south in the Balkans and in Iran. Whether 
Stalin "hoped to get British and American agreement to this 
at Potsdam, or whether he imagined rather that he would be 
able to present the Western Powers with a series of faits
accomplis which they would be powerless to undo, cannot be
20said". Either way, the conflict between what was 
happening in eastern Europe and the principles to which the 
United States clung was glossed over and did not come into 
the open until later in the year. What now of the United 
States?
III.
In the previous chapter, it was argued that during 
1944 two seemingly contradictory United States policies 
concerning eastern Europe developed. At the same time as 
it was opposed to a Soviet sphere of influence, the United 
States government, by its actions and inactions, in effect 
granted the Soviet Union such a sphere of influence in 
eastern Europe. This contradiction was not faced up to at
19 Stalin wrote to Roosevelt on December 27, 1944 - 'I have 
to say frankly that if the Polish Committee of National 
Liberation will transform itself into a Provisional Polish 
Government then, in view of the above said, the Soviet 
Government will not have any serious ground for postponement 
of the question of its recognition'. R.V. Laniels (ed.), A 
Documentary History of Communism, Vol. II (New York, Vintage 
Books, 1960), p.137.
20 W.M. McNeill, op.ait., pp.614-15.
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the Yalta conference. By the time of the Potsdam conference 
some members of the State Department had come to regard 
eastern Europe as a Soviet sphere of influence, but they 
were not yet prepared to accept a Soviet sphere.
In a Briefing Book Paper prepared for the Potsdam 
conference, State Department officials argued not merely 
that the Russians had "already gone far to establish an 
effective sphere of influence in eastern Europe", but that
21eastern Europe was "in fact, a Soviet sphere of influence".
With regard to this it recommended that United States policy
should be "to discourage the development of rival spheres of
influence, both Russian and British... Our primary objective
should be to remove the causes which make nations feel that
22such spheres are necessary to their security". In sum, it
was in the words of the Briefing Paper, "basic United States
23policy...to oppose spheres of influence in Europe". In 
view of the admission by some officials that eastern Europe 
was already a Soviet sphere of influence, this meant that 
the declared policy of the United States was revisionist 
from the outset, in that it sought to undo what was already 
done.
In May 1945 a review of United States policy toward 
Hungary, Bulgaria and Romania was undertaken. Two military 
officers, Generals Schuyler and Crane, both of whom had 
first hand experience of conditions in Romania and Bulgaria, 
were called home for consultation. Both argued that the 
situation in Romania and Bulgaria did not meet the 
requirements of the Yalta agreements and they rejected the 
idea that the United States should recognize a Soviet sphere 
of influence. "At the same time, they opposed the use of 
military force to attain United States goals. Instead they 
recommended that the United States continue to promote the
FRUS3 The Conference of Berlin (Potsdam), 1945, Vol. I, 
p.256 and p.259.
22 Ibid., p.257.
22 Ibid., p.262.
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principles of the Yalta agreement through 'diplomatic
pressure', a public statement of the political conditions
inside Rumania and Bulgaria, and by the threat of
withdrawing economic and financial assistance from the 24Soviet Union". Neither General Schuyler nor General Crane
offered any suggestions as to what types of 'diplomatic
pressure' the United States should use, but it was later
decided that the United States should not sign peace
treaties with the unrepresentative governments in Romania,
Bulgaria and Hungary. The United States neither tried
alternative policies such as bargaining with economic
credits and withholding lend-lease shipments, nor considered
the use of military force to attain implementation of the
25principles of the Declaration on Liberated Europe. It 
acted similarly with regard to the other states of eastern 
Europe.
One of the reasons the United States remained unwilling 
to recognise a Soviet sphere of influence was because 
Washington felt acceptance would encourage even further 
expansion. In October Secretary Byrnes sent a special 
representative, Mark Ethridge, to assess the situation in 
Bulgaria and Romania. Ethridge reported that in view 
of the Soviet attitude in Romania and Bulgaria, the United 
States had the alternative either of "continuing its 
policy of adherence to the position taken at Yalta and 
Potsdam or of conceding this area as a Soviet sphere of 
influence. Its present policy is presumably founded on two 
principles: namely, that peace will be secure only if based
on truly representative governments in all countries with 
Western political traditions, and that to concede a limited 
Soviet sphere of influence at the present time would be to 
invite its extension in the future. Unless the United States 
is prepared to abandon these two principles it must take the
L.E. Davis, op.oit, p.275. 
25 Ibid., p.287.
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2 6necessary steps to ensure their eventual application".
The United States was not prepared to abandon either 
principle but at the same time continued to do nothing 
effective toward the implementation of the principles of 
the Declaration on Liberated Europe.
By not trying all the possibilities that it might have
in aid of implementing the principles of the Declaration
and to oppose Soviet predominance, the United States perhaps
encouraged the Soviet Union to believe it actually had the
concurrence of the United States. Harriman suggested that
the generality of the principles adopted at Yalta may well
have led the Soviet Union to believe that the United States
would accept its predominance in eastern Europe. "It may
be difficult for us to believe", Harriman reported, "but it
may still be true that Stalin and Molotov considered at
Yalta that by our willingness to accept a general wording of
the declaration on Poland and Liberated Europe, by our
recognition of the need of the Red Army for security behind
its lines, and of the predominant interest of Russia in
Poland..., we understood and were ready to accept Soviet
27policies already known to us". If this were true, the 
actions and inactions of the United States in the months 
which followed Yalta can only have contributed to the 
impression that it was willing to accept Soviet policies.
Another factor was the claim the United States made as 
to the regions in which it had a special interest itself. At 
the time of the San Francisco conference in May 1945, United 
States policy as to spheres of influence was seen by one 
American official as placing the United States in an awkward 
position with regard to arguing for any special relationship 
between it and the states of Latin America. Secretary of
2 6 Ethridge memorandum, FRUS, Diplomatic Papers, 1945, Vol. 
V, p.637.
27 FRUS3 Diplomatic Papers, 1945, Vol. V, pp.821-22.
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State Stimson's aide, John J. McCloy, suggested to Stimson 
that United States claims as to Latin America might give 
the Soviet Union justification for similar claims with 
respect to eastern Europe and detract from the aims of the 
United Nations.
In a not altogether coherent telephone conversation 
with Stimson, McCloy suggested that if America insisted on 
control over the western hemisphere, the Soviet Union would 
"want to have the same thing in Europe and Asia", and that 
building up such big regional systems would "cut out the 
heart of the world organization". At the same time McCloy 
thought the United States should have its own region but 
that it should not bargain away its role in Europe on that 
account. Rather that the United States "ought to have [its] 
cake and eat it too." Stimson agreed and went on to say 
that he thought the Soviet Union would tie a big region to 
itself and that it was not asking too much for the United 
States to similarly have its region in the western 
hemisphere.
McCloy restated his concern that the Soviet Union would 
want something in return for an American region. Again 
Stimson answered that the Soviet Union would not "give up 
her right to act unilaterally in...nations around her...like 
Rumania and Poland". Whatever the United States did the 
Soviet Union would have a sphere of influence. Stimson went 
on to say that in any case the two powers were not in a 
parallel position
She's not such an overwhelmingly gigantic power 
from the ones which she's probably going to make a 
row about as we are here and on the other hand our 
fussing around among those little fellow [sic] there 
doesn't upset any balance in Europe at all. That's 
the main answer. It doesn't upset any balance there 
where she may upset a balance that affects us
Diary of Henry L. Stimson, May 8, 1945. Quoted in A.M. 
Schlesinger (ed.), The Dynamics of World. Power3 A Documentary 
History of United States Foreign P o l i c y 1943-1973 (New York, 
Chelsea House and McGraw-Hill, 1973), Vol. II Eastern Europe 
and the Soviet Union, W. LaFeber (ed.), pp.82-86.
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In other words, American predominance in the western 
hemisphere was no reason for the Soviet Union to claim 
predominance in eastern Europe. Whereas the United States 
in Europe would be no threat to the Soviet Union, if the 
United States were not in Europe, the Soviet Union might be 
a threat to the United States. The Soviet Union would not 
have seen it this way and it is more likely than not that 
McCloy was correct in suggesting that the Soviet Union would 
see United States predominance in the western hemisphere as 
a reason for its own predominance in eastern Europe.
However, this is not to suggest that had the United States 
renounced its predominance in the western hemisphere the
29Soviet Union would have done the same as to eastern Europe.
To summarise so far, at Yalta the principle of 
tripartite responsibility for the political and military 
problems of liberated Europe was established. In the 
Declaration on Liberated Europe the principles which were 
to guide the formation of representative governments were 
laid down and the conflict between the Atlantic Charter 
principles and Soviet aims in eastern Europe was apparently 
resolved. At the Potsdam conference, five months later, 
these commitments were reaffirmed. Between the two 
conferences it became increasingly apparent that the Soviet 
Union was establishing a sphere of influence. The United 
States was not prepared to accept a Soviet sphere and sought 
to oppose the Soviet Union mainly through rhetoric in support 
of the Declaration on Liberated Europe and by withholding 
recognition of the possible ways in which it might have 
opposed the Soviet Union. It might also have insisted upon 
joint consultation between the British, Soviet and American 
governments under the provisions of the Declaration. 
Alternatively, it might have withdrawn from participation 
in the Allied Control Commissions. It could have insisted 
upon United States supervision of the holding of free
This raises the question of reciprocity, which is 
discussed at the end of Chapter 6.
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elections. It might have bargained with lend-lease and 
financial aid to the Soviet Union. Finally, it might have 
used military force in an effort to implement the principles 
of the Declaration. By doing none of these and relying on 
merely asserting its commitment to the principles of the 
Declaration and withholding recognition of unrepresentative 
governments, the United States may have led the Soviet Union 
to believe that while it was opposed to a Soviet sphere in 
principle it would do little to oppose it in practice.
The question arises as to whether in 1945 the United 
States was opposed to a Soviet sphere of any kind whatsoever 
or only to one of the kind the Soviet Union was establishing. 
That is to say, it was perhaps not a matter of whether the 
Soviet Union should or should not have influence over eastern 
Europe, but what the nature and extent of its influence 
should be. In October 1945, Secretary of State James F. 
Byrnes said
We surely cannot and will not deny to other nations 
the right to develop such a policy as the Monroe 
Doctrine. Far from opposing, we have sympathized 
with, for example, the effort of the Soviet Union to 
draw into closer and more friendly association with 
her Central and East European neighbors. We are 
fully aware of her special security interests in 
these countries and we have recognized these interests 
in the arrangements we have made for the occupation 
and control of her former enemy states. We can 
appreciate the determination of the Soviet Union that 
never again will they tolerate the pursuit of policies 
in these countries deliberately directed against the 
Soviet Union's security and way of life.^O
Similarly a fortnight later Dean Acheson said: "We
understand and agree with them [the Russians] that to have
friendly governments along their borders is essential for
31the security of the Soviet Union". Thus, some American 
officials did consider that the Soviet Union had a
Quoted by Brian Thomas, 'Cold War Origins, II', Journal 
of Contemporary lliutory, Vol. 3, No. 1 (January 1968), p.186.
31 Ibid., p.185.
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legitimate interest in eastern Europe and perhaps would
have granted it some degree of influence. But on the other
hand, "Stalin had no intention of allowing anyone else any
political influence whatsoever in his sphere of influence,
in particular in Poland, Rumania, and Bulgaria... His sphere
was to be exclusive, and it was because of this conception
3 2that the situation became so serious". In terms of the 
principles to which they were committed, it was impossible 
for the United States and other western nations to accept a 
sphere of influence in the form in which it was imposed. It 
may be left for speculation as to whether the Soviet Union 
would have wanted to exert the degree of influence it did 
had the United States been less bound by the principles of 
the Declaration on Liberated Europe and more willing 
explicitly to recognise a Soviet sphere of influence.
Finally, in 1945, the reasons for which the United 
States opposed spheres of influence in its plans for post­
war order meant that it was not prepared to act according to 
the principle of the balance of power. For Morgenthau it 
was the "disregard for power political considerations [that
3 3ray] at the roots of the settlements of Yalta and Potsdam". 
The Soviet military presence and political influence could 
not be met with paper promises. Once the conflict over 
eastern Europe became explicit and public towards the end 
of 1945, it was not long before the United States did begin 
to act out of regard for balance of power considerations.
It did not do so by attempting to strip the Soviet Union of 
its influence in eastern Europe, but by consolidating the 
status quo. This it did through the Truman Doctrine, the 
Marshall Plan, and later the North Atlantic Treaty
J. Laloy, 'Origins of the Post-War Crisis: A Discussion',
Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 3, No. 2 (April 1968), 
pp.228-29.
33 H.J. Morgenthau, Germany and the Future of Europe (Chicago, 
Chicago University Press, 1951), p.80.
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Organization. The effect of these was a further 
strengthening of the appearance of United States 
acquiescence in and a further consolidation of the Soviet 
sphere of influence. Next to be considered, then, is the 
place of the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan in the 
consolidation of spheres of influence.
IV.
The Truman Doctrine was formulated as part of a
request to Congress for aid to Greece and Turkey. It was
not, however, formulated with regard only to Greece and
Turkey but to what United States officials perceived to be
the strategic importance of these two countries for the
Middle East, the Mediterranean and for the survival of the
free world. Throughout 1946 United States officials were
concerned about Soviet aims in Iran, Turkey and Greece. In
December 1945, the Soviet supported rebellion in the Iranian
province of Azerbaijan provoked fears that Iran might fall
under Soviet domination. Similarly it was thought that the
Soviet Union was aiming at the domination of Turkey, if for
no other reason than to secure control over the Straits of
the Dardanelles. In Greece there was the prospect of a
communist government which, it was thought, would be crucial
not only for Turkey and the Middle East, but also for the
34impact it might have in western Europe. In February 1947, 
in a memo to the Secretary of State, Acheson wrote: "The
capitulation of Greece to Soviet domination through lack of 
adequate support from the U.S. and Great Britain, might 
eventually result in the loss of the whole Near and Middle 
East and northern Africa. It would consolidate the position 
of Communist minorities in many other countries where their 
aggressive tactics are seriously hampering the development
Geoffrey Warner, 'The Truman Doctrine and the Marsha]1 
Plan', International Affairs, Vol. 50, No. 1 (January 1974), 
pp.82-87. See also J.M. Mackintosh, Strategy and Tactics of 
Soviet Foreign Policy (London, Oxford University Press, 1962), 
and D.S. McLellan, 'Who Fathered Containment? A Discussion', 
International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 17, No. 2 (June 1973).
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35of middle-of-the-road governments". Acheson went on to 
argue that as Greece and Turkey were unlikely to receive 
sufficient aid from Britain, the United States should assist.
It was at this time that the British government informed
the United States that after March 31 it would not be able to
provide further aid to Greece and Turkey. With reference to
this a special State Department committee recommended that
the United States had the choice either of taking
responsibility for Greece and Turkey or of facing "the
consequences of a widespread collapse of resistance to Soviet
pressure throughout the Near and Middle East and large parts
3 6of western Europe".
On March 12, 1947, Truman asked Congress for aid to
Greece and Turkey and his speech was cast in terms which went 
beyond the immediate purpose. In that part of his speech
which became known as the Truman Doctrine, the President told 
Congress that
every nation must choose between alternative ways of 
life...
One way of life is based upon the will of the 
majority, and is distinguished by free institutions, 
representative governments, free elections, 
guarantees of individual liberty, freedom of speech 
and religion, and freedom from political oppression.
The second way of life is based upon the will of 
a minority forcibly imposed upon the majority. It 
relies upon terror and oppression, a controlled press 
and radio, fixed elections, and the suppression of 
personal freedoms.
I believe that it must be the policy of the 
United States to support free peoples who are 
resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities 
or by outside pressures.^'
Memorandum to the Secretary of State, February 21, 1947, 
FRUS, 1947, Vol. V, pp.29-31.
3 6 Annex 2 to undated Henderson memorandum, FRUS, 1947, Vol. 
V, p.53; unsigned minutes of a meeting of the Secretaries of 
State, War and Navy, February 26, 1947 , ibid.,, pp.56-57.
37 D.S.B., Vol. XVI, No. 409A (May 4, 1947), p.831.
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The militant tone of this speech was no doubt partly due to 
the need to win public and Congressional support for the 
policies the administration was proposing to embark upon.
Buc presenting the matter as a choice between two ways of 
life implied that relations between States included a 
struggle about ways of life within them. What did this 
doctrine mean for the consolidation of spheres of influence?
First, Truman was of course referring to the forms of 
government represented by those of the United States and the 
Soviet Union. Most of the States of eastern Europe already 
had a communist government and "way of life" and the region 
had been privately acknowledged by United States officials 
as a Soviet sphere of influence. In effect the speech drew 
a line between these states and those where Soviet influence 
was not established. It was a formal declaration that the 
United States would resist any extension of the Soviet sphere 
of influence beyond its existing limits. As such it marked 
a recognition on America's part that eastern Europe was a 
Soviet sphere of influence.
Second, if the words "armed minorities" were to be
taken at their face value, the United States was henceforth
committed to the suppression of internal revolution all over
the world. In the context, "free" meant "anti-communist" and
3 8included "police states on this side of the Iron Curtain".
It meant, Kennan commented, that the United States "would
find it necessary to give aid, over the ensuing years, to a
number of regimes which could hardly qualify for it on the
39basis of their democratic character". Kennan had objected
B. Thomas, 'The Cold War and Henry Wallace', The Listener 
(September 15, 1966), p.378. For many officials and 
politicians it was not a matter of suppressing internal 
revolution but giving aid against intervention. With 
reference to the Truman Doctrine, Senator Arthur Vandenburg 
said: "I like what Elihu Root once said of our Monroe 
Doctrine: 'It rests upon the right of every sovereign state
to protect itself by preventing a condition of affairs in 
which it will be too late to protect itself'". See N.D. 
Markowitz, The Rise and Fall of the People's Century (New 
York, The Free Press, 1973), p.231.
39 G.F. Kennan, Memoirs 1925-1950 (London, Hutchinson, 1968), 
p.321.
128
to the speech the day before it was delivered. While he was
in favour of giving aid to Greece he did not believe any aid
should be given to Turkey and objected to the portrayal of
two ways of life and "the open-end commitment to aid free 40peoples". "It implied", he wrote, "that what we had 
decided to do in the case of Greece was something we would 
be prepared to do in the case of any other country, provided 
only that it was faced with the threat of 'subjugation by 
armed minorities or outside pressures'"
With regard to other countries Acheson had, on March 5,
pointed out to the Secretary of War that in the course of
discussions on Greece and Turkey the idea had frequently
been expressed that they were merely part of a wider problem.
He recommended, therefore, that a study be made in order to
ascertain which other countries might warrant aid. This was
undertaken by the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee,
which shortly submitted a list in estimated order of urgency
and which included Hungary. The Joint Chiefs of Staff did
not agree with the order of priority. "They felt that
countries like Hungary, which were within the Soviet sphere
of influence, should be removed from the list, and their
pecking order actually put Turkey and Greece fifth and sixth
42behind Britain, France, Germany and Italy". The Joint 
Chiefs of Staff were of the belief that from the point of 
view of national security, it was desirable to exclude every 
region under Soviet control from assistance. In this 
category they included Hungary, Poland and Czechoslovakia,
J.M. Jones, The Fifteen Weeks (New York, The Viking Press, 
1955), pp.154-55.
41 G.F. Kennan, op.cit., p.320. Note - Kennan was assumed to 
be the author of the Truman Doctrine after the publication of 
his so-called "X-Article" in Foreign Affairs, July 1947. 
However, in his Memoirs he claims that when he wrote the "X- 
Article", he had in mind "containment" only with respect to 
areas the United States considered vital to its security, not 
the whole world as the Truman Doctrine implied. See ibid., 
p.359.
42 Warner, op.cit., p.89.
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which they thought could not "in the foreseeable future be
43removed from Soviet influence". None of these countries 
had, at that time, fully-fledged Communist governments as 
did Romania and Bulgaria. Thus, whereas the United States 
might still have been able to oppose Soviet influence, 
particularly in Czechoslovakia, the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
were in favour of writing off the whole of eastern Europe as 
a Soviet sphere of influence.
Accompanying the Joint Chiefs of Staff's memorandum was
a report by the Joint Strategic Survey Committee which set
out recommendations as to which regions the United States
had a primary strategic interest. Foreshadowing NATO it
stated that the defence of the United States and Canada, of
Great Britain and France, was inseparable from the combined
defence of them all. It argued that Germany was potentially
the strongest military power in western Europe and that its
economic revival was of first importance. As to Latin
America it was recommended that the provisions in the Act of
Chapultepec for collective security be finalised and the
inter-American system drawn closer together. Finally, with
regard to the United Nations, the report stated that aid
such as was to be given to Greece and Turkey would undermine
the role of the United Nations and work against understanding
with the Soviet Union. But against this it cautioned that
the United Nations could not enhance the national security of
the United States. "On the contrary, faith in the ability of
the United Nations as presently constituted to protect, now
or hereafter, the security interests of the United States
would mean only that the faithful have lost sight of the
vital security interests of the United States and could quite
44possibly lead to results fatal to that security".
Memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to State-War-Navy 
Coordinating Committee, FRUS, 1947, Vol. I, p.736.
44 Ibid., pp.737-49.
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Each of these points reflected the trend of United 
States policy and in practice it was a policy which 
consolidated spheres of influence. Regarding Soviet 
predominance in eastern Europe as irreversible; recommending 
collective defence for North America and western Europe with 
the recovery of West Germany as an important part; 
strengthening a regional order in Latin America; and, 
finally, reluctance to entrust the security of the United 
States to the United Nations, were all steps in the 
direction of Great Power spheres of influence. Together 
with the Truman Doctrine these policies were not steps 
toward "the world without unilateral action and spheres of 
influence, without exclusive alliances and balances of power, 
which President Roosevelt pictured when he addressed Congress 
on his return from Yalta. It was not the world order of 
cooperation under international law", for which hopes had 
been held.^
After the Truman Doctrine, the second important 
innovation in United States policy during 1947 was the 
Marshall Aid Plan. As Secretary of State, General Marshall 
attended the Council of Foreign Ministers meeting held in 
Moscow during March and April. While there he had a long 
conversation with Stalin, which, according to Charles Bohlen, 
made a deep impression.^ Stalin was apparently indifferent 
to the recovery of western Europe and it seemed to Marshall 
that this was not without reason. For in the prevailing 
economic conditions in western Europe, Marshall saw "the 
kind of crisis that Communism thrived on". All the way back 
to Washington, Marshall talked of the importance of finding 
some initiative to prevent the complete breakdown of western 
Europe. On his return Marshall instructed Kennan to get the
45 Council on Foreign Relations, The U.S. in World Affairs, 
1947-48 (New York, Harper, 1948), p.l.
4 6 Charles E. Bohlen, Witness to History, 1929-1969 (New 
York, Norton, 1973), p.263.
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newly conceived Policy Planning Staff together to produce a
47report on the problem. In its report the Policy Planning 
Staff argued that the crisis had resulted largely from "the 
disruptive effect of the war on the economic, political, 
and social structure of Europe.... This situation has been 
aggravated and rendered far more difficult of remedy by the 
division of the continent into east and west". Thus, the 
Policy Planning Staff was of the opinion that Europe had 
already been divided.
The report went on to say that, although Communists
were exploiting the situation in Europe, "American effort
in aid to Europe should be directed not to the combatting
of Communism as such but to the restoration of the economic
health and vigor of European society. It should aim, in
other words, to combat not Communism, but the economic
maladjustment which makes European society vulnerable to
exploitation by any and all totalitarian movements and which
4 9Russian communism is now exploiting". This idea that the 
United States should inject aid into Western Europe to 
counteract the socio-economic conditions conducive to 
Communism became the rationale of the Marshall Aid Plan. 
However, there was more to it than merely wanting to save 
Western Europe from the clutches of Communism. In a 
memorandum, Under-Secretary of State for Economic Affairs 
William Clayton, argued that "[w]ithout further prompt and 
substantial aid from the United States, economic social and 
political disintegration will overwhelm Europe. Aside from 
the implications which this would have for the future peace 
and security of the world, the immediate effects on our 
domestic economy would be disastrous: markets for our surplus
production gone, unemployment, depression, a heavily 
unbalanced budget on the background of a mountainous war
See Kennan, op.cit., pp.325-26, and Warner, op.ait., p.90. 
4 8 Enclosure to Kennan memorandum, May 23, 1947, FhUS, 1947, 
Vol. Ill, pp.224-26, 228.
49 Ibid.
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50debt". In short, Clayton thought the collapse of Western 
Europe would be a serious blow to the prosperity of the 
United States."^
The intention of the Marshall Plan was to prevent Soviet 
influence from spreading into Western Europe. It was 
intentionally addressed to all of Europe and was in theory 
open to the participation of the Soviet Union and the states 
of Eastern Europe; but it was not expected that they would 
participate.
If the Russians came in the whole project would 
probably be unworkable because the amount of money 
involved in restoring both Eastern and Western 
Europe would be so colossal it could never be got 
from Congress, especially in view of the strong and 
growing reaction against the Soviet Union. But 
there was a strong probability that the USSR would 
never come in on a basis of disclosing full 
information about their economic and financial 
condition, which was necessary if a common recovery 
plan were to work.52
Clayton memorandum, May 27, 1947, FRUS, Vol. Ill, pp.230-32. 
51 With regard to this, note should be taken of the school of 
thought which gives economic interests a central place in the 
determination of United States policy. The Kolkos, for 
instance, argue that "during and immediately after World War 
II the key American leaders articulated an economic 
interpretation of the sources of world conflict that usefully 
complemented their vision of the United States' post-war 
needs". Furthermore, "[t]he question of foreign economic 
policy was not the containment of Communism, but rather more 
directly the extension and expansion of American capitalism 
according to its new economic power and needs. Primarily, 
America was committed to inhibiting and re-directing other 
forces and pressures of change abroad in the world among non-, 
even anti-, Soviet States. Russia and Eastern Europe were an 
aspect of this problem...". G. and J. Kolko, The Limits of 
Power, The World and United States Foreign Policy, 1945-1954
(New York, Harper & Row, 1972), pp.12 and 23. The general 
thrust of the revisionist school, of which the Kolkos are 
representatives, is that American suspicion of the Soviet 
Union was unjustified. It is argued that the Russians wanted 
only security and the Cold War was the result of defensive 
Soviet reactions to hostile moves on the part of the United 
States (especially moves of an economic nature), rather than 
the other way about.
52 J.M. Jones, op,cit.f p.253.
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By leaving it open to the Soviet Union to refuse
participation the United States hoped to avoid blame for the
division of Europe. "If they responded favourably", wrote
Kennan, "we would test their good faith by insisting that
they contribute constructively to the program as well as
profiting from it. If they were unwilling to do this, we
would simply let them exclude themselves. But we would not
5 3ourselves draw a line through Europe". There was in fact 
a very slim chance that the states of eastern Europe could
abandon the "near exclusive Soviet orientation of their
54economies" or that the Soviet Union would participate.
Thus, when the Plan was announced the Soviets "met it with
55the consolidation of their control in eastern Europe".
The effect of the Plan was that it divided Europe between 
American and Soviet predominance.
Within a month of Marshall's speech on June 5 at 
Harvard, which launched the Plan, the Soviet attitude to it 
was impressed upon Czechoslovakia and Poland. It was made 
clear that the independence and freedom of action of Poland 
and Czechoslovakia was limited by the Soviet Union. When 
it was announced both Czechoslovakia and Poland welcomed the 
Plan. At the beginning of July both were engaged in 
bilateral talks in Prague on economic matters and saw the 
Plan as offering some hope for lessening their difficulties. 
Their initial enthusiasm was dampened when Molotov walked out 
of talks on the proposed Plan held in Paris, but the Polish 
delegation in Prague hoped Czechoslovakia and Poland would 
nevertheless be able to participate. Arguments between the 
Great Powers, they reasoned, were not their concern.
On July 8, 1947, Czechoslovak leaders including Masaryk 
and Goltwald, the leader of the Communist party, went to
Memoirs, op.oit., p.342.
^  Allen memorandum, May 29, 1947, FEUS, 1947, Vol. Ill, p.235. 
5 5 Council on Foreign Relations, op.oit., p.444.
134
Moscow. This same day the Polish government announced that 
Poland would not participate in the Marshall Plan. When 
the Czechoslovak delegation arrived in Moscow, Goltwald, 
unknown to the other members, had a preliminary conference 
with Stalin. Goltwald then informed the other members of 
the delegation "that Stalin was furious and demanded 
Czechoslovak withdrawal from the Marshall Plan". As far as 
Stalin was concerned the Marshall Plan was aimed at 
isolating the Soviet Union and held no immediate economic 
advantages for Czechoslovakia. Stalin was reported as 
having said that "[i]n the Soviet Government no one doubts 
the friendship of Czechoslovakia for the Soviet Union. If 
you take part in the Conference you will prove by that act 
that you allow yourselves to be used as a tool against the 
Soviet Union. Neither the people nor the Government of the 
U.S.S.R. would tolerate that".~^ There was nothing for the 
Czechoslovaks to do but give up any further thought of 
participation. Masaryk concluded that Stalin did not want 
economic recovery in Western Europe and commented privately, 
"[i]t is a new Munich. I left for Moscow as Minister of 
Foreign Affairs of a Sovereign State. I am returning as 
Stalin's stooge".^
The Russian veto on Czechoslovak participation in the 
Marshall Plan was an act of consolidation and possibly a 
step toward the Coup of February 1948. From Moscow, the 
American Ambassador commented that in no previous instance 
had "the Soviet Government been so firm in handling its 
satellites.... The lines are drawn. Our response is awaited. 
I do not need to point out to the Department the repercussions 
of a failure to meet the Soviet challenge, in terms not only
M.A. Kaplan, The Communist Coup in Czechoslovakia
(Princeton Centre of International Studies, Research Monograph 
No. 5, January 1960), pp.13-14.
57 Cited by B. Kovrig, The Myth of Liberation (Baltimore,
Johns Hopkins, 1973), p.79.
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of the control of Europe, but of the impact which such a 
failure would have in the Middle and Far East and throughout 
the colonial world"
Another state which declined to participate in the 
Marshall Plan was Finland. This was not because of any 
ultimatum Finland received, but because of its own assessment 
of what would be tolerable to the Soviet Union. "Finland", 
commented a Finnish scholar and diplomat, "may have saved
5 9herself from Communism by saying no to the Marshall Plan".
While Finland would undoubtedly have fallen into great 
disfavour with the Soviet Union if it had decided to 
participate, it is impossible to say just what the Soviet 
Union would have done in response. However, that Finland 
felt obliged, and that Poland and Czechoslovakia were forced, 
to decline Marshall Aid, was a clear indication of how the 
Soviet Union perceived the relationship between these states 
and itself. For some observers the Marshall Plan was the
6 0turning point which marked the post-war division of Europe.
The Soviet reaction was certainly one of hastening to
consolidate and demarcate what it regarded as its sphere of
influence. For the western powers also, the time for
consolidation had arrived. Commenting on the rejection of
Marshall Aid by the states of Eastern Europe, the British
Foreign Secretary, Ernest Bevin, said: "I believe the time
61is ripe for the consolidation of western Europe". Thus, 
the lines were drawn: what had been going on since before
the end of the war was now explicit and open.
During the year that followed, the coup in Czechoslovakia, 
the Soviet-Yugoslav dispute, and the Berlin Blockade all served
Smith telegram, July 11, 1947, FRUS, 1947, Vol. Ill, p.327. 
59 Max Jakobson, Finnish Neutrality (London, Hugh Evelyn,
1968) , p.60.
6 0 For this view, see Louis Halle, 'The Turning Point1,
Survey, No. 58 (January 1966), pp.158-76.
^  Royal Institute of International Affairs, Documents on 
International Affairs 1947-1948 (ed., M. Carlyle) (London, 
Oxford University Press, 1952), p.211.
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further to consolidate and to demarcate the limits of Soviet 
and of United States influence. Let us look briefly at each 
of these before turning to the consolidation of United 
States influence in Latin America.
V.
The pro-Communist coup in Czechoslovakia, in February 
1948, caused a further deterioration in United States-Soviet 
relations. United States officials regarded the coup as 
having been directed from Moscow and indicative of Soviet 
plans for the whole of Europe. While the coup might have 
accorded with a contingency plan that would have been put 
into operation when the time seemed ripe, it is not at all 
clear that it did occur because of any Soviet plan or 
instigation. But whatever the reasons for it were, it had 
the effect of putting Czechoslovakia firmly within the Soviet 
sphere of influence. For the western powers this had a 
considerable effect on the future course of foreign policy in 
that it helped pave the way toward the formation of the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organisation. However, what is interesting 
here is United States policy toward Czechoslovakia just prior 
to the coup.
In November 1947, some Czechoslovak democrats, led by a 
Mr Zenkle, went to United States Ambassador Lawrence 
Steinhardt and expressed their fear that the Communists were 
preparing to seize power. Steinhardt told them that he knew 
Stalin and was sure that Stalin wanted to maintain 
Czechoslovakia as a display of cooperation between East and 
West. Mr Zenkle "referred to the execution of Petkov [in 
Bulgaria] and to the ineffective American protests.
Steinhardt replied that [whereas] Bulgaria had been a defeated 
enemy country the situation in Czechoslovakia was quite 
different. Czechoslovakia was an ally for whom the United 
States had great regard. Moreover, American troops were in 
Bavaria on the Czechoslovak border. The U.S...., would take 
an active interest in anything that happened in 
Czechoslovakia".
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Between making this allusion to United States military
force in November and February when the coup actually
occurred, Steinhardt visited the United States and arrived
back in Prague, as it happened, on the same day as the Soviet
Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs. Once again Steinhardt was
visited by Mr Zenkle, but on this occasion the Ambassador was,
to say the least, much less assuring. He told Zenkle "the U.S.
was in no position to aid the Czechoslovak democrats other than
6 2by expressions of sympathy or moral support". The change 
from the more hopeful assurances given at the previous 
meeting was perhaps the result of Steinhardt having been 
informed of a revision of United States policy during his 
visit to Washington. Possibly he was told that the United 
States regarded Czechoslovakia as already a Soviet sphere of 
influence and would not give it any aid. This much would 
have been in keeping with the recommendations of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff as to which countries should receive aid 
after Greece and Turkey.
Whereas the coup in Czechoslovakia consolidated and 
extended Soviet influence, the Soviet-Yugoslav dispute had 
the effect of putting Yugoslavia outside the Soviet sphere 
and of limiting its influence. According to Djilas, beneath 
the surface of political and ideological agreement in 
Yugoslav-Soviet relations there was actually an underlying 
reality of divergent practices and judgements which caused 
considerable friction. There were disagreements over 
recruiting for the Soviet Intelligence Service, ideological 
and economic matters and over the way the Yugoslavs ranked Tito 
next to Stalin. Stalin mistrusted the independence of the 
Yugoslavs and sought to bring them more closely under control. 
Belgrade was designated as the seat of Cominform, ostensibly in 
recognition of the Yugoslav revolution. But the real 
intention, Djilas argues, was "to lull to sleep the Yugoslav
62 Kaplan, op.cit., pp.19-26.
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leaders with revolutionary self-satisfaction and to
subordinate Yugoslavia to some supposed international
Communist solidarity - in fact, to the hegemony of the
6 3Soviet State, Djilas further argues that although
it has been thought that Stalin was generally against 
revolutions because he withdrew support from "the Chinese, 
Spanish, and in many ways even the Yugoslav revolutions", at 
decisive moments, this is not quite correct.
He was opposed only conditionally, that is, to the 
degree to which the revolution went beyond the 
interests of the Soviet State. He felt instinctively 
that the creation of revolutionary centres outside 
of Moscow could endanger its supremacy in world 
Communism, and of course that is what actually 
happened. That is why he helped revolutions only up 
to a certain point - up to where he could control 
them - but he was always ready to leave them in the 
lurch whenever they slipped out of his grasp.^4
In short, if Djilas is correct the Soviet-Yugoslav dispute, 
which developed into a break in relations, was very much a 
matter of Stalin wanting control over Yugoslav politics.
The break in relations came in June 1948, with 
Yugoslavia's expulsion from Cominform. In the resolution 
which announced the expulsion, Yugoslav leaders were accused 
of "pursuing an unfriendly policy toward the Soviet Union 
and the CPSU". The resolution stated that the Yugoslav 
leaders had shown a poor understanding of the international 
situation and were being intimidated by the "blackmailing 
threats of the imperialists". The Yugoslav leaders, it 
continued, "think they will be able to bargain with [the 
imperialists]... for Yugoslavia's independence and, gradually, 
get the people of Yugoslavia oriented... [to]... capitalism.
In this they proceed tacitly from the well-known bourgeois- 
nationalist thesis that 'capitalist states are a lesser 
danger to the independence of Yugoslavia than the Soviet
M. Djilas, Conversations with Stalin (Harmondsworth, 
Penguin, 1962), p.103.
64 M. Djilas, loc.cit.
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Union'...".^  It is reasonable to think that this was 
intended either to frighten Tito, Kardelj, Djilas and 
Rankovic into subservience to Moscow or to provoke a coup 
which would replace them with people who could be controlled 
by Moscow. In other words it was an attempt by the Soviet 
Union to consolidate its sphere of influence. If this was 
its purpose it failed and resulted in Soviet influence 
stopping at the Yugoslav border. Yugoslavia was not then 
in the sphere of any power.
Before the break, the United States had not made any
distinction between Tito or Yugoslavia and other states
under Soviet influence. After the break it began to
conceive of Yugoslavia as representing an acceptable middle
course which other socialist states in the Soviet sphere of
influence would be encouraged to follow. That is to say,
they would be encouraged to take their own roads to
socialism, which in terms of Yugoslavia meant that they
would become less dependent on, and controlled by, the Soviet
Union. Thus, following a meeting between Tito and Dulles
in 1954, a joint communique was issued which asserted the
importance for the states of Eastern Europe of independence,
of "non-interference from the outside in their internal
affairs, and [of] their rights to develop their own social
6 6and economic order in ways of their own choice". A policy 
which suited both Yugoslavia and the United States.
In the same month that Yugoslavia was expelled from 
Cominform, the Soviet command in Germany closed down all 
access to the western sections of Berlin except by air. The 
Soviet action was both a test of the resolution of the 
western powers to stay in Berlin and an attempt to defeat
6 5 Resolution of the Communist Information Bureau Concerning 
the Situation in the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, June 28, 
1948. See Royal Institute of International Affairs, The 
Soviet-Yugoslav Dispute (London, Oxford University Press, 
1948), pp.62-63, 68-70.
6 6 Council on Foreign Relations, Documents on American 
Foreign Relations 1955, Ed. P.E. Zinner (New York, Harper & 
Brothers, 1956), p.165, note 4.
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the currency reform introduced into Bizonia and Berlin.
Within a short time after Germany was occupied, United
States officials had been concerned with the need for
currency reform and made attempts to implement it through
the Allied Control Council. These attempts failed and, in
March 1948, the Council collapsed when the Soviet members
walked out. When this happened it was decided to introduce
new currency into Bizonia in June. Once it was introduced
the Soviet command imposed the blockade which it had already
6 7been moving toward for three months.
The Blockade, which the Soviets did not officially
admit existed, lasted almost a year and ended with the
announcement on May 4, 1949, that restrictions on transport
would be ended and that a meeting of the Council of Foreign
Ministers would be convened to consider the questions
relating to Germany and problems arising out of the situation
in Berlin. For the Soviet Union this amounted to an
admission that the blockade had failed; the currency reform
had succeeded and the Western presence in Berlin was
confirmed. It meant also that the status quo in central
6 8Europe was to be based on the division of Germany. While 
it did not achieve what was intended with regard to currency, 
the blockade served to demarcate the limits of Soviet 
influence in Germany.
In summary, the Truman Doctrine announced that the 
United States would henceforth resist what it perceived to 
be Soviet aims by attempting to contain Soviet influence 
within the limits it had already reached. At the same time 
it meant United States acquiescence in a Soviet sphere of 
influence in Eastern Europe. In that sphere were included 
some states such as Czechoslovakia and Hungary which were
See R.D. Murphy, Diplomat Among Warriors (London, Collins, 
1964), pp.310-17, and P. Windsor, City on Leave (London, 
Chatto & Windus, 1963), Chapter 5.
68 For this argument, see Windsor, op.cit., p.50.
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not then clearly under Soviet control. The Marshall Plan 
provoked the Soviet Union to further consolidation and the 
extent of Soviet influence was made clear when Poland, 
Czechoslovakia and Finland, all of which would have preferred 
to have participated in the plan, declined to do so. With 
the coup in Czechoslovakia and the Yugoslav-Soviet dispute 
in 1948, and the final outcome of the Berlin Blockade, the 
Soviet sphere of influence in eastern Europe was fully 
established. The process which had been going on since 
before the end of the war had reached maturity. Having thus 
dealt with the Soviet sphere of influence in Europe it 
remains to trace post-war developments which had a bearing 
upon the United States sphere of influence in Latin America. 
This is done with the purpose of providing the background 
for dealing, in Chapter Six, with the actions of the Soviet 
Union and of the United States, from which it may be inferred 
that there is tacit understanding as to spheres of influence.
VI.
Whereas the post-war policies of the United States 
toward Europe were at first derived from its commitment to 
the Atlantic Charter principles and then revised in response 
to what it perceived as a threat from the Soviet Union, its 
policies towards Latin America were an extension of the 
pre-globalist traditions that had guided American statecraft 
since the time of President Monroe. United States 
involvement in Europe represented a break with the 
isolationism of its past, but its actions and policies with 
respect to Latin America were a continuation of earlier 
policies. Unlike the de facto predominance the Soviet Union 
established in eastern Europe, the United States was able to
consolidate its predominance in Latin America within a
.juridical framework. When, in the late 1940s and early 1950s, 
"international communism" was perceived as a threat to the 
western hemisphere, the United States invoked the Monroe 
Doctrine: in particular that part of the doctrine aimed at 
precluding the political system of European powers from the
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hemisphere. Not only did the United States reaffirm the 
Monroe Doctrine, but succeeded in having it formally 
accepted as a hemispheric principle by all members of the 
inter-American system. In terms of law, the acceptance by 
the Latin American states of the Monroe Doctrine as a 
principle of continental solidarity did not necessarily mean 
acceptance of United States predominance within the 
continent. But in fact the United States was predominant 
and, in promoting hemispheric solidarity, it was concerned 
with consolidating a sphere of influence. It is proposed to 
proceed by saying something, first, of the principles of the 
inter-American system and second, of United States policy 
and of its practice with reference to Guatemala in 1954 and 
then Cuba in 1961.
With the outbreak of World War II, the preoccupations
which had given rise to the Monroe Doctrine were revised.
The possibility both of colonial possessions passing from
one European power to another during the war and of an
attack on the hemisphere brought the Foreign Ministers of
the American Republics together in Havana in July 1940. At
that meeting later treaties for collective security were
foreshadowed by the declaration that "any attempt on the part
of a non-American State against the integrity or inviolability
of the territory, the sovereignty or the political
independence of an American State shall be considered as an
act of aggression against the states which sign this 
6 9declaration". Similarly at the third meeting of Foreign
Ministers, in Rio de Janeiro in January 1942, it was once
more affirmed that an attack against one American State was
7 0to be considered an attack against all. This principle 
was retained and formalised at later inter-American
S.F. Bemis, The Latin American Policy of the United States
(New York, Harcourt and Brace, 1943), pp.368-73.
70 S.F. Bemis, loc.cit.
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conferences and has been important in justifications the 
United States has given for actions it has taken against 
American States.
The provisions in the Charter of the United Nations for
regional arrangements, together with certain stipulations in
inter-American treaties with regard to the United Nations,
have also been important in this respect. When the United
States went to Dumbarton Oakes to discuss plans for post-war
order, it did so without having consulted its Latin American
associates. The initial approval at Dumbarton Oakes of
regional arrangements, provided their powers of enforcement
were to be employed only with the authorisation of the
Security Council, created misgivings in the American
republics about the prospect of a Security Organisation
71dominated by the Great Powers. They therefore urged a 
meeting with the United States and so the Inter-American 
Conference on the Problems of War and Peace was convened at 
Chapultepec Castle in Mexico City one month before the United 
Nations Conference.
At the Chapultepec conference an agreement known as the
Act of Chapultepec was signed. It declared itself to
constitute "a regional arrangement for dealing with such
matters relating to the maintenance of international peace
and security as are appropriate for regional action in [the] 
72Hemisphere". This required recognition, in line with the 
Dumbarton Oakes proposals, of regional arrangements in the 
Charter of the United Nations. There was a precedent for 
this in Article 21 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, 
which, as was previously stated, provided for "the validity 
of international engagements, such as treaties of arbitration
H.G. Nicholas, The United Nations, op.cit., p.34.
72 G. Connell-Smith, The Inter-American System (London,
Oxford University Press, 1966), p.133. See also, Report of 
the Delegation of the United States of America to the Inter- 
American Conference on Problems of War and Peace (Washington, 
D.C., 1946).
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or regional understandings like the Monroe Doctrine, for
7 3securing the maintenance of peace". At San Francisco not
only the Great Powers, but also smaller states which were
members of the inter-American system, the British
Commonwealth or the Arab League and which did not want to
be tied by a Great Power veto, had an interest in regional
organisations. The "pressures in favour of recognizing
regional arrangements were greater even than at Dumbarton 
74Oakes". Thus, provision was made in Article 52 of the
Charter for Regional Arrangements to deal with such matters
relating to the maintenance of international peace and
security as were appropriate for regional action. Moreover
the Charter stipulated that "the Security Council shall
encourage the development of pacific settlement of local
7 5disputes through such arrangements".
These provisions in the Charter of the United Nations
were complemented in the inter-American system by the Inter-
American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, signed in Rio in
1947. Article 2 of the Inter-American Treaty called for the
peaceful settlement of disputes by the American States
themselves before referring to the General Assembly or the
Security Council of the United Nations. Article 6 prescribed
a meeting of the organ of consultation to agree on the
measures to be taken "if the inviolability or the integrity
of the territory or the Sovereignty or political
independence of any American State should be affected by an
7 6aggression which is not an armed attack". Thus, the Rio 
Treaty placed responsibility for the defence of the gestern 
hemisphere, in formal terms, upon all members of the inter- 
American system. In the following year at Bogota the system
73 See Chapter 2 above.
74 Nicholas, op.cit,, p.34.
75 Article 52(3).
7 6 Organization of American States, Annals, Vol. 1, No. 1, 
1949, pp.87-90. See also Connell-Smith, op.cit,, pp.190-97.
145
was further formalised by the foundation of the Organisation 
of American States. The Charter of the OAS established the 
organisation as a regional agency within the provisions of 
the United Nations. It proclaimed among its purposes that 
of strengthening the peace and security of the continent, 
and, in Articles 15 and 17, affirmed the principle of non­
intervention as a fundamental rule of inter-American 77relations.
Each of the points mentioned above, the principle that 
an attack on one American State was to be considered an 
attack on all; the provision in the Charter of the United 
Nations for regional arrangements; and the provisions of the 
Inter-American Treaty and the Charter of the Organisation of 
American States, has had an important bearing upon United 
States actions in Latin America. Important in terms of what 
the United States has had to take into account before acting; 
in terms of the justifications it has given for its actions; 
and in terms of how its actions have been regarded by the 
American States and world opinion. All of which will be 
taken up in the next two chapters. What now of United States 
policy and practice?
VII.
In February 1946, Assistant Secretary of State Spruille 
Braden set out United States policy with respect to Latin 
America. The Monroe Doctrine was emphasised as representing 
the unilateral policy of the United States and yet being at 
the same time "in complete harmony with the joint, 
multilateral policy adopted by the American republics and 
expressed in the inter-American system". While the 
hemisphere no longer needed to fear colonisation it had to
See Connell-Smith, op.oit., pp.197-203. For inter- 
American developments with respect to the principle of non­
intervention, see R.J. Vincent, Non-Intervention and 
International Order (New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 
1974), Chapter 6.
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guard against "the infiltration of any foreign system or 
theory of Government". Secondly, Braden declared that even 
if the United States were not committed, as it was, "to 
refrain from unilateral intervention, such intervention 
would still be obnoxious to us as being contrary to the 
principles of equity that we wish to see established in the 
world". The commitment to non-intervention, together with 
the preponderance of United States power in the inter- 
American community meant, he continued, that the United 
States had "a special responsibility to exercise the most 
scrupulous restraint". Finally, Braden asserted that to 
whatever extent it was successful, the inter-American system 
promoted an area of order and stability; one which
7 8contributed "effectively to international stability".
By the time of the Rio and Bogota meetings the threat 
of infiltration by a foreign system or theory of government 
was thought to lie in international communism. Consequently, 
in 1950 Assistant Secretary of State Miller stated that any 
attempt to extend communism to the Americas would be 
considered as dangerous to the peace and stability of the 
United States. Underpinning this was the idea that a threat 
to one is a threat to all. In response to such a threat the 
United States would take whatever action was necessary and 
would do so jointly with the other American States. Any 
action taken by the American States against the one under 
threat would not be intervention on their part, but a 
collective action against the intervention of communism.
Far from it being a violation of the principle of non­
intervention, such collective action would rather be a
7 9corollary of it. This subsequently became an inter- 
American doctrine and was brought within the meaning of 
Article 6 of the Rio Treaty at the Tenth Inter-American
'Our Foreign Policy and Its Underlying Principles and 
Ideals', D.S.B., Vol. XIV, No. 347 (February 24, 1946), 
pp.294-97.
7 9 'Non-Intervention and Collective Responsibility m  the 
Americas', Address of April 26, 1950, D.S.B., Vol. XXII, No. 
567 (May 15, 1950), pp.768-70.
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Conference at Caracus in 1954. Secretary of State Dulles 
succeeded in having a resolution passed which declared:
[T]hat the domination or control of the political 
institution of any American State by the 
international Communist movement, extending to 
this hemisphere the political system of an extra­
continental power, would constitute a threat to 
the sovereignty and political independence of the 
American States, endangering the peace of America, 
and would call for a Meeting of Consultation to 
consider the adoption of appropriate action in 
accordance with existing treaties.80
During this conference the Foreign Minister of 
Guatemala asked, perhaps with foreboding, "what is 
international Communism?" Mr Dulles answered by saying 
that it was "disturbing if the foreign affairs of one of 
our American Republics are conducted by one so innocent 
that he has to ask that question". It was, he said, "that 
far-flung clandestine political-organization which is 
operated by the leaders of the Communist Party of the Soviet 
Union". Moreover, he was of the belief that the 
International Communist apparatus was seeking to bring the 
western hemisphere, "or parts of it, into the Soviet Orbit". 
This the United States was not going to tolerate and 
Mr Dulles flatly declared that "[t]he slogan of 'non­
intervention' can plausibly be invoked and twisted to give 
immunity to what is, in fact, flagrant intervention". On
In Declaration of Solidarity for the Preservation of the 
Political Integrity of the American States Against 
International Communist Intervention, annex A to W.G. iiowdler, 
"Report on the Tenth Inter-American Conference", D.S.b., Vol. 
XXX, No. 744 (April 26, 1954), pp.638-39; and see Article 1, 
Tenth Inter-American Conference Declaration of Solidarity for 
the Preservation of the Political Integrity of the American 
States against International Communist Intervention,
Department of State Publication 5556, Inter-American Series 
48 (Washington, D.C., 1954), pp.8-9. Also Department of 
State Bulletin, March 22, 1954, pp.423-25.
81 Statement by Secretary Dulles before the Politico-Juridical 
Committee on the Tenth Inter-American Conference on 
Intervention of International Communism in the Americas, 
Department of State Publication 5556, Inter-Amerlean Series 48 
(Washington, D.C., 1954), pp.1-7.
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his return from Caracus, Mr Dulles told a press conference
that "the threat which stems from international communism is
a repetition in this century of precisely the kind of danger
against which President Monroe had made his famous declaration
130 years [before]". For one of the American states to have
become a "Soviet Communist puppet", would have been, in
Mr Dulles emphatic words, "a disaster of incalculable 
8 2proportions". This was only two months before action was 
taken against Guatemala to eliminate what was described as a 
danger "to the peace of America".
When the Caracus Conference met, the United States had 
for some time regarded the Arbenz government in Guatemala as 
communist dominated. Consequently on June 19, Colonel 
Castillo Armas led an invasion engineered by the Central 
Intelligence Agency, from Honduras. The United States' role 
in the invasion was regarded as intervention "against foreign 
intervention", and as being in keeping with the Roosevelt 
corollary to the Monroe Doctrine, which allowed for United
States intervention in States in which there was "a general.
8 3loosening of the ties of civilized society". The day 
after the invasion the Guatemalan representative to the 
United Nations requested that the Security Council be called 
into session in the hope that Honduras and Nicaragua could 
be prevailed upon to deprive the rebels of their base. On 
June 20 the Security Council met to hear the Guatemalan case 
and Henry Cabot Lodge, representing the United States, took 
the occasion to argue both that it was a matter for the OAS 
and to denounce Soviet support for Guatemala as interference 
in the affairs of the hemisphere.
Department of State Publication 5556, Inter-American 
Series 48 (Washington, D.C. 1954), pp.10-11.
8 3 G. Connell-Smith, op.cit., p.164. See also P.B. Taylor, 
'The Guatemalan Affair: A Critique of U.S. Foreign Policy',
The American Political Science Review, Vol. L, No. 3 
(September 1956), and D. Horowitz, From Yalta to Vietnam 
(Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1967), Chapter 10.
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Lodge argued that what had occurred was a result of 
Guatemalans against Guatemalans and that it seemed to the 
United States Government "to be precisely the kind of problem 
which in the first place should be dealt with on an urgent 
basis by an appropriate agency of the Organization of 
American States". In the second place Lodge made it 
abundantly clear to the Soviet Union that as far as the 
United States was concerned, the western hemisphere was the 
exclusive concern of the United States and her sister 
republics. The Soviet Union had objected to, and threatened 
to veto, any motion that the OAS rather than the Security 
Council should deal with the Guatemalan problem. Mr Lodge 
asked, rhetorically, what it was to which the Soviet Union 
was objecting. He referred to Article 52(2), which he said 
was "a harmless provision" and wondered why the Soviet 
representative, "whose country is thousands and thousands of 
miles away from here, would undertake to veto a move like 
that?" Lodge implied that the Soviet Union had designs on 
the American hemisphere and of this he said:
I say to you, representative of the Soviet Union, 
stay out of this hemisphere and don't try to start 
your plans and your conspiracies over here...84
For the United States, the Soviet Union was not only
interfering in inter-American affairs through the United
Nations, but was in fact ultimately responsible for what had
happened in Guatemala. Dulles described the Guatemalan
affair as an intrusion of Soviet despotism which was "a
direct challenge to our Monroe Doctrine, the first and most
8 5fundamental of our foreign policies". Similarly, a Senate 
Committee report said "active intervention in the affairs of
Department of State Publication 5556, Inter-American 
Series 48 (Washington, D.C., 1954), pp.14-17.
8 5 Radio and Television Address by Secretary Dulles on 
International Communism in Guatemala, June 30, 1954, 
Department of State Publication 5556, Inter-American Series 
48 (Washington, D.C., 1954).
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Western Hemisphere Republics by a Euro-Asiatic power
constitutes a flagrant violation of the Monroe Doctrine and
is in direct conflict with the treaties existing between
8 6the U.S. and our Latin American Sister Republics".
Finally, on June 25 in a speech, once again to the
Security Council, Lodge spoke at some length on the
relationship of the United Nations to regional organisations.
"If the United States in 1946 had thought that the United
Nations Charter in effect abrogated our inter-American
System, I say to you as a man with thirteen years' experience
in the Senate, the Charter would not have received the
8 7necessary two-thirds vote". The burden of his speech was 
that hemispheric problems were to be dealt with by the GAS.
In short, with respect to extra-continental powers, the 
United States insisted on a free hand in the hemisphere.
After Guatemala it was Castro's government in Cuba that 
became the focus of United States anxiety about the 
infiltration of international communism into the hemisphere. 
By the time Kennedy became President, the United States 
regarded Cuba as a Soviet satellite and as a transgression 
of the Monroe Doctrine that could not oe tolerated. The
Report of the Sub-Committee to Investigate Communist 
Aggression in Latin America. To the Select Committee on 
Communist Aggression, House of Representatives, 83rd Congress, 
2nd Session (1954), p.2. In hearings before the same sub­
committee, Congressman Patrick J. Hillings, as Chairman, told 
Carlos Armas that Guatemala had a "unique distinction. It is 
the only country that has broken free from Communist rule, 
once the shackels of the Kremlin had been firmly secured - we 
are sure - that your statement here will provide hope for the 
enslaved people of Europe and Asia who now live under the 
communist yoke". 9th Interim Report of Hearings before the 
Sub-Committee on Latin America of the Select Committee on 
Communist Aggression. House of Representatives, 83rd 
Congress, p.3.
87 Department of State Publication 5556, op.ait,, pp.18-23.
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United States wanted to overthrow Castro but was reluctant
to use force or the threat of force since this could not
have been justified under any inter-American pact or the
8 8United Nations Charter. For some months prior to Kennedy's
inauguration the Central Intelligence Agency had been planning
an invasion of the island by Cuban exiles, in the hope that
it could repeat the success it had had in Guatemala. In
response to mounting speculation that the United States would
intervene in Cuba, both Adlai Stevenson and President Kennedy
89denied that there was any such intention. Nevertheless the 
invasion was attempted and it failed.
At first the United States denied that it had been
involved in the invasion, but Kennedy subsequently took full
responsibility. The President stated that unilateral
American intervention was against the traditions and
international obligations of the United States. But, he
continued, the restraint of the United States was not
inexhaustible. "Should it ever appear that the inter-
American doctrine of non-interference merely conceals or
excuses a policy of non-action - if the nations of this
hemisphere should fail to meet their commitments against
outside Communist penetration - then I want it clearly
understood that this Government will not hesitate in meeting
its primary obligations, which are the security of our 
90nation". In other words, the United States would not 
tolerate anymore Cubas. It would regard, as it had for some 
time, American states perceived to be falling under the 
influence of the Soviet Union as a threat to the peace and 
security of the United States and act accordingly. Though 
the Bay of Pigs invasion failed where the invasion of
See Connell-Smith, op.cit., pp.173-74 and also H. Thomas, 
Cuba (London, Eyre and Spottis Woode, 1971), Chapters CIII 
and CVI, and T. Draper, Castroism 3 Theory and Practice 
(London, Pall-Mall, 1965).
p q
D.S.B., Vol. XLIV, No. 1141 (May 8, 1961), pp.661-62 and 
667-68.
D.S.B • t Vol. XLIV, No. 1141 (May 8, 1961), pp.659-61.
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Guatemala had succeeded, the United States Government 
supported both for the same reason. The independence and 
freedom of action of any of the American republics was to 
be subordinated to the interests of the United States 
whenever it perceived a threat to its "peace and security".
In summary, the interventions in Guatemala inspired by 
the United States, together with what it said in each case, 
showed that the United States reserved for itself the right 
to determine what constituted a threat to the peace and 
security of the hemisphere, or alternatively, what 
constituted an acceptable form of government in each of the 
American States. Either way this amounted to the United 
States treating Latin America as its sphere of influence and 
its doing so was not unlike the Soviet Union's insistance on 
"friendly" governments along its western borders. The post­
war policy of the United States with regard to Latin 
America had the Monroe Doctrine as its lynchpin. In 
spelling out the relevance of the Monroe Doctrine for the 
hemisphere, in its post-war policy, the United States 
announced that it considered Latin America its sphere of 
influence.
VIII.
To recapitulate, when the Truman Doctrine and the 
Marshall Plan were announced, the Soviet Union had already 
gone a long way toward consolidating a sphere of influence 
in eastern Europe. The Truman Doctrine and the Marshall 
Plan prompted the Soviet Union into further consolidation 
of its influence throughout eastern Europe, which in any case 
American officials recognised among themselves as being a 
Soviet sphere. At the same time the nature of the influence 
the Soviet Union established offended the principles which 
the United States upheld in its public statements. Even 
before World War II ended the United States had foreseen what 
would happen in eastern Europe, yet it did nothing effective 
to ensure implementation of the principles it upheld. It did 
not try any of a number of policies which may have brought
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compliance from the Soviet Union. That it did not may have 
led the Soviet Union to think the United States was 
acquiescing in a Soviet sphere of influence. If so this 
would have been reinforced by the Truman Doctrine drawing a 
line, as it did, between two systems of government.
Just as the Soviet Union established eastern Europe as 
its sphere of influence so the United States, in keeping 
with the traditions of the Monroe Doctrine, made it clear 
both through the principles it promulgated and in the actions 
it took that it regarded Latin America as its sphere of 
influence. The nature of the influence it exerted was not 
of the same kind as the Soviet Union exerted in eastern 
Europe, and the United States was able to establish its 
predominance, to some extent, through a formal institutional 
framework. A further and important assymetry was that at 
the time when the Soviet Union was consolidating its sphere 
of influence in eastern Europe, the United States had 
military forces in Europe with which it could have attempted 
to enforce the principles of the Declaration on Liberated 
Europe. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, did not have 
the means with which to challenge anything the United States 
might have done in Latin America and to which it objected.
In any case it was not until the Arbenz Government in 
Guatemala appeared to be under threat from the United States 
that the Soviet Union would have had any explicit cause for 
which it could invoke the threat of military force.
The consolidation of post-war spheres of influence was 
essentially a unilateral process. Each power consolidated 
its sphere largely by actions it alone decided upon and 
undertook. But for each to have been able to successfully 
pursue its unilateral policy depended to a large extent upon 
the acquiescence of the other. The consolidation of the 
Soviet sphere of influence in eastern Europe, for instance, 
depended largely upon the extent to which the United States 
acquiesced. Such acquiescence as ther^ was had to be covert 
and implicit. Had it been overt and explicit, that wou'd 
have implied agreement as to spheres of influence which 
there was not.
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In general terms, acquiescence as to spheres of 
influence has taken the form of A disclaiming what B does 
and in fact disapproving of what B does, but at the same 
time acquiescing by virtue of effectively doing nothing to 
oppose B. That A does not effectively oppose B, may be 
because (i) it chooses not to, out of regard for the 
consequences, for instance the possibility of war; (ii) 
because it believes that for one reason or another it cannot; 
or (iii) because it hopes B will reciprocate with regard to 
some region in which A has a special interest.
The next chapter will deal with how acquiescence 
became tacit understanding as to what the Soviet Union and 
the United States expect of each other. At the end of it, 
the question as to why each power has an interest in 
acquiescence and in tacit understanding will be answered.
* * * *
CHAPTER SIX
THE GROWTH OF UNDERSTANDING 
AS TO SPHERES OF INFLUENCE
In Chapter Three it was stated that it cannot be known 
if there is tacit understanding about spheres of 
influence, but that such understanding can be inferred from 
the actions of an influencing power and the actions or 
inactions of its adversary. The acquiescence of one power 
in what another does admits the inference that there is tacit 
understanding about what each expects of the other. With the 
purpose of determining what it is that implies tacit 
understanding as to spheres of influence, the present chapter 
examines four examples of the actions of influencing powers 
and the reaction of the adversary power in each case. Two 
examples are of Soviet actions in eastern Europe and two are 
of United States actions in Latin America: namely, the
invasion of Hungary in 1956 and of Czechoslovakia in 1968, 
the naval blockade of Cuba during the missile crisis of 1962 
and finally, the invasion of the Dominican Republic in 1965. 
Discussion of each of these occupies the first two parts and 
follows the pattern of presenting first, what the influencing 
power did, second, the justification it advanced and third, 
what the adversary power did and said in response. In the 
third part three questions are dealt with: What alternatives
were open to the adversary power in response to what the 
influencing power did? What in the four examples implies 
that there was tacit understanding? and finally, What 
purposes might such understanding have served?
I.
The Soviet Union.
1. Hungary.
The death of Stalin in 1953 opened the way to changes 
in Soviet policy toward eastern Europe. In 1955 Khrushchev 
initiated a rapprochement with Yugoslavia and during talks
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with Tito in May of that year referred to "mutual 
respect... for different forms of socialist development".^
At the Twentieth Party Congress held in February 1956, 
Khrushchev delivered his so-called "secret speech" in which 
he denounced the cult of personality and the effect Stalin 
had had on relations between communist parties. Khrushchev 
asserted that the ways to socialism differed and that 
alongside the Soviet form of reorganizing society, there was 
the form of People's democracy. In April 1956 the Soviet 
Union made the concession to Titoism of dissolving Corninform 
and in June Khrushchev and Tito met once more to re-examine 
relations between their respective parties. A declaration 
was issued which stated that "the path of socialist 
development differs in various countries and conditions [and 
that] the multiplicity of forms of socialist development3tends to strengthen socialism". The doctrine of different 
roads to socialism; the re-establishment of Yugoslav-Soviet 
relations; and Khrushchev's criticisms of Stalin resulted in 
the rehabilitation of leaders who had been victims of 
Stalinism and in a decline in the influence of Stalinists 
who had blocked political and economic reforms. There were 
growing demands in the states of eastern Europe for 
political and economic reforms.
By October 1956 ehe demand for reforms in Poland and 
Hungary was perceived by the Soviet Union as a threat to the 
rule of the Communist Party in both states. In Poland the 
signs of de-Stalinisation, coupled with resentment against 
Soviet domination and discontent with socio-economic 
conditions, culminated in the Poznan workers' riots which 
Bulganin described as being provoked by hostile agents of
Z.K. Brzezinski, The Soviet Bloc (New York, Praeger, 1961), 
pp.173-75.
2 For the text see CDS? , Vol. VIII, No. 4 (1956).
3 Cited by G. Ionescu, The Break-up of the Soviet- Bmp < .re m  
Eastern Europe (Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1965), p.54.
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capitalism. "Every country", Bulganin said, "should go its 
own way to socialism, but we cannot permit this to be used 
to break up the solidarity of the peace camp...under the 
pretext of extending national peculiarities or democracy".^ 
For a short time in October Poland was under the threat of 
Soviet intervention, but this ended when Khrushchev, Molotov, 
Kaganovitch and Mikoyan went away from a Polish Central 
Committee meeting apparently satisfied that Poland would stay 
firmly under the rule of the Communist Party. Meanwhile in 
Hungary the movement for reform went further than in Poland 
and developed into an anti-Communist revolution.
In April 1955 the Hungarian Prime Minister Imre Nagy 
was expelled from the Party and replaced by Matyas Rakosi, a 
Stalinist. Whereas Nagy had enjoyed the support of 
intellectuals and workers and had sought to introduce 
economic improvements and a relaxation of party controls and 
demands, Rakosi reverted to Stalinist policies and was 
disliked by intellectuals. During 1956, discontent among 
intellectuals turned into open defiance and began to cause 
concern in the Soviet Union. Perhaps because it feared a 
repetition of the Poznan riots, the Soviet Union sent Mikoyan 
to Hungary to supervise Rakosi's resignation and the 
formation of a new Central Committee. The new committee 
included Janos Kadar, who had been imprisoned by Rakosi, but 
the post of First Secretary went to Erno Gerö, an associate 
of Rakosi and an opponent of Nagy. Placing Gerö in this 
position did not help dispel discontent and there was 
agitation for Nagy to be reinstated into the party membership 
and for Gerö's resignation. In October demonstrations by
Cited by J.M. Mackintosh, Strategy and Tactics of Soviet 
Foreign Policy (London, Oxford University Press, 1962), p.157 
See also H. Ripka, Eastern Europe in the Post-War World 
(London, Methuen, 1961), p.128.
5 See Ripka, op.cit., Ionescu, op.cit., and Mackintosh, p.164 
For a full account of events in Poland, see K. Syrop, Spring 
in October (London, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1957).
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citizens became widespread. Some took on a revolutionary
character and on October 23 precipitated the first Soviet 
6invasion.
On that evening a Central Committee meeting was held
and Nagy was elected Prime Minister, though Gerö remained as
First Secretary. Some time that same night G. Marosan, a
member of the Hungarian Politburo, appealed on behalf of the
Hungarian Politburo for direct Soviet military aid in7accordance with the terms of the Warsaw Treaty. Hence the 
first Soviet invasion occurred and sporadic fighting between 
the Soviet Army and Hungarian rebels ensued.
On October 27, a government led by Nagy was 
reconstituted without Gerö. It included several 
prominent non-Communists such as Zoltan Tildy and Bela Kovacs 
of the Small-holders Party, which had been a major party 
after the war in the period before the Communist Party gained 
absolute power. Nagy succeeded in negotiating a cease-fire 
and Soviet troops began to leave Budapest the following day. 
For the moment, the Soviet Government apparently recognised 
Nagy and Janos Radar as heads of the legitimate government.
On October 30, the same day as the Soviet Union issued its 
declaration "On Friendship and Co-operation between the 
Soviet Union and Other Socialist States", which is discussed 
below, Nagy announced the restoration of a multi-party 
system and the formation of a coalition government between 
the Communist, Social-Democratic, Small-holders', and 
National Peasant Parties. This alone would have been enough 
to severely exercise the Soviet Union, but on November 1,
Nagy went even further by repudiating unilaterally the Warsaw 
Treaty and declaring Hungary's neutrality. Early in the
See Brzezinski, op.cit., Chapter 10 and Ionescu, op.cit.,
pp.68-86.
Brzezinski, op.cit., p.225.7
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morning of November 4, Soviet forces once more entered 
Budapest and a pro-Soviet government headed by Janos Kadargwas established.
What did the Soviet Union have to say of the events in 
Hungary and of its own actions?
Some initial comments came in a Pravda editorial of
October 23, which described the revolt as an "antipopular
venture... the result of prolonged subversive activity
conducted by the imperialist powers with the criminal intent
of destroying the people’s democracies and restoring the
9capitalist system in these countries". Elsewhere it was 
described as "the result of long underground work carried 
out by the imperialist p o w e r s " T h e  charge that the revolt 
was inspired and supported by "imperialist powers" was 
repeated in other places. At the same time it was asserted 
that the Soviet troops had gone to the aid of the Hungarian 
working people at the request of the Hungarian Government.
As Comrade Imre Nagy indicated in his October 25 radio 
address, the use of Soviet troops in the struggle against 
the counter-revolution became "necessary to safeguard the 
vital interests of our Socialist system".
For accounts of the events in Hungary, see F.A. Vali, Rift 
and Revolt in Hungary (Cambridge, Massachusetts, Harvard, 
1961); R.L. Garthoff, 'The Tragedy of Hungary', Problems of 
Communism, Vol. VI, No. 1 (January-February 1957); T. Aczel 
(ed.), Ten Years After (New York, Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 
1966); S.D. Kertesz (ed.), East Central Europe and the World 
(Notre Dame, University of Notre Dame Press, 1962). For the 
Soviet view, see A. Belokon and V. Tolstikov, The Truth About 
Hungary (Moscow, Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1957).
 ^CDSP, Vol. VIII, No. 41 (November 21, 1956), pp.12-13.
Hew York Times, October 28, 1956.
P.E. Zinner (ed.), national Communism and Popular Revolt 
in Eastern Europe, A Selection of Documents on Events in 
Poland and Hungary3 February-Hovember 1956 (New York,
Columbia University Press, 1957), pp.435-40.
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The requirements of the Socialist system and its
defence were set out more fully in a Declaration by the
Government of the USSR on the Principles of Development and
Further Strengthening of Friendship and Cooperation Between
the Soviet Union and Other Socialist States, of October 30,
121956. This declaration stated the principles of 
"proletarian internationalism" which were repeated in 
numerous places in the ensuing weeks and, as will be seen, 
after the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. The "countries 
of the great commonwealth of Socialist nations" it said
can build their mutual relations only on the 
principles of complete equality, of respect for 
territorial integrity, state independence and 
sovereignty, and non-interference in one another's 
internal affairs.
These principles did "not exclude close fraternal cooperation 
and mutual aid among the countries of the Socialist 
commonwealth in the economic, political and cultural spheres, 
[but] on the contrary...presuppos[ed]" them. The document 
went on to admit there had been "mistakes in the mutual 
relations among the socialist countries - violations and 
errors which demeaned the principle of equality in relations 
among the socialist states". It reiterated several times 
both the principle of national sovereignty and that the 
Hungarian Government had requested the aid of Soviet military 
units. In relation to fraternal cooperation and mutual aid, 
the Soviet Government expressed its confidence that the 
workers, peasants and intelligentsia of each socialist 
country would continue "to remove all obstacles in the path 
of further strengthening of the democratic foundations, 
independence, and sovereignty of their countries". In other 
words that there would be no more threats to Communist power. 
"Sovereignty" clearly meant "socialist sovereignty", that is 
to say, rule of the Communist Party.
12 Pravda, October 31, 1956, CDSP, Vol. VIII, No. 40 
(November 14, 1956), pp.10-11; see also Zinner, op.cit,, 
pp.487-89.
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The Declaration also made mention of the articles of
the Warsaw Treaty related to stationing the troops of one
state in the territory of another. Rather than emphasise
the Warsaw Treaty as a collective self-defence agreement in
accordance with Article 51 of the U.N. Charter, the Soviet
Union presented it as a regional arrangement for the
maintenance of international peace and security. By so
arguing they were able to claim that the events in Hungary
were "the exclusive affair of the Hungarians, Soviets and
13other Warsaw Treaty States", and therefore not a matter 
for the United Nations.
Pravda related the second invasion as it had the first.
The revolt was presented as the handiwork of reactionary
forces and once again as "the fruit of lengthy subversive
work of the imperialist powers" which entertained the hope
that "the victory of reaction in Hungary will radically
14change the balance of power in the world...".
In the latter half of November an article entitled 'To 
Consolidate Further the Forces of Socialism on the Basis of 
Marxist-Leninist Principles' appeared in Pravda. It stated 
both the rationale for the Soviet intervention and a 
principle of relations between the Soviet Union and states 
in its sphere of influence.
A socialist state could not remain a passive 
spectator in face of the bloody orgy of fascist 
reaction in the People's Democratic Hungary —  We 
consider that we have fulfilled our international 
duty in helping the Hungarian working class in 
their struggle against the counter-revolutionary 
machinations. 5^
In other words the Soviet Union intervened in Hungary because 
the rule of the Party was in jeopardy and by implication it
R.A. Remington, The Warsaw Pact: Case Studies in
Communist Conflict Resolution (Cambridge, Massachusetts, 
M.I.T. Press, 1971), pp.34 and 38.
14 Full text reprinted; Zinner, op.cit., p.499.
15 November 23, 1956. Reproduced in Zinner, op.cit., 
pp.541-63.
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would perform its "duty" and do so again as the occasion 
demanded. Thus intervention was a duty devolving from 
ideological fraternity and the preservation of class 
solidarity. At the same time the Soviet Union professed to 
uphold the sovereign rights of states. For the Soviet Union 
there was no contradiction between upholding sovereignty as 
a general principle and performing its fraternal duty.
Rather, the preservation of class solidarity was a higher 
duty which cut across the general principle of sovereignty 
when the two were in conflict.
When the Soviet Union proclaimed that "the countries of 
the great commonwealth of socialist nations [could] build 
their mutual relations only on the principles of complete 
equality, of respect for territorial integrity, state 
independence and sovereignty, and of non-interference in one
■] canother's internal affairs", it did not in fact mean 
unlimited sovereignty. Speaking on the "lesson of Hungary", 
Khrushchev explained that it meant "fraternal socialist 
solidarity always and in everything". Thus the espousal of 
the principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs of 
other states was not absolute. "Soviet policy", observed 
Professor Vali, "evidently [aimed] at establishing a kind of 
Monroe Doctrine for the areas under its domination, both to 
exclude foreign influences and maintain a status quo created 
by the military presence of the Soviet Army in this area 
since 1945".^ This it could not do in Hungary in 1956 at 
the same time as upholding the principle of non-intervention.
So much for what the Soviet Union said of its 
intervention. What now of the United States?
Long before the Soviet intervention the United States 
had made it clear that its policies toward eastern Europe did 
not include resorting to force. In December 1955, Secretary
CDSP, Vol. VTII, No. 40 (November 14, 1956), pp.10-11.
Also reprinted in Zinner, op.cit., p.485.
17 F.A. Vali, Pi ft and Revolt in Hungary: nationalism versus
Communism (Cambridge, Massachusetts, Harvard University Press, 
1961), p.468.
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Dulles told the Illinois Manufacturers' Association that 
there seemed to be a new phase in the struggle between 
international communism and freedom. Whereas the first post­
war decade had been marked by violence and the threat of 
violence, that phase seemed to have passed. For Dulles this 
meant a change of tactics rather than purpose, but he said 
"we do not...want policies of violence to reappear".
Although there were grave injustices to be aired, there were 
also "grave dangers to be averted". He referred to a speech 
of Eisenhower's in which the President had declared that 
"[e]agerness to avoid war...can produce outright or implicit 
agreement that injustices and wrongs of the present shall be 
perpetuated in the future. We must not participate in any 
such false agreement... In the eyes of those who suffer 
injustice, we would become partners with their oppressors".
But Secretary Dulles stated explicitly, "we shall not seek 
to cure these injustices by ourselves invoking force".
Instead he proposed merely that the United States endeavour 
to "constantly keep these injustices at the forefront of
human consciousness" and hopefully bring "the moral
18condemnation of the world" upon the heads of the
perpetrators of injustice. Thus, the policy of the Eisenhower 
administration was to make it clear that while it neither 
condoned nor accepted Soviet dominance, it would not 
resort to force to free the captive nations from that 
dominance. It made this clear again as soon as the 
Soviet Union intervened in Hungary.
The day after the first intervention President Eisenhower 
was reported by the New York Times as having drawn a line 
against intervention in Hungary. He had said that while the 
purpose of the United States was "to strengthen liberty
19everywhere", it could do so only by peaceful means. The
D.S.B., Vol. XXXIII, No. 860 (December 19, 1955), pp.1003- 
005.
19 New York Times, October 26, 1956, p.l.
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following day he again said that while it had been United
States policy to fulfil the wartime pledge of self-government
for the countries of eastern Europe, the United States "could
20net, of course, carry out this policy by resort to force".
On October 27 Secretary Dulles gave an address in Dallas,
Texas, in which he spoke about the captive nations and
mentioned what had happened in Hungary. But he made no
suggestion that the United States would then, or in future,
21respond to Soviet intervention with force. Similarly on
October 29, Deputy Under Secretary of State Murphy told an
audience at the Free University of Berlin that while the
United States would never accept the enslavement of the
states of eastern Europe, it would not seek to cure the
22injustices they suffered by invoking force.
Following the second Soviet intervention on November 4
it was reported that several days previously, some United
States officials had suggested that the United States could
have exerted influence on the Soviet Union by such means as
demonstrative movements of the Strategic Air Force and
cancellation of leave for military forces. But these ideas
did not gain favour and apparently were not discussed at23President Eisenhower's conference on Hungary. Eisenhower
condemned both the Soviet action in Hungary and the threats
of military intervention in Egypt, but in a news conference
he implied that no unilateral action would be undertaken by24the United States in either Hungary or the Middle East.
Both Dulles and Eisenhower rejected the idea that the 
United States should come to the aid of revolution in the 
captive nations. A few days after the second intervention
D.S.B., Vol. XXXV, No. 907 (November 12, 1956), p.743. 
D.S.B., Vol. XXXV, No. 906 (November 5, 1956), pp.695-99. 
D.S.B., Vol. XXXV, No. 905 (October 29, 1956), p.675.
New York Times, November 6, 1956.
New York Times, November 15, 1956, p.l.
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Dulles stated that the United States believed Soviet rule
could and had to be ended. "But we believe that the process
must be an evolutionary process, and not violent revolution
.... We did not encourage violent revolution because we did
25not see how violent revolution would prevail". At a press 
conference on November 14 President Eisenhower said the 
events in Hungary had disturbed the American people.
But I must make one thing clear, the United States 
does not now and never has, advocated open rebellion 
by an undefended populace against force over which 
they could not possibly prevail.... We have never in 
all the years that I think we have been dealing with 
problems of this sort urged or argued for any kind 
of armed revolt which could bring about disaster to our friends.26
In other words any revolution in the satellites would have
to succeed without United States military aid, for in spite
of what the United States had to say about "liberation" and
rolling back communism, it had no intention of militarily
supporting an uprising when doing so might bring it into
conflict with the Soviet Union. Eisenhower's statement in
his memoirs that he wondered what his recommendation to
Congress and the American people would have been "had
Hungary been accessible by sea or through the territory of
allies who might have agreed to react positively to the
tragic fate of the Hungarian people" has the appearance of
27being a post hoc apology.
In addition to ruling out the use of force, the United 
States also said it would be unwilling to recognise a 
government set up by the rebels. Following the first 
intervention it was reported that the United States "would 
be sympathetic to a free regime in Hungary. But Washington
25 New York Times, December 3, 1956.
2 6 New York Times, November 15, 1956, p.26.
D.D. Eisenhower, Mandate for Changey 1953-1956 (London, 
Heinemann, 1963), p.88.
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officials do not want to offer a major provocation to the
Soviet Union through recognition of a Hungarian government
unfriendly to Moscow". Such a provocation, it was suggested,
28might lead to war. President Eisenhower explained that 
while the United States would welcome "democratic" governments 
in the states of eastern Europe, it would not regard such
29governments as potential allies against the Soviet Union.
Secretary Dulles took this up in a press conference of
December 18, 1956. The United States, he said, "has no
purpose at all to turn these satellite countries into our
allies, in the sense that we have no desire to surround the
Soviet Union with a band of hostile states and to revive what
3 0has been called the cordon sanitaive...". Thus it would 
be loath to recognise a government which the Soviet Union 
would regard as hostile.
In summary, the Soviet Union justified its actions in 
Hungary in terms of the doctrine of socialist 
internationalism. That is to say, it argued that it had 
merely fulfilled its duty to the fraternal parties of the 
socialist states. The Soviet Union did not conceive of 
intervention as a violation of the sovereignty of Hungary, 
but rather as an action necessary to preserve it.
"Sovereignty" meant "socialist sovereignty" and this meant 
that the Soviet Union would not allow non-communist 
governments in eastern Europe. The United States considered 
that the Warsaw Treaty entitled Soviet troops to be in 
Hungary, but questioned their use to put down an internal 
rebellion. It did not accept Soviet dominance and reasserted 
its longstanding policy that there should be representative 
governments in eastern Europe. But at the same time, the 
United States rejected the idea that it should use force to 
support the Hungarian rebels against the Soviet Union and to
2 Q New York Times, October 27, 1956, p.5.
2 Q D.S.B., Vol. XXXV, No. 907 (November 12, 1956), p.743.
., Vol. XXXVI, No. 915 (January 7, 1957), pp.3-4.30 D.S.B
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establish a representative government either in Hungary or 
in any other east European state. Representative governments 
would have to come through peaceful change.
Finally, it may be noted in passing that while the 
United States was not prepared to resort to counter­
intervention in eastern Europe, after the Suez crisis the 
Middle East was regarded differently. In January 1957 
Eisenhower asked Congress to give him authority to assist any 
of the Middle East nations desiring assistance against 
"international communism". Such assistance was "to include 
the employment of the armed forces of the United States to 
secure and protect the territorial integrity and political 
independence of... nations, requesting... aid, against overt
armed aggression from any nation controlled by International 31Communism". This became known as the "Eisenhower Doctrine"
and the President subsequently used his authority, in July
3 21958 to send an expeditionary force to Lebanon.
2. Czechoslovakia.
On the night of 20-21 August 1968 Warsaw Pact forces
3 3invaded Czechoslovakia. By August 28 some 400,000 troops, 
of whom at least three-quarters were Soviet, and the rest
D.S.B., Vol. XXXVI, No. 917 (January 21, 1957), pp.85-87.
32 See W. Knapp, A History of War and Peacey 1939-1965 
(London, Oxford University Press, 1967), p.428.
33 There is now an extensive body of literature concerning 
the 1968 invasion, mostly dealing with domestic policies, 
Soviet-Czechoslovak relations and Czechoslovak relations with 
other east-European states. Very little has been written 
specifically about the implications of the invasion for 
Soviet-US relations. A survey of writing on Czechoslovakia 
may be found in H. Gordon Skilling, 'Reform Aborted: 
Czechoslovakia in Retrospect', International Journal, Vol. 
XXVIII, No. 3 (Summer 1973), pp.431-45. The present work has 
relied principally upon The Department of State Bulletin; 
Current Digest of the Soviet Press; R.R. James (ed.), The 
Czechoslovak Crisis (London, Chatto, 1969); P. Windsor and 
A. Roberts, Czechoslovakia 1968 (London, Chatto, 1969);
R.A. Remington (ed.), Winter in Prague (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts, M.I.T. Press, 1968); R.A. Remington, The 
Warsaw Pact (Cambridge, Massachusetts, M.I.T. Press, 1971); 
T.W. Wolfe, Soviet Power and Europe> 1945-1970 (Baltimore, 
Johns Hopkins, 1970).
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from East Germany, Poland, Hungary and Bulgaria, had 
occupied the country. Whilst it should not be overlooked 
that the events which led to the invasion had their origins 
much further back, for our purposes they may be said to have 
begun with the removal of Antonin Novotny from the post of 
First Secretary of the Czechoslovak Communist Party on 
January 5, 1968.
Novotny and his supporters had prevented reforms from
being implemented in three aspects of Czechoslovak life which
were primary causes of the revolution that gained momentum
during that year. First, the economy had fallen into
stagnation, largely as a result of Stalinist theories and
methods of management maintained by Novotny. Second, there
were long standing problems in relations between Czechs
and Slovaks, exacerbated once again by Novotny's hostility
to the so-called "petty-bourgeois nationalism" of the Slovaks.
Third, there was a great deal of discontent among writers and
intellectuals with, the controls placed upon them by the 35Party. Once Novotny was deposed the clamour for reforms 
quickly gained momentum and resulted in some being 
implemented. This gave rise to further demands and so the 
process continued until it went too far for the tolerance of 
the Soviet Union, Poland and East Germany. Each of these saw
the rule of the Party in Czechoslovakia as being in grave
. 36danger.
One of Mr Dubcek's first statements after he replaced 
Novotny emphasised the loyalty of the Czechoslovak Communist 
Party to Marxism-Leninism and "to the Socialist principles of 
internationalism". These principles, he said, were the 
foundation of the integral state of Czechs and Slovaks and 
the basis of the safety and international security of 
Czechoslovakia, which was "an inseparable part of the world
34 See R.R. James (ed.), op.czt., Chapter One.
35 Wolfe, op.cit., p.360.
3 6 Windsor and Roberts, op.cit., pp.6-7.
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o 7socialist system, firmly linked with the Soviet Union".
Nevertheless by July Moscow regarded Dubcek's government "as
the gravest challenge to Soviet interests in East Europe
since the Hungarian rebellion of 1956". The reforms which
his government implemented were "accompanied by an erosion
of what the orthodox believers in other countries regarded
3 9as the legitimate role of the party".
The extent to which the authority of the Communist Party
of Czechoslovakia (CPCz) was perceived by the Soviet Union
and the Warsaw Pact countries to be in jeopardy was of
central importance in the sequence of events. Especially
since the primacy of the party was linked to the security of
the socialist Commonwealth as a whole. Whatever detracted
from the authority of the party in one of its member states
detracted from and undermined the unity of the Commonwealth.
Outside Czechoslovakia reforms were seen as a threat to the
Commonwealth. Whereas the Czechoslovaks saw, for instance,
4 0the Action Program of April 9 as something which would
"preserve the rule of the party by tacking... the various
problems in Czechoslovak life which under Novotny had
threatened to undermine the party's leading role", the
fraternal socialist parties saw it as potentially subversive.^1 *34
Even so, the gravity with which the Warsaw Pact countries
viewed events in Czechoslovakia seems to have reached serious
proportions only after the publication on June 27 of the4 2"2000 words" manifesto written by Ludvik Vaculik. The 2000 
words brought what had been studiously avoided "a 
polarization between the internal demands of the Czechoslovak
4 3peoples and the external demands of Czechoslovakia's allies".
37 Cited by James, op.cit., pp.10-11.
3 8 Wolfe, op.cit., p.348.
39 Windsor and Roberts, op.cit. , p.17.
40 For the text, see R.A. Remington, Winter in Prague, op.cit., 
pp.88-137.
41 Wolfe, op.cit., p.365.
4 2 For the text, see Remington, op.cit., pp.196-202.
4 3 Windsor and Roberts, op.cit., p.50.
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The course of the response to the 2000 words, and to
events in Czechoslovakia in general, was set by Mr Brezhnev
on July 3 during a speech in honour of Janos Kadar. Although
the permanent obligation of Communists was the building of
socialism and communism in their own country, Mr Brezhnev
said they were at the same time internationalists and could
not and never would be "indifferent to the fate of socialism
44and communism on earth". Thus, a Pravda article of
July 11 referred to those associated with the 2000 words as
forces hostile to socialism seeking to undermine the CPCz as
"the vanguard of the working class and the guiding force in
society" and as enemies "trying to undermine the [CPCz's]
friendship with the Soviet Union and other socialist
countries". It reiterated the importance of
the party and friendship with fraternal states. The 2000
words, it said, was "an overt attack on the [CPCz]" and
sought "to undermine the friendship between the Czechoslovak
45people and the peoples of fraternal socialist states".
This article, as Wolfe has pointed out, laid down essentially
the same rationale as was used to justify the invasion of
4 6Hungary in 1956. Other Soviet sources continued to 
describe the 2000 words as an attempt to undermine "the 
Party's organizational foundations and its leading role".4^
CDSP, Vol. XX, No. 27 (July 24, 1968), p.7.
45 CDSP, Vol. XX, No. 28 (July 31, 1968), pp.3-4.
46 Wolfe, op.cit., p.373.
47 BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, SU/2832, 24 July 1968, 
Moscow Home Service. Poland and East Germany reacted to the 
2000 words in the same way. The Polish Press regarded them 
as evidence that there were forces in Czechoslovakia out to 
deprive the party of its power and to "undermine the socialist 
system and pit Czechoslovakia against the fraternal socialist 
countries". East German sources called the 2000 words 
"slanderous propaganda...clearly aimed at undermining the 
[CPCz] and the country's state rule". See CDSP, Vol. XX,
No. 28 (July 31, 1968), p.8. See also, 'The Leninist View 
of the Party's Leading Role in Building Socialism', BBC 
Summary of World Broadcasts, SU/2835, 29 July 1968; and 
'Democratic Centralism Reasserted', Pravda, August 9, CDSP, 
Vol. XX, No. 32.
171
The mounting criticism directed at Czechoslovakia 
referred not only to the role of the party but also to "the 
interests of the entire socialist system". In a letter dated 
July 18, from the Communist parties of Bulgaria, Hungary,
East Germany, Poland and the Soviet Union to the Central 
Committee of the Czechoslovak Party, the signatories said 
they were "deeply convinced" that the "reactionaries' 
offensive" was threatening to push Czechoslovakia "off the 
path of socialism and consequently imperils the interests of 
the entire socialist system".
We cannot assent to hostile forces pushing 
your country off the path to socialism and creating 
the threat that Czechoslovakia may break away from 
the socialist Commonwealth. This is no longer your 
affair alone. It is the affair of all Communist 
and Workers' Parties and states that are united by 
alliance, cooperation and friendship.
It went on to say "we must have solidarity and unity in
defense of the gains of socialism, our security and the
international positions of the entire socialist 
48Commonwealth". Similarly, a broadcast to South-East Asia
said the notion of "national communism" in the hands of
Western propagandists represented nothing more than "an
attempt to undermine the international essence of the
socialist system". The duty of the communists of the
socialist countries was "to cement their solidarity and unity
in protecting the achievements of socialism, in defending the
security and international position of the entire socialist 
49community".
The potential undermining of the rule of the party and 
the socialist Commonwealth was linked variously to the 
nefarious activities of the CIA, to official US policy and
48 CDSP, Vol. XX, No. 2 (August 7, 1968), p.4.
49 BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, SU/2828, 20 July 1968, 
Moscow for S.E. Asia, pp.3-4.
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50to the revanchist Federal Republic of Germany. In July
there were reports that "a secret cache of weapons of foreign
make" were discovered near the frontier of the Federal
51Republic of Germany. It was left open as to whether this
was the work of the United States, of the Federal Republic
of Germany, or both in collaboration. The United States
policy of "Bridge-Building" was condemned as a concept "used
for intense ideological penetration into the socialist
countries, [for] interference in their domestic affairs and
eroding Socialist Society..." and as "little less than
unabashed imperialist intervention against the Socialist 
52States". Similarly Izvestia described "building bridges"
as "one of several new tactical approaches invented by the
imperialist ideologists for the struggle against the world
53socialist commonwealth". Thus "building bridges" was seen
as merely an extension of "John Foster Dulles' doctrine of
54pushing back communism to the 1939 frontiers", which was 
described as having "manifested itself fully in the fascist 
rising in Berlin in 1953 and in Hungary in 1956". The 
notion of "pushing back" the frontiers of communism is of 
particular significance when linked with the socialist 
commonwealth, for anything which tended to undermine the 
latter would undermine the former.
For instance, almost on the eve of the invasion, a Soviet 
broadcast for Portugal said West German revanchists were 
continuing "to defend the legitimacy of Hitler's Munich 
Agreement with the West...". BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 
SU/2853, 19 August 1968. See also CDSP, Vol. XX, No. 2 
(August 7, 1968).
51 CDSP, Vol. XX, No. 2 (August 7, 1968).
See I. Inozemtsev, 'Some Urgent Problems of European 
Security', International Affairs (Moscow, June 1968), p.69; 
and O. Pavlov, 'Proletarian Internationalism and Defense of 
Socialist Gains', International Affairs (Moscow, October 
1968) , p.13.
b3 CDSP, Vol. XX, No. 28 (July 31, 1968), p.7.
^  BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, SU/2830, 24 July 1968.
33 BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, SU/2830, 23 July 1968, 
Turkish for Cyprus.
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At the same time as Moscow was keen to point out, in
connection with Czechoslovakia, that Western propaganda was
trying to aggravate relations between the socialist countries
5 6and so undermine the post-war frontiers, it noted that
"[n]ot a day passes without Washington swearing that the USA
is keeping out of developments in Czechoslovakia...". "Are
there not", a broadcast asked, "too many denials?" The truth
of the matter was that "Imperialist circles [were] doing
everything possible to help Czechoslovakia to break loose
from the orbit of the socialist community in order to make a
breach in the socialist system and thereby to change the
57balance of power in Europe to their advantage".
From the tenor of statements such as the one in the
letter from fraternal parties, cited above, that they could
not assent to Czechoslovakia being pushed off the path to
socialism, from concern for the rule of the party, the
response to the 2000 words, and the extended Warsaw Pact
manoeuvres then in progress, it might have been expected that
the Soviet Union would intervene in Czechoslovakia. Indeed,
in July an Associated Press correspondent asked Mr Kosygin,
then visiting Stockholm, if he felt the guiding role of the
Czechoslovak Communist Party was seriously threatened and
whether he thought military or political intervention by the
Soviet Union in the events in Czechoslovakia were possible
under certain conditions. Mr Kosygin said he thought the
CPCz would never yield its guiding role, but added that the
Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia were Warsaw Pact allies and
so the Soviet Union had mutual obligations which it would
5 8perform unfailingly.
When the Warsaw Pact manoeuvres, which had begun on 
June 20, resulted in the protracted presence of Soviet and
BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, SU/2848, 13 August 1968, 
Moscow Home Service.
^  BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, SU/2830, 23 July 1968, 
Moscow Home Service.
Kosygin Press Conference, Stockholm, July 13, CDSP, Vol. 
XX, No. 28 (July 31, 1968), p.9.
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Warsaw Pact forces, it seemed as if they might be intended
59to occupy Czechoslovakia. However, on August 3, the same
day as the Bratislava meeting in which Czechoslovak leaders
met with the signatories of the so-called Warsaw letter, it
was announced that the last Soviet troops had left
Czechoslovak territory. The statement issued at the
Bratislava conference affirmed at one and the same time the
obligations attached to the socialist commonwealth and the
principles more normally recognised as governing state
relations. "Fraternal ties expand and increase every
socialist country's potential. The conference participants
expressed the firm desire to do everything in their power to
intensify all-round cooperation among their countries, based
on the principles of equality, respect for sovereignty and
national independence, territorial integrity and fraternal
6 0mutual aid and solidarity". This statement, about which 
more will be said presently, was central to the Soviet 
rationale for the invasion which soon followed.
For a short time after the Bratislava meeting, the 
Soviet press and radio continued the suspension, which had 
begun on August 1, of attacks on Czechoslovakia. Among the 
factors which precipitated their recommencement was the 
publication on August 10 of Draft Party Statutes expressly 
permitting the right of an outvoted minority to adhere to 
its views, secret voting, and the limitation of a period of 
office for Party functionaries. Only another eleven days
The presence of Warsaw Pact troops was apparently not 
totally unwelcome to all Czechoslovaks. On July 30, Pravda 
published a letter from Czechoslovak workers, which said in 
part that "any honest, decent citizen of our homeland who 
supports the construction of socialism, the regeneration 
process and sincere, real friendship with the USSR cannot 
regard the presence of your troops and Warsaw Pact troops as 
a hindrance to his daily work for the benefit of society. 
Indeed, the reverse is true: he should feel more secure in
his work". CDSP, Vol. XX, No. 31.
60 CDSP, Vol. XX, No. 31 (August 21, 1968), p.4.
61 Windsor and Roberts, op.cit., p.61.
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passed before the invasion on the night of August 21-22.
Once it had invaded Czechoslovakia what did the Soviet Union 
say in accounting for its actions?
The immediate statements from the Soviet Union asserted
that the fraternal socialist countries had, in keeping with
the Bratislava statement, "united on the premise that the
support, strengthening and defense of the people's socialist
gains are the common international duty of all socialist
states". Hence the governments of the Soviet Union,
Bulgaria, Hungary, the German Democratic Republic and Poland
had decided to give aid in response to a request from the
Communist Party of Czechoslovakia. "The actions undertaken",
it was claimed, were "not directed against any state and to
no extent infringe[d] upon any state interests".^  As in
earlier pronouncements, the defense of socialism in
Czechoslovakia was claimed as "not only the internal affair
of that country's people but also a problem of defending the
positions of world socialism. It is for this reason that we
are rendering support to the peoples of Czechoslovakia in
6 3defense of the gains of socialism". Obviously referring 
to the new Draft Party Statutes, a Moscow broadcast said that 
certain leaders of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia's 
Central Committee "[i]nstead of resolutely stopping the 
attempts to destroy the Party, [had] continued transforming 
the CPCz into an amorphous organization incapable of action, 
a sort of debating society.... The Party was on the verge of 
legalizing splinter groups and splitting into autonomous
64organizations with only a loose connection between them".
The claim that assistance in defence of the gains of 
socialism was given at the request of the CPCz proved 
unsustainable. "Not only were the Russians unable to produce
CDSP, Vol. XX, No. 34 (September 11, 1368), p.3.
^  Pravda editorial, August 22. CDSP, Vol. XX, No. 34 
(September 11, 1968), p.5.
 ^ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, SU/2855, 22 August 1968, 
Moscow Home Service.
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a single Czechoslovak leader to authenticate the alleged
call for help, but, more embarrassing still, no one could be
found in Prague to form a puppet government - even among the
most orthodox party conservatives who were considered to be
in Moscow's pocket".^ Soviet spokesmen were therefore
forced to re-marshall the theoretical justification of the
invasion into a doctrine which subsequently became known as
the "Brezhnev Doctrine". In its 1968 version this doctrine
first appeared in an article by S. Kovalev and was only later
6 6expounded by Mr Brezhnev. But its origins go back at least 
to 1956 if not to Lenin. It "was more a reversion to 
orthodoxy than the enunciation of a novel concept". What 
then was the justification spelt out by Kovalev?
The idea that the invasion of Czechoslovakia was 
contrary to "the Marxist-Leninist principle of sovereignty 
and the right of nations to self-determination" was rejected 
as being "based on an abstract, nonclass approach to the 
question of sovereignty and the right of nations to self- 
determination". Lenin was cited in support of the principle 
that just as "someone living in a society cannot be free of 
that society, so a socialist state that is in a system of 
other states constituting a socialist commonwealth cannot be 
free of the common interests of the commonwealth". Thus as 
in the many statements made before the invasion, it was 
asserted that "[t]he Communists of the fraternal countries 
naturally could not allow the socialist states to remain idle 
in the name of abstract sovereignty while the country was 
endangered by anti-socialist degeneration".
As to law, it was stated that in "the Marxist conception 
the norms of law, including the norms governing relations 
among socialist countries, cannot be interpreted...outside
Wolfe, op.oit.f p.381.
6 6 By Mr Brezhnev at the Polish Party Congress in Warsaw on 
November 12, 1968. For the text, see CDSP, Vol. XX, No. 46 
(December 4, 1968), pp.3-5.
67 Wolfe, op.cit., p.383.
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the general context of the class struggle in the present-day 
world". In other words, the struggle between capitalism and 
socialism and the link between capitalist powers and anti­
socialist forces in Czechoslovakia meant self-determination 
could not be allowed if the future of Czechoslovakia, as a 
socialist state, was in doubt. Far from the sovereignty of 
Czechoslovakia being violated by the invasion, it was rather 
that what was at stake was "a struggle for the Czechoslovak 
Socialist Republic's sovereignty against those who would like 
to deprive it of this sovereignty by delivering the country 
to the imperialists". Sovereignty, in short, is inseparable 
from socialism and the invasion was aimed at defending both 
"the fundamental interests of the socialist commonwealth and
primarily at defending Czechoslovakia’s independence and
6 8sovereignty as a socialist state..." (emphasis added). As 
with the invasion of Hungary the invasion of Czechoslovakia 
was not seen as being in contradiction with the principles 
of bourgeois international law. "The foreign policy doctrine 
of socialism and the international policy of socialist states 
which is based on it show that there is not and cannot be any 
contradiction between internationalism and such principles of 
contemporary international law as sovereignty and non­
intervention" .
The struggle between socialist and imperialist forces, 
as a principle linked with the Soviet intervention in 
Czechoslovakia in defence of the gains of socialism, relates 
not only to the Soviet justification but also to why the 
Soviet Union cannot admit any understanding as to spheres of 
influence. With reference to Czechoslovakia, A. Sovetov,
For this and all above quotes from Kovalev, see CDSP,
Vol. XX, No. 39 (October 16, 1968), pp.10-12.
C Q A. Sovetov, 'The Present Stage in the Struggle Between 
Socialism and Imperialism', International Affairs, 11 
(Moscow, November 1968), p.5. On the "Brezhnev Doctrine", 
see also S. Sanakoyev, 'Socialist Foreign Policy and the 
Community of Fraternal Countries'; 0. Pavlov, 'Proletarian 
Internationalism and Defense of Socialist Gains'; and 
K. Ivanov, 'Lessons for the Future', International Affairs, 
10 (Moscow, October 1968).
178
writing in International Affairs, noted that "[a] number of
newspapers and magazines have started to raise the problem
of the so-called division of the world into spheres of
influence. This is done for a very definite purpose.
Articles and other material have been features in the
bourgeois, and not only bourgeois, press attempting to prove
that the world has been secretly divided into spheres of
influence between the super-powers and that each of them
tacitly recognizes this division". What is interesting about
this are Sovetov's reasons for rejecting it. His argument is
that the Soviet Union acts not in its own interests but in
class interests, in the interests of socialism. Soviet
policy is determined by the interests of socialism and while
it needs to ensure its own security, it can do so without
the help of the United States. "From the moment of its birth
the Soviet Union linked its destinies and the destiny of
world socialism in a single whole...". To suggest an
understanding as to spheres of influence would be "to
counterpose the Soviet Union to other socialist countries
and the interests of our country to the interests of 
70socialism". Spheres of influence would imply that when 
the Soviet Union invaded Czechoslovakia it behaved as any 
other Great Power and casts doubt on whether its actions 
were motivated by socialist solidarity alone, if at all. The 
elaborate theoretical framework explaining the events would 
then become merely a justification, rather than a set of 
principles governing relations between socialist states.
Enough has been said of the Soviet account of the 
invasion of Czechoslovakia. What did the United States say 
and do before, during and after the invasion?
We have seen how, both before and after the invasion, 
the Soviet Union linked the United States and other western 
powers to developments in Czechoslovakia. During the month
70 Sovetov, op.cit. p.9.
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before the invasion, accusations implicating the United
States caused concern and comment in Washington. The Warsaw
Pact forces which had been sent on manoeuvres in June were
still in Czechoslovakia and the possibility of their being
used by Russia to impose its will was aired in the Western 
71press. Perhaps for that reason the United States took care
explicitly to disassociate itself from events in
Czechoslovakia. Secretary of State Dean Rusk made a personal
protest to Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin over the "continuing
series of allegations that the United States [had] involved
72itself in events in Czechoslovakia".
In the United States it was reported by the press that
the Administration regarded the situation in Czechoslovakia
and the response it was drawing from the other states of
east Europe and the Soviet Union as intra-mural, not as
something which "should become an east-west conflict.
Consequently the United States was of the opinion that NATO
units in Germany should be kept as inconspicuous as possible
73so as to avoid any appearance of sabre-rattling". The
author of this same article asserted that officials were
"inclined to regard the Eastern European nations as a
legitimate Soviet sphere of influence" and to be reluctant
to engage in any "attempt to improve United States relations
with the one-time Soviet satellites at the expense of
relations with the Soviet Union". In more than one report
it was stated that whatever happened in Czechoslovakia, the
74Administration was "determined to stay on the sidelines".
Not only was the United States apparently going to stay on
See, for instance, AAP Reuters dispatch in the Age,
July 22, 1968.
^  Washington Post, 23 July 1968, and New York Times, July 
24, 1968, p.13.
^  See Peter Grose, New York Times, July 22, 1968, p.7, and 
Benjamin Welles, New York Times, July 26, 1968, p.12.
^  New York Times, July 22, 1968, p.l, and July 24, 1968,
p. 3.
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the sidelines, but it remained, in James Reston's words,
75remarkably quiet. Indeed President Johnson apparently
placed a ban on comments that might strain Soviet-
7 6Czechoslovak relations.
In contrast to these reports that the United States had
adopted a policy of silence, a Soviet broadcast claimed that
reports emanating from the United States had warned that if
troops were sent into Czechoslovakia, the projected talks of
strategic arms limitation would be deferred and some
bi-lateral agreements cancelled. The broadcast said this
warning was supposed to have been transmitted to officials
of the Soviet Foreign Ministry by Charles Bohlen, but it
denied that any such warning had been received. It dismissed
the idea that the Soviet Union might intervene in
77Czechoslovakia. Whether or not there was any such warning, 
the impression in the United States and in Western Europe was 
one of silence and that the United States would "stay on the 
sidelines".
During July more than one observer likened the situation
7 8which was developing to the example of Munich in 1938.
Sir Fitzroy McLean, a British MP, referred to Neville
Chamberlain and felt it "scarcely conceivable that, in such
a situation, no word of warning should be uttered by any
7 9Western statesman". Similarly Senator Clairborne Pell of 
the Foreign Relations Committee said at the time "[t]here is 
now the danger of a second Munich in Europe, [there is] even 
a tacit agreement with the Soviet Union which would sell
77
New York Times, July 24, 1968, p.40.
New York Times, July 26, 1968, p.12.
BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, SU/2842, August 7, 1968.
See, for instance, C.G. Burnham, 'Czechoslovakia Thirty 
Years After Munich', Yearbook of World Affairs, 1969, 
pp.53-81.
^  New York Times, July 26, 1968, p.12.
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Czechoslovakia down the river for the price - again the
8 0illusory price - of continued detente". But while the
United States did keep quiet before the invasion, the thought
was expressed that unlike the situation in 1938 silence in
1968 was "not dishonor but wisdom in what must be recognized
81as a new phase in East-West relations". As was not 
engaging NATO troops in manoeuvres, so silence was thought 
to be a necessary measure in avoiding provocation which might 
bring a Soviet invasion. However, silence in this case was 
acquiescence and the Soviet Union would have been right to 
interpret it as such.
Early in August, George Ball, then United States 
Representative to the United Nations, addressed the American 
Bar Association on the "Structure of Peace". In the course 
of his address, he spoke of the hopes which had been held at 
the close of the war for universal organization, but which 
had been undermined by regionalism. The response of the 
United States to the Soviet Union's interpretation of the 
Yalta agreements and the way it extended its influence over 
eastern Europe had, according to Ball, taken two forms.
First, the United States had and would continue as much as 
possible to use the organs of the United Nations. Second, 
for the purpose of halting the "outward thrust of communist 
power", it had built a structure of alliances on a regional 
basis and outside the reach of the veto.
The doctrinal formulation of this objective, which 
became known as the policy of 'containment', 
reflected the preoccupations of classical diplomacy.
It assumed a recognition of a balance of power that 
must not be upset and suggested in less clear 
outlines, the implicit acceptance by both sides of 
broad spheres of influence.
The United States had implicitly, though not explicitly, 
accepted a Soviet sphere of influence in eastern Europe since
New York Times, July 28, 1968, p.3.
New York Times, July 26, 1968, p.12.
D.S.B., Vol. LIX, No. 1522, August 26, 1968, p.221.
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the closing stages of World War II, and there was no reason 
for the Soviet Union to think that it would not stay on the 
sidelines should the Soviet Union take action in 
Czechoslovakia. What did the United States say or do 
when the Soviet and Warsaw Pact forces did intervene?
On August 22, President Johnson made a very brief
statement to the effect that the reasons for the intervention
offered by the Soviet Union were "patently contrived"; that
the actions of the Warsaw Pact allies were a violation of the
United Nations Charter and that the United States would "join
with other nations in the Security Council to insist upon the
8 3Charter rights of Czechoslovakia and its people". In a 
news conference on the same day, Secretary Rusk said much the 
same. When questioned on the likely effect of the invasion 
on east-west relations Rusk was cautious about mentioning the 
Soviet Union and spoke instead of the bilateral relations 
between the members of the Warsaw Pact and the countries of 
western Europe and the United States. This perhaps indicated 
an unwillingness to suggest that there would be any serious 
setback for relations between the Soviet Union and the United 
States. Nevertheless, the United States did cancel the 
strategic arms limitation talks scheduled to be in September.
With regard to the arms limitation talks Mr Rusk 
explained that as far as the United States knew the Soviet 
Union was still prepared to proceed. "We felt we could not. 
Public opinion in the United States and in the West would not 
have comprehended a summit meeting and the start of talks 
right after the invasion of Czechoslovakia". The Soviet 
Union had not, Mr Dobrynin told an American official, 
connected SALT and the invasion and so expected to begin in 
September as Mr Rusk surmised. And unlike Mr Rusk, President 
Johnson was, according to John Newhouse, anxious to proceed. 
Consequently, in November Mr McNamara approached Soviet
83 D.S.B • / Vol. LIX, No. 1524, September 9, 1968, p.261.
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leaders on behalf of the United States and negotiations 
84recommenced. By June 1969, the progress of SALT was back
8 5to where it had been in August 1968.
Apart from cancelling the arms negotiations the United
States appeared to be aiming at minimising any hostility with
the Soviet Union that might arise from the invasion. It was
announced that the United States would not go to war over
Czechoslovakia. But at the same time as the United States
rejected the idea of counter-intervention, it made it clear
that it did not approve of what had happened. President
Johnson stated that there would be "no condoning of
aggressors and no appeasement of those who prowl across
8 6national boundaries..,". The United States was equally 
concerned to dispel the idea that it had done nothing because 
of any agreement as to spheres of influence. On August 22 
the State Department issued a statement, apparently 
unsolicited and not in answer to any charge, denying that the 
United States had ever agreed with the Soviet Union to divide 
Europe into spheres of influence.
The US government has never entered into any 'sphere 
of influence' agreements or understandings with 
anyone anywhere in the world. There has been no 
discussion of any such idea in connection with recent 
developments in Czechoslovakia, nor has any government 
attempted to elicit from the United States any such 
understanding.
Any suggestion that the United States, tacitly 
or otherwise, gave the Soviet Union to understand that 
the United States would be indifferent to the action 
which the Soviet Union and other Warsaw Pact countries 
have now taken in Czechoslovakia is malicious and 
totally without foundation.
Secretary Rusk took this up again in an address on September 
12, when he once more denied that there had been or was "some
John Newhouse, Cold Dawn, The Story of SALT (New York, 
Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1973), pp.130-36.
85 Ibid., p.162.
88 New York Times, August 31, 1968.
8 7 See Keesings Contemporary Archives, October 26-November 2, 
1968; and D.W. Bowett, The Search for Peace (London, RKP, 
1972) , p.119.
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tacit understanding between the Soviet Union and the United 
States with respect to Czechoslovakia". Mr Rusk repeated 
that the United States had "not entered into any spheres of 
influence agreements or understandings with anyone anywhere 
in the world". Moreover, he said, "we do not see the concept 
of spheres of influence consistent with the possibilities of 
maintaining the peace of the world". Nonetheless Mr Rusk 
acknowledged that Europe was divided. "The Soviet Union has, 
in fact, with the Red Army, established and maintained by 
force in Eastern Europe a sphere not of influence but of 
dominance".® ®
Whether it was a sphere of influence or dominance was, 
in this case, merely academic. Whereas influence might not 
amount to dominance, dominance would certainly subsume 
influence. But in many ways it was the dominance rather than 
the influence to which the United States objected. It was 
argued in the previous chapter that it was perhaps not so 
much a Soviet sphere of influence to which the United States 
objected, as the form the Soviet sphere took. This found 
expression again in an address by Under Secretary Katzenbach 
concerning the United States and western Europe in the wake 
of the invasion of Czechoslovakia. "Perhaps the most 
fundamental lesson of the invasion", Katzenbach said, was 
that "many in the West had a very different view from the 
Soviets of what detente was all about". Whereas the United 
States had "looked upon internal change within the Soviet 
bloc as an important part of the process of detente", the 
Soviet Union apparently thought of detente as involving no 
"real change in the rigidities of the system". For the Soviet 
Union, detente was limited to its relations with the United 
States and had nothing to do with the states in its east 
European sphere of influence. Detente was a matter of 
resolving issues between blocs rather than states and was not
Address on September 12 to the Manufacturers' Association 
of Connecticut, D.S,B., Vol. LIX, No. 1528, October 7, 1968, 
pp.350-51.
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aimed at ending the division of Europe which Katzenbach
described as the central issue of the time. For the United
States, on the other hand, detente would hopefully lessen
Soviet control over the states of east Europe and bring
improved relations between all the states of Europe, both
8 9east and west and the super-powers alike. The United
States had hoped perhaps that ultimately detente would result
in self-determination for the states in the Soviet sphere,
consistent with what Rusk called "our deep-rooted commitment
90to self-determination". With respect to Czechoslovakia, 
the United States commitment to self-determination meant that 
while it did nothing to oppose the Warsaw Pact forces, it did 
not agree with what was done.
On the day of the invasion the United States rejected
both the TASS statement that the invasion was in response to
a Czechoslovak request and the claim that it had been
occasioned by the machinations of external "imperialist" and
"counter-revolutionary" forces. The United States condemned
the invasion in the Security Council as being "contrary to
the United Nations Charter and... contrary to all
international law". It was denounced as "a gross act of
perfidy" and as contrary, in particular, to the principle of
91non-intervention. Similarly on September 12 the United 
States Representative in the United Nations Special Committee 
on Principles of International Law spelt out the ways in 92which the invasion violated the principles of the Charter.
Address given on October 16, 1968, D.S.B., Vol. LIX,
No. 1533, November 11, 1968, pp.489-93.
9 0 Rusk address to the Manufacturers' Association of 
Connecticut, op.ait., p.351.
91 Dean Rusk, Second Statement of August 21 in the UN 
Security Council, D.S.B., Vol. LIX, No. 1524, September 9, 
1968, pp.268-69.
92 See D.S.B., Vol. LIX, No. 1529, October 14, 1968, 
pp.396-401.
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But none of these criticisms was related to the theoretical 
underpinning of the invasion which did not emerge until the 
Kovalev article made its appearance in September.
When Mr Rusk addressed himself to the Kovalev article
in a plenary session of the UN General Assembly on October 2,
his criticisms were derived from the Charter. After stating
the content of Kovalev's article and posing a series of
questions as to its meaning, Mr Rusk said the world would
look for assurance that the Soviet Union was "not seeking to
place itself above the law of the charter". He added, "[l]et
us say very plainly to the Soviet Union: The road to detente
93is the road of the charter". In this way Mr Rusk
explicitly rejected the so-called Brezhnev Doctrine as being
contrary to the charter. On a later occasion he rejected the
idea that the Soviet Union had a "right to make the decisive
94decisions for all those inside the socialist commonwealth".
The doctrine attaching to the Socialist Commonwealth, as
Kovalev had set it out, was discussed at length by the United
States Representative to the UN General Assembly in the Sixth
9 5Committee on November 19 and 25. Once more it was
criticised as being "a rejection of the fundamental
principles of the charter and the whole scheme of relations
among states upon which the charter rests" and as "an open
assertion that the sovereign equality of states...may be
discarded when they run afoul of the objectives of the old
world imperialism with the new name - the 'Socialist
96Commonwealth'". Thus the United States clearly did reject 
the Soviet justification for the invasion. But this by no
D.S.B., Vol. LIX, No. 1530, October 21, 1968, p.407.
94 D.S.B., Vol. LIX, No. 1532, November 4, 1968, p.476. At 
the same time he was asked whether the United States could 
have done anything to prevent the Soviet Union from invading 
Czechoslovakia. In answering he made no mention of the 
possibility of resistance by force or of any unilateral action 
by the United States.
95 The Sixth Committee deals with legal matters.
96 D.S.B., Vol. LIX, No. 1539, December 23, 1968, pp.665 and
668.
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means implied that it would oppose the Soviet Union in other 
cases to which the "Brezhnev Doctrine" and its consequent 
actions might be applied.
In summary, whereas the intervention in Hungary was 
unilateral, in Czechoslovakia the Soviet Union had the support 
of Warsaw Pact forces and in particular of Poland and East 
Germany. Both in Hungary and in Czechoslovakia the object 
was to maintain the rule of the communist party. As in 1956, 
the Soviet Union asserted that socialist sovereignty was a 
higher principle than sovereignty as understood by "bourgeois 
international law". For the Soviet Union the intervention 
upheld rather than violated the sovereignty of Czechoslovakia. 
Before the invasion the United States did nothing to suggest 
that it would not acquiesce in Soviet intervention. After the 
invasion it did postpone the strategic arms limitations talks 
but otherwise confined itself to rejecting the Soviet 
explanation for the invasion. The United States did not act 
in any way which suggested there was not tacit understanding 
about spheres of influence.
II.
The United States.
1. Cuba.
Just as the Soviet Union intervened in Hungary and
Czechoslovakia to preserve the rule of the Communist Party,
the advent of a communist government in Cuba brought attempts
by the United States to topple it. The presence of Castro's
government was regarded as an affront to the principles which
97informed United States policy toward Latin America. The 
United States disapproved of Cuba exporting revolution by 
example and by giving material aid to other states of Latin
In September 1962 Time magazine published a portrait of 
President Monroe on its cover and argued that Soviet 
activities in Cuba called for United States action in keeping 
with the Monroe Doctrine.
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America. Moreover, it perceived of Cuban ties with the
Soviet Union as a threat to the balance of power in the
region and ipso facto to the predominance of the United
States. As was shown in the previous chapter, the Central
Intelligence Agency engineered the Bay of Pigs invasion of
1961 in an attempt to overthrow the Castro government. Once
that failed and at the same time embarrassed the United
States, Kennedy ruled out the use of force to overthrow
Castro, unless Cuba were to act in any overtly aggressive
way. Kennedy warned that the restraint of the United States
was not inexhaustible and that it would act "against outside
communist penetration". It was not, Kennedy said, so much a
matter of Cuba being a threat to the United States as of it
being "a base for subverting the survival of other free
98nations throughout the hemisphere".
Apart from threatening to use force if the occasion
arose, the United States sought to isolate Cuba within Latin
America through trade embargoes and through breaking
diplomatic ties. At an OAS meeting in San Jose, Costa Rica
in August 1960, the United States attempted to secure a
pronouncement against Castro, but the resolution which was
adopted merely "condemned interference by extra-continental
9 9powers in the hemisphere [and] said nothing about Cuba". 
However, at Punte del Este in December 1961, the OAS 
resolved that the Government of Cuba was "incompatible with 
the principles and objectives of the inter-American system" 
and that "this incompatibility exclude[d] the present 
government of Cuba from participation in the inter-American 
system". Part II of the same act urged members to take
whatever
D.S.B., Vol. XLIV, No. 1141 (May 8, 1961), pp.659-61.
9 9 A.M. Schlesinger Jnr., A Thousand Days (London, Andre 
Deutsch, 1965), p.670.
Points 2 and 3. Resolution pertaining to VI. 'Exclusion 
of the Present Government of Cuba from Participation in the 
Inter-American System', Final Act. Eighth Consultative 
Meeting of Foreign Ministers of the American States. OAS, 
Official Records, OEA/Ser. C/11.8 (English).
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steps that they may consider appropriate for their 
individual or collective self-defence; and to 
cooperate, as may be necessary or desirable, to 
strengthen their capacity to counteract threats or 
acts of aggression, subversion, or other dangers 
to peace and security resulting from the continued 
intervention in [the] hemisphere of Sino-Soviet 
powers, in accordance with the obligations 
established in treaties and agreements such as the 
Charter of the Organization of American States and 
the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance. ^ ^
Similarly, on September 20, 1962 the Senate and the House of
Representatives passed a Joint Resolution which referred to
the Monroe Doctrine, the Rio Treaty and the Punte del Este
resolution and resolved to restrain Cuba from extending "its
aggressive or subversive activities to any part of [the]
102hemisphere". The government of Cuba was, therefore,
associated with a perceived threat to the hemisphere from 
extra-continental powers. It was in this light that the 
prospect of missiles was regarded.
In response to the United States attempts to isolate 
Cuba and to its threats of force the Soviet press attacked 
United States "provocations" over Cuba. During the month 
before the Soviet medium range ballistic missile sites in 
Cuba were spotted in aerial reconnaissance photographs, TASS 
accused the United States of wanting to intervene in Cuba as 
it had done on the side of the whites during the civil war 
in Russia. It warned that United States policy toward Cuba 
"could plunge the world into the catastrophe of a general 
world war with the use of thermonuclear weapons". The Soviet 
Union, it continued, had such powerful missiles for 
delivering its nuclear warheads that it had no need to seek 
sites for them beyond the boundaries of the Soviet Union. 
Moreover, were the United States to unleash an attack against 
another state, and were that state to ask for help, then no 
one should doubt that the Soviet Union would extend such
101 Resolution 3.
102 For the text, see D,S,B., 
(October 22, 1962), p.597.
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help. While it did not say that such help would include
the threat of the use of nuclear weapons, that was the 
implication. What is more, in spite of its claims not to 
need missile sites outside its own boundaries, the Soviet Union 
did attempt to establish such sites in Cuba. That it made 
the threats it did, and that it attempted to establish missile 
sites may be seen, at least in part, as a response to United 
States attempts to overthrow Castro.
The Soviet attempt to place missiles in Cuba
distinguishes the Cuban crisis from the other three examples
discussed in this chapter, in that it was in the Cuban case
alone that the adversary power took action which increased
the risk of war with the influencing power. Indeed, some
people have regarded the confrontation which resulted as
being such that "the population of the northern hemisphere
104was closer to extinction than at any previous time". The
interventions in Czechoslovakia, Hungary and as will be seen 
presently, the Dominican Republic, were largely a matter of 
the influencing power acting against the influenced state in 
question. As to Cuba, it was a matter of the Soviet Union 
as the adversary power, acting against the United States as 
influencing power. But it will be shown that despite this 
adversary component the case of Cuba played a part in the 
emergence of tacit understanding.
By September 1962 the United States was mindful of the
influx of Soviet arms into Cuba and that surface-to-air
missiles were among the shipments. President Kennedy drew
a distinction between surface-to-air missiles for defensive
purposes, which would be tolerated, and surface-to-surface
105offensive missiles, which would not. At a news conference
on September 13 he stated explicitly, in accord with what he 
had said after the Bay of Pigs, that "if Cuba should ever
103
CDSP, Vol. XIV, No. 37 (October 10, 1962), pp.13-14.
104 Hugh Thomas, Cuba (London, Eyre and Spottiswood, 1971), 
p.1315.
105 Ibid., p.1396.
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attempt to export its aggressive purposes by force or the 
threat of force against any nation in this hemisphere, or 
become an offensive military base of significant capacity 
for the Soviet Union, then this country will do whatever 
must be done to protect its own security and that of its 
allies".106
The idea of Cuba being the beachhead for a Sino-Soviet
threat to the Americas was reiterated on October 3 by Under
Secretary Ball in a Statement to the House Select Committee
on Export Control. Cuba, Mr Ball told the Committee, "has
value to the bloc primarily as a base for the subversive
activities of international communism in the Western
Hemisphere". He mentioned the surface-to-air missile sites
already established and said, as the President had, that if
the Soviet Union ever appeared to be "succeeding in making
Cuba a threat to the security of this country or this
107hemisphere", America would have to act.
A few days earlier Mr Rusk had also spoken of the
problem offensive weapons would raise. When asked whether
the United States would lose "prestige and respect for
permitting Russia to outflank" it by building a base for
subversion next door, Mr Rusk said the question of prestige
was "primarily a question of solidarity in [the]
108hemisphere". A further question suggested Cuba was a
problem for the United States alone. To this Mr Rusk said
rather evasively that it was "a major problem for [the]
hemisphere because of the commitments of the hemisphere under
its treaties and charters, and in those commitments the
United States plays a very important role. It is a problem
for us because it is a problem in the hemisphere as well".
Asked whether Soviet aims might not be to negotiate a deal
to close down the base in Cuba in return for the United
States closing down some of its own, Mr Rusk bluntly asserted
109that that was "not a negotiable point".
106
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Heedless of the warnings on offensive missiles, the 
Soviet Union nevertheless began building medium range 
ballistic missile bases. These were first spotted in 
photographs taken on October 14, and were brought to the 
attention of the President on October 16. That day the so- 
called Executive Committee of the National Security Council 
was brought together and for the next thirteen days the 
Cuban missile crisis was in progress.11(^ The immediate 
problem for the United States was to force the Soviet Union 
to withdraw its missile components. In the longer term it 
remained, as Mr Rusk said after the crisis had ended, Cuba's 
Marxist-Leninist government, which he described as 
"incompatible with the commitments of the hemisphere; so 
[that] when we are talking about normal relationships, we are 
talking about things which go far beyond the immediate crisis 
precipitated by the offensive weapons in Cuba". Solving the 
weapons problem did not solve the rest, "we simply take up 
again that question that we had before us before the 
offensive weapons got into Cuba".111 Nevertheless, in 
October 1962 the missiles were the primary problem.
There is no intention here of treating certain of the 
strategic and so-called crisis management aspects of the 
missile crisis. For treatment of these matters see the 
following: E. Abel, The Missile Crisis (New York,
Lippincott, 1966); C. Bell, The Conventions of Crisis (London, 
Oxford University Press, 1971); A. Horelick, 'The Cuban 
Missile Crisis', World Politics, Vol. XVI, No. 3 (April 1964); 
J.H. Kahan and A. Long, 'The Cuban Missile Crisis: A Study of
Its Strategic Context', Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 
LXXXVII, No. 4 (December 1972); J.A. Nathan, 'The Missile 
Crisis: His Finest Hour Now', World Politics, Vol. XXVII,
No. 2 (January 1975); Khrushchev's Report to the Supreme 
Soviet of the USSR, December 12, 1962. Reproduced in 
A. Dallin (ed.), Diversity of International Communism: A
Documentary Record> 1961-1963 (Columbia, 1963), p.670ff.;
A. and R. Wohlstetter, 'Controlling the Risks in Cuba', ADELPHI 
Papers, No. 17.
For details of the reconnaissance flights of EXCOM and 
its procedure, see T.C. Sorensen, Kennedy (London, Hodder & 
Stoughton, 1965), p.672ff. and Robert Kennedy's 13 Days, 
passim.
111 News Conference, December 10, 1962, D.S,B., Vol. XLVII,
No. 1227 (December 31, 1962), p.999.
The removal of the missiles was achieved through the
imposition of a naval "quarantine" which, as Under Secretary
Ball explained, enabled the United States to "avoid resort
to an immediate use of force that might have led the United
States and the Soviet Union, and with them their allies, up
112an ascending scale of violence". In announcing both the
missile sites and the quarantine, President Kennedy said the
transformation of Cuba into a strategic base constituted "an
explicit threat to the peace and security of all the Americas,
in flagrant and deliberate defiance of the Rio Pact of 1947.
The traditions of [the] nation and hemisphere, the Joint
Resolution of the 87th Congress, the Charter of the United
113Nations", and his own public warnings. The President
spoke of the danger attached to deception, particularly "in 
an area well known to have a special and historical 
relationship to the United States and the nations of the 
Western Hemisphere...". Similarly, on the same day, in a 
letter to Mr Khrushchev, President Kennedy said he thought 
he had made it quite clear that in view of the objectives of 
Soviet ideology, the United States would not tolerate any 
Soviet action "which in a major way disturbed the existing 
over-all balance of power in the world". Hence, he was 
therewith informing Mr Khrushchev that the United States was 
determined that the threat to the security of the hemisphere 
be removed.
The following day, at a special meeting of the Council 
of the Organization of American States, Mr Rusk also 
emphasised the threat to the hemisphere and the challenge 
posed for the "determination of the American governments to 
carry out [the] hemispheric commitments solemnly assumed in
D.S.B., Vol. XLVII, No. 1223 (December 3, 1962), pp.831- 
32. On the decision to impose the quarantine, see R. Kennedy,
13 Days, The Cuban Missile Crisis (London, Pan, 1969), passim.
] ] 3 Address to the Nation, October 22, D.S.b., Vol. XLVII,
No. 1220 (November 12, 1962), p.715.
D.S.B., Vol. LXIX, No. 1795 (November 19, 1973), pp.635- 
36. This edition of the Bulletin contains a series of 
messages exchanged by President Kennedy and Chairman Khrushchev 
during the Cuban Missile Crisis. See pp.635-55.
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the inter-American treaties and resolutions...". Mr Rusk 
continued by saying "that the growing intervention of the 
international Communist movement in [the] hemisphere must 
stop", and he urged the governments of the hemisphere to 
support the United States under the Inter-American Treaty of 
Reciprocal Resistance to meet the threat "from outside the 
hemisphere". Consequently, under the mantle of being the 
provisional organ of consultation, the Council resolved, in 
accordance with Articles 6 and 8 of the Inter-American 
Treaty to
take all measures, individually and collectively, 
including the use of armed force, which they may 
deem necessary to ensure that the Government of 
Cuba cannot continue to receive from the Sino- 
Soviet powers military material and related 
supplies which may threaten the peace and security 
of the Continent and to prevent the missiles in 
Cuba with offensive capability from ever becoming 
an active threat to the peace and security of the 
Continent. H 5
This amounted to an OAS sanction on the quarantine being 
imposed by the United States. In fact this was one case in
which the American Republics willingly supported the United
04. 4- 116 States.
At the very same time as Mr Rusk was in the Council of 
the Organization of American States, Adlai Stevenson was 
making a long statement in the Security Council. It was only 
while he was making this speech that he was informed of the 
OAS resolution and so was able to claim its support for the 
quarantine. About Cuba and its relationship to the broader 
contest between the super-powers, Stevenson said the threat 
of the Castro regime lay in its submission to "the will of 
an aggressive foreign power".
The foremost objection of the states of the 
Americas to the Castro regime is not because it is 
revolutionary, not because it is socialistic, not
For Mr Rusk's address and the text of the resolution, 
see D.S.B., Vol. XLVII, No. 1220 (November 12, 1962), 
pp.720-23.
See G. Connell-Smith, The Inter-American System (I.ondon, 
Oxford University Press, 1966), pp.255-59.
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because it is dictatorial, not even because Dr 
Castro perverted a noble revolution in the 
interests of a squalid totalitarianism. It is 
because he has aided and abetted an invasion of 
this hemisphere - Cuba has given the Soviet Union 
a bridgehead and staging area in this hemisphere,
...it has invited an extra-continental, anti­
democratic, and expansionist power into the bosom 
of the American family...
Mr Stevenson made a number of references to the extension of
Soviet power into the Western Hemisphere and how that cut
across the traditions of the Americas. He also referred to
"the precarious balance in the world" and how Soviet actions
were a "basic disturbance of the world's structure of
power...". On subsequent days, Mr Stevenson's statements
mostly repeated what was in his first address, except for a
brief statement on the legal basis of the measures taken by
the American Republics. He said, quite simply, that the
threat posed by the weapons contravened Article 2, paragraph
4, of the Charter, and so was a threat which the American
118Republics were entitled to meet as they had done. Not
surprisingly he did not mention that it could have been 
equally well argued that Article 2(4) should have prevented 
United States action, as there were difficulties in passing 
it off as individual or collective self-defence. This, 
however, is taken up in the next chapter.
While the crisis was running its course, both Mr Rusk 
and Under Secretary Ball reiterated that the threat was to 
the hemisphere and not the United States alone. In an 
address to the inter-American Defense College, Mr Rusk 
referred to an informal meeting of foreign ministers of the 
American Republics held during the previous week. At that 
conference there was, Mr Rusk said, unanimous agreement that 
the most urgent problem before the nations attending was 
"the Sino-Soviet intervention in Cuba and its aim of 
converting [the] island into an armed base for Communist
-L-L/ D.S.B., Vol. XLVII, No. 1220 (November 12, 1962), 
pp.723-34.
118 Ibid., p.737.
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penetration and subversion of democratic institutions in the
119American Republic". Similarly, when attending the opening
of a bridge across the Panama Canal, Mr Ball referred to the
same meeting and said "the Western Hemisphere will never
tolerate intrusion or invasion of foreign despots into the
life and affairs of the hemisphere". He added that "the
Sino-Soviet intervention designed to convert that island into
an armed base for Communist penetration of the hemisphere, is
120a problem for all free nations of Latin America". In
short the missiles were "taken as a deliberate challenge to
the most cherished single principle of tested American
121foreign policy - the Monroe Doctrine". The missiles were
seen not just as a threat to the physical security of the 
United States but to its ideology as well.
What is particularly interesting here is that the 
crisis was ended by an understanding which the United States 
reasserted and the Soviet Union apparently accepted in 1970, 
some eight years later. What was this understanding and why 
was it invoked in 1970?
On October 26, Khrushchev proposed to Kennedy that if
the United States would undertake not to invade Cuba; would
"restrain others from such action"; and would call off the
naval blockade, then the presence of Soviet military
specialists in Cuba would no longer be necessary. An
undertaking from the United States that it would not invade
Cuba, wrote Khrushchev, would "change the [Soviet] approach
to the question of destroying not only the armaments which
122you call offensive, but every other kind of armament".
iX D.S.B., Vol. XLVII, No. 1218 (October 29, 1963), p.643.
120 Ibid., p.647.
121 Bayliss Manning in J. Plank (ed.), Cuba and the United 
States (Washington, The Brookings Institute, 1967), p.230. 
Note: During the crisis the Doctrine was not publicly
mentioned by the administration. Kennedy rejected the idea 
of using it in Stevenson's speech to the Security Council. 
See Abram Chayes, The Cuban Missile Crisis (London, Oxford 
University Press, 1974). This is discussed in the next 
chapter.
12 2 Chairman Khrushchev's message of October 26, 1962. 
Official translation, D.S.B., Vol. LXIX, No. 1795 (November 
19, 1913), p.645.
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At the same time an official from the Soviet Embassy in
Washington met ABC reporter John Scali and asked him to
convey to the United States government that the Soviet Union
would remove its missiles under United Nations supervision
or inspection if the United States "would lift the blockade
and give a pledge not to invade Cuba as its part of the
123understanding".
The following day (Saturday, October 27) before any
answer had been decided upon, a further, less accommodating
letter from Khrushchev was received. Khrushchev's proposal
was now that the Soviet Union would agree to remove its
missiles from Cuba and would state its commitment to do so
in the United Nations, if the United States would similarly
commit itself to remove its missiles from Turkey. The
United States had been planning to remove its missiles from
Turkey for the past eighteen months but Kennedy did not want
to order their withdrawal under threat from the Soviet 
124Union. The problem of how to answer Khrushchev's latest
proposal was debated by the so-called "Ex-Comm" most of the
afternoon but no consensus was reached. Some were unwilling
to endorse the State Department's proposal to reply bluntly
that no trade with the missiles in Turkey could be made.
However, during the course of the discussion Robert Kennedy
had the idea of ignoring Khrushchev's second letter and
responding instead to the more acceptable proposals of the 
125previous day. This was decided upon by President Kennedy
and a letter was sent to inform Khrushchev that the United 
States would accept a solution along the lines of the letter 
of 26 October.
It read in part:
As I read your letter, the key elements of your 
proposals - which seem generally acceptable as I 
understand them - are as follows:
123 R. Kennedy, op.cit., p.90.
124 Ibid., p.94.
125 Ibid., p.99.
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1) You would agree to remove these weapons systems 
from Cuba under appropriate United Nations 
observation and supervision; and undertake, with 
suitable safeguards, to halt the further introduction 
of such weapon systems into Cuba.
2) We, on our part, would agree - upon the 
establishment of adequate arrangements through the 
United Nations to ensure the carrying out and 
continuation of these commitments - (a) to remove 
promptly the quarantine measures now in effect and
(b) to give assurances against an invasion of Cuba.1^6
The following day Khrushchev accepted this and stated that
Soviet personnel had been instructed "to take the necessary
measures to stop the construction of the facilities
indicated; and to dismantle and return them to the Soviet 127Union". In this way the missile crisis came to an end.
The United States took the understanding to apply not
only to the missile crisis, but also to any future deployment
of Soviet strategic weapons in the hemisphere. This became
apparent in September 1970 when United States officials
announced that the Soviet Union had begun work on a
submarine base at Cienfuegos in Cuba. The United States
warned that it would regard such a base with the "utmost
seriousness" and as a violation of the 1962 understanding.
The Soviet Union claimed that it was not constructing a base
of its own and by the middle of October, work appeared to
have stopped. However, the United States continued to be
concerned by the presence of a submarine tender which left
Cienfuegos in October after the United States issued its
warning but which returned early in November. It finally
left in January 1971, but by February 5 another was on its 
128way to Cuba. During an interview on January 4, President
President Kennedy's message of October 27, 1962, D.S.B., 
Vol. LXIX, No. 1795 (November 19, 1973), p.649.
127 Ibid., p.652.
1 op G.H. Quester, 'Missiles in Cuba, 1970', Foreign Affairs, 
Vol. 49, No. 3 (April 1971), p.493. See also C. Gasteyger, 
'Political and Strategic Implications of Soviet Naval Presence 
in the Caribbean', in J.D. Theberge (ed.), Soviet Seapower in 
the Caribbean: Political and Strategic Implications (New
York, Praeger, 1972), pp.59-71, and J.D. Theberge, The Soviet 
Presence in Latin America (New York, Crane, Russak & Co.,
1974), p.69.
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Nixon was asked about the prospect of a submarine base at
Cienfuegos. In response Nixon stated that "President Kennedy
[had] worked out an understanding in 1962 that the Russians
would not put any offensive missiles into Cuba". He
continued by saying that "in the event that nuclear
submarines were serviced either in Cuba or from Cuba, that
129would be a violation of the understanding". At a press
conference held on February 17, Nixon once more repeated that
the understanding would be broken by submarines being
130serviced either in or from Cuba. In short the United
States regarded the arrangement which ended the Missile 
Crisis as having established an understanding about the 
tolerable limits of Soviet activity in or from Cuba, and 
this was reinforced by the so-called "mini-crisis" of 1970-71. 
As in 1962, the United States would not allow the Soviet Union 
to be seen to undermine its predominance in the region by 
introducing offensive missiles.
Finally, just as the United States criticised the account 
the Soviet Union gave of its actions in Hungary and 
Czechoslovakia, so the Soviet Union rejected the quarantine 
as contrary to the principles of international law.
On October 23, the day after the "quarantine" was
announced, Khrushchev accused the United States of having
"openly taken the path of grossly violating the United Nations
Charter, the path of violating international norms of freedom
of navigation on the high seas", and of having acted
aggressively against both Cuba and the Soviet Union. The
quarantine announced by the United States could "only be
regarded as undisguised interference in the internal affairs
of the Republic of Cuba, the Soviet Union and other 
131states". The following day, Chairman Khrushchev sent a
further message in which he questioned the meaning of the
129 D.S.B. ,
130 D.S.B. ,
131 D.S.B. ,
Vol. LXIV, No. 1648 
Vol. LXIV, No. 1654 
Vol. LXIX, No. 1795
(January 25, 1971), p.110. 
(March 8, 1971), p.284. 
(November 19, 1973), p.636.
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term "quarantine". A "quarantine", the message said, was
something which could be established "according to accepted
international practice, only by agreement of states between
themselves and not by some third party". The United States
was not declaring a quarantine but "setting forth an
ultimatum and threatening" the use of force in the event
that its demands were not met. Moreover, such demands could
not be justified by being sanctioned by the OAS. The OAS,
Khrushchev's message said, had "absolutely no authority or
basis" for deciding to impose a blockade and it was a
violation of the universally accepted norms of international
law. "The Soviet government considers that the violation of
the freedom to use international waters and international
air space is an act of aggression which pushes mankind
132toward the abyss of a world nuclear-missile war".
After the missile crisis ended the Soviet press had
almost nothing to say, either about it or the quarantine.
Two exceptions were an article by the Soviet jurist Korovin
and another by an American academic in the pages of
133International Affairs, At the same time as Korovin
castigated the United States for illegal acts, he cited
Chairman Khrushchev as having said that there must be
agreement on how to eliminate the possibility of nuclear war
breaking out. From this he proceeded to say that the United
States was undermining international law in several ways.
The blockade in particular violated both the Charter of the
United Nations and the charter of the Organization of
American States. Not only did it constitute interference in
Cuba's domestic affairs, it was in contempt of respect for
sovereignty and independence, of equal rights and non- 
134interference. Ten months later the editors of the same
132 Ibid,, message of October 24, pp.638-39.
13 3 Y. Korovin, 'International Law Through the Pentagon's 
Prism', International Affairs (Moscow) (December 1962), and 
F.B. Schick, 'Cuba and the Rule of Law', International 
Affairs (Moscow) (September 1963) .
Korovin, op.cit,, pp.5-7.
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journal stated that the "Monroe Doctrine never was and never
became [either before or after the Inter-American Treaty of
Reciprocal Assistance] a standard of universally agreed
international law, but was and remains a political slogan
and the diplomatic instrument of various US governments which
have endowed it with extremely varying legal content and used
135it for widely differing aims". They did not reject the
political expediency of the Monroe Doctrine, but only the 
idea that it had any standing in international law.
In summary, the United States regarded Castro's 
government in much the same way as the Soviet Union regarded 
the prospect of non-communist governments in eastern Europe. 
But whereas the United States did not oppose Soviet actions 
in eastern Europe, the Soviet attempt to put missiles in 
Cuba may be seen in part as an attempt to defend Cuba against 
the United States. For whatever reason the Soviet Union 
tried to establish missile sites, its action in doing so was 
seen by the United States as an attempt to undermine its 
predominance and as the intrusion of an extra-continental 
power into Latin America, contrary to the principles of the 
inter-American system. The blockade and the demand that the 
missiles be withdrawn meant not only that the United States 
would not tolerate offensive missiles in the region but also 
that the Soviet Union was not to extend its influence in Cuba 
any further than what was already achieved by Castro's coming 
to power. By withdrawing its missiles the Soviet Union in 
effect confirmed that Cuba was in the United States sphere 
of influence. Whatever expectations the Soviet Union had 
before the crisis as to what the United States would tolerate, 
its expectations should have been clear afterward. Also they 
should have been confirmed by what the United States said 
with regard to Cienfuegos in 1970 and 1971. With regard to 
the rest of Latin America the crisis served to announce that
135 September 1963 issue.
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the United States would not allow any more Cubas. Thus, it 
intervened in the Dominican Republic in 1965 to forestall 
what it saw as the threat of another communist government in 
the hemisphere.
2. The Dominican Republic.
In 1904 events in the Dominican Republic gave rise to 
the Roosevelt corollary to the Monroe Doctrine and in 
1905 and again in 1916, the Dominican Republic was subjected 
to intervention by the United States. On April 28, 1965, 
the United States intervened once more, essentially to uphold 
the Monroe Doctrine against what was perceived as the threat 
of extra-continental political influence in the hemisphere. 
What precipitated the latest intervention?
In December 1962, the first democratic elections since 
1930 replaced the dictator Trujillo with a government led by 
Dr Juan Bosch, "the leftist anti-communist leader of the 
Democratic Revolutionary Party". His government lasted only 
until September 1963 when it was overthrown by a coup which 
brought to power a three-man civilian junta dependent on 
military backing, led by Donald Reid Cabral. Cabral's first 
period of rule was also shortlived. Partly because of the 
deteriorating economic situation, a group of younger officers 
initiated a revolt on April 24, 1964, aimed at restoring rule 
to the leaders of the Democratic Revolutionary Party. The 
revolt failed to gain the support of the majority of the 
armed forces which, under the leadership of General Wessin y 
Wessin, began to put down the rebellion. Initially the 
United States government refused to intervene either in 
favour of Reid Cabral or in response to a request from the 
rebels for aid in negotiating a settlement. Conflict between 
the rebel and anti-rebel factions continued and so on April 
28, more than 500 American marines were landed, ostensibly to 
protect and evacuate American citizens in the Republic. The
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American forces were rapidly reinforced and were maintained 
until an inter-American force, which enabled some of them to
“I O  CLbe withdrawn, was established.
In his first statement President Johnson announced that
he had ordered the Secretary of Defence "to put the necessary
American troops ashore in order to give protection to the
137hundreds of Americans still in the Dominican Republic".
Adlai Stevenson offered the same reason to the Security 
138Council. Within two days the rationale was extended by
Ambassador Bunker when addressing the Tenth Meeting of
Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, to "the
elementary duty to save lives in a situation where there is
no authority able to accept responsibility for primary law
and order". Bunker explained that the United States did
not consider intervention to this end as being inconsistent
with inter-American obligations. "We wholeheartedly
subscribe to these obligations, including the doctrine of
non-intervention and self-determination". But in spite of
its having taken responsibility for law and order, the United
States argued that it was "for the OAS to find the means to
assist the Dominican people to constitute a government which
reflects their wishes and a government which can undertake
139the international obligations of the hemisphere".
The international obligations of the hemisphere, of 
which Bunker spoke, whether intentionally or otherwise, were 
a hint that United States troops were in the Dominican 
Republic for some reason other than to protect the lives of
136 See R.W. Logan, Haiti and the Dominican Republic (London, 
Oxford University Press, 1968), pp.70-82; A.F. Lowenthal,
'The US and the Dominican Republic to 1965: Background to
Intervention', Caribbean Studies, Vol. 10, No. 2, pp.30-35; 
and A.F. Lowenthal, 'The United States and the Dominican 
Republic', in K.N. Waltz and S.L. Spiegel, Conflict in World 
Politics (Cambridge, Massachusetts, Winthrop, 1971), 
pp.99-114.
Statement of April 28, D.S0B., Vol. LII, No. 1351 (May 17, 
1965), p.738.
138
139
Ibid., p.739. 
Ibid., p.740.
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American citizens and keep law and order. A month earlier
Bunker had spoken of "Castro's attempts to subvert and
14 0overthrow the governments of his Latin neighbors". 0nx
April 30, the same day as Bunker addressed the meeting of
Foreign Ministers, President Johnson said there were "signs
that people trained outside the Dominican Republic are
seeking to gain control". Not only were the aspirations of
the Dominican people threatened but also "the principles of
141the inter-American system". The following day Johnson
once more cast events in the Dominican Republic in terms of 
"a threat to the principles of the inter-American system and 
the peace of the hemisphere". Thus the goal of the United 
States was to support "the treaties and agreements which make 
up the fabric of the inrer-American system". At the same
time he proposed that an OAS committee be sent to the
o  u i • 1 4 2Republic.
On May 2, the outside agents mentioned the previous day
were branded by Johnson as communists, many of whom were
trained in Cuba. Whereas the revolution had begun as a
popular democratic one, it had been "taken over and really
seized and placed into the hands of a band of Communist 
14 3conspirators". This the United States would not tolerate
and the President proclaimed what became known as the Johnson 
Doctrine: "The American nations cannot, must not, and will
not permit the establishment of another Communist government 
in the Western Hemisphere". In support of this pronouncement 
he cited an inter-American resolution of January 1962 to the 
effect that "[t]he principles of Communism are incompatible 
with the principles of the Inter-American system". President
D.S.B., Vol. LII, No. 1344 (March 29, 1965), p.465.
Note: Bunker's statement was informed partly by a meeting of
Latin American Communist Parties, held in Havana earlier in 
the year, which had called for unity. Cuba was reported as 
being torn between Moscow's aim of expanding communism 
without war and the more militant Chinese line. See the New 
York Times, January 19, 1965, p.12; January 23, 1965, p.4; 
and January 31, 1965, p.24.
141 D.S.B., Vol.
142 Ibid., p.743
143 Ibid., p.745
No. 1351 (May 17, 1965), p.742.
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Johnson went on to say this was what Kennedy had meant when 
he said "[w]e in this hemisphere must also use every resource 
at our command to prevent the establishment of another Cuba 
in this hemisphere...".^44
Once the notion of protecting the hemisphere from the 
advance of international communism was introduced as a reason 
for the intervention, it was repeated many times. Thus what 
was at first justified as an action to protect American lives 
was subsequently explained as taking responsibility for law 
and order; on one occasion as having the purpose of both 
protecting lives and preventing communism, and finally as 
defending the hemisphere. President Johnson asserted that 
revolution in any country was a matter for that country to 
deal with and that the "form and nature of the free Dominican 
Government...[was] solely a matter for the Dominican 
people". But when the object of revolution was "the 
establishment of a Communist dictatorship", the form of, 14 5government became a matter for hemispheric action. In
other words, the extent to which revolution was a matter for 
the people to deal with, and the form and nature of the 
Dominican Government a matter for the Dominican people, was 
limited.
Before the revolt broke out, Ellsworth Bunker told the
Council of the OAS that the organization gave the United
States legal power and that "without the existence of the
OAS the countries of the hemisphere would have been faced
with far greater difficulties in countering the dangers of
146Castro communism". Presumably this meant that without the
144 Ibid., p.746. Note: The extent of communist influence
and the likelihood of the revolt being taken over has been 
disputed by Senator Fullbright, The Arrogance of Power 
(London, Cape, 1967), pp.88-89; Theodore Draper, The 
Dominican Revolt (New York, Commentry, 1968); and F. Parkinson, 
'Santo Domingo and After', Yearbook of World Affairs: 1966,
p.145. Similarly R.W. Logan, op.cit., commented with respect 
to the Soviet Union, that even if communists took over "it 
might have greatly preferred not to become involved with yet 
another sugar republic within the United States sphere of 
influence", p.79.
145 Ibid., p.747.
D.S.B., Vol. LII, No. 1340 (March 1, 1965), p.303.’ 4
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mantle of the OAS, at times the United States would have 
felt less free to act. Once the United States had intervened 
unilaterally and so presented the OAS with a fait accompli, 
it had the problem of enlisting the support of the 
organization in order to confer whatever legitimacy it could 
upon its actions.
On April 30 President Johnson appealed to the OAS by
saying it had "a grave and immediate responsibility" and that
it was important that the organization take immediate action
for the sake of the Dominican Republic.^ ^  The same day
Ambassador Bunker went to the Tenth Meeting of Consultation
of Ministers of Foreign Affairs. His reasons for the
intervention followed President Johnson's. But as to the
place of the OAS, he pleaded for the urgency of establishing
a committee of observers and mediators to be sent to Santo
14 8Domingo forthwith. At the same time he said the United
States was prepared to transfer its responsibility to the OAS
14 9"at the earliest possible moment".
Three days later, on May 3, Bunker addressed himself to 
proposing a permanent inter-American force and to the
question of whether or not the Charter of the OAS had been
150violated. On both these matters the United States was
opposed by the American states. First, the American states 
were divided over the inter-American force, with some 
positively opposed to the proposal, particularly Venezuela,
Chile and Mexico and to a lesser extent, Argentina, Ecuador
151and Peru. Faced with this opposition the United States
147
148
149
New York Times 
Ibid., p.6 and 
New York Times
May 1 
May 2, 
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1965.
1965, p .2.
30, 1965, p.l.
New York Times, May 4, 1965, p.l.
151 On the division within the OAS, see r. Parkinson, op.ctt., 
pp.152-54; and J. Slater, 'The Limits of Legitimization in 
International Organizations: The Organization of American
States and the Dominican Crisis', International Organization, 
23 (Winter 1969), pp.48-72.
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had to do whatever it could to muster sufficient support.
When the vote was taken the force was approved as a temporary
expedient by 14 to 5, barely the required two-thirds 
152majority. Much of the opposition had apparently stemmed
from resentment over Washington's having acted unilaterally
153without first consulting or advising the organization.
Nevertheless once it was approved the Secretary General of
the OAS described the purpose of the Inter-American force as
"clearly not one of intervention but rather one of rendering
154assistance to the people of a sister nation".
Second, whereas several of the American states argued
that the Charter of the OAS had been violated, in particular 
155Article 17, Bunker argued that United States forces were
in the Dominican Republic "to help carry out the resolutions 
] 5 6of the OAS". Similarly, in the United Nations Adlai
Stevenson argued that it was only the temporary presence of 
the United States forces that made it "possible for the OAS 
to carry out its consultations, to organize its machinery, 
and to take its proper place on the scene of the fighting in 
the Dominican Republic". In short the actions of the United 
States were presented as a holding operation. In the 
same statement Stevenson denied that the principle of 
non-intervention had been violated. It was rather, he 
said, a matter of the primary purpose of the OAS as 
set out in Article 1 of the Charter, having been served
New York Times, May 6, 1965, p.l. For a text of the 
resolution adopted, see New York Times, May 7, 1965, p.14.
15 3 New York Times, May 7, 1965, p.l.
Cited by Mr Stevenson in the Security Council on May 24, 
D.S.B., Vol. LII, No. 1353 (May 31, 1965).
155 Article 17 reads: "The territory of a state is
inviolable: it may not be the object, even temporarily, of
military occupation or of other measures of force taken by 
another state, directly or indirectly, under any grounds 
whatever".
156 D.S.B., Vol. LII, No. 1353 (May 31, 1965), pp.859-60.
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"to achieve an order of peace and justice, to promote... 
solidarity, to strengthen...collaboration, and to defend 
[the] sovereignty... territorial integrity and... 
independence" of the American states. In this way Mr
Stevenson attempted to argue that the intervention was in 
fact serving the OAS and was within the competence of its 
Charter.
Apart from the question of whether or not the Charter
of the OAS had been violated, the question of whether or
not the intervention was a matter for the United Nations
cropped up. In the UN Security Council Mr Stevenson argued
for the primacy of the OAS in settling hemispheric problems.
Replying to a charge from the Soviet representative that the
intervention was "incompatible with the obligations assumed
by the United States under the Charter of the United Nations",
Mr Stevenson said the Dominican strife was a matter for the 
158hemisphere. "[T]he Soviet Government knows perfectly well
that the Western Hemisphere has an active and effective
regional organization, the OAS, to which the Republics of the
Western Hemisphere are deeply attached and which they prefer
to be the vehicle for resolving the problems of this
hemisphere". On this occasion Mr Stevenson asserted as he
did on subsequent days that the proper organ for dealing
with the Dominican problem was the OAS and not the UN;
moreover, that this was both proper and consistent with the
precedents of the Security Council. "The UN Charter in
Article 52 specifically recognizes the authority of reg.ional
organizations in dealing with regional problems. The council
recognizes the desirability of encouraging regional efforts,
and, I may add, the confidence of this council in the
abilities of regional organizations to deal with their own
159problems has been justified by the historical record".
Ibid., pp.879-80. On the principle of non-intervention 
in relation to the Dominican Republic, see R.J. Vincent,
Non-Intervention and International Order (Princeton, 1974), 
pp.202-07.
1 C O
New York Times, May 4, 1965, p.16.
159 D. S • B » , Vol. LII, No. 1353 (May 31, 1965), pp.871-74.
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The debate which ensued was concerned with the role of
the Security Council. On May 11, Mr Stevenson argued that
the Charter of the UN stated that the Security Council should
encourage the pacific settlement of disputes through regional
arrangements. He urged the Council to adopt a resolution
which would "manifest the admitted competence and concern of
the Security Council" but at the same time contain "no
ambiguity, no inferences, especially inferences that the
Security Council is not encouraging the regional 
160organization". Such a resolution was adopted on May 14.
On May 22 the debate was still in progress, with Stevenson 
relentlessly arguing for the primacy of the OAS. In sum, 
the United States maintained, as it did after it had 
intervened in Guatemala, that its actions were consistent 
with the provisions of the Charter of the UN, but fell within 
the competence of the OAS and did not warrant the attention 
of the United Nations. So much for what the United States 
did and said. What of the Soviet Union?
The immediate response of the Soviet press was to reject 
the reason for what had happened as being to protect American 
citizens and assert that it was nothing "but outright US 
intervention". Washington had made known which faction it 
supported and this prompted reactionaries to launch a counter­
revolt. On May 2 TASS denounced the intervention as "a
cynical violation of the elementary norms of international law 
and of the UN Charter", and as "an act of outright aggression 
against the people of that small country, gross interference 
in its internal affairs, the latest attempt to maintain in 
power a reactionary, antinational and dictatorial regime 
suitable to the United States". Moreover, the United States 
had once more attempted "to use the shield of the organization 
of American States... [in]... the service of its imperialist 
schemes" .
160
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As to the OAS, Soviet criticism seemed to be aimed more
at the use the United States had made of it than at the
organization itself. The "collective" actions of the OAS
could serve only United States interests and allow the United
States to "shift the responsibility for its crimes on to its
partners". Using the OAS as it had, carried "a serious threat
16 3to the sovereignty of all the countries on the continent".
By bringing the Dominican intervention under the aegis of the 
OAS, the United States had contributed to an important 
precedent for "future crises in the Western Hemisphere". The 
whole affair had created "[a] dangerous precedent... for new 
interference in the affairs of other Latin American 
peoples...".164
The idea of the intervention having set a precedent for
interference in other countries was later expanded into a
two-fold attack on United States policy. For Soviet analysts,
the Dominican intervention and the Johnson Doctrine had shown
that the United States would use intervention to suppress
national liberation movements in order to keep the countries
of Asia, Africa and Latin America in the "world system of 
16 Scapitalism". Intervention or "intercepting revolution",
as one Soviet author had it, was "a screen for the strategy
of the monopoly bourgeoisie to extend the reproduction of
166capitalist relations to the third world". Thus the
Dominican intervention was cast in terms of the general 
intention of Washington "to employ armed intervention every 
time the national-liberation struggle endangers US 
investments in any country of the western hemisphere".
CDSP, Vol. XVII, No. 2 (February 3, 1965), p.6; Pravda, 
May 19.
1 64 CDSP, Vol. XVII, No. 21 (June 16,' 1965), p.22; Pravda,
May 28.
'I/''"J B. Marushkin, 'US Policy and the National Liberation 
Movement', International Affairs (Moscow) (April 1966), p.53.
16 6 V.I. Fyodorov, 'The Imperialist Doctrine of Intercepting 
Revolution', International Affairs (Moscow), 5 (May 1966), 
p. 67.
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Washington was in fear of being displaced from the 
"hinterland" of United States imperialism and so the Johnson 
Doctrine was no more than "the 'second edition' of the Monroe 
Doctrine".
In the Security Council, Soviet Representative
N.T. Fedorenko described the actions of the United States as
having "trampl[ed] under foot the fundamental principles of
the Charter of the United Nations and the universally
recognised principles of international law...". A month
later he extended his remarks to include the reasons for
which the Soviet Union believed the resolutions of the OAS
violated both its own Charter and that of the United Nations.
Fedorenko asserted, in the first place, that the OAS
resolution establishing the inter-American force which was
then in the Dominican Republic contravened Article 2(4) of
the UN Charter. Second, that the resolution violated Article
39 of the UN Charter according to which the Security Council
is the only agency which shall determine "the existence of
any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of
aggression", and shall determine what measures shall be taken
'to maintain or restore international peace and security".
Third, it contradicted Article 53, which holds that no
enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements
or by regional arrangements "without the authorization" of 
. 169the Security Council. Hence, Fedorenko asserted the OAS
resolution had violated the basic tenets of the UN Charter
and was therefore illegal. As to the Charter of the OAS, he
argued that the United States had disregarded Article 17
which required that no state or group of states has the right,
under any pretext, to intervene directly, or indirectly, in
17 0the internal affairs of any other state.
L. Kamynin, 'International Piracy Doctrine', International 
Affairs (Moscow), 6 (June 1965), pp.15-16. See also 'From the 
Monroe Doctrine to the Johnson Doctrine', International 
Affairs (Moscow), 8 (August 1965), pp.105-07.
168 New York Times, May 3, 1965, p.16.
169
170
Article 53(1).
CDSP, Vol. XVII, No. 3 (February 10 1965), p .21.
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Such then, were the Soviet arguments against the
justifications the United States gave for its actions in
Santo Domingo. For more than a year after the Dominican
intervention, Soviet writers argued for the principle of
non-intervention in connection with the OAS and the Dominican 
171Republic. Clearly the Soviet Union was concerned to do
what it could to strip the United States account of its 
actions of legitimacy. But apart from that it did nothing to 
suggest that it would oppose United States intervention in a 
future case. It did not, as it had before the Cuban Missile 
Crisis, make any threats to use force or suggest any 
other measures which might dissuade the United States should 
it again perceive intervention to be in its interest.
In summary, the United States intervened unilaterally in 
the Dominican Republic and claimed that it had done so 
ultimately to prevent the spread of a political system c\lien 
to the hemisphere. It sought to bestow legitimacy upon its 
actions through the OAS and argued that the OAS had primacy 
over the United Nations in the matter. The Soviet Union 
denounced the intervention as a precedent for United States 
intervention against revolution. Elsewhere it rejected the 
United States account of its actions as a cynical use of the 
OAS and as a travesty of international law. However, it did 
not suggest and took no action which would suggest that it 
might attempt to prevent future United States intervention 
in Latin America.
Having set out what the influencing power did and 
said and what the adversary power did and said in response to 
each case, what alternatives were open to the adversary? What 
is it about these cases that suggests tacit understanding 
and why should there be tacit understanding?
See A. Piradov, 'The Principle of Non-Interference in the 
Modern World', International Affairs (Moscow), 1 (January 
1966); S. Gonionsky, 'The Inter-American System in the Grip 
of Contradictions', International Affairs (Moscow), 3 (March 
1966); and D. Levin, 'The Non-Interference Principle Today', 
International Affairs (Moscow), 11 (November 1966).
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It has been shown that the United States responded to 
Soviet intervention in Hungary and to the intervention of 
Warsaw Pact forces in Czechoslovakia by denouncing the 
actions taken and by rejecting the reasons given in each 
case. After the invasion of Czechoslovakia the United States 
took the additional step of postponing the commencement of 
SALT. The Soviet Union attempted to establish medium range 
ballistic missile bases in Cuba and the United States imposed 
a blockade which resulted in the Soviet Union withdrawing its 
missiles. In response to the Dominican Republic the Soviet 
Union condemned the actions of the United States but did 
nothing more. With the exception of Cuba, what is important 
about each of these cases is that the adversary power 
rejected alternative ways of opposing the influencing power. 
But what were the alternatives?
First, there was the alternative either of using military 
force or of threatening to use military force. The United 
States could have attempted a counter-intervention in both 
Hungary and Czechoslovakia. However, at least two things 
would have militated against it doing so. On the one hand, 
it would have had to secure the cooperation of its NATO allies 
and on the other, counter-intervention would have 
brought it into direct conflict with the Soviet Union. This 
would have entailed a high risk of general war and would 
alone have made counter-intervention an unlikely alternative. 
Nevertheless it was an alternative. The Dominican Republic 
is not entirely comparable since the Soviet Union did not 
have large conventional forces nearby and would have had to 
get them there. Moreover, there was not, as there was in the 
cases of Hungary and Czechoslovakia, a similar period before 
the invasion of the Dominican Republic in which it might have 
been expected and a counter-intervention prepared. In short, 
there was an asymmetry between the conventional forces the 
United States could command in Europe and what the Soviet 
Union could deploy in the Caribbean. The Cuban Missile Crisis 
was different again. Once the United States imposed the
III.
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blockade, the Soviet Union would have increased considerably 
the risk of war had it either continued to construct the 
missile sites or attempted to run certain of its ships 
through the blockade. Withdrawing the missiles meant that 
it did not want to incur that risk. Indeed, it is reasonable 
to conclude that neither Cuba nor the Dominican Republic were 
important enough to the Soviet Union for it to risk war with 
the United States. Similarly it is reasonable to conclude 
that neither Hungary nor Czechoslovakia were important enough 
to the United States for it to risk war with the Soviet Union. 
But whatever reasons there might have been for not using force, 
it was at all times a possibility.
As to the threat of force, with regard to events in both 
Hungary and Czechoslovakia, the United States could have 
threatened the Soviet Union with a nuclear attack. It could 
also have asked its NATO partners to agree to threaten the 
use of conventional forces, either explicitly or implicitly, 
by staging manoeuvres along the borders of the states of 
eastern Europe. Similarly in response to United States 
intervention in the Dominican Republic, the Soviet Union could 
have threatened to use missiles or it could have dispatched 
naval vessels to the Caribbean. Though, as with the actual use 
of force, there was an asymmetry between the capabilities of 
the United States in Europe and the Soviet Union in Latin 
America upon which the credibility of the threat to use 
conventional forces would have been based. In the case of 
Cuba, the Soviet Union did threaten to use force against the 
United States before the missile sites were discovered. Not 
only that but missiles in Cuba would have constituted a 
permanent threat. That the Soviet Union removed them and 
did not try to send ships carrying strategic armaments through 
the blockade suggests Cuba was not important enough to the 
Soviet Union for it to raise any higher the risk it had 
already incurred. In sum, with the exception of Cuba, no 
threats of force were made and indeed the United States 
explicitly stated that it would not use force. Nevertheless, 
threats of force were a possibility.
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A second alternative open to the adversary power in each 
case was for it to respond by breaking diplomatic relations 
with the influencing power in protest against what it had 
done. Two points about this are first, that it would seem 
an action more appropriate to a case in which the adversary 
itself was the offended party. With regard to the actions 
of influencing powers, it has been more usual for protests to 
be conducted in the General Assembly of the United Nations. 
One reason for this being that the adversary power in each 
case stands to gain political kudos by leading the protest in 
that forum. Here agc.in there is an asymmetry in that the
United States has probably had less censure in the United 
Nations than has the Soviet Union. Second, as with the use 
or threat of force, it is unlikely that the fate of states in 
each other's sphere of influence has been important enough to 
warrant the Soviet Union and the United States breaking 
diplomatic relations.
A third possibility would have been for the adversary in
each case to break off trade relations with the influencing 172power. In the case of Czechoslovakia the United States
could have directed such action not only against the Soviet 
Union, but also the other Warsaw Pact countries which took 
part in the invasion. But once again there is an asymmetry 
between the Soviet Union and the United States. The United 
States would have been more likely to affect the Soviet Union 
than vice-versa.
Fourth, both the Soviet Union and the United States 
might have tried to put the idea of linkage into practice. ' 
That is to say they might have attempted to impress upon each
For a discussion of economic sanctions, see J. Galtung, 
'On the Effects of International Sanctions: With Examples
from the Case of Rhodesia', World Politics, Vol. XIX, No. 3 
(April 1967), pp.378-416; and M.P. Doxey, Economic Sanctions 
and International Enforcement (London, Oxford University 
Press, 1971).
17 3 On linkage, see M. Kalb and B. Kalb, Kissinger (New York, 
Dell, 1975), Chapter 6, pp.122-23.
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other by their actions that they regarded progress in 
important matters in which each had a common interest as 
being linked to acceptable conduct in other matters. This 
was what the United States did in a limited way by cancelling 
the opening of strategic arms limitation talks when the 
Soviet Union invaded Czechoslovakia. Both had a common 
interest in getting the talks under way and by postponing the 
opening of them, the United States served notice that it did 
not regard the invasion as being unrelated. Similarly, when 
the United States bombed Haiphong harbour and damaged Soviet 
vessels just before the Moscow Summit in May 1972, the Soviet 
Union could have cancelled the meeting. In this case, 
however, it might have cut both ways. Had the Soviet Union 
cancelled the summit in protest against the bombing, the 
United States could have argued that the bombing was made 
necessary by the Soviet Union supplying North Vietnam, and 
that only if the Soviet Union stopped supplying North 
Vietnam would it be able to stop bombing. Hence, as long as 
the Soviet Union supplied North Vietnam, it and not the United 
States would be impeding the progress of SALT. But with the 
exception of the postponement of talks in 1968, the idea of 
linkage does not seem to have been used to any effect in 
connection with spheres of influence.
Finally, rather than denouncing each other’s actions at 
the same time as attempting no effective counter-actions, 
each might have openly and verbally recognised the other's 
sphere of influence.
Instead of attempting any of these alternatives the 
United States acquiesced in the interventions in Hungary and 
Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union acquiesced in the 
intervention in the Dominican Republic. When it attempted to 
establish missile sites in Cuba the Soviet Union was not 
acquiescing in United States policies toward Cuba. But the 
outcome of the missile crisis amounted to the Soviet Union 
acquiescing in what the United States laid down as the upper 
limits of its tolerance with respect to Soviet involvement 
in Cuba. Limits which were spelled out once more in 1970
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and 1971. Having said there was acquiescence, 
what is it about the examples discussed that implies tacit 
understanding on the part of the Soviet Union and the United 
States as to spheres of influence?
In Chapter Three a tacit understanding between two 
states was defined as one which seems implicit in the actions 
of each with respect to that which there is said to be an 
understanding and about which they either cannot or will not 
communicate. Tacit understanding, it was argued, rests upon 
precedent and expectations. Precedent refers to the past 
actions of a state in particular circumstances and precedents 
are an important source of expectations about the probable 
future behaviour of that state in similar circumstances.
When expectations are met they add to the precedent already 
held. What is more, the precedents upon which a state 
bases its expectations of another state's likely 
behaviour may be ones to which it has itself contributed.
Tacit understanding comes about through consciously contingent 
unilateral acts based upon precedents and expectations. Thus, 
when A will refrain from doing X if A expects B will also 
refrain from doing Y, and each understands this to be the 
case, it can be said that there is an unspoken or tacit, 
mutual understanding of the situation impinging on each.
But what is understood by each of two influencing powers 
about each other's sphere of influence?
Each understands that the other will refrain from 
interfering with relations between it and the states it 
influences and that the one will not attempt to extend 
political influence in the sphere of the other. It is 
understood by each that the other will allow it to limit the 
freedom and independence of states in its sphere of 
influence, principally by maintaining governments of which 
it approves and which serve its perceived interests. In other 
words each understands that when it takes actions it perceives 
as necessary to maintain its sphere of influence, the other
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will acquiesce. What of the examples in this chapter? What 
sort of expectations might the Soviet Union have had prior 
to the invasion of Hungary?
In December 1955 Secretary Dulles had said that while 
the United States did not approve of the "injustices" 
inflicted upon eastern Europe by Soviet dominance, it would 
not attempt to reject those injustices by "invoking force".
On the eve of the first Soviet invasion of Hungary, President 
Eisenhower reaffirmed this when he said, with reference to 
the situation in Hungary, that the United States did not want 
to provoke the Soviet Union as that might lead to war. On 
the basis of evidence such as this, the Soviet Union could 
have expected that the United States would not attempt to 
stop it either by force or the threat of force. The United 
States response to the first invasion would have reinforced 
such expectations. In his speech in Dallas, Secretary Dulles 
made it clear that no assistance would be given to the 
Hungarian rebels and during the next couple of days Murphy 
and Eisenhower did the same. It is unlikely that the Soviet 
Union would have expected a different response when it 
decided to intervene on the second occasion early in 
November. After the second intervention, Eisenhower once 
more rejected either force or the threat of force and what 
is more, stated that the United States would not challenge 
Soviet actions in eastern Europe either by force or the threat 
of force. Moreover, the United States did not suggest ways 
other than force and the threat of force, in which it might 
oppose the Soviet Union should a situation such as that which 
had arisen in Hungary crop up again. It did not suggest 
sanctions, breaking diplomatic ties or other means by which 
it might attempt to restrain the Soviet Union. It did 
obstruct recognition of the credentials of the Hungarian 
representatives at the United Nations and was instrumental in 
keeping the "Hungary Question" on the agenda of the United 
Nations for a considerable time. However, this was not 
something which would have suggested that the United States 
would on a future occasion respond to Soviet intervention
219
any differently than it had in the case of Hungary. In 
short, the United States acquiesced in the invasion of 
Hungary and did nothing to suggest to the Soviet Union that 
it would not do so on another occasion. It is quite likely 
that in 1956 Soviet expectations as to what the United States 
would and would not acquiesce in stretched back to the close 
of World War II. But whatever the starting point of the 
chain of Soviet expectations, United States acquiescence in 
the invasion of Hungary would have left the Soviet Union with 
the expectation that it could act similarly on another 
occasion.
When the Soviet Union was confronted with the events in 
Czechoslovakia in 1968 and had to decide whether or not to 
intervene, and what the consequences of intervention would 
be for its relations with the United States, it had in the 
first place the precedent of Hungary from which to draw some 
of its expectations. In the second place it had the 
precedents of both the Cuban missile crisis and the United 
States intervention in the Dominican Republic. The United 
States placed limits on Soviet involvement in Cuba and when 
it intervened in the Dominican Republic the Soviet Union 
acquiesced. Thus Soviet officials might have reasoned that 
what the United States required for itself it would grant the 
Soviet Union. A third source of expectations was the lack of 
any clear warning from the United States that the Soviet 
Union should not intervene in Czechoslovakia. When the reform 
movement and the Soviet reaction to it was already such as to 
make intervention a possibility, the United States said it 
would stay on the sidelines. The United States sought to 
dissociate itself from the suggestion of links with the reform 
movement and denied Soviet allegations that it was encouraging 
the Czechoslovaks. Secretary Rusk explicitly denied any 
involvement to Ambassador Dobrynin.
Although the Soviet press denounced such denials as 
meaning that the United States was supporting the reform 
movement, it is likely that Soviet officials regarded these
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denials as significant. At the same time there were press 
reports that the United States wanted to avoid the movement 
of NATO units and any manoeuvres which might give the Soviet 
Union the pretext for intervening in Czechoslovakia. In 
conjunction with United States attempts to disengage itself, 
this could have been taken as a further sign that the United 
States would not oppose the Soviet Union. Similarly,
Johnson's idea that United States officials should not 
comment on events in Czechoslovakia could have been 
interpreted as a form of consent by silence to Soviet 
intervention. In sum, before the invasion, the United States 
seemed to the Soviet Union to be acting in accord with the 
concept of world order Mr Ball outlined to the Bar Association 
early in August and which included the acceptance of spheres 
of influence.
Before the invasion the United States did not try any 
of the alternatives it might have in an attempt to forestall 
an invasion. It did not threaten economic and diplomatic 
action; it did not threaten to use force; it did not in any 
effective way seek to couple some common interest it had with 
the Soviet Union to an attempt to discourage Soviet 
intervention. The United States did nothing to suggest to 
the Soviet Union that it did not regard Czechoslovakia as 
being in the Soviet sphere and open to Soviet intervention. 
Once the invasion had occurred, the United States confined 
itself to rejecting the justification the Soviet Union gave 
and to cancelling the commencement of strategic arms 
limitation talks. But only two months later the United States 
initiated new negotiations to bring about commencement of the 
talks. What of Cuba?
Although Cuba no longer had a government under United 
States influence, it was strategically located within a 
region that was a United States sphere of influence. What 
was important was not that it had a communist government 
having links with the Soviet Union, but rather the extent of 
what the United States would allow the Soviet Union to do in 
and from Cuba. The Soviet Union was not to take advantage of
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Cuba either to improve its nuclear and strategic balance with 
the United States or as a base from which to promote more 
socialist revolutions in Latin America. Apart from any other 
advantages they would have bestowed upon the Soviet Union, 
for the United States missiles in Cuba would have increased 
Soviet prestige in Latin America and cast doubt upon the 
resolution and durability of United States policy. By 
responding as it did the United States made clear to the 
Soviet Union what it would tolerate with regard to Cuba. The 
understanding which ended the missile crisis exchanged a 
promise from the United States that it would not invade Cuba 
in return for the Soviet Union removing its missiles. This 
the United States took to bind the Soviet Union not to 
introduce offensive missiles into Cuba again. In late 1970 
and early 1971 this was broadened to mean offensive missiles 
carried by vessels serviced in or from Cuba. President 
Nixon's injunction against servicing missile firing vessels 
in or from Cuba was a restatement of what the United States 
regarded as acceptable Soviet conduct with respect to Cuba 
and to the United States sphere of influence in Latin 
America.
The Dominican intervention was similar to the 
interventions in Hungary and Czechoslovakia in that in none 
of the three cases did the adversary power either do 
anything that might increase the risk of war or suggest that 
it might do so in future cases. Just as the United States 
did not warn the Soviet Union against future interventions, 
the Soviet Union did not warn the United States against 
further interventions in Latin America. Soviet publications 
asserted that the Dominican intervention showed that the 
United States would use its power to continue to crush 
liberation movements in the western hemisphere. In the 
Security Council the Soviet representative argued that the 
United States had violated international law. But through 
neither forum did the Soviet Union issue threats or warnings 
designed to deter the United States from future similar 
actions in Latin America.
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Each of the cases discussed allows the inference that 
there was tacit understanding about spheres of influence.
In Hungary, Czechoslovakia and the Dominican Republic the 
influencing power took actions which limited the freedom and 
independence of the state under its influence and the 
adversary power acquiesced in virtue of doing nothing 
effective either to oppose the influencing power or to deter 
it on future occasions. In each of these cases the 
influencing power was left with the expectation that it could 
act in a like manner in future cases without opposition from 
its rival. The circumstances which led up to the Cuban 
missile crisis and the manner in which it was resolved were 
different, but the outcome nevertheless resulted in 
understanding as to acceptable conduct with regard to spheres 
of influence. The very act of attempting to place missiles 
in Cuba was an act against acquiescence. The presence of the 
missiles was in itself a threat of force, as were the veiled 
references the Soviet Union made to its nuclear strength 
before the missile sites were discovered. By attempting to 
put the missiles in Cuba, the Soviet Union raised the risk 
of war. When confronted with the blockade it had either to 
accept the demands of the United States or otherwise raise 
the risk of war even higher. That it withdrew the missiles 
meant it wanted to avoid war and that it acquiesced in 
the limits the United States placed upon its involvement in 
Cuba. In sum, the outcome of the crisis was such as to add 
to what each super-power understood as appropriate behaviour 
with regard to each other's sphere of influence. This it 
had in common with the other three cases.
Now, the argument has been that acquiescence in the 
actions of an influencing power creates expectations about 
future cases and in this way it comes to be understood what 
influencing powers expect of each other in certain 
circumstances. But why is it that the Soviet Union and the 
United States have acquiesced in each other acting as 
influencing powers? What purpose is served by tacit 
understanding as to this?
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Franck and Weisband have argued that, as a matter of
reciprocity, the one power acquiesces in what the other does
because it must allow the other what it has claimed for 
174itself. They argue that the super-powers perpetuate
spheres of influence through the justifications they give 
when they intervene in their respective spheres. These 
justifications have two effects: (i) they "authorize" the
other power to do the same as what is being justified, and 
(ii) when the other power does do the same, the first power 
is tied by its own justification from impeding the other. In 
other words, the "cumulative effect" of the justifications 
the United States gave for its actions with regard to 
Guatemala, Cuba and the Dominican Republic was that they 
appeared "to authorize the Soviet Union to do exactly what 
it did to Czechoslovakia in 1968". Moreover, because of
the justifications the United States itself had advanced it 
could not easily oppose the Soviet Union. Thus, for Franck 
and Weisband, the Soviet and United States spheres of 
influence, or the "two-ghetto" system, have been largely the 
result of the United States failing to take sufficient 
account of the demands of reciprocity when it has justified 
its actions and therefore, it has allowed the Soviet Union 
to consolidate its sphere of influence.
As a matter of reciprocity, what the United States says 
and does gives rise to Soviet expectations about what it can 
do; to the idea that the Soviet Union has a right to pursue 
the same policies as does the United States. "To the degree 
a super-power fails to think reciprocally about its own 
behaviour, it fails to be realistic in its understanding of 
how that behaviour through the operation of mutually shared
T.M. Franck and E. Weisband, Word Politics3 Verbal 
Strategy Among the Superpowers (New York, Oxford University 
Press, 1972) .
175 Ibid., p.8.
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expectations and the systemic norm of reciprocity affects
and alters the system". What is more, reciprocity is a
norm and because of the danger involved in upsetting mutual
expectations, the super-powers have an obligation to "act in
accordance with the norm of reciprocity". Had the United
States upset the expectations of the Soviet Union in 1968
by attempting to deny to the Soviet Union what it had claimed
for itself in the Dominican Republic, it would have incurred
a grave risk. "A sudden shift in signals and a repudiation
of an implied reciprocal obligation on our part would have
created an extremely serious crisis, perhaps pushing the
177world to the brink of nuclear war". In short, the
reciprocal obligation of which Franck and Weisband speak is 
that of each super-power allowing the other what it claims 
for itself. This means there is acquiescence because each 
wants predominance over a sphere of influence and to have 
this it must allow the other to also have predominance over 
a sphere of influence.
It is doubtful whether there is any such "reciprocal 
obligation". Neither super-power is "obliged" to acquiesce 
in the sphere of the other. It could choose to upset all 
existing expectations. As was argued in Chapter Three, the 
justifications each super-power employs are not intended 
primarily or perhaps e^en at all for the other super-power. 
They are intended for a wider, mixed audience which 
includes the allies of the power giving the justification.
For the other super-power it is other actions and inactions, 
such as not mounting a counter-intervention or 
taking other effective action to impede it,that are 
important. Finally, Franck and Weisband's argument 
presupposes that if the United States had acted differently 
with regard to Latin America, then the Soviet Union would
176 nid.,
177 Ibid.,
p.135. 
p.136.
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have been obliged to act differently with regard to eastern 
Europe. This cannot be assumed and is in any case doubtful.
It may be concluded that to explain acquiescence in terms of 
a principle of reciprocity whereby each must allow the other 
what it claims for itself is not satisfactory.
It is far more likely that the reason for acquiescence
and the need for tacit understanding lies not in need for
reciprocity in itself but rather in the common interest each
super-power has in avoiding nuclear war. In 1956, the same
year as the Soviet intervention in Hungary with which this
chapter began, Khrushchev told the Twentieth Congress of the
Communist Party of the Soviet Union that the nations of
Europe shared a common interest in preventing another war.
Although the economic bases which gave rise to wars would
last as long as imperialism existed, war, Khrushchev declared,
17 8was no longer a "fatalistic inevitability". This was a
revision of the doctrine of the inevitability of war and no
doubt reflected Soviet awareness of the seriousness of nuclear
war. Later the same year, at the time of the invasion of
Hungary, President Eisenhower stated that: "The compelling
challenge before the world is not the matter of testing
nuclear weapons... but of making impossible their use in 
179any...war". Thus with regard to the invasion of Hungary
Raymond Aron wrote that the passivity of the West, and
especially of the United States, created "the feeling that
from then on there existed a hidden Russo-American pact
against war, an agreement probably more binding than any
180other alliance". It is this common interest in avoiding
nuclear war, rather than reciprocity alone, which is the more 
compelling reason for acquiescence and it is the primary 
reason for the existence of tacit understanding.
17 8 See CDSP, Vol. VIII, No. 4 (1956).
179 Madison Square Garden Speech, New York Times, October 26, 
1956, p.18.
18 0 R. Aron, 'The Meaning of Destiny', in T. Aczel (ed.), Ten 
Years After (New York, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1966), p.21.
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It is understood by the United States and the Soviet 
Union, and each understands that the other understands, that 
by acquiescing in spheres of influence and in the actions 
each takes in its sphere of influence, they avoid conflict 
with each other. When one super-power acts in its sphere of 
influence it is less likely to come into conflict with the 
other than when it acts in some other area. Each understands 
what the other will tolerate with respect to its sphere of 
influence to an extent that is not understood with regard to 
other areas. In this way tacit understanding about spheres 
of influence provides the guidelines whereby both can 
advance their common interest in avoiding nuclear war. This 
bears upon the place of spheres of influence in international 
order and that will be taken up in Chapter Eight.
* * * *
In this part the emergence of tacit understanding 
between the Soviet Union and the United States as to spheres 
of influence has been traced. First, it was shown that 
establishment of the Soviet sphere of influence in eastern 
Europe began during World War II. By the last year of the 
war much of eastern Europe was already a Soviet sphere of 
influence and this was privately recognised by some United 
States officials. But the United States did not publicly 
recognise a Soviet sphere and, indeed, was opposed to spheres 
of influence because of the principles of post-war order to 
which it was committed and which included those of the 
Atlantic Charter and subsequently the Declaration on 
Liberated Europe. However, in spite of being opposed to 
spheres of influence, the United States by its actions and 
inactions perhaps created the impression in Soviet minds that 
it was acquiescing in a Soviet sphere and so took the first 
steps toward a tacit understanding to that effect. For its
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own part, while it did not see itself as either having or 
wanting a sphere of influence, the United States nevertheless 
could be seen as having had one in Latin America, with a 
history stretching back long before World War II.
After the war the American reluctance to acknowledge 
spheres of influence continued until the announcement of the 
Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Aid Plan. Neither of these 
amounted to an explicit acceptance of spheres of influence, 
but implicitly they represented the acceptance of a division 
of Soviet and United States predominance in that they were 
an attempt to stabilise the status quo. Following the 
announcement of the Truman Doctrine and Marshall Aid, the 
Soviet Union demarcated the limits of and consolidated its 
influence in eastern Europe and the United States acquiesced 
in the Soviet Union's acts of consolidation. In Latin 
America the United States fostered the development of inter- 
American institutions and principles designed to consolidate 
the region against the introduction and spread of what was 
perceived as Soviet-controlled communism. At the same time 
as the consolidation of these spheres of influence meant an 
implicit acceptance of spheres of influence as an integral 
part of world order, it did not lead to open acceptance.
In spite of there not being open acceptance, the 
continued mutual acquiescence in the consolidation of 
respective spheres of influence contributed to the further 
emergence of tacit understanding. From the immediate post­
war period down to the present, each new act of consolidation 
or control by an influencing power in which the adversary 
power has acquiesced, has made more defensible the inference 
of tacit understanding. The acquiescence of the United 
States in the Soviet interventions in Hungary ana 
Czechoslovakia and the Soviet acquiescence both in the limits 
imposed by the United States on Soviet activity in Cuba and 
in the Dominican intervention have each strengthened the 
evidence for tacit understanding. And each can be 
interpreted as a further step toward open acceptance by the 
Soviet Union and the United States.
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The most recent evidence of the tendency to open 
acceptance of spheres of influence is the so-called 
"Sonnenfeldt Doctrine" which first appeared in press reports 
early in April 1976. It was reported that at a meeting in 
London, of United States ambassadors from eastern and western 
Europe, Mr Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Chief Adviser to Secretary of 
State Kissinger, spoke of United States interest in 
encouraging "an organic" relationship between the Soviet 
Union and the states of eastern Europe. Mr Sonnenfeldt told 
the ambassadors that it must be United States policy "to 
strive from an evolution that makes the relationship between 
the Eastern Europeans and the Soviet Union an organic one... 
our policy must be a policy of responding to the clearly 
visible aspirations in Eastern Europe for a more autonomous 
existence within the context of a strong Soviet geopolitical 
influence".'1" These statements were interpreted as saying the 
United States was in favour of recognising the Soviet sphere 
of influence. They were not well received in the United 
States and both President Ford and Dr Kissinger stated that 
Sonnenfeldt had been misunderstood and emphatically rejected 
recognition of the legitimacy of a Soviet sphere of influence 
in eastern Europe. The adverse public reaction, and the 
consequent statements by President Ford and Dr Kissinger, is 
perhaps the most interesting aspect of Mr Sonnenfeldt's 
remarks. It is plausible that Mr Sonnenfeldt's remarks were 
intended to test public reaction to the idea of openly 
acknowledging spheres of influence. If so, open 
acknowledgement is still far away.
One of the problems explicit acquiescence would present 
is that it would imply accepting actions of the kind 
discussed in Chapter Six, which influencing powers have taken 
and which are considered by many to be contrary to
From the official State Department summary of Mr 
Sonnenfeldt's remarks as published in the Hew York Times, 
April 6, 197 6, p.14. See also David Binde]', New York Times, 
ibid., p.l; Hella Pick, The Guardian Weekly, April 11, 1976, 
p.9; and Jonathon Steele, loc.cit.
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international law. But even in the absence of explicit 
acquiescence, the reality of spheres of influence and the 
very fact of the practices associated with them present 
problems for international law. How are the actions taken 
by influencing powers to be regarded by international law? 
And apart from whether or not the actions of influencing 
powers bring spheres of influence into conflict with law, do 
spheres of influence contribute to or detract from 
international order? The following and final part will 
examine first the relationship between spheres of influence 
and international law and second, their place in 
international order.
PART III
INTERNATIONAL LAV7 AND ORDER
CHAPTER SEVEN
SPHERES OF INFLUENCE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
In the previous chapter it was shown that when the 
United States and the Soviet Union have intervened in their 
respective spheres of influence, they have sought to justify 
their actions to the world at large primarily by appealing 
to the needs of their perceived security requirements. They 
have also sought to justify their actions in terms of 
international law, but the status in international law, both 
of spheres of influence and of the actions influencing powers 
have taken, is uncertain and needs to be determined. However 
what one jurist will count as law another may not and what is 
law to one state is not necessarily considered law by another 
A prior question, therefore, is: What is in international
law? Accordingly, the first part of this Chapter discusses 
the nature of international law, both western conceptions 
and the Soviet conception. The second part deals with 
spheres of influence in the history of international law, and 
the third summarises legal argument concerning the actions 
the influencing powers took in the same four examples 
considered in the last chapter: namely, Hungary, the
Dominican Republic, Czechoslovakia and the Blockade of Cuba. 
The fourth and final part deals with the relevance of the 
conflicting conceptions of international law and sets out the 
place of spheres of influence in international law.
I.
Conflicting Conceptions of the Nature of Internationa1 Law.
1. Western Conceptions.
One widely accepted way of defining international law 
has been to regard it as the body of rules and principles of 
action which are binding upon states in their relations with
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one another.“ But since states are not the only entities 
which fall within the purview of international law, it is 
better regarded as the body of rules which bind states and 
other agents in world politics in their relations with one 
another and are considered to have the status of law. In 
contrast to this definition, which identifies law with rules 
of a particular kind, international law may be conceived of 
as a particular kind of social process. Taken together, 
these two different conceptions, which will be clarified 
below, suffice to demonstrate that there are conflicting 
judgements among Western jurists as to the nature of 
international law. It is not intended to suggest that these 
two conceptions are the only ones that can be distinguished. 
The purpose is merely to illustrate rather than to classify.
(i) Law as a body of rules.
The definition of law as a body of rules may, for
convenience, be called the traditional view of law. In this
2positivist form it has a few key tenets which Professor 
Dworkin, after cautioning that not every philosopher who is 
called a positivist would subscribe to his presentation, has 
summarised in three points
(a) The law of a community is a set of special 
rules used by the community directly or indirectly 
for the purpose of determining which behavior will 
be punished or coerced by the public power.
These rules correspond with what Hart has called "primary" 
rules and may be identified and distinguished with the aid of
See, for instance, J.L. Brierly, The Law of Nations, 6th Ed. 
(Oxford, Clarendon, 1963), p.l; W.E. Hall, A Treatise on 
International Law (Oxford, Clarendon, 1924), p.l; Sir F. 
Pollock, 'The Sources of International Law', Essays on 
International Law from the Columbia Law Review (New York, 
Columbia University Press, 1965), p.3; and The Collected 
Papers of John Westlake on Public International Law (Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 1914), p.l.
Z On positivism, see H.L.A. Hart, 'Legal Pos itivi sm' , The 
Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, ed. P. Edwards (New York, 
Collier-MacMillan, 1967), Vol. 4; and H.L.A. Hart, The Concept 
of Law (Oxford, Clarendon, 1961), p.253.
3 For this and subsequent references, see R. Dworkin, 'The 
Model of Rules', The University of Chicago Law Review, Vol.35, No. 14 (1967-68), pp.17-21.
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"secondary" rules which are rules about rules. It is only 
primary rules that are rules of law as such. "Primary rules 
are those that grant rights and impose obligations upon 
members of the community. Secondary rules are those that 
stipulate how, and by whom, such primary rules may be formed, 
recognized, modified or extinguished". In virtue of Hart's 
distinction between primary and secondary rules "there are 
two possible sources of a rule's authority". On the one 
hand, "[a] rule may become binding upon a group of people 
because that group through its practices accepts the rule as 
a standard for its conduct". On the other hand, a rule may 
become binding "by being enacted in conformity with some 
secondary rule that stipulates that rules so enacted shall 
be binding...". Thus Dworkin has summed the matter up by 
saying "a rule may be binding (a) because it is accepted or 
(b) because it is valid".
The second tenet of positivism is that the scope of law 
is restricted to the body of "valid legal rules" determined 
and separated from spurious legal rules by secondary rules.
(b) The set of these valid legal rules is 
exhaustive of 'the law', so that if someone's
case is not clearly covered by such a rule (because 
there is none that seems appropriate, or those that 
seem appropriate are vague, or for some other 
reason) then that case cannot be decided by 'applying 
the law'. It must be decided by some official, like 
a judge, 'exercising his discretion', which means 
reaching beyond the law for some other sort of 
standard to guide him in manufacturing a fresh legal 
rule or supplementing an old one.
Finally
(c) To say that someone has a 'legal obligation' 
is to say that his case falls under a valid legal 
rule that requires him to do or to forbear from 
doing something. In the absence of such a valid 
legal rule there is no legal obligation...
4
4 See Hart, The Concept of Law, Chapter 5.
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Though Professor Dworkin is concerned with municipal law, the 
preceding points serve to convey what is meant by speaking of 
law as a particular body of rules. The idea of law as a 
social process of a particular kind offers a somewhat 
different account.
(ii) Law as a social process.
The idea of lav/ as a social process is associated with
American legal realism and, with respect to international law
5in particular, with Myres McDougal and the Yale Law School. 
McDougal conceives of international law as a continuing 
process of authoritative decisions and rejects the notion of 
law as merely the impartial application of rules.
International law is regarded as a branch of social 
engineering and as an implement for the realisation of certain 
objectives, especially objectives which promote human welfare. 
Rules play a part, but not the only part. "The indispensible 
function of jurisprudence", writes McDougal, "is to delimit a 
frame of reference appropriate to the study of the 
interrelations of law and community process...". Moreover, 
it must be aimed at solving problems. "The processes of lav/ 
have as their proper office the synthesizing and stabilizing 
of creative efforts toward a new order by the procedures and 
structures of authority, thereby consolidating gain and 
providing guidance for the next steps along the path toward 
a universal system". Similarly, in another place: "A
relevant jurisprudence must be problem oriented if it is to
There is also a British "sociological" school of law, of 
which Professor Schwarzenberger is representative, which lays 
claim to realism but is in many ways different from the 
American school, particularly in its reluctance to abandon 
the imperative quality of law deriving from the "law as rules" 
tradition.
 ^M.S. McDougal with Lasswell and Reisman, 'Theories about 
International Law: Prologue to a Configurative
Jurisprudence', Virginia Journal of International Law, Vol.
8, No. 2 (April 1968), p.196.
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contribute as creatively as possible to our institutions of
public order in ways that promise to extricate us from the7destructive anarchy of our times".
For McDougal and his associates, the conception of law 
as a body of rules is one which pays insufficient regard to 
the social context and is inadequate. "The analytical 
attitude [of Hart and the jurisprudence he represents] toward 
the relations between authoritative decision and social gprocess can only be described as calculated obliviousness".
oThey are critical of Hart's rules of recognition on the 
grounds that those rules observe the notion of authority, 
which can only be understood through "the entire constitutive 
process of authoritative decision", and which is but barely 
grasped "by reference only to rules".^ Only by including 
the whole spectrum of authoritative decisions which have an 
effect on international life, can international law serve 
what McDougal and his associates see as "the goal appropriate 
to the jurisprudence of international law". Namely, in the 
first place, a "commitment to a postulated goal for the 
public and civic order of mankind; [and] second, the 
adoption of human dignity as the postulated aim of 
jurisprudence, understanding this to embrace within the world 
commonwealth of men everywhere, and to imply a universe of 
wide rather than narrow participation in the shaping of 
values, including power, until such time as power itself
11becomes redundant and yields to the civic order of man".
M.S. McDougal and H.D. Lasswell, 'The Identification and 
Appraisal of Diverse Systems of Public Order', American 
Journal of International Law, 53 (1959), p.3. See also p.5 
in Studies in World Public Order (New Haven, Yale University 
Press, 1960).g 'Theories about International Law', op.cit., p.250.
9 A rule of recognition being one which specifies "some 
feature or features possession of which by a suggested rule 
is taken as a conclusive affirmative indication that it is a 
rule of the group to be supported by the social pressure it 
exerts". See Hart, op.cit., p.92.
10 Ibid., p.253.
11 Ibid., p.298.
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In relation to the idea that jurisprudence should be
informed by the goal of public and civic order and of human
dignity, what these authors say of natural law theorists is
12not without interest. At the same time as being critical
of naturalists, they approve of the "profound inclination
toward a purposive conception of law" evinced by naturalists
and the "essentially integrated vision of man and the world
[which meant] a conception of a world community and of common
interests on a global scale, matched in no other
13jurisprudential frame". This is in fact a frame which is 
in some ways not unlike the one to which they themselves 
subscribe.
Finally, McDougal and Lasswell have argued that
traditional international law provides a bulwark with which
"totalitarian powers" can obstruct steps "toward a world
order with genuine measures of security". They argue that
communist powers have resisted the institutional
reconstructions necessary for security by invoking doctrines
such as sovereignty, domestic jurisdiction, non-intervention,
14independence and equality. Because of this McDougal and
Lasswell have been seen as having cold war values and it lias
been argued that their conception of law as a tool of social
engineering might be used to promote partisan values, or at
least values that are in dispute. Thus, it has been pointed
out that those who believe law to be a tool of social
engineering but do not approve of its use to promote values
15they perceive as partisan may be in a dilemma.
(iii) The conflict between the two conceptions.
The two examples of different conceptions of law under 
consideration come into conflict in at least two respects:
On natural law, see R. Wollheim, 'Natural Law', The
Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, op.cit., Vol. 4.
13 'Theories about International Law', op.cit., p.227.
14 'The Identification and Appraisal of Diverse Systems of 
Public Order', op.cit., p.4.
15 Rosalyn Higgins, 'Policy and Impartiality: the Uneasy
Relationship in International Law', International Organisation, 
Vol. XXIII, No. 4 (Autumn 1969), p.930. A review of Falk's 
Legal Order in a Violent World.
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first, with regard to the role of jurists and second, with 
regard to what may be counted as being among the sources of 
law.
When regarded as a body of rules, international law is 
something a judge has as his task "to apply objectively to 
the facts before him". The law to be applied may change 
through time. But "at any given moment of time it is the 
duty of the judge 'to apply the law as he finds it', [which] 
entails the beliefs that law is 'rules'; that these laws are 
'neutral'; that the judiciary is 'objective'; and that its 
prime task is to 'apply' rather than to 'make' the rules''.^ 
When conceived of as a social process, international law is
the whole process of competent persons making 
authoritative decisions in response to claims 
which various parties are pressing upon them, in 
respect of various views and interests... and it 
is the task of the judge to decide the distribution 
as between them of values at stake, but taking into 
account not only the interests of the parties, but 
the interests of the world community as a whole.^
By way of illustrating the role of the jurist according 
to the conception of law as a body of rules, Rosalyn Higgins 
cites Judges Fitzmaurice and Spender concerning South West 
Africa.
We are not unmindful of, nor are we insensible to, 
the various considerations of a non-juridical 
character, social, humanitarian and other, which 
underlie this case; but these are matters for the 
political rather than the legal arena. They cannot 
be allowed to deflect us from our duty of reaching 
a conclusion strictly on the basis of what we 
believe to be the correct legal view.
At a later date they said
[This] is a court of law and can take account of 
moral principles only in so far as these are given 
a sufficient expression in legal form.
Rosalyn Higgins, 'Policy Considerations and the 
international Judicial Process', International and Comparative 
Law Quarterly, Vol. 17 (1968), p.58. Note: The terms
"neutral" and "objective" should be taken in a limited rather 
than an absolute sense. Neutral laws and an objective 
judiciary are ideals.
17 Ibid., p.59.
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These quotations, Higgins points out, have two themes: (1)
"that the judge is concerned with applying 'the correct legal 
view'" or "rules of law"...and (2) "that humanitarian 
social or moral questions are for the political arena, and 
not for the judge". Against this she argues for law as "a 
particular process of making authoritative decisions".
The judge must be concerned with the entire process, 
and not just the reference to a 'rule'. His task is 
not just finding 'the correct rule', but rather 
making a choice between alternatives.... Policy 
considerations, even though they differ from 'rules', 
are an integral element of that decision-making 
process which we call international law. In other 
words, the assessment of 'extra-legal' considerations 
is part of the legal process...18
In the remainder of the same article, Higgins argues that a 
distinction between juridical and non-juridical disputes 
cannot be sustained. Of this more will be said at the 
conclusion of this chapter.
To summarise so far, the conception of law as a social
process holds that rather than merely determining which rule
of law is applicable, the function of the jurist should be
to distil from the practice of states what the prevailing
norms of international society are and hence what is
19appropriate behaviour in terms of these norms. For those 
who conceive of it as a social process, international lav/ in 
general should have as its aim the clarification of norms 
with the purpose of making clear for those at the head of 
government, the national decision-makers, the choice of action 
which in particular circumstances will be both acceptable to 
international society and will serve a particular goal. For 
a decision or action to be respected and carry the mantle of 
authority, it must be in keeping with the prevailing norms
^  Ibid., pp.61-62.
19 As it is outlined here the notion of distilling the norms 
of international society from the practice of states is very 
close to the positivist account of international law and to 
this we shall return below, see pp.252-54.
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and so acceptable to the relevant audience. If the decision 
or action flouts the prevailing norms, it will be resisted
2 0and not carry authority even though it may bring compliance.
Rather than drawing only on rules regarded as having the 
status of law and which are all that may be applied to the 
case at hand, the international lawyer is invited to include 
in his deliberations all factors related to the case. Rules 
of law are to be treated as merely one set of considerations 
relevant to and necessary for arriving at a fit decision 
under the circumstances. Rules are but an index to what has 
in the past been considered the proper thing to do, in that 
they embody what have been, perhaps are or may equally no 
longer be, the norms of international society. They are only 
an indication of what is likely to be accepted and hence 
authoritative, and are but one part of the total body of 
related factors pertaining to the matter.
When the practice of law is spoken of as a "policy 
scheme", it is in effect being claimed that law should be an 
adjunct and handmaiden to making political decisions. It is 
not to be taken as just something which may be resorted to 
in order to arbitrate or adjudicate on the correctness of 
policies and political acts, both past and contemplated, in 
terms of rules considered to be law. Rather it is part of 
those policies and acts . Law informs them and should be part 
of them, rather than something distinct.
So much for the function of jurists. The other respect 
in which it was suggested that the two conceptions under 
consideration differ was over what may be counted as being 
among the sources of law.
One way of approaching the question of what may be 
included among the sources of law has been to regard Article 
38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice as a
See T.J. Farer, 'International Law and Political Behaviour: 
Toward a Conceptual Liaison', World Volition, Vol. XXV, No. 3 
(April 1973).
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complete statement of the sources of international law.
Of the sources mentioned in Article 38, our concern here is 
only with Custom which, according to Brownlie, has as its 
sources such things as diplomatic correspondence, policy 
stacements, press releases, resolutions of the United Nations 
General Assembly and so on. These are all sources 
encompassed by the judicial logic of the traditional view 
of law.
In introducing a volume which has the declared 
purpose of examining law as a basis for world order, Falk and 
Mendlovitz suggest that "tacit understandings" are ci source 
of law. What they say bears quoting at length.
In a decentralized system, stable expectations tend 
to fix a norm for the behavior of individual states.
The violation of these expectations leads to a 
destabilizing response, and so the presence of these 
expectations provides a measure by which to assess 
and guide behavior. In this manner tacit 
understandings operate as a source of law, and the 
task of the legal analyst is to distill their 
existence from international practice, rather than 
provide a technical justification for their character as law. In instances where conflict is especially 
severe the dismal prospects for agreement do not
21
For this view, see I. Brownlie, Principles of Public 
International Law (Oxford, Clarendon, 1966), Chapter 1. Note: 
Article 38.1 reads: The Court, whose function is to decide
in accordance with international law such disputes as are 
submitted to it, shall apply:
(a) international conventions, whether general or particular, 
establishing rules expressly recognized by the contesting 
states;
(b) international custom, as evidence of a general, practice 
accepted by law;
(c) the general principles of law recognized by civilized 
nations;
(d) subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial 
decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified 
publicists of the various nations, and subsidiary means for 
the determination of the rule of law.
This provision shall not prejudice the power of the Court 
to decide a case ex equo et bono, if the parties agree 
thereto.
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imply there exists no need to establish minimum 
standards of legal order; on the contrary, it is 
here that tacit understandings operate as a 
functional equivalent to formally agreed uponrules and procedures.22
By saying it is the task of the legal analyst to distil the 
existence of tacit understandings from international practice, 
rather than provide a technical justification for their 
character as law, they show themselves to be spokesmen for 
the conception of law as a social process. They are asking 
the "legal analyst" to go beyond formal "laws" and have 
regard for the contribution of tacit understandings in 
limiting violence, which is implicitly a desired goal.
As they say, the super-powers do have stable expectations 
which both fix a norm for behaviour and are the basis of tacit 
understandings. Such understandings do stand in the stead of 
formally agreed upon rules and procedures and by so doing 
perform a valuable function precisely because they pertain to 
matters over which there can be no formal agreement. However, 
such understandings are essentially -political and devolve 
from the realities of power. Those who conceive of law as a 
body of rules would not countenance such understandings as 
falling within the competence of international law. This 
has bearing upon the place of spheres of influence in 
international law and will be taken up in the final part of 
the chapter.
Having now outlined two western conceptions of 
international law and some of their points of conflict, we 
shall turn to the Soviet conception of international law.
2. The Soviet Conception of International Law.
This section is intended to give a brief account of the 
central tenets of the Soviet theory of international law, as 
it is presently expounded, with two purposes in mind. First,
R.A. Falk and S.M. Mendlovitz (eds.), The Strategy of World 
Order, Vol. II, International Law (New York, World Law Fund, 
1966), p.2. See also R.A. Falk, 'The Reality of International 
Law', Review Article, World Politics, Vol. XIV, No. 2 
(January 1962).
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to distinguish the Soviet conception of international law 
from the Western conceptions discussed above and second, at 
the same time draw attention to that part of Soviet theory 
which bears upon actions the Soviet Union has taken in its 
sphere of influence.
The Soviet conception of international law has changed
from time to time according to the circumstances of the
Soviet state and to the theoretical stance of the leaders of
23the communist party. Nevertheless, there are two cardinal 
doctrines in Soviet international law: that of "peaceful
coexistence" and of "socialist internationalism". These two 
doctrines represent the "basic thrust of Soviet foreign 
policy" and are essential to the Soviet conception of law and 
to how relations between states are classified.^  Father 
than speaking only of relations between states in general, 
Soviet writers typically distinguish: (1) relations between
capitalist states; (2) relations between capitalist and 
socialist states; (3) relations between socialist states; and 
(4) relations between Third World countries and both socialist 
and capitalist states. Of these only the second and third 
are important for our purposes and the third in particular in 
relation to spheres of influence.
Relations between socialist and capitalist states are 
said to be governed by "peaceful coexistence" which is, in 
Soviet theory, the basis of general international law. 
Relations between socialist states, on the other hand, are 
said to be governed by the "higher" principle of "socialist 
internationalism". Soviet theorists argue that although the 
two principles are mutually exclusive in operation, they are 
both subsumed under the general "law of peaceful coexistence".
See B.A. Ramundo, Peaceful Coexistence (Maryland, Johns 
Hopkins, 1967), p.24.
24 Ibid. , p.10.
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Socialist internationalism both "reflects the special nature
of the relations between socialist states, [and] broadens
and deepens the democratic character of general international 
25law". Both terms require some elucidation.
(i) Peaceful coexistence.
"Peaceful coexistence" is defined in Soviet writings as
the struggle and competition between the socialist and
capitalist system conducted by peaceful means. It is
considered a legal principle and identified, circularly, with
international law itself or, in the words of Y. Korovin,
"[c]ontemporary international law may be defined as the
2 6international code of peaceful coexistence". Thus a Soviet 
textbook of international law defines it, in part
as the aggregate of rules governing relations between 
states in the process of their conflict and 
cooperation, designed to safeguard their peaceful 
coexistence...27
The same text declares the purpose of international law to
be the promotion of peaceful coexistence and cooperation
28between all states "regardless of their social system".
Apart from enjoining states to repudiate war as a means
of settling disputes, the principle of peaceful coexistence
includes the duty of all states to observe each other's
territorial integrity and sovereignty, non-intervention in
the internal affairs of other states, and equality and mutual
2 9assistance between states. These principles of peaceful 
coexistence correspond to the five principles, or so-called
25 Ibid., p.20.
2 6 Y. Korovin, 'International Law Today', International 
Affairs (Moscow), 7 (July 1961), p.19.
27 F.I. Kozhevnikov (ed.), International Lav (Moscow, Foreign 
Languages Press, no date), p.7.
Ibid., p.11.
29 D. Baratashvili, 'International Law Principle of Peaceful 
Coexistence', International Affairs (Moscow), 2 (February
1972), p.21.
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Panch Shila (of which the fifth is "peaceful coexistence"
itself), and which were set out in April 1954 in a treaty
between India and China concerning Tibet. The first four of
these, it should be noted, stem from the United Nations
Charter and indeed Soviet writers assert that the basis for
peaceful coexistence in international law is formed by the
rules and principles of international law as recognised by30the United Nations Charter.
In the present meaning of the term, the perceived 
necessity for "peaceful coexistence" between the two mutually 
antagonistic social systems, which Soviet writers take as a 
basic feature of international life, devolves from the danger 
of nuclear war. It is because of that danger that the 
rejection of force as a means of settling disputes is 
embodied in the principle of peaceful coexistence. However, 
Soviet authors explicitly state that while peaceful 
coexistence includes the renunciation of war, it does not 
mean that there is or will be no struggle between the two 
"diametrically opposed systems". "While peaceful coexistence 
between socialist and capitalist states precludes their armed 
struggle it does not mean cessation of their economic, 
political and ideological struggle". Rather it is "a 
struggle against imperialism" and is at no time "a cut-and- 
dried formula" but may differ considerably from one period 
to another.^
How is peaceful coexistence related to what Soviet 
authors call "general international law"? In the Marxist 
theory of society the material conditions of life, together 
with the productive forces and the relations of production, 
are "the real basis on which a juridical and political 
superstructure arises and to which definite forms of social
See Rosalyn Higgins, Conflict of Interests > International 
Law in a Divided World (London, Bodley Head, 1965), pp.101-09.
31 G. Tunkin, 'Coexistence and International Lav;', in Tunkin 
(ed.), Contemporary International Law (Moscow, Progress 
Publishers, 1969), pp.13, 14 and 17.
244
3 2consciousness correspond”. It is upon the relationship of 
men to the means of production that the political and legal 
and the ideological superstructure are formed. The politics 
and law of society cannot be understood without first 
ascertaining the nature of its productive forces and economic 
structure. Thus, in Soviet theory international law is a 
category of the superstructure and is determined ultimately 
by the economic system.
However, it is not just a matter of simple determinism
as between base and superstructure; there is causal
interaction within the superstructure itself. The content
of the law is determined by both the economic base and the
rest of the superstructure. "Society's economic system
influences the development of international law not only by
the method of 'direct' action but through other categories
of superstructure whose influence on the whole cannot
transcend the bounds defined by the economic system of 
33society". The point of all this is that the connection 
between base and superstructure has given rise to the 
argument that because there are two "diametrically" opposed 
systems there are two systems of international law and not 
one general international law, except to the extent that all 
international law is subsumed by peaceful coexistence.
Tunkin in particular, has argued that this confuses
economic materialism with Marxism-Leninism. "Marxism-
Leninism treats the historical process in all its complexity
and diversity. The Marxist-Leninist theory of law does not
consider law and international law in particular a simple
projection of the economic system in the sphere of
34superstructure". Moreover, states belonging to the two 
different systems are not isolated from one another but 
indeed maintain relations in several fields. International
Karl Marx, 'Preface to the Critique of Political Economy', 
K. Marx and F. Engels, Selected Works (Moscow, Foreign 
Languages Publishing House, 1951), Vol. 1, p.329.
33 Tunkin, op.cit., p.31.
34 Ibid., pp.31-32.
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law, which is based upon peaceful coexistence, has the
function of governing such relations. "States do not
conclude agreements on ideological matters; they agree on the
concrete rules governing their behaviour. They may have
different views regarding the content and nature of
international law, but even this does not create insuperable
difficulties to the establishment by agreement, of
35appropriate international rules". In this way international
law is regarded by Soviet authors as promoting peaceful
3 6coexistence and as "a major factor in human progress".'^
There are two additional aspects of the Soviet notion of
general international law which warrant mention. First, it
is asserted that international law has as its chief function,
as was noted above, to govern relations between "sovereign
states". That is to say, states alone are regarded as being
the only subjects of international law. "Neither
international organizations nor, even less, physical persons
37are regarded as subjects of international law". The 
principle reason for this is that both individuals and 
international organizations are seen as potentially 
subversive of state sovereignty and therefore not to be 
extended legal recognition. For instance, a Soviet author 
cited Professor Richard Falk as having argued that "the only 
apparent way to balance social progress with enduring peace 
is to entrust regional and universal institutions with a 
gradually increasing competence and responsibility for social 
change". Of this Fyodorov wrote
The efforts of the imperialist ideologists to 
denigrate national sovereignty, which, they [Falk and 
Black] say, is incompatible with modern technological 
and economic ’integration', have far-reaching aims.
G. Tunkin, 'The Soviet Union and International Law', 
International Affairs (Moscow), 11 (November 1959), p.40.
3 6 Tunkin, 'Coexistence and International Law', op.eit., p.33. 
37 I. Lapenna, 'International Law Viewed through Soviet Eyes', 
Yearbook of VJorld Affairs (1961), p. 223.
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The propaganda of supra-national institutions is 
a cover-up for the imperialist plans to establish 
indirect control over the liberated peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America.38
In short, anything which detracts from national sovereignty 
(outside the Socialist system) is considered undesirable and 
not to be acknowledged. Moreover, allowing states as the 
only subjects of international law is a first line of defense 
against the depredations of imperialist powers.
Second, the Soviet view of the sources of international
law should be mentioned. Only treaties and international
custom are regarded as sources of law. Of these two primary
importance is accorded to treaties. "Bourgeois" jurists are
criticised for neglecting International Treaty Law and
exaggerating the importance of international custom. Soviet
jurists regard custom as a source of law only in so far as
it can be considered to embody rules which have acquired legal
significance over a prolonged period and are recognised as
legal rules in accord with Article 38(b) of the Statute of the
3 9International Court of Justice. Treaties as a source of law 
are also circumscribed by the Soviet refusal to accept 
whichever treaties it considers unjust, unequal, enslaving, 
or "legally null and void" in terms of its own conception of 
international law.4^
Finally, on one hand, the principles of peaceful 
coexistence are no more than an enumeration of general 
principles found in western conceptions of international law, 
with which western jurists have no quarrel. On the other 
hand, Soviet jurists have not explained how the principles of
V.I. Fyodorov, 'The Imperialist Doctrine of Intercepting 
Revolution', International Affairs (Moscow), 5 (May 1966),
p. 66.
39 Kozhevnikov, op.cit., p.12; see also T.A. Taracouzio, The
Soviet Union and International Law (New York, MacMillan,
1935), pp.12-13.
40 See Lapenna, op.crt., p.220, and Tunkin, 'The Soviet Union 
and International Law', op.ail., p.41.
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peaceful coexistence are to be used to actually settle
disputes. Instead they have used the principles of peaceful
coexistence to obscure their own changing conceptions of the
place of international law in relations between capitalist
41and socialist countries. What is more, at the same time 
as the Soviet concept of general international law 
incorporates the principle of universality, it maintains the 
essential separateness of peaceful coexistence and socialist 
internationalism. For this reason it is for some western 
jurists "an artful fragmentation of international law".^
But what is meant by "socialist internationalism"?
(ii) "Socialist internationalism" as a principle of law 
governing relations among socialist countries.
In Soviet doctrine, relations among the socialist states,
meaning the states of eastern Europe and China before the
schism, are distinguished from relations among other states.
The socialist states, it is asserted, are bound together by a
common interest "in defending revolutionary gains and national
independence from imperialist states". Relations between
states that form the socialist system are regarded as being
of a nature which has brought into being "fundamentally new
international law relations". These relations are based on
Marxism-Leninism and "socialist" or "proletarian
4 3internationalism".
"Socialist internationalism" is sometimes used 
synonymously with the term "proletarian internationalism", 
but there is a distinction between the two terms. On the one 
hand, proletarian internationalism refers to the principles 
and body of theory guiding the world communist movement as a
E. McWhinney, 'Peaceful Coexistence’ and Soviet-Western 
International Law (Leyden, Sythoff, 1964), pp.36-37.
4 2 Ramundo, op.cit., p.22.
4 3 V.M. Shurshalov, ’International Law in Relations Among 
Socialist Countries', in G. Tunkin, Contemporary International 
Law, op.cit., pp.59-63.
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whole. That is to say, it refers to relations embracing
ruling-party states, all non-ruling communist parties, all
parties and organizations united in national liberation
movements in third world countries, and all peoples and
organizations fighting against imperialism and for peace.
On the other hand, "socialist internationalism is a far more
exclusive condition, applying to a 'higher order* of
44relations among ruling states only". It is, therefore, 
"socialist internationalism" which is the appropriate term 
with regard to relations between the Soviet Union and the 
states of eastern Europe.
The principle of socialist internationalism is explained
as being "best reflected in fraternal and disinterested
mutual aid" and such aid is reciprocal. For a socialist
state to receive aid, it is obliged to help its partners
economically, politically and if need be, "militarily when
their independence is threatened by the imperialist 
4 5aggressor". Thus, the interventions in Hungary and 
Czechoslovakia are referred to as "striking examples" of 
"mutual assistance of socialist states in the struggle for 
peace". According to Tunkin, the "activities of the five 
socialist states in August 1968 were aimed at the protection 
of socialism and of the socialist sovereignty of the 
Czechoslovak state, fully in conformity with the principles 
of proletarian internationalism". This means that in 
practice the crux of the principle is that no socialist state
N. Jamgotch, Soviet-East European Dialogue: International
Relatione of a New Type? (Stanford, Hoover Institution, 1968), 
pp.94-95. See also B. Miroshnichenku, 'Socialist 
Internationalism and Soviet Foreign Policy', International 
Affairs (Moscow), 5 (May 1966); I. Dudinsky, 'A Community of 
Equal and Sovereign Nations', International Affaire (Moscow), 
11 (November 1964); and S. Sanakoyev, 'The Basis of the 
Relations Between the Socialist Countries', International 
Affairs (Moscow), 7 (July 1958). All cited by Jamgotch.
Ibid. , p. 65 .
4 6 Cited by Ivo Lapenna, 'The Soviet Concepl of "Socialist" 
Internationalism', The Yearbook of World Affaire, 1975, p.261.
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be allowed to slip from the rule of the communist party.
The sovereignty of one is inseparable from the sovereignty 
of all. The interventions in Hungary and Czechoslovakia are, 
under the principle of socialist internationalism, construed 
as legal obligations. Socialist internationalism involves 
therefore, a special sense of sovereignty which is crucial 
to how Soviet jurists regard the legality of Soviet actions 
with respect to the Soviet sphere of influence.
The meaning of "sovereignty" in relations between 
socialist states is clearly stated by E. Korovin.
The socialist countries firmly reject the 
nationalist interpretation of the sovereignty 
slogan and attempts to present it as irreconcilable 
with the international solidarity of the socialist 
countries. Any weakening of international socialist 
unity, any step towards national isolation on the 
part of any state means that it would inevitably 
become increasingly dependent on the capitalist 
countries which, in turn, would lead to the 
inevitable reduction and loss of its political and 
economic independence (sovereignty).^7
In other words, as has already been pointed out, for 
socialist states "sovereignty" and government by the 
Communist party are one and the same. If the rule of the 
party is in jeopardy then so is the "sovereignty" of that 
state. Moreover, a threat to one is a threat to all. As 
Mr Brezhnev said in Warsaw in November 1968, a threat to the 
cause of socialism in one socialist country is "a threat to 
the security of the socialist community as a whole". 
Preservation of the whole through preservation of party 
sovereignty in each part is perhaps the very essence of the 
principle of socialist internationalism.
E. Korovin, 'Proletarian Internationalism in World 
Relations', International Affairs (Moscow), 2 (February 1958), 
pp.23-30.
48 For the text of Mr Brezhnev's speech, see CDS I, Vol. XX,
No. 46 (December 4, 1968), pp.3-5.
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The implications for international law of the 
overriding requirement of maintaining the pre-eminence of 
the party, were stated by S. Kovalev in the article which 
set out what was later known as the Brezhnev doctrine.
Those who speak of the 'illegality' of the allied 
socialist countries' actions in Czechoslovakia 
forget that in a class society there is and can be 
no such thing as non class law. Laws and the norms 
of law are subordinated to the laws of the class 
struggle and the laws of social development.
The class approach to the matter cannot be 
discarded in the name of legalistic considerations. 
Whoever does so and forfeits the only correct, 
class oriented criterion for evaluating legal norms 
begin to measure events with the yardsticks of 
bourgeois law.49
For the socialist states, the requirements of the class 
struggle take precedence over those of "abstract" principles 
of international law, abstract principles being defined as 
those of bourgeois law. Hence, the special meaning of 
sovereignty which informs the principle of socialist 
internationalism, unlike bourgeois notions of sovereignty, 
may be regarded as a norm which meets the demands of the 
class struggle.
It should not be overlooked that in Soviet "general
international law" sovereignty has a quite different meaning,
one more in keeping with Western understanding of the term.
It has the meaning of "state sovereignty", defined by Tunkin
"as the independence of a state expressed in its right freely
and at its own discretion to decide its internal and external
affairs without violating the rights of other states and the
50principles and rules of international law". What is 
considered a violation of general international lav;, such as 
intervention, may be considered, as we have seen, a legal
S. Kovalev, 'Sovereignty and the International Obligations 
of Socialist Countries', Pravda, September 26, 1968. CDSP, 
Vol. XX, No. 39 (October 16, 1968), pp.10-12.
50 Cited by Lapenna, 'The Soviet Concept of "Socialist" 
International Law', op.cit., p.260.
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Obligation under the principle of socialist internationalism.
"State sovereignty", Lapenna writes, "is regarded as one of
the main weapons 'in the struggle for peace and against
imperialist aggression'. Since aggression is impossible
between 'socialist' countries, this weapon cannot be utilised
in the relations inside the 'socialist community of states',
based on the principle of 'socialist internationalism', and
the 'drastically' different 'socialist' principle of
51sovereignty formulated by L. Brezhnev".
Finally, what is the relationship between "socialist
internationalism" and "peaceful coexistence"? Socialist
internationalism is claimed as a "higher, more profound and
qualitatively new principle", which in relations between
socialist states replaces the principle of peaceful
coexistence. The two principles are said to operate in
"different spheres". What may have "a positive (progressive)
value in relations between capitalist states may, in a number
of cases, acquire the opposite (reactionary) character when
52transferred to relations between socialist states". This 
is shown, Korovin argues, by the idea of neutrality and the 
case of Hungary when it renounced the Warsaw Treaty and 
declared itself neutral in 1956. Korovin cites with approval 
the General Secretary of the Communist Party of the 
Netherlands as having written with regard to Hungary that:
For those countries over which America at present 
rules, neutrality, guaranteed by both world camps, 
would be a step forward towards national 
independence. For a socialist country neutrality 
would be a step backward toward subordination to 
imperialism and its spheres of influence.53
This is once again essentially an argument about sovereignty. 
Had Hungary become neutral it would have lost its "socialist 
sovereignty". But when "sovereignty" has this meaning it
1 bid,, p. 260.
52 E. Korovin, op.cit., p.29.
5 3 E. Korovin, loc.cit.
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means something different from what is understood by the term 
when it is part of the principle of peaceful coexistence.
Soviet theorists see no contradiction between the two meanings. 
What is part of the principle of socialist internationalism is 
above the principle of peaceful coexistence and ipso facto not 
subject to the concessions to bourgeois ideology inherent in 
peaceful coexistence.
At this point, three different conceptions of 
international law have been outlined and it remains to say 
something about the relationship between all three and about 
the debate as to the nature of international law generally.
3. The Relationship Between the Conceptions Outlined.
The distinction drawn above between the traditional, or
law as rules, and law as social process conceptions of
international law, was partially an overstatement. In
practice the distinction is not so clear, for while there
are important differences between the two views there are
also similarities and points of coincidence. To a certain
extent the debate between the two schools of thought is merely
a continuation of the much older debate between natural law
54theorists and positivists. Natural law theorists regard the
ideal or ethical law "as grounded in something wider or more
general or more enduring than the mere practical needs of men,
whether these be expressed in custom or in convention and
agreement". Grotius, Pufendorf and others identified the
nature or essence of man with the possession of reason and
held law "to be whatever is found acceptable by recta ratio
55or sana ratio". By the use of "right reason" men could 
discover the laws inherent in the universe and in their own 
nature. Positivists, on the other hand, have sought rules by 
observing the actual behaviour of men. Thus, in the history
On this, see A. Nussbaum, A Concise History of the Law of 
Nations (New York, MacMillan, 1947), Rev. ed., and Lord Denis 
Lloyd, The Idea of Law (Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1973), 
Chapters 4 and 5.
55 R. Wollheim, op.cit., p.450.
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of international law, naturalists have regarded the rights
and duties of men, and states as collections of men, as no
more than their natural inheritance as men or states; while
positivists have considered a right or a duty to have meaning
only if it has been sanctioned by custom or by a treaty
5 6between states. Each of the conceptions outlined in the 
preceding sections shares characteristics in common with 
either naturalism or positivism or with both.
In the first place, both naturalism and positivism rely 
on rules, and the conception of law as a body of rules has 
this in common with both. On the other hand, law as a social 
process attempts to dispense with rules and in this way is 
unlike either naturalism or positivism.
Second, whereas the idea of law as a social process 
does not place as much value on rules as the positivist law 
as rules conception does, the social process account of the 
function of jurists is in some ways like the positivist view. 
It was shown above that the conception of law as a social 
process holds that rather than merely determining which rule 
of law is applicable, the function of the jurist should be 
to distil from the practice of states what the prevailing 
norms of international society are and hence what is 
appropriate behaviour in terms of these norms. This would 
fit an account of positivism equally as well as one of law 
as a social process. However, there is a difference in that 
whereas traditionalists of the positivist school survey state 
practice to find rules, the social process theorists survey 
it to find patterns of persuasive behaviour.
Third, although social process theorists say they distil 
prevailing norms from the practice of states, they sometimes 
conflate this with expounding norms they believe to be 
desirable. McDougal's notion of "human dignity", for 
instance, is not a practice of states but rather a preferred
56 H.L.A. Hart, 'Legal Positivism', op,ait., p.418.
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value, a goal which it is seen as desirable to promote. For 
this reason advocates of law as a social process may be 
identified in a very loose sense with naturalists, in that 
they impart their own moral preference and in so doing blur 
the distinction between what is legal and what is a right or 
useful or good policy.
These points serve to demonstrate that there is no clear 
distinction between one view of the nature of law and another. 
There are rather interconnections which complicate the debate 
and hence any attempt to arrive at a generally acceptable 
statement of the nature of international law. Moreover, 
apart from the argument between western jurists there remains 
the Soviet conception. Soviet international law stands 
firmly in the positivist camp and in terms of the way it 
views relations between capitalist and socialist states, it 
is very much in the tradition of the law as model. But in 
setting aside a distinct and higher law for relations between 
socialist states it pays attention not merely to practice, in 
the positivist tradition, but also policy goals in the manner 
of the social process school.
In conclusion then, any answer to the question "what is 
international law", with which we started, is complicated by 
both conflicting western conceptions and by the conflict 
between western and Soviet law. This in turn complicates 
the task of stating the place of spheres of influence in 
international law which is to be done in the last part of 
this chapter. In that part, we shall come back to the 
conceptions which have been discussed in this part. Before 
hand, it is necessary to survey first, the place spheres of 
influence have had in the history of international law and 
second, how recent actions of influencing powers have been 
regarded by jurists.
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Spheres of Influence in the History of International Law.
Spheres of influence have figured in the history of 
international law in three ways: first, through treaties
explicitly concerned with spheres of influence; second, 
through policies such as the Monroe Doctrine which are 
claimed to bestow legal rights upon influencing powers; and 
third, through questions about the legality of actions 
influencing powers have taken. In this part the first and 
second of these are discussed and it should be noted that it 
is only in connection with the first that spheres of influence 
as such have been explicitly named in the literature of 
international law.
(i) Treaties.
In Chapter Two it was shown that when the European powers 
expanded into Africa and Asia in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries they concluded treaties as to spheres of 
influence. Through these treaties spheres of influence 
became a subject of international law. For the first time 
the literature of international law spelt out the legal 
obligations arising out of formal agreements on spheres of 
influence.
The territory encompassed by the spheres of influence
which were demarcated was considered to have one of two
possible kinds of status. On the one hand, there was what
European powers held to be territorium nullius, that is to
say, "a tract of country...inhabited only by isolated
individuals who were not united for political actions, so
57that there was no sovereignty in exercise...". Territorium 
nullius was the subject of agreements only between European 
powers. On the other, there was territory which was
II.
M.F. Lindley, The Acquisition and Government of backward 
Territory in International Law (New York, Negro Universities 
Press, 1969). Reprinted from the 1926 edition, p.23.
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considered to have a sovereign. European powers sometimes 
concluded agreements about a sphere of influence with the 
non-European sovereign of such territory.
There were basically three kinds of treaty as to spheres
of influence. First, there were those concluded between
European powers which amounted to a promise that each would
not acquire sovereign rights in the sphere of the other.
This form of agreement, as did the others to be considered
here, came into use mostly after the Berlin Conference of
1885. Following that conference it was recognised that
territory might be under influence as distinct from protection
or sovereignty. But influence in itself did not amount to a
legal right; "the establishment of a sphere of influence [did]
not in itself vest territorial rights of a legal nature in the
5 8state exercising the influence". The legal implications of 
agreements of this type were threefold. (i) The rights of any 
native sovereign whose territory was in a sphere of influence 
so demarcated were not affected. (ii) As to the parties to 
the agreement themselves, they were under a legal obligation 
to refrain from interfering or attempting to acquire sovereign 
rights in each other's sphere. Commercial activity, however, 
was not restricted. (iii) Third powers were not debarred by 
law from establishing political relations with, or acquiring, 
territory in the sphere of influence demarcated by agreements 
to which it was not party. Such "arrangements conferr[ed] no 
territorial rights and impose[d] no responsibility on the state 
in whose favour they [were] created, in relation to non­
contracting powers; and although considerations of comity or 
fear [might have induced] the latter to respect such arrangements 
...this [was] a matter of policy, and not of law".’ The phrase
L. Oppenheim, International Law: A Treatise (London,
Longmans Green, 1947), 6th Ed. (ed. by H. Lauterpacht), Vol. 1, 
p.514.
59 Pitt Cobbett, Cases on International Law (London, Sweet and 
Maxwell, 1947), 6th Ed., Vol. 1 Peace, p.119.
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"sphere of influence", according to Hall, implied a moral
claim rather than a true right and the understanding that a
territory was within a sphere of influence did no more than
warn off friendly powers and constituted no barrier to covert 
6 0hostility. It was precisely because spheres of influence 
were not a recognised form of aggrandisement that they were 
often merely a first step toward colonisation. To secure its 
claim a power would make its sphere of influence a 
protectorate, then a colony, and so on.
The second kind of agreement was that in which two
European powers recognised the special interest of the one in
the territory or part of the territory of a single third
state. An example of this was the agreement of 1907 between
Russia and Great Britain on Persia. Such agreements
generally contained an express recognition of the independence
of the state whose territories were comprised in the sphere or
61spheres in question. They gave no legal rights to European 
powers and had no legal implications beyond recognising the 
independence of the state whose territories were the subject 
of the agreement.
Third, there were agreements which demarcated a sphere
of influence in the territory of a single state by direct
agreement with the sovereign of that state. Typical of such
arrangements were the non-alienation agreements European powers
concluded with China during the 1890s. Once again, these gave
no territorial rights to the European parties to them, but
they warned off other powers and perhaps earmarked "the
territories in question for the Powers concerned in case
future events [rendered] the acquisition of such territories
6 2possible or desirable".
W.E. Hall, A Treatise on International Law (Oxford, 
Clarendon, 1924), 8th Ed., p.154. See also Hall's A Treatise 
on the Foreign Powers and Jurisdiction of the British Crown 
(Oxford, Clarendon, 1894), p.229.
^  Lindley, op.cit., p.225.
6 2 Ibid. Note: Agreements of this kind were not entirely
confined to arrangements involving European powers. Japan 
secured similar agreements with Korea between 1895 and 1907.
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Once spheres of influence were no longer a step to 
colonisation in the sense that they had been during the 
nineteenth century, and once formal agreements about spheres 
of influence no longer had a place in the practice of states, 
and indeed became unacceptable, the term almost completely 
disappeared from the literature of international law. It 
simply had no place and when it had, there were, as we have 
seen, no legal rights pertaining to spheres of influence as 
such. Curiously the term survived in Lauterpacht's revisions 
of Oppenheim's Treatise up to the eighth edition, long after 
the sense in which it was discussed had ceased to have any 
meaning for the practice of states.
Thus the first entry of spheres of influence into 
international law was relatively short-lived. The second 
entry, through policies and practices associated with them, 
has a longer history and is illustrated by, but not confined 
to, the Monroe Doctrine. Unlike the treaties which named 
spheres of influence, the claims derived from the Monroe 
Doctrine are not explicitly concerned with rights pertaining 
to a sphere of influence. Nevertheless, that is an 
implication of them.
(ii) The Monroe Doctrine.
Any doubt as to whether the Monroe Doctrine was intended
to preclude the European powers from colonising parts of
America itself which were not then coronised was dispelled
by President Polk in 1845. "N[o] future European colony or
dominion", said Polk, "shall, with our consent, be planted or
64established on any part of the North American continent".
At that time the North American continent included territory 
which, according to the rules of international law, could 
have been considered territorium nullius. Both the Monroe
6 Oppenheim, op.cit., 8th Ed. (1955). Spheres of influence 
are discussed in paragraph 227 of the 6th, 7th and 8th 
editions.
64 Cited by Lindley, op,cit., p.76.
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Doctrine and Cleveland's message, therefore, asserted claims 
to which America arguably had no legal right. The point is 
that although Monroe's message was not a legal rule but a 
political doctrine, some American statesmen and authors have 
attempted at times to ascribe to the Monroe Doctrine the 
status of a rule of international law.
At the time of the Venezuelan boundary dispute in 1895 
President Cleveland argued that for the same reasons as those 
which impelled the Concert of Europe to maintain the balance 
of power in Europe, the United States was prompted to maintain 
its primacy in the Americas. To do so, he argued, was 
important for the peace and safety of the United States and 
"essential to the integrity of our free institutions and the
6 6tranquil maintenance of our distinctive form of government".
To be able to maintain its peace and safety and distinctive
form of government was the right not only of the United
States but of all nations. Thus Cleveland asserted that
"[t]he Monroe Doctrine finds its recognition in those
principles of international law which are based upon the
theory that every nation shall have its rights protected and
6 7its just claims enforced". Similarly, Elihu Root wrote
that the Monroe Doctrine "is not international law but it
rests upon the right of self-protection and that right is
recognized by international law. The right is a necessary
6 8corollary of independent sovereignty".
Writing at the turn of the century, Hannis Taylor argued 
that dicta such as Cleveland's asserting the "right" of every 
nation to protect its perceived interests, together with the
This was a dispute between Great Britain and Venezuela in 
which the United States claimed the right to arbitrate.
6 6 Cited by Hannis Taylor, A Treatise on International Public 
Law (Chicago, Callaghan, 1901), p.150.
67 Ibid.
6 8 Elihu Root, 'The Real Monroe Doctrine', The American 
Journal of International Law, Vol. 8, No. 3 (July 1914), p.432.
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assertions of other Presidents and Secretaries of State, 
should be regarded as sources of law and that the Monroe 
Doctrine was on the way to becoming part of international 
law.
The Monroe Doctrine must...be classed with 
those sources of international law which rest upon 
instructions given by states for the guidance of 
their own courts and officers. All such national 
acts are in their inception nothing more than 
expressions of opinion by particular states that 
certain rules are so just and equitable that they 
are willing to bow to their authority. Not until a 
new rule thus announced has, through its own merits, 
won general acceptance can it become a part of the 
general body of international law. In that event 
the first announcement should be considered as the 
source from which the general rule was drawn. 9^
Taylor thought the Monroe Doctrine was by this process being 
"rapidly incorporated into the general body of the law of 
nations" and that the hegemony of the United States would 
become "a part of the public law of the world".
This was, however, a reflection of Taylor's mind rather
than of the state of law, for the Monroe Doctrine was not
then, and has not been, accepted as a Doctrine of International
Law. At the time of the Venezuelan boundary dispute, Secretary
of State Olney, in what Professor Pearce Higgins called "an
extraordinary spirit of Caesarism", proclaimed that "[t]he
United States is practically sovereign on this continent and
its fiat is law upon the subjects to which it confines its
7 0interposition". During the course of the dispute nord
Salisbury informed Secretary Olney that while Great Britain
recognised the Monroe Doctrine as being an expedient policy,
no European state would be "prepared to admit that the
recognition of that expediency is clothed with the sanction
71which belongs to a doctrine of international law".
Taylor, op.oit., p.151.
7 0 A. Pearce Higgins, 'The Monroe Doctrine', The British 
Yearbook of International Law, 1924, p.113.
71 Salisbury was referring to that part of the Doctrine 
concerned with future colonisation.
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International law, said Salisbury, "is founded on the general 
consent of nations, and no statesman however eminent, and no 
nation, however powerful, are competent to insert into the 
code of international law a novel principle which has never 
been recognized before, and which has not since been accepted 
by the government of any other country". In terms of the 
status of the Monroe Doctrine in international law, 
Salisbury's statement holds as much at present as it did when 
it was made. The importance of the doctrine has remained 
largely political and not legal.
Even so, as Oppenheim pointed out, "[w]hile its claim to
legal validity has never been admitted, it has not been
actively opposed by the European Powers". Indeed, "it was
given a quasi-legal status by Article 21 of the Covenant" of
the League of Nations, which had specifically recognised the
validity of "international engagements" such as the Monroe 7 3Doctrine. But all that this claimed was that the Monroe 
Doctrine was a regional understanding which makes for the 
maintenance of peace. It was in no sense presented as being 
legally binding on any government and notwithstanding its 
mention in the covenant, it remained as before a political 
doctrine to be reaffirmed and applied by successive United 
States governments according to their perception of national 
requirements, except in so far as it has been dignified since 
World War II by being converted into a regional arrangement.
In summary, whereas United States officials and jurists 
have at times argued that the Monroe Doctrine bestows legal 
rights upon the United States with regard to Latin America, 
this has not been accepted by other states. It is not 
regarded as a legal doctrine. The Covenant of the League of 
Nations which allowed for the Monroe Doctrine did not legally 
bind states which were not party to inter-American agreements 
to observe them. It merely allowed for the existence of such
72 Cited by Lindley, op.cit.
7 3 Oppenheim, op.cit., 8th Ed., p.316. For the text of 
Article 21, see Chapter 2, p.33, above.
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arrangements. Similarly, allowance for regional arrangements 
was made in the Charter of the United Nations, but this did 
not give the United States legal rights to a sphere of 
influence. Under the provisions of the Charter it was open 
to the United States to take actions in its area of special 
interest through regional arrangements, but only in so far as 
these did not conflict with the Charter. However, as will be 
seen presently, the aspirations of the United States as an 
influencing power have conflicted with its legal obligations 
under the Charter.
This brings us to the third way in which spheres of 
influence have entered the literature of international law: 
the actions influencing powers have taken.
III.
The Legal Status of Actions Taken by Influencing Powers.
The arguments to be related here are not arguments about 
the legality of spheres of influence as such but about actions 
which have been taken by influencing powers. Influence as 
such is not contrary to the law except when it extends to acts 
such as intervention. Once again the four examples used are 
the interventions in Hungary, the Dominican Republic and 
Czechoslovakia in that order, and finally the naval blockade 
of Cuba.
(i) The invasion of Hungary.
The Soviet invasion of Hungary was widely regarded,
except by the Soviet Union and most of the Warsaw Pact
countries, as illegal in terms of international law. In the
first place it appeared contrary to Article 2 of the Charter
of the United Nations which obliges members to "settle their
disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international
74peace and security, and justice, are not endangered", and to
74 Charter of the United Nations, Article 2, paragraph 2.
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refrain in their international relations from the 
threat or use of force against the territorial 
integrity or political independence of any state, 
or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations. 5^
Among the purposes of the organization are "the suppression
of acts of aggression" and the development of "relations
among nations based on respect for the principle of equal
7 6rights and self-determination of peoples...". However, 
before it can be concluded that the principles and purposes 
of the Charter and the legal obligations pertaining to and 
derived from them have been violated in any one case, it is 
necessary to consider whether or not there were exceptions in 
the case which justified departure from the norm.
While intervention is, as a rule, forbidden by
international law there are permitted exceptions.
According to Oppenheim, intervention proper is always
dictatorial interference and "must neither be confused with
good offices, nor with mediation, nor with intercession, nor
7 7with cooperation". But the role of Soviet troops in
Hungary could not be regarded as one of mediation or good
offices and the invasion represented intervention proper.
Were there in this case any relevant exceptions to the rule
forbidding intervention? The International Commission of
Jurists was of the opinion that only Article 51, which allows
for individual or collective self-defense in the event of an
armed attack, merited consideration. The Commission concluded
that there had been no attack and that Article 51 provided "no
basis for the suppression of an internal disturbance in one
7 8country by the forces of another".
7 5 Ibid., paragraph 4.
^  Ibid., Article 1 (i) and (2).
7 7 L. Oppenheim, International Law> A Treatise, Ed. by
H. Lauterpacht (London, Longmans Green, 1955), 8th Ed., p.305.
7 8 International Commission of Jurists, The Hungarian 
Situation and the Rule of Law (The Hague, 1957), p.9.
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The Commission of Jurists also disallowed the argument
advanced by Soviet spokesmen, to the effect that the Warsaw
Treaty provided independent grounds for the entry of Soviet
troops into Hungary. In that Treaty, the contracting parties
declared themselves to be "guided by the objects and
principles of the Charter of the United Nations" for the
furtherance of "the principles of respect for the
independence and sovereignty of states and of non-interference
in their internal affairs"; the peaceful settlement of
international disputes and "[i]n the event of armed attack in
Europe on one or more of the Parties to the Treaty, [the]...
right to individual or collective self-defense in accordance
with Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations 
79Organization". Thus the Commission further concluded 
that in its application to the Hungarian situation the Warsaw 
Pact was "closely linked with Article 51 of the 
Charter" and provided "no justification for armed
8 0intervention in the internal affairs of another state". In 
short, the Commission of Jurists was in no doubt that the 
intervention was not justified by international law.
It might have been justified had the Warsaw Pact forces
been invited by the Hungarian government. The Warsaw Treaty
allows for Soviet troops to be stationed in the Warsaw Pact
countries, but only by agreement among the States and in
accordance with the requirements of mutual defense. It also
allows for collective action but only upon explicit request.
Although the initial invasion was apparently invited by a
Politbüro member, this was not considered by Western jurists
81to be an official request from the constituted government. 
After the first invasion and before the second a further
See the Pre-amble, Article 1 and Article 4, Treaty of 
Warsaw, reproduced in The Hungarian Situation and the Rule 
of Law, and R.H. McNeal, International Relatione Among 
Communists (New Jersey, Prentice-Hall, 1967), p.00.
8 0 International Commission of Jurists, op.ait., p.10. The 
Commission also dealt with an annex to the treaty and Article 
5, but argued that these also provided no legal justification 
for the invasion.
See Chapter 6, p.158, above.81
265
request was made by the Kadar Government, but this also was
not considered to be a legitimate request as it came from a
government which had been established by the force of Soviet
arms. "The consent of a State", argued Quincy Wright,
"cannot be deduced from the request of a puppet government
8 2acting in its name but set up by foreign intervention".
As there was no request which would be allowed by law prior 
to the first invasion, the conclusion remains that the 
intervention was not justified by international law. Moreover, 
both the Commission of Jurists and Quincy Wright argued that 
it constituted an act of aggression contrary to the aims of 
Article 1 of the Charter.
(ii) The Dominican intervention.
Just as the Soviet Union attempted to justify its actions
in Hungary as being within the competence of the Warsaw
Treaty, so did the United States attempt to justify its
actions in the Dominican Republic by invoking the principles
and purposes of the Charter of the Organization of American
States. It will be recalled that the United States intervened
in the Dominican Republic before either consulting or gaining
the sanction of the OAS. The United States then argued that
its having acted unilaterally in the first instance was in
keeping with Article 1 of the OAS Charter, which states that
one of the primary purposes of the Organization is "to
achieve an order of peace and justice, to promote their
solidarity, to strengthen their collaboration, and defend
their sovereignty, their territorial integrity and their 
8 3independence".
In very much the same way as the Soviet Union argued 
that Hungary was being subjected to "imperialist aggression", 
the United States was in essence arguing that the Dominican 
Republic was threatened by international communism, with the
Quincy Wright, 'Intervention 1956', American Journal of 
International Law, Vol. 51, No. 2 (April 1957), p.275.
8 3 Cited in 'The Dominican Situation in the Perspective of 
International Law', Address by Leonard C. Meeker, D.S.B., 
Vol. LITI, No. 1359 (July 12, 1965), p.62.
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loss of its sovereignty, territorial integrity and
independence. Indeed, it claimed the threat was immediate
and required prompt action and that by taking the initiative
"the United States gave the organs of the OAS the essential
time in which to consider the situation in the Dominican
Republic and to determine means of preserving the rights of
that country under the inter-American system". Without the
presence of United States forces none of the subsequent
84actions of the OAS "would have been meaningful".
In presenting the argument, Leonard Meeker, Legal
Adviser to the State Department, invoked the Punta del Este
declaration of January 1962 which had decreed that the
principles of communism were incompatible with the principles
8 5of the Inter-American System. For this reason the foreign 
ministers meeting at Punta del Este had urged
...the member states to take those steps that they 
may consider appropriate for their individual or 
collective self-defence, and to cooperate, as may 
be necessary or desirable, to strengthen their 
capacity to counteract threats or acts of aggression, 
subversion, or other dangers to peace and security 
resulting from the continued intervention in this 
hemisphere of Sino-Soviet powers, in accordance with 
the obligations established in treaties and 
agreements such as the Charter of the Organization 
of American States and the Inter-American Treaty of 
Reciprocal Assistance.86
This was the lynchpin of the United States case for the 
legality of its actions; it argued that it had acted within 
the provisions of both the Charter of the OAS and the Inter- 
American Treaty in the interests of collective self-defence.
However, there are a number of difficulties with this 
justification, all of which support the charge that the 
actions of the United States constituted an illegal
^  Ibid,, pp.62-63.
o r: See Chapter 6, pp.188-89, above. 
^  Cited by Meeker, op.oit.
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intervention in the affairs of the Dominican Republic. In 
the first place, there was the problem of whether or not the 
United States could sustain, as a point of law, the argument 
that its actions were consistent with the Charter of the OAS 
and in particular Articles 15 and 17. Article 15 appears 
to prohibit intervention absolutely but is qualified by 
Article 19 which allows that: "Measures adopted for the
maintenance of peace and security in accordance with existing 
treaties do not constitute a violation of the principles set 
forth in Articles 15 and 17".
The relevant exceptions are laid down by Articles 3 and 
6 of the Rio Treaty. In Article 3 it was laid down that an 
armed attack on one American state was to be considered an 
attack on all, and each one undertook to assist in meeting 
the attack. Article 6 provided that
If the inviolability or the integrity of the 
territory or the sovereignty or political 
independence of any American state should be 
affected by an aggression which is not an armed 
attack or by an extra-continental conflict, or by 
any other fact or situation that might endanger the 
peace of America, the Organ of Consultation shall 
meet immediately in order to agree on the measures 
which must be taken in case of aggression to assist 
the victim of the aggression or, in any case, the 
measures which should be taken for the common 
defense and for the maintenance of the peace and 
security of the Continent.
In other words, the stringent requirements of Articles 
15 and 17 of the Charter of the OAS need not necessarily have 
precluded "legal" action under Article 6 of the Rio Treaty.
8 7 Article 15 reads: No state or group of states has the
right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any reason 
whatever, in the internal or external affairs of any other 
State. The foregoing principle prohibits not only armed 
force but also any other form of interference or attempted 
threat against the personality of the State or against its 
political, economic and cultural elements. Article 17 reads: 
The territory of a state is inviolable, it may not be the 
object, even temporarily, of military occupation or of other 
measures of force taken by another state...on any grounds.
268
The United States could have called an urgent session of the 
Council of the OAS for the purpose of invoking Article 6 of 
the Rio Treaty. It did not and, as has already been shown, 
pleaded the circumstances were too pressing for prior 
consultation. Thus Senator Fulbright argued that advising 
the American States after action had been taken did not 
constitute compliance with either the OAS Charter or the Rio 
Treaty; "nor, indeed would advising them before the fact have 
constituted compliance. Inter-American law requires 
consultation for the purpose of shaping a collective decision. 
Only on the basis of advance consultation and agreement could 
we have undertaken a legal intervention in the Dominican 
Republic".
As to the argument that the United States was acting in
self-defense under Article 3 of the Rio Treaty and Article
51 of the United Nations Charter, Thomas and Thomas assert
that there was an "armed attack". They argue that armed
attack can include "indirect aggression", defined as military
aid to groups which commit armed subversive or terrorist
activities against another state. Thomas and Thomas say that
such "aggression" is a violation of Article 2(4) of the
United Nations Charter in that such actions are taken against
8 9the political independence of the victim state. The 
difficulty with this is that it seeks to apply an 
international legal regime of armed attack and self-defense 
to conflict which retains significantly domestic 
characteristics, and might therefore more properly be dealt 
with in terms of intervention and counter-intervention. In 
the particular case of the Dominican Republic, certainly it 
seemed farfetched to declare that something tantamount to
J.W. Fulbright, The Arrogance of Power (London, Cape,
1967), p.94.
89 A .J. and A.V.W. Thomas, Working Paper, The Dominican 
Crisis 1965, the ninth Hammarskjöld Forum, J. Carey (ed.)
(New York, Oceana Publications, 1967), p.28. Note: Thomas
and Thomas take their definition of indirect aggression from 
McDougal and Feliciano's Law and Minimum Pul lie Order, p.190.
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armed attack had taken place, and Thomas and Thomas seem 
implicitly to recognise this by devoting space to showing 
that there are exceptions to the rule of non-intervention.
In an effort to defend the Dominican intervention,
Thomas and Thomas argue, quite properly, that there are legal
exceptions to the duty of non-intervention. Intervention,
they point out, "can be justified as legal where the
intervening state can show that its action is sanctioned by
some principle of international law that takes precedence
over the right to independence...".'' As one such principle
they examine the notion of intervention for humanitarian
purposes as taking precedent over the rule of non-intervention.
"There is", Friedmann points out, "respectable authority for
the view that the original limited intervention to protect
U.S. citizens from imminent danger in a situation of anarchy
91did not violate international law". Both the Charter of
the United Nations and the Charter of the OAS stress human
rights and the right to life as fundamental. Thus Thomas
and Thomas point out that under certain circumstances "the
preservation of human life must take precedence over the
right of a nation not to have troops landed on its 92territory". But as Friedmann argues, in the case of the
Dominican intervention the scale of United States involvement,
the identification of communist involvement with indirect
foreign aggression, and the prolonged presence of United
States troops all render arguments concerning humanitarian
9 3intervention spurious.
Another argument considered by Thomas and Thomas is that 
for the American states the principle of non-intervention was 
meant to "protect the freedom of a people to govern themselves
Thomas and Thomas, op.cit., p.9.
91 Wolfgang Friedmann, 'U.S. Policy and the Crisis of 
International Law', The American Journal oj' International Law, 
Vol. 59, No. 4 (October 1965), p.867.
92 Thomas and Thomas, op.czt., p.18.
93 Friedmann, op.cit., p.867.
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democratically without outside interference". Once a
communist-controlled government is established in a state
the people of that state can no longer govern themselves
democratically and without outside interference. The scale
of involvement of the United States, therefore, represented
"an attempt to preserve for the Dominican people the right
to choose their own form of government and came within the
94purpose of the rule of non-intervention". But the 
difficulty with this view is first, that the rule of non­
intervention does not say anything about domestic democracy, 
and indeed in the form in which it has been adopted by the 
Organization of American States it stipulates that there 
shall be no intervention, whatever the nature of government 
in the state in question. Second, communism is in any case 
not synonymous with outside interference. The argument that 
it is and the argument that intervention against communism 
upholds the principle of non-intervention are special United 
States doctrines which are not shared by other members of 
the OAS, except in so far as intervention against communism 
can be justified by the Caracus resolution of 1954 and the 
Punte del Este resolution. But neither of these authorised 
unilateral intervention or action without first convening a
meeting of consultation or invoking Article 6 of the Rio 
95Treaty. The United States took neither of these steps 
before it intervened in the Dominican Republic.
The legality of American action in the Dominican 
Republic is then hard to defend in terms of the rules of 
intervention and non-intervention, and it is interesting in 
this regard that Leonard Meeker's presentation of the United 
States' case depended on the conception of law as a social 
process. There were, he said, two ways of looking at the 
matter. On the one hand, the United States might have taken
94 Thomas and Thomas, op,ait., pp.26-27.
95 See R.T. Bohan, 'The Dominican Case: Unilateral
Intervention', The American Journal of International Law, 
Vol. 60, No. 4 (October 1966), p.810.
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"a fundamentalist approach" and adopted the attitude that
the doctrine of non-intervention precluded it from sending
troops into Santo Domingo. "Or we might say that a request
from a Dominican government, if we had chosen to recognize
one, could have served to justify the landing of forces. We
might simply have invoked the Monroe Doctrine". On the other
hand, and this was what Meeker argued for, international law
could be seen not as "abstract imperatives", but rather part
of "man's attempt to create satisfactory and useful human
relationships" - "law and other institutions of society
should be seen as deliberate and hopefully rational efforts
97to order the lives of human communities".
To this Wolfgang Friedmann rejoined that what Meeker 
called a "fundamentalist approach" was, in fact, "one of the 
major foundations both of the traditional system of 
international law and of the U.N. Charter, i.e., the 
territorial and jurisdictional integrity of any state. And 
what he describes as black and white is a distinction between 
legal and illegal actions which is the very cornerstone of
Q Olaw". Meeker's plea for law as rational efforts to order
the lives of human communities was but rhetoric which
"undermines the claim of international law to be regarded as
99a legal system with definite rights and obligations". 
Friedmann concluded by pleading against stretching law to 
fit the imperatives of politics. His argument was that "if 
in the considered judgement of this country's responsible 
policy-makers and of students of international affairs, 
international tensions have become too great to make the 
observance of international law compatible with elementary 
interests of survival, it will be better to acknowledge it, 
rather than to degrade the science and purposes of law by 
special pleading" .
9 6 Meeker, op.cit., p.64.
97 Ibid., p.60.
9 8 Friedmann, op.cit., pp.868-69.
99 Ibid., p.861.
100 Ibid., p.871.
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(iii) The invasion of Czechoslovakia.
It has already been shown that the Soviet Union regarded 
its intervention in Czechoslovakia not as having undermined, 
but on the contrary, as having upheld the sovereignty of 
Czechoslovakia in accordance with the principle of socialist 
internationalism.'^'1' Also that this principle is regarded as 
being above but not in conflict with bourgeois international 
law. But how was it regarded by bourgeois international lav;?
In the United Nations Special Committee on Principles of
International Law, Herbert Reis, the representative of the
United States, gave a point-by-point account of how the
invasion had violated the fundamental principles of the
Charter, which constitute legal obligations. First he gave
an analysis of each Paragraph of Article 2, arguing at each
step that the Soviet Union had acted illegally in terms of 
102the Charter. It is unnecessary to rehearse each of the
points made, but it is worth considering the first.
The Soviet-led invasion and occupation, Reis charged, 
violated the most basic principle of the United Nations - 
that of respect for the sovereignty of a member and its right 
to treatment in law as a sovereign equal of every other 
member - as was laid down in Article 2(1). However, the 
Soviet Union does not accept that sovereignty in this sense 
is applicable to states of the socialist commonwealth, and 
there is no way of reconciling the Soviet interpretation with 
the Charter. It is a matter of there being a fundamental 
difference as to the meaning and implications of the term 
"sovereignty". But in terms of the Charter, the point remains 
that there can be no doubt that the Warsaw Pact forces did 
violate the sovereignty and territorial integrity of 
Czechoslovakia.
101 See Chapter 6, p.177 and pp.247-52 above.
102 Ü.S. B • r Vol. LIX, No. 1529 (October 14, 1968), p.397ff.
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It was argued that the Warsaw Pact powers also violated
Article 8 of the Warsaw Treaty which requires each member to
act with a view to "adhering to the principle of respect for
the independence and sovereignty of the others and non-
103influence in their internal affairs". Once again the
Soviet Union could argue that under the principles of 
socialist internationalism the intervening states did not 
violate Article 8, as they were upholding the sovereignty of 
Czechoslovakia.
Further points made by Reis were first, as with Hungary,
that the invasion accorded with the Soviet Union's own
104definition of and proposals concerning "aggression".
Second, that both Article 51 of the Charter and Article 4
of the Warsaw Treaty state the right of individual and
collective self-defence in the event of an armed attack. But
no attack was made, and indeed the Soviet Union made no claim
"that there was an actual or impending attack by
Czechoslovakia or anyone else against the Soviet Union".
Finally the subject was broached of whether the Socialist
Commonwealth formed a distinct set of relations of concern
only to member states. To this Reis said, "respect and
concern for the Charter is the responsibility of every member
of the United Nations. From a legal point of view, there is
no basis for asserting that the relationships of the Eastern
European states among themselves are the concern of that
105group of states alone".
However, while on these grounds the United States would 
not allow that there was any legal basis for setting 
relationships between the socialist states beyond general
103
104
Ibid., p.399.
See also 'U.N. Legal Committee Discusses the Question of 
Defining Aggression', D.S.B., Vol. LIX, No. 1539 (December 23, 
1968), pp.664-69.
105 D.S.B., Vol. LIX, No. 1529 (October 14, 1968), p.400.
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international law, it had itself asserted similar
privileges for Latin America. To a greater degree than the
United States would admit, the Soviet Union defense for its
actions in Czechoslovakia resembled its own defense for its
actions in the Dominican Republic. Indeed Franck and
Weisband have argued that the resemblance is such that Soviet
and United States doctrine could be interchanged. Both
powers have reached beyond the law as it stands and imposed
political solutions for what they see as good ends. Thus
Wolfgang Friedmann has observed that the defense the United
States gave for its actions in the Dominican Republic came
close to the attempts of Nazi and communist lawyers to
justify intervention in terms of a legal order of the 
107future. With regard to Cuba also, the United States
asserted special inter-American prerogatives.
(iv) The naval quarantine of Cuba.
It has already been stated that a special meeting of
the Organization of American States, convened on October 23,
resolved to take whatever measures were deemed necessary to
prevent Cuba from continuing "to receive...military material
and related supplies which may threaten the peace and
security of the continent and to prevent the missiles in Cuba
with offensive capability from ever becoming an active threat
108to the peace and security of the continent". This, it was
claimed, was in accordance with Articles 6 and 8 of the 
Inter-American Treaty and was resolved after Kennedy had 
announced that a quarantine was to be instituted and after 
Stevenson had begun his address to the Security Council. At
See T.M. Franck and E. Weisband, Word Politics 3 Verbal 
Strategy Among the Superpowers (New York, Oxford University 
Press, 1972), p.97.
107 W. Friedmann, 'United States Policy and the Crisis of 
International Law', American Journal of International Law, 
Vol. 59, No. 4, 1965, p.869.
108 See Chapter 6, p.194 above.
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a later date Mr Stevenson argued that the Soviet missiles 
posed a threat which contravened Article 2, paragraph 4 of
the Charter. Article 39 was also thought to have been
4- 109contravened.
The introduction of Soviet missiles and the consequent 
imposition of the "quarantine" posed two basic questions for 
international law. (1) Was the introduction of Soviet 
missiles lawful? and (2) was the quarantine lawful as the 
United States government claimed, or unlawful?
First, concerning the legality of placing "offensive" 
missiles in Cuba, Professor Quincy Wright argued that 
"customary international law did not consider such 'displays 
of force' illegal so long as they remained on the high seas 
or on the state's own territory: unless there was evidence
of an immediate intention to use them for attack. Such 
displays, however, constitute 'threats of force' and 
consequently would appear forbidden by the U.N. Charter 
unless justifiable as measures of individual or collective 
self-defense" Castro and Khrushchev claimed that the
missiles were for self-defence and Wright argues that a 
reasonable case for their being only defensive could be made.
Whether or not such a case can be made, there is the 
further point of whether there was any obligation 
precluding such weapons. "In principle, a sovereign 
state is free to take, within its territory, measures 
which it deems necessary for its defense, unless some 
obligation of international law or treaty forbids, and 
other states are free to assist it in such defense".
Article 39 reads: The Security Council shall determine
the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, 
or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or 
decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with 
Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international 
peace and security.
Quincy Wright, 'The Cuban Quarantine', American Journal 
of International Law, Vol. 57, No. 3 (July 1963), p.549.
Ill Ibid. , p.550.
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As to the secrecy with which the weapons were installed,
Wright considered there was "no rule of international law
that requires publicity for collective defense measures,
though such a rule may be desirable and indeed necessary if
112the installations are to have a deterrent influence".
Neither was it a matter of the Monroe Doctrine being
flouted, for it had never imposed international legal
obligations. "Furthermore, as a declaration of United States
intention to defend the Americas by unilateral action, the
Monroe Doctrine has, to some extent, been superseded by
inter-American agreements, especially those of Rio and
113Bogota, and by the United Nations Charter". Thus, taking
the above and other arguments into account, Professor Wright 
summed up the charge the Soviet Union had violated Article 
2(4) by saying that while it could have been argued "that 
Castro violated obligations under inter-American agreements 
and resolutions by his close relations with the Communist 
Powers... such intentions or obligations of Castro could 
not impose obligations on the Soviet Union. It is difficult, 
therefore, to support the allegation that the Soviet Union 
violated international obligations in sending and installing 
missiles in Cuba". 4
Secondly, was the quarantine legal? The case argued by 
the United States Government was put, among other people, by 
Leonard Meeker, in the American Journal of International Law. 
Meeker first referred to the OAS resolution adopted on 
October 23 in accord, he said, with Articles 6 and 8 of the 
Rio Treaty. It was claimed therefore, that the proclamation 
of quarantine was "based on the action of the OAS under the 
Rio Treaty" and so was sanctioned by and consistent with the 
principles and purposes of the OAS. There are two main
112 Ibid,, p.551.
113 Ibid,, p.552.
^ 4 Ibid,, p.553.
115 Leonard C. Meeker, 'Defensive Quarantine and the Law',
American Journal of International Law, Vol. 57, No. 3 (July 
1963) , p.517.
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objections to this argument concerning the authority of the 
Organization of American States. The first is that the 
resolution of October 23 was passed after the President had 
declared the intention of unilateral action, though the day 
before the quarantine was to go into effect. The 
Consultative Organ of the OAS was, in other words, presented 
with a fait accompli. But the more important point about 
the resolution is, according to Professor Wright, that it 
"could not...in law affect the rights of the Soviet Union, 
against which the quarantine was primarily directed. A 
state's rights, under international law, cannot be reduced
I I rby a treaty to which it is not a party".
117The second point concerning the authority of the OAS 
stems from the question of whether or not the quarantine 
constituted "enforcement action" which, under the United 
Nations Charter, cannot be instituted by a regional 
organization such as the OAS without prior consent of the 
Security Council. Meeker, arguing the United States case, 
first referred to Article 53(1). On the one hand it seems 
to prohibit any independent action, in that it states "no 
enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements 
or by regional agencies without the authorization of the 
Security Council". On the other it provides, as an 
exception, for "regional arrangements directed against renewal 
of aggressive policy on the part of any such state, until such 
time as the Organization may, on request of the Governments 
concerned, be charged with the responsibility for preventing
Wright, op.cit., p.558.
117 A revealing point was that Robert Kennedy at first thought that the OAS action was political - not legal. 
This comment of Robert Kennedy's at the time contrasts with 
his retrospective evaluation in Thirteen Days. There he 
said, "It was the vote of the Organization of American States 
that gave a legal basis for the quarantine.... It...changed 
our position from that of an outlaw acting in violation of 
international law into a country acting in accordance with 
twenty allies legally protecting their position". See Abram 
Chayes, The Cuban Missile Crisis (London, Oxford University 
Press, 1974), pp.16-17.
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further aggression by such a state". The official argument
was that the action taken did amount to enforcement and hence
did not require prior authorisation. Meeker cited Articles
39, 40, 41 and 42 and concluded that the phrase "enforcement
action", as it appears in Article 53(1), "should not be taken
to comprehend action of a regional organization, which is
118only recommendatory to members of the organization".
Against this Professor Wright argued that the quarantine
was "enforcement action" and that Article 53(1) was
applicable to the OAS resolution. That it was applicable was
"supported by the fact that Article 51 of the Charter, which
permits 'collective self-defense' without prior Security
Council approval, was adopted at San Francisco on behalf of
the American States because it was thought that Article 53
...would prevent forcible, autonomous measures by these
states". Wright argues for the view that the United States
could "justify the quarantine against Cuba by the OAS
resolution, but it certainly [could not] justify its action
119against the Soviet Union by that resolution".
The charge that the introduction of "offensive missiles"
contravened Article 2(4) has already been questioned; but was
the quarantine a contravention? Whereas Meeker argues that
it was not "because it was a measure adopted by a regional
organization in conformity with the provisions of Chapter VII
120of the Charter", Wright argues that it was not only a non­
peaceful means forbidden by Article 2(3), but also a "threat 
of force" forbidden by Article 2(4), unless it came within 
one of various exceptions, the main one being that it was
permitted by Articles 6 and 8 of the Rio Treaty which, as
121has already been argued, it was not.
118 Meeker, op.cit., p.521.
119 Wright, op.cit., p.559.
120 Meeker, op.cit. , pp.532-34.
121 Wright, op.cit., p.557. Note; Though it was never used
officially, another argument debated in connection with the 
quarantine was that both it and the OAS resolution were 
measures in aid of "individual or collective self-defense" as 
provided for by Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. See 
Chayes, op.cit., p.65, and Quincy Wright, op.cit.
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Finally it is worth mentioning that, more than a month 
before the Cuban missile crisis occurred, a memorandum 
concerning the legality of possible courses of action against 
the use of Cuba as a missile base by the Soviet Union was 
drafted by the Office of Legal Council and then discussed in 
the White House. According to Norbert Schlei, author of the 
memorandum
The President was critical of our draft [statement] 
because it mentioned the Monroe Doctrine. 'The 
Monroe Doctrine', he snapped at me, 'What the hell 
is that?'... it was clear that whatever it was or 
meant, he didn't want to mention it in his statement.122
Hence Kennedy "buried the Doctrine as a basis for the claim
of a special hemispheric legal regime". Abram Chayes
commented that "[t]he President's instinct was sound.
Although the idea of a special regime of law for the Western
Hemisphere, based on the Monroe Doctrine, has sometimes been
advanced by United States legal scholars...it has not been
embraced by any other Western Hemisphere publicist. Whatever
substance there may once have been to the United States claim
of a special prerogative in the hemisphere can hardly have
survived the multilateral treaties concluded after the Second
123World War to govern hemispheric relations". Chayes'
argument is refreshing but it cuts against the grain of 
official United States thinking in this matter. Since World 
War II and specially since Guatemala, the assertion of 
special hemispheric rights against communism has underlain 
United States policy and practice toward Latin America.
In summary, in each of the four cases just discussed 
spokesmen for the influencing powers attempted to show that 
the actions taken were legal. But for each case there is a 
substantial body of legal opinion that the actions were not
Letter from Norbert A, Schlei to Abram Chayes, see 
Appendix 1, Chayes, op,oil., p.133.
123 Ibid,, p .23.
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legal and this, at any rate in terms of "law as rules", seems 
to be the more convincing case. That the influencing power 
attempted in each case to establish that its actions were 
legal suggests that the actions were not taken with disregard 
for law. When the government of an influencing power 
contemplates an action such as intervention, it may be 
constrained in its choices by legal considerations and is in 
any case mindful of the need for a legal justification of 
its actions to both a domestic and variety of international 
audience. It will generally choose a course of action which 
most closely approximates to the requirements of both legal 
and political acceptability, but when the legality of the 
action taken is disputable, the government concerned will 
attempt to show that it considers both itself and other 
states to be bound by the relevant rule or rules of law. In 
short, it cannot be concluded that because there is serious 
doubt as to the legality of the actions influencing powers 
have taken that these actions were taken without any regard 
to the requirements of law.
Finally, it was pointed out above that the legality or 
illegality of the actions of influencing powers is not an 
argument about the legality of spheres of influence as such. 
It remains then to finish by returning to the debate about 
the nature of international law with which we began, and 
reach some conclusion about the place of spheres of influence 
in international law.
IV.
The Place of Spheres of Influence in International Law.
For spheres of influence to gain acceptance in 
international law there would need to be recognition of the 
right of influencing powers to act as influencing powers 
per se. One way in which such recognition could be secured 
would be through a formal agreement in which influencing 
powers conceded to each other explicit rights to spheres of
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influence. This, however, would not be accepted either by 
world opinion or by the influenced states concerned and 
these are reasons for why there is tacit understanding about 
spheres of influence rather than open agreement. But in the 
absence of an open agreement which would confer rights upon 
influencing powers, there is the problem of how the actions 
influencing powers take should be regarded from a legal 
point of view. The conclusion in the preceding section that 
they are illegal leads to the view that spheres of influence 
have no place in international law, but this is only one of 
a number of possible viewpoints. How the precedents created 
by the actions of influencing powers are regarded depends 
very much upon the conception of lav; with which they are 
approached.
First, the traditional or "law as rules" model would 
appear to be incompatible with the idea of recognising legal 
rights for influencing powers. The actions influencing powers 
have taken have, as has been shown, cut across the accepted 
principles of law embodied in instruments such as the Charter 
of the United Nations. This is a problem for the 
traditionalist confined in his approach to the practices of 
influencing powers by the doctrine of opinio juris, which 
admits as "legal" only practices required by or consistent 
with prevailing law. To recognise the right of influencing 
powers to exercise supervisory intervention in their 
respective spheres of influence would require a revision of 
the existing rules of international law, or at least more 
provision for exceptions to these rules. Thus traditionalists 
might argue that these exceptions would blur the distinction 
between law and politics and eventually undermine the distinct 
and imperative quality of law. But the crucial point here is 
that it is arguable that a body of state practice is being 
built up in relation to spheres of influence, which deserves 
treatment, in the positivist tradition as evidence of an 
emerging rule or rules. It might be impossible in virtue of
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its apparent contradiction of the Charter to reconcile this 
practice with opinio juris, but the defenders of spheres of 
influence have at least a case based on practice to be 
answered.
At the other end of the continuum of different 
conceptions, the idea of law as a social process is much 
more compatible with acceptance of the legality of the 
actions of influencing powers, having no inconvenient doctrine 
such as opinio juris to stand in the way of its prescriptions.
A jurisprudence which includes the whole spectrum of 
authoritative decisions, which is problem-oriented and which 
distils the prevailing norms of international society from 
the practice of states, has direct application to spheres of 
influence. It can be argued, and this will be examined in 
the next chapter, that the patterns of control exercised by 
influencing powers, together with mutual acquiescence in 
such control, contributes to international order. That being 
the case, recognition of the right to exercise control could 
be seen as a good policy and as one which jurists should 
promote. Recognition of the right to exercise such control 
would amount to formalising the tacit understanding 
influencing powers already have that each will acquiesce in 
the actions of the other. With regard to this it was shown 
in an earlier section that social process theorists regard 
tacit understanding as a source of law. This implies 
acceptance of the right of influencing powers to uphold what 
they perceive as order in their respective spheres and in 
this way spheres of influence are compatible with international 
law conceived of as a social process.
An initial point about bringing tacit understanding 
within the compass of law is that the wisdom of so doing is 
questionable. As long as the "rights" of influencing powers 
are de facto and subject to adverse world opinion, there is 
perhaps a greater likelihood of the influencing powers being 
circumspect about exercising control. De jure rights would 
constitute a direct challenge to the sovereignty of influenced
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states, Thus it might be objected that because the 
sovereignty of lesser powers is regarded as a good thing and 
as something which ought to be upheld on grounds of justice, 
anything which further detracts from it, such as de jure 
spheres of influence, should not be encouraged. But it is 
in any case difficult to specify when a de facto right 
becomes a de jure right; the former may become the latter 
without any conscious design. It should be said then of 
this objection to bestowing the mantle of law upon the actions 
of influencing powers, that it might only hasten what would 
eventually happen anyway.
It was noticed above that an objection to accommodating
the patterns of control associated with spheres of influence
with international law is that this would conflate law with
politics. This objection persists in any attempt to bestow
legality upon spheres of influence. Professor Richard Falk is
perhaps the only international lawyer recently to have been
concerned with the relationship between spheres of influence
and international law. Falk presents spheres of influence as
belonging to one of what he identifies as "the five principle
124dimensions of the international legal order".
International legal order is defined by him as "an aggregate
conception embodying those structures and processes by which
authority is created, applied, and transformed in
125international society". It is an order which embraces
more than what is in traditional terms "of the law".
The decentralized character of the present system 
of international legal order complicates the task 
of specifying the prevailing profile of authority.
It is difficult, for instance, to deal realistically
R.A. Falk, 'The Interplay of Westphalia and Charter 
Conceptions of International Legal Order', in R.A. Falk and 
C.E. Black (eds.), The Future of the International Legal 
Order, Vol. I (New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1969), 
p.69. The five dimensions are: the Westphalia Conception,
the Charter Conception, Geopolitical Conceptions (spheres of 
influence, deterrence, etc.), Rules of the Game, and 
Decentralized Modes of Implementation.
125x Ibid. c p.33,
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with 'spheres of influence' that are tacitly and 
reciprocally acknowledged by principle sovereign 
states as creating special prerogatives about the 
exercise of national power. For instance, the role 
of the United States in Latin America or the role 
of the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe are critical 
aspects of the constituted authority system that 
cannot be explained in terms of formal norms or even 
by reference to formal processes of decision. To 
exclude these patterns of control from the 
conception of international legal order tends to 
produce an artificially formalistic and legalistic 
conception, one that over-clarifies the distinction 
between the realm of law and the realm of politics 
in international affairs. To assimilate de facto 
regimes of control into a conception of legal order, 
however, would endanger a confusion of law and power 
such that it would no longer be meaningful to 
distinguish the standards of international law from 
the patterns of international politics. We seek 
here an intermediate position, one that maintains 
the distinctiveness of legal order while managing 
to be responsive to the extra-legal setting of 
politics, history, and morality. ^-26
The patterns of control associated with spheres of 
influence are indeed part of "international order"; but are 
they or should they be part of the "international legal 
order"? Professor Falk stands at the blurred frontiers 
between law and politics and the question raised by him is 
that of what the distinction is between order and legal 
order. At present what is tacitly understood about spheres 
of influence may be thought of as rules of the game which 
regulate relations between the influencing powers. What 
Falk has done is raise the problem of whether or not these 
rules of the game, which reflect actual practices, should be 
part of international law.
To begin with, what reason is there for incorporating 
spheres of influence into international law and for 
dignifying rules of the game pertaining to them with the
Ibid,, p.34. See also R.A. Falk, 
Order Construct', in J.N. Rosenau, V. 
(eds.), The Analysis of International 
Free Press, 1972).
'Zone II as a World 
Davis and M.A. East 
Politics (New York,
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mantle of law? It has already been argued that a compelling 
reason for acquiescence in spheres of influence is the 
avoidance of nuclear war. Spheres of influence serve the 
avoidance of nuclear war by avoiding "overlapping pretensions 
of authority and commitment on the part of principle rival1?7states". “ This goal might be subserved by openly 
acknowledging as "legitimate" the pattern of control which 
the influencing powers (Zone I actors) exert over the 
influenced states (Zone II actors) in their respective spheres 
of influence. These patterns of control, in the form of 
supervisory intervention, are mutually accepted by the 
influencing powers and tacit understanding as to spheres of 
influence is such that each influencing power implicitly 
accepts the control exercised by the other as legitimate.
Falk argues for having the legitimacy of these patterns of 
control made explicit rather than tacit. In support of this 
view, he argues that: "One cost of resting world order
partially upon patterns of control that cannot be 
acknowledged by their own creators is to cast the entire 
enterprise of law and order in world affairs into cynical
128disrepute, except for marginal issues of world security".
If the rules implicit in tacit understanding as to spheres 
of influence were made explicit, spheres of influence might 
no longer be considered a disreputable means of achieving 
order, if indeed they do achieve order. But more importantly 
here, Falk's argument is in the positivist tradition that law 
should take account of state practice rather than set rules 
which are observed in the breach against it.
One objection to this is that acknowledging spheres of 
influence might prematurely sacrifice too much at the altar 
of state practice. It may be that the influencing powers do 
not or cannot continue the practices in which they have in 
the past engaged and that to acknowledge these practices
R.A. Falk, 'Zone II as a World Order Construct', op.ait.,
p.188.
128 Ibid.., p . 192 .
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would perpetuate and worsen their effects. Influenced states
in the Soviet and United States spheres of influence are not
uniformly repressed and acceptance of the practices of
influencing powers might consign them to a destiny from
which they could otherwise have been spared. Another
objection to the acknowledgement of spheres of influence is
that it is not inevitable that influencing powers should
intervene in the states they influence. Franck and Weisband
have argued that the United States might set an example to
the Soviet Union by reaffirming her commitment to and then
adhering herself to the principles of national sovereignty
129and territorial inviolability. By this means a world of
non-intervening states in which the problems associated with 
spheres of influence did not arise might be recreated.
These objections to acknowledging spheres of influence 
do not diminish the problem of how the pattern of "illegal" 
intervention associated with spheres of influence should be 
regarded from a legal point of view. Both the Soviet Union 
and the United States have built up a body of practice which 
implies norms as to spheres of influence and these norms do 
not accord with prevailing international law. The Soviet 
doctrine of "socialist internationalism" conflicts with the 
traditional conception of law as do United States arguments 
for hemispheric jurisdiction. It is interesting that in 
other ways the Soviet conception is positivist but that the 
doctrine of "socialist internationalism" goes beyond 
positivism and is in many ways like the notion of law as a 
social process, in that it directly serves policy goals. In 
short, as matters stand there are practices of influencing 
powers and in virtue of the conflict between the different 
conceptions of law there is no agreement as to how they 
, should be regarded. The question of how they should be
See T.M. Franck and E. Weisband, Word Politics, Verbal 
Strategy Among the Superpowers (New York, Oxford University 
Press, 1972), especially Chapter 8.
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regarded inevitably leads us back to the debate about the 
nature of international law and to the shadowy frontier 
between law and politics.
In terms of the two conceptions of law with which we 
started, Professor Falk's aim of maintaining the 
distinctiveness of legal order while managing to be 
responsive to extra-legal factors is germane. The difficulty 
with the conception of law as rules is that it leads too far 
in the direction of saying that anything which is not in, for 
instance, the Charter of the United Nations, is not law.
This sets law and politics too far apart and takes insufficient 
account of the practices which have built up and sets rules 
which are observed in the breach against norms which are 
observed. On the other hand, the idea of law as a social 
process goes too far in giving purchase to the assumption that 
what is orderly should be bestowed ipso facto with the mantle 
of law„ This concedes too much to politics in that it allows 
too great a scope for ideological interpretations of order.
Thus although it may result in further blurring the already 
blurred distinction between law and politics, the aim of 
plotting a course between the two conceptions commends itself.
* * * *
CHAPTER EIGHT
INTERNATIONAL ORDER AND SPHERES OF INFLUENCE
The task of this final chapter is to examine and to 
reach some conclusion about the relationship between spheres 
of influence and international order. There are three 
aspects of this relationship which need to be taken into 
account. (i) How spheres of influence contribute to order 
in general, (ii) whether spheres of influence contribute to 
order in relations between influencing powers, and (iii) 
whether there is order in the relations between states within 
a sphere of influence and between such states and the power 
that influences them. At the same time it must be asked of 
each of these whether, even if spheres of influence have 
contributed to order, there are reasons for thinking they 
might in future lead to disorder. But what in any case is 
international order? By way of establishing a focus for the 
remainder of the chapter the first part examines the notion 
of order. The second part goes into the three aspects of 
the relationship mentioned between spheres of influence and 
international order, while the third part discusses the place 
of spheres of influence in future developments of the states 
system and ends with a few words concerning the idea of a 
system without states. The fourth and final part brings the 
conclusions of the chapter together and these bear upon the 
thesis as a whole.
I.
The Notion of Order.
In ordinary language the term "order" may be used to 
refer to the existing condition of things or to the 
disposition of a number of separate but related objects.^ A 
room for example, in which the contents have been neatly 
placed rather than scattered might be said to display "order".
Oxford English Dictionary. The discussion of order in this 
section and the definition adopted owe much to both Hedley 
Bull and John Vincent, though neither may agree with what is 
said here.
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At the same time as it describes the disposition of the 
contents of the room, the term would normally be thought of 
as implying some value in things being as they are rather 
than merely scattered. To say something displays order or 
is orderly, usually though not alv/ays, means that it is to 
be preferred to disorder in the same thing. However, what 
is important is not merely a neat arrangement of separate 
objects in contrast to untidyness, but rather the disposition 
of separate but related objects, and related in such a way as 
to complement each other.
The ignition system of a motor car, for instance, is 
composed of a number of separate but related parts. If the 
spark plug leads are arranged in the wrong order they do not 
complement each other as they should and the motor functions 
badly if at all. Thus the term "order” in the sense of 
referring to separate but related objects, refers to the 
condition in which everything is in its proper place and 
performs its proper function. A condition generally 
preferred to one in which things either are not actually or 
are not considered to be in their proper place or performing 
their proper function. But proper for what? For what 
purpose is a place or function proper?
A room in which everything is considered to be in its 
proper place and fulfilling its proper function may have been 
arranged as it is to present, to the best advantage, various 
objects of art housed in it. Objects which might be obscured 
from view by a different arrangement of the book shelves. In 
such a case the arrangement of the room may be said to serve 
the purpose of its owner. The owner's actions in arranging 
the room as he has, and which result in one sort of order 
rather than another, are committed with some purpose in mind. 
Whatever order results is specific to the purpose which has 
brought it into being. Another purpose may result in another 
order.
The idea of order being the condition in which 
everything is in its proper place and performs its proper 
function with respect to some purpose or other, is central
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to the idea of order in social life. Order in social life
may be taken to refer to some discernible pattern or
principle, in the way individuals or groups conduct their
relations, "that produces a particular result or facilitates
2the achievement of a particular purpose". But unlike the
purpose of a person in arranging a room, when defining order
in social life, we are not interested in the purpose or
preferences of this or that group, of one society or another.
For what suits one group or society will not suit another.
With regard to social life, what is required is a definition
of order which reflects not this or that set of preferences,
but which holds for all forms of social life. That is to say,
order defined as "a pattern or structure of human
relationships that sustains... the primary or elementary goals
of social coexistence; goals that are common to social life
3at all times and in all places". Such goals will be ones 
which might be called "the minimum conditions for 
coexistence".
What are the elementary goals of social coexistence?
What conditions have to be fulfilled for there to be some 
degree of order in social life?
In connection with natural law H.L.A. Hart argued that 
just as human life itself, in the sense of physiological 
survival, rests on a few fundamental needs which are 
independent of human prescriptions, so social life rests on5a few fundamental truisms. It is a contingent fact, writes 
Hart, that "most men most of the time wish to continue 
existence.... For it is not merely that an overwhelming 
majority of men wish to live, even at the cost of hideous 
misery, but that this is reflected in whole structures of
2 Hedley Bull, 'Order vs. Justice in International Society', 
Political Studies, Vol. XIX, No. 3 (September 1971), pp.269-70.
3 Ibid., p.270.
4 See S. Hoffmann (ed.), Conditions of World Order (Boston, 
Houghton-Mifflin, 1968), p.2.
5 H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law (Oxford, Clarendon, 1970), 
pp.187-95. All following quotes from and references to Hart 
are from these pages which are summarised in this and the 
next paragraph.
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thought and language, in terms of which we describe the world 
and each other". Given this there are certain truisms which, 
as long as they hold good, show "there are certain rules of 
conduct which any social organization must contain if it is 
to be viable".
First, there must be some restriction on the use of 
violence in killing or inflicting bodily harm. Secondly, 
though men differ in physical strength, agility and 
intellectual capacity, they are none the less approximately 
equal. This makes necessary a system of mutual forebearance 
and compromise to prevent a constant struggle of all against 
all. Third, such mutual forebearance is made both possible 
and necessary by man's limited altruism. Were all men angels 
there would be no need for rules and were all men devils, 
rules would be impossible. As they are neither but something 
in between, rules are both needed and generally observed. 
Fourth, the fact that resources are limited makes necessary 
"some minimal form of the institution of property (though not 
necessarily individual property)", if basic necessities are 
to be won from nature. Finally, man's limited understanding 
and strength of will means that some men attempt to serve 
their own immediate interests at the expense of the general 
interest. Consequently sanctions are required as a guarantee 
that those who would voluntarily obey the rules respecting 
persons, property and promises shall not be sacrificed to 
those who would not.
For our purposes three requirements may be singled out 
as being necessary if not sufficient for a minimum of order 
in social life. In the first place there needs to be some 
restriction placed upon the use of violence. Second, there 
must be confidence among members of a society, both that 
promises will be kept and that certain expectations may be 
relied upon. Third, there must be some means of securing 
property, whether public or private, against theft, 
destruction or forcible annexation. Of these three 
elementary goals of social coexistence, none is absolute in 
the sense that each must be perfectly observed all the time 
before it is possible to say that order prevails in society.
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It may perhaps be objected that these goals of social 
life are not contingent facts but merely a way of defining 
order so as to defend the status quo. Against this it may 
be argued that if the obtaining of these goals is a 
prerequisite for the sustenance of social life at all times 
and in all places, then they are independent both of the 
degree of justice obtaining in a society and its form of 
government. Indeed, to say justice and order were inseparable 
would be tantamount to denying the idea of an unjust yet 
orderly society. However, there are societies which are both 
unjust and orderly. This is precisely why some would reject 
a definition of order which is compatible with injustice.
But to conflate justice and order on that account would be at 
least confused and perhaps intellectually dishonest. To say 
there is order in a society does not amount to saying ipso 
facto that it is a just society. In some important cases the 
requirements of order clash with justice, but more will be 
said of this later.
Having now defined order in social life as a pattern or 
structure of human relations that sustains the elementary 
goals of social coexistence and identified these goals; 
international order may be defined as a pattern or structure 
of human relations such as to sustain the elementary goals of 
social coexistence among states. But what are the goals of 
social coexistence among states? In international relations 
the principle of state sovereignty can be said to serve the 
purpose of stabilising possession, just as rules of property 
do within the state. That being the case, international 
order should be conceived of in terms of rules requiring 
states to limit the violence they bring to bear on one 
another, to have regard for promises and stable expectations 
and to respect one another's sovereignty. The imperatives of 
each of these requirements means that for states to achieve 
international order, "they must be able to arrive at 
guidelines or signposts that show them how they must behave 
if they are to advance...common interests: that is to say
they must articulate norms or rules and agree upon them".
6 Bull, op.cit., p.271.
293
It is with some of these norms and guidelines that we have 
been concerned when writing about tacit understanding as to 
spheres of influence.
Guidelines for behaviour are related to predictability,
in terms of which international order has sometimes been
defined. "Order", wrote Quincy Wright, "implies a measure of
predictability of cultural, social, economic and political
relations making it possible for members of a society to plan
7their futures". The importance of predictability may be 
discerned in what is mutually understood about spheres of 
influence. Tacit understandings embody the guidelines by 
which Powers form their expectations or predict the 
consequences of actions contemplated. But as Hedley Bull has 
pointed out, "order is not the same as predictability for 
there are patterns or regularities of international behaviour, 
of which we may be aware and from which we may form 
expectations about the future, which are in fact patterns of 
disorder and anarchy: the breakdown of restraints on
international violence, the disregard of established 
undertakings and the infringement of sovereign jurisdictiongmay occur in a regular and predictable way...". Thus while 
order has an element of predictability and while the two are 
related they are not the same and cannot be identified, the 
one with the other.
In international society the goals of social 
coexistence are the responsibility of individual states.
States are responsible for both order within themselves and 
in their relations with one another. International order 
depends upon whether states act so as to sustain the goals 
of social life in their relations with each other: that is 
to say, whether they do limit the resort to violence, keep 
promises and not upset expectations, and respect each other's
Quincy Wright, The Role of International Law in the 
Elimination of War (Manchester, Manchester University Press, 
1961), p.7.
8 Bull, op.cit., p.272.
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sovereignty (the last being, as we have said, analogous to 
the stability of possession of property within a state).
The question arises as to which of the goals enumerated has 
the most important place in relations between states with 
regard to order. There are compelling reasons for believing - 
this will be argued more fully below - that it is respect for 
state sovereignty.
A corollary to state sovereignty is the principle of 
non-intervention, which John Vincent has shown to be an 
elementary rule of orderly international relations. "So long 
as international society is primarily composed of sovereign 
states, observance of a general rule of non-intervention can 
be regarded as a minimum condition for their orderly 
coexistence". In other words respect for sovereignty is 
central. With regard to the goals of social coexistence this 
leads Vincent to assert that
[i]f the sovereign state is the principal guarantor 
of the values of the security of life, the sanctity 
of contracts, and the stability of possession, and 
if the analogy between sovereignty and property is 
at all accurate, it can be said that of the three 
goals of order, it is the stability of possession 
which is fundamental to international life, prior 
in that environment to the other two.9
It will be argued here that for the influencing powers, 
spheres of influence serve the principle of stable possession 
and are in a sense a manifestation of it. But it is not a 
stable possession based squarely on the principle of state 
sovereignty, for the relationship between influencing powers 
and the states they influence has the latter subjected to 
prior hegemonic rights of the former, which are clearly 
asserted, as we have seen, in periodic bloc interventions. 
However, these have not eclipsed the principle of state 
sovereignty as a "day to day" norm of intra-bloc order. The 
Polish government retains sovereignty in Poland and the 
government of the Dominican Republic retains sovereignty in
R.J. Vincent, Non-intervention and International Order (New 
Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1974), p.332.
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the Dominican Republic. Thus, in the relationship between 
influencing powers and the states they influence, there can 
be said to be stable possession in two senses, the one being 
superimposed on the other. There is day to day sovereignty 
overlain by a prior bloc norm by which possession of the 
influenced states is conditional on fealty paid to the 
influencing power. By these means the influencing power 
marks out a much greater area of control than is demarcated 
by its own territorial boundaries, and the perimeter of this 
area is signposted by terms such as the "frontiers of 
communism" or "the inter-American system" of which more will 
be said presently.
II.
Do Spheres of Influence Contribute to International Order?
(i) Spheres of influence and international order 
in general.
It can be said that such order as there is in the 
contemporary world is in large part based on the element of 
order that exists in the relations of the super-powers, and 
that acquiescence in each other's sphere of influence is in 
turn a pillar on which this order rests. It is for this 
reason that the focus of this thesis has been relations 
between the United States and the Soviet Union. But spheres 
of influence have a place in the politics of states which 
extends beyond this contemporary focus. The defence of spheres 
of influence in general, as principles of order, is that they 
diminish the prospect of conflict in the international system 
partly by marking out areas of the world in which the writ of 
one great power is to run, and thus remove that area from 
external challenge, and partly by asserting a hierarchical 
relationship which maintains order within the bloc. And to 
the extent that the value of order is one that profits all 
members of international society, then their interest in it 
is one that is advanced by these functions of spheres of 
influence. Of either of these modes of maintaining order it 
can be said that they apply to one sphere of influence or to
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several, to this system of states or any system of states.
We shall come later to the first of these questions and 
examine the tacit understanding which can be said to be 
special to order in the contemporary international system, 
but will deal first with the second of them, the question of 
order within a sphere of influence.
(ii) Influenced states and the power which influences 
them.
One way in which spheres of influence may be said to 
contribute to order is with respect to relations between 
influenced states in the same sphere of influence. In 
contemporary international politics states within both the 
Soviet and American spheres of influence have, by and large, 
not resorted to force against each other during the past 
thirty years. Disputes between them have been muted and have 
not become international problems with implications beyond 
the immediate region in which they occur. For instance, 
disputes between the states of eastern Europe, of the sort 
which were very much in evidence before World War II, no 
longer reach the surface of conscious political activity.
It is not that there are no longer any internal conflicts in 
these states or any rivalries between them, but that the 
presence of the influencing power keeps them in check. To a 
certain extent the order which obtains in relations between 
influenced states, in the same sphere of influence, is the 
result of each one of them acting in accord with what they 
perceive the influencing power to require. By so doing they 
maintain order between both themselves and the influencing 
power.
The regard shown by influenced states for what they 
perceive to be the requirements of the influencing power 
amounts to the recognition of hierarchy. But the recognition 
of this hierarchy is the result of it being demonstrated from 
time to time. The attempt at the Bay of Pigs and the 
interventions in Guatemala, Hungary, the Dominican Republic 
and Czechoslovakia each represent action taken to maintain 
hegemony. Actions such as these, by which means an
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influencing power polices its sphere of influence, induce 
recognition of the hierarchy within the sphere. Thus order 
within a sphere of influence is a condition which is produced 
partly by the influencing power actively policing its sphere 
and partly by passive recognition on the part of the 
influenced states of the hierarchical relationship.
Intervention, however, is merely the most obvious 
assertion of hierarchy. So far we have been treating order 
as a political arrangement of stable possession maintained by 
periodic intervention to remind errant states of the 
existence of a hierarchy. It may also be an economic 
arrangement and indeed neo-Marxist literature would cast 
spheres of influence entirely in this form. For neo- 
Marxists the relationship between influencer and influenced 
is one properly explained only in terms of economic dependence 
and it is important to consider this as a form of control.
Also it is by this route that we shall arrive at the question 
of whether or not spheres of influence are just.
Theories of "dependence" vary but in general the term 
refers to the constraints imposed upon the internal 
development of less developed countries by the nature of 
their relationship with the dominant rich industrial states 
of the international system. The latter are referred to 
variously as metropolitan powers, dominant actors or as the 
Centre, while the former are dependent actors or the Periphery. 
Theories of dependence postulate a dynamic system of unequal 
exchange, that is to say, a pattern of asymmetric relationships 
such that they consistently favour the Centre to the 
disadvantage of the Periphery, or, at least favour one 
relatively more than the other. The result is economic 
development for the Centre and economic underdevelopment for 
the Periphery with an ever widening gap between the two. What
See for instance, H. Magdoff, The Age of Imperialism, The 
Economics of U.S. Foreign Policy (New York, Modern Reader 
Paperbacks, 1969), passim.
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is more the asymmetry of the relationship between Centre and 
Periphery is reproduced within the Periphery itself and this 
is also part of the structure of dependence. "The resulting 
picture is rather like an octopus, the head being the rich 
metropolis and the tentacles representing the ability of the 
metropolis to suck surplus out of the poor nations. Each 
tentacle is known as a 'sphere of influence'".^
In the contemporary international system, dependence is
institutionalised through a diverse network of private and
governmental economic, political, military and cultural
organizations. Through these channels dependence is
established and maintained with aid, trade and investment.
Dependence theorists argue that whatever the motive behind
aid policies, the net effect has usually been to safeguard
the dominant economic positions occupied before decolonization
or established after independence. Severe limitations on the
manner in which aid grants or loans are to be used,
restrictions on the types of projects that are to be promoted,
inbuilt requirements of cooperation with foreign experts and
foreign institutions, and crippling debts resulting from
interest rates and loan repayments all serve to tie the
Periphery to the Centre and to ensure that it serves the
12interests of the Centre.
A similar pattern obtains in trade relations and in 
foreign investment. Trade relations are such that the Centre 
takes raw materials from the Periphery and returns finished 
goods. Through its control of the Periphery the Centre
R. Jenkins, Exploitation, The World Power Structure and 
Inequality of nations (London, Paladin, 1971), p.84. On 
dependence generally see Magdoff, op.cit.j J. Galtung, 'A 
Structural Theory of Imperialism', Journal of Peace Research,
3 (1971); A.G. Frank, Capitalism and Underdevelopment
(Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1971); P. Baran and P.M. Sweezy, 
Monopoly Capital (Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1968), and S. Amin, 
Accumulation on a World Scale (New York, Monthly Review Press, 
1974), 2 volumes.
] 2 On aid see T. Hayter, Aid as Imperialism (Harmondsworth, 
Penguin, 1971), passim.
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maintains a greater capacity to produce goods and services
that involve much higher levels of processing and
specialisation and so the Periphery does not develop the
13infra-structure necessary for relative independence. As 
to foreign investment, it is argued that the giant 
corporations assisted by such organizations as the 
International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, have promoted 
in underdeveloped countries a neo-capitalist model of 
development which has retarded the introduction of radical 
land reform and only promoted the economic growth of 
privileged groups (the centre within the Periphery) who, in 
most cases, have acted as intermediaries for the entry of 
foreign capital. Foreign investment has thus tended to 
distort the developing economy by subordinating it to the 
needs of the capitalist system and by creating a new local 
class of industrialists, managers and bureaucrats whose 
technocratic interests have had little relationship to notions 
of distributive justice or self-reliant development.
Most of the literature on dependence has focused on the 
relationship between capitalist powers and the third world, 
but Michael Barrat Brown has argued that a similar economic 
structure underpins the Soviet sphere of influence. His 
argument is that while there is "no evidence of the division 
of labour, typical of the capitalist world, between capital 
goods and other finished manufactured exports from the 
developed countries in exchange for raw materials from the 
underdeveloped", there is a form of Soviet imperialism and it 
has "something in common with economic imperialism in the 
capitalist world". Brown argues that the economies of the 
states of eastern Europe are subordinated to that of the 
Soviet Union and that commodity exchanges between the former 
and the latter have been such that workers in each have been
On trade see A. Emmanuel, Unequal Exchange} A Study of the 
Imperialism of Trade (London, New Left Books, 1972), passim.
M.B. Brown, The Economics of Imperialism (Harmondsworth, 
Penguin, 1974), p.297 and p.304.
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unaware "of the proportion of their current labour time that
was being taken from them to invest in the future through the
15relative prices and wages that were being centrally fixed".
Part of the wealth that is taken in this manner from the
workers is "funnelled into the Communist Party hierarchy" in
16both the Soviet Union and its satellites. Thus there is an 
unequal distribution similar to that described by dependence 
theorists. Moreover, Brown traces the Soviet-Yugoslav split 
of 1949, and events in Hungary and Poland in 1956, 
Czechoslovakia in 1968, and again in Poland in 1970, to Soviet 
exploitation of the workers in those countries.
It has not been the purpose here to inquire into the 
empirical plausibility and truth or falsity of the theory of 
economic dependence. But if it is true and if spheres of 
influence can be described in these terms, intervention to 
maintain the relationship of hierarchy between an influencing 
power and the states it influences is generally unnecessary. 
Through aid, trade and investment and through the harmony of 
interest between the elites in both influenced states and the 
influencing power, control has been established and can be 
maintained. Even when an influenced state has a government 
which wants to redistribute wealth and to lessen the effects 
of structural dependence it might not do so out of regard for 
the possible consequences. When the military junta headed by 
General Velasco came to power in Peru in October 1968, it 
attempted to expropriate the holdings of the International 
Petroleum Company, a subsidiary of Standard Oil of New 
Jersey. The United States then threatened economic sanctions 
and informed the Peruvian Government of various proposed 
investments which were attractive for Peru, and which other 
American mining and oil companies would make, provided it did
15 Ibid., p.292.
16 Ibid., pp.293-94.
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17not persist with attempting to expropriate I.P.C. This is 
but one example of how a state may be influenced to do what 
it would prefer not to do without there being resort to 
force.^
However, to the extent that spheres of influence can be
identified with dependence, it can be argued that they might
lead to disorder. One reason for this is that they perpetuate
an unjust distribution of wealth which will cause
revolutionary violence in the quest for social and economic
justice. J.F. Kennedy seemed to recognise this when he
commented with regard to Latin America that "[t]hose who make
peaceful revolution impossible will make violent revolution 
19inevitable". Revolutionary violence within an influenced 
state need not lead to disorder in international relations, 
but if it became widespread within the sphere or resulted in 
a protracted armed struggle with the influencing power it 
could have consequences for the whole international system. 
Were such a situation to arise an outside power might be 
tempted or driven into supporting the revolutionary forces in 
the influenced state or states and this would herald the 
dangers attendant to challenging the stability of possession 
of the influencing power.
Regardless of whether or not they might lead to disorder, 
we are left with the conclusion that spheres of influence do 
not promote justice and indeed are intrinsically unjust. Not 
only because of the inequalities in the distribution of wealth 
to which the theory of dependence draws attention, but also 
because the periodic policing actions associated with them, 
violate the doctrine of the sovereign equality of states. 
Influenced states do not enjoy the freedom and independence
S. Lindquist, The Shadow: Latin America Faces the
Seventies (Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1972), pp.212 and 266.
18 On this theme see H. Hueem, 'The Global Dominance System', 
Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 10, No. 4 (1973).
19 Cited by A.M. Schlesinger, A Thousand Days: John F.
Kennedy in the White House (London, Deutsch, 1965), p.674.
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of the powers which influence them, and they are unable to 
redress this inequality. Influencing powers deny to 
influenced states the rights which they themselves enjoy. 
Finally, if the theory of dependence is true, a further 
injustice consists in the denial of the equality of 
individuals as a necessary consequence of the unequal 
distribution between Centre and Periphery.
In summary, the pattern of relations between influenced 
states in the same sphere of influence has been orderly, 
partly because influenced states act out of regard for what 
the influencing power might do if they act otherwise and 
partly because the latter maintains order. Influencing powers 
maintain order in two ways, by policing actions such as 
intervention and through economic structures which tie the 
actions of influenced states to their bidding. Order within 
spheres of influence can be said to have contributed to 
international order in general by limiting the possibility of 
conflicts breaking out which might affect the entire 
international system. But the relationship with the 
influencing power which brings about such order is not a just 
one. The freedom and independence of influenced states is 
always impaired and no matter how much they contribute to 
order, spheres of influence are necessarily unjust.
Having now considered order within spheres of influence 
it remains to discuss how spheres of influence contribute to 
order between influencing powers.
(iii) Order in relations between influencing powers.
Spheres of influence contribute to each of the three 
purposes that order was thought to consist in at the outset 
of this chapter. They contribute, that is to say, to the 
stability of possession, the limitation of violence and to 
the sanctity of contracts or stable expectations, and of these 
three the first was identified as prior to the other two.
Thus it is with the principle of stable possession that the 
account of order between influencing powers begins.
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In relation to spheres of influence there are, as was
pointed out above, two senses of stable possession: the "day
to day" sovereignty of the influenced states and the bloc
order superimposed over these states by the influencing power.
This order is hierarchical, first because the influencing
power demonstrates it by such means as intervention and
second, to whatever extent there is a structure of dependence
with the influencing power at the Centre. The perimeters of
spheres of influence or the areas in which an influencing
power requires stable possession are marked out by 'frontiers'.
These are not merely state boundaries but lines of demarcation
between the influence of different powers, in the sense
implied by a Soviet broadcast which asserted that there was
no reason to believe the United States had "lost hope of
attaining the aims revealed in John Foster Dulles' doctrine
20of pushing back Communism to the 1939 frontiers". This 
implies a notion of frontier which subordinates the states of 
eastern Europe to the hegemonic rights of the influencing 
power.
It is important that the frontiers of influence be 
accepted, for it is through their acceptance that spheres of 
influence contribute to order. The acceptance of the frontier 
of a sphere of influence means that the area it includes is, 
in practice, removed from dispute between influencing powers. 
An example which demonstrates the relevance of this is the 
residual question about what the Soviet Union might do with 
regard to Yugoslavia once Marshall Tito dies. At present the 
frontier of the Soviet sphere of influence lies along the 
Yugoslav border, and the speculation as to whether the Soviet 
Union will attempt to reassert hegemony over Yugoslavia, 
raises the question of whether that frontier will be extended 
to include Yugoslavia. This in turn raises the question of 
what the reaction of the United States to any such attempted
One month before the invasion of Czechoslovakia. See BBC 
Summary of World Broadcasts, SU/2830, July 24, 1968. Also on 
"frontiers" see Chapter 1, pp.19-22 above.
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extension might be. The Cuban missile crisis may also be 
seen in terms of the frontiers of influence. What the United 
States did in forcing the withdrawal of Soviet missiles, was 
disabuse the Soviet Union of the idea that the frontier of 
the United States sphere of influence could be revised 
further than what had been achieved already by Castro coming 
to power.
The dangers of the Cuban missile crisis point also to 
the fact that it is by respecting spheres of influence and 
the frontiers which demarcate them, that spheres of influence 
contribute to the limitation of violence. It is limited in 
the first place by the influenced states within them 
recognising the hierarchy of the sphere and accordingly 
acting in general so as not to challenge it in ways that 
might result in the use of force. Secondly, and more 
importantly, it is limited by the influencing powers 
acquiescing in each other's spheres of influence. This in 
turn means that when an influencing power resorts to the use 
of force in policing its sphere, the violence it uses is 
limited by not being challenged by its adversary. This form 
of acquiescence by the super-powers in each other's actions 
is due, it was argued, to the imperative of avoiding nuclear 
war.
Finally, it is interesting that the formal agreements 
of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century often 
preceded any actual influence and were intended to prevent or 
limit conflict which might occur between European powers as 
they expanded into Africa and Asia. In this respect they are 
unlike contemporary spheres of influence and tacit 
understanding about them. To the extent that contemporary 
spheres of influence have limited conflict, this has been an 
effect and not a cause of them, and tacit understanding has 
not preceded but been derived from the implicit recognition 
of spheres of influence. Thus while spheres of influence 
have at all times served to limit conflict, what is special 
about this in contemporary international politics is the 
understanding by which it is achieved.
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Each of the two purposes of order discussed so far is 
in turn served by stable expectations which are the functional 
equivalent of the sanctity of contracts. Stable expectations 
are the foundation of tacit understanding by which means the 
frontiers of spheres of influence are recognised and violence 
is limited.
It is through tacit understanding that spheres of 
influence contribute to order between influencing powers and 
the main way in which they contribute to order in general in 
contemporary international politics. In many ways 
expectations and tacit understandings are more important than 
are formal agreements. Much of the everyday life of 
individuals, groups and societies is conducted on the basis 
of expectations and unspoken understanding. Individuals 
contemplate actions which affect others and act without the 
permission of those others, very often out of necessity. It 
would complicate life immensely were it necessary to secure 
an agreement with other parties on all matters affecting them, 
before acting. Moreover, quite apart from the mere utility of 
expectations and understandings as to the limits of acceptable 
behaviour, it is difficult to conceive of there being order in 
social life without expectations which turn out to be correct. 
Were it not possible to anticipate the response of others to 
various acts, there would be a perpetual contest of all against 
all, each trying to secure his own interest before others had 
a chance to deny it. Social conduct is in a number of 
important ways a matter of give and take based on expectations 
and tacit understandings. The same may be said of relations 
between states.
Tacit understandings stand in the stead of formal 
agreements. In cases where states either will not or believe 
they cannot conclude agreements about matters which 
nevertheless require an understanding between them, tacit 
understandings provide a rational basis for conduct. As with 
the expectations upon which they rest, if tacit understandings 
were constantly broken, states would in important cases have 
no basis upon which to conduct their behaviour. They would
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be much more suspicious of each other. Arguably they would 
be more prone to undertake such things as preventive wars 
and might in general be more inclined to resort to force than 
is presently the case. It is for reasons such as these that 
we have included in the definition of order, not only the 
requirement that promises should be kept, but also that there 
need to be stable expectations of a particular kind.
More specifically, influencing powers cannot, as they 
once could in the heyday of European expansion, formally agree 
to recognise each other's sphere of influence. That is 
because the doctrine of sovereign equality which informs 
international opinion conflicts with the limitations 
influencing powers impose upon the freedom and independence 
of states in their respective spheres. In the case of the 
Soviet Union and the United States, each understands that the 
other expects to be able to limit the freedom and 
independence of states in their spheres without coming into 
conflict with each other. In other words, what is understood 
as appropriate behaviour with respect to each other's sphere 
provides a stability in relations between the two influencing 
powers which does not obtain with respect to areas not 
considered to be in the sphere of either one or the other 
(unless there is a tacit understanding between them that
21scertain areas are to be the domain of neither of them ).
But with respect to spheres of influence if either one were 
to upset the expectations of the other, the basis of 
understanding between them would be upset if not destroyed 
and relations between them would be destabilised. It would 
be much the same as breaking a contract and there would no 
longer be the same basis for trust. Thus, to aid rebellious 
states in another power's sphere of influence would be to go 
against what is expected, and by challenging the hegemony of 
the influencing power be inimical to international order.
See for instance, Chapter 1, p.18 on United States 
aspirations for Africa being a sphere of restraint.
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Standing in contrast with spheres of influence and the 
stable expectations which have formed about them there are 
"grey areas" in which no one power is predominant and about 
which there are no stable expectations. In relation to such 
areas great powers have not arrived at any clear understanding 
of what each expects of the other. Consequently "grey areas" 
are regions in which the super-powers might be drawn into a 
local conflict on opposite sides and hence run the risk of a 
direct confrontation with each other. For this reason it is 
sometimes proposed that such areas should either be 
consolidated into spheres of influence or otherwise be treated 
as spheres of restraint. But the point here is merely to draw 
attention to the contrast between the nature of the 
expectations which attach to spheres of influence and to grey 
areas, in order to highlight the value for international 
order of defined spheres of influence and tacit understanding 
about them.
Apart from contributing to international order through 
the place tacit understanding about them has had in relations 
between the super-powers, spheres of influence are said also 
to be important to a balance of power, in the sense that it 
can be argued that a balance of power is best achieved through 
spheres of influence. With regard to this, one of the charges 
against United States foreign policy is that it has been 
informed by a globalist doctrine which aims at a preponderance 
over, rather than a balance with, its principal opponents. 
Rather than confine its interests to certain areas, it has 
perceived its interests to be at stake in regions over the 
whole globe. This has meant United States intervention in 
places in which a change in the status quo probably would not 
have affected the overall balance between the United States 
and its principal rivals. Indeed, it may be that an overall 
balance would have been better served had the United States 
not sought global preponderance. As an alternative to 
'globalism', Walter Lippmann and Ronald Steel after him have 
proposed a balance of power based on spheres of influence.
Writing at the time of the Dominican invasion in 1965, 
Walter Lippmann argued that
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spheres of influence are fundamental to the very 
nature of international society. Great powers will 
resist the invasion of their spheres of influence.... 
Recognition of spheres of influence is a true 
alternative to globalism. It is the alternative to 
communist globalism which proclaims a universal 
revolution. It is the alternative to anti-communist 
globalism which promises to fight anti-communist 
wars everywhere. The acceptance of spheres of 
influence has been the dominant foundation of the 
detente in Europe between the Soviet Union and the 
West. Eventually it will provide the formula of 
coexistence between Red China and the United States.22
Following Lippmann, Steel also argued that global involvement
did not provide a true balance of power and that a "true
2 3balance of power must be based on spheres of influence".
A viable alternative to global intervention is a 
mature spheres of influence policy - mature in the 
sense that while it recognises the dominant interest 
of great powers in areas they deem essential to 
their security, it does not give them carte balance 
to treat those areas as colonies. Spheres of 
influence should not be used as a policy to justify 
counter-revolution, as in Santo Domingo or 
Czechoslovakia. Perhaps the best way to avoid such 
dominance by a single hegemonic power is the 
creation of several power centres.24
However problematical Steel's vision is, the difficulties do
not overturn the basic idea that both he and Lippmann had of
an overall balance between the great powers being served best
25by local imbalances or spheres of influence.
2 2 Cited by Ronald Steel, Pax Americana (New York, The Viking 
Press, 1967), p.328.
2 3 See also Stanley Hoffmann, 'Weighing the Balance of Power', 
Foreign Affairs, Vol. 50, No. 4 (July 1972). Hoffmann writes 
that "an effective balance of power requires either agreements 
on spheres of influence and dividing lines, or hands off 
arrangements neutralizing certain areas", p.627.
^  Ronald Steel, 'A Sphere of Influence Policy?', Foreign 
Policy, No. 5 (Winter 1971-72), p.114.
2 5 For criticism of Steel, see Pierre Hassner, 'Spheres of 
What? An Exchange', Foreign Policy, No. 6 (Spring 1972), 
pp.142-49. On local imbalances see R.J. Vincent, 'Kissinger's 
System of Foreign Policy', The Yearbook of World. Affairs,
1977, forthcoming.
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Need great powers have spheres of influence for there to
be a balance of power between them? The answer to this
depends partly upon what is taken as the meaning of the term
"balance of power". Among the meanings distinguished by
Martin Wight were those of it referring to the principle that
power ought to be evenly distributed, and of it meaning the
principle of equal aggrandisement of the great powers at the
2 6expense of the weak. With regard to the latter, mention 
was made in Chapter One of the so-called scramble for 
concessions in China, which amounted to the great powers 
demarcating spheres of influence in order to maintain what 
was called "the balance of power in the East". In contemporary 
international politics there is a connection between spheres 
of influence and the balance of power in this equal 
aggrandisement sense, in that what one power has another 
wants; but there is also a connection in the sense of it 
being thought that power ought to be evenly distributed.
So far it has been argued that spheres of influence 
contribute to order between influencing powers, and hence to 
order in general, through tacit understanding which serves 
the goals of social coexistence, and by contributing to what 
influencing powers perceive as necessary to a balance of 
power. While it can be concluded that spheres of influence 
do contribute to order between influencing powers, it must 
again be reiterated that they might also result in disorder.
Martin Wight, 'The Balance of Power', in H. Butterfield 
and M. Wight (eds.), diplomatic Investigations (London, Allen 
and Unwin, 1966), pp.149-75.
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It was pointed out in relation to order within spheres of
influence that the injustice associated with them might lead
27to conflict which "spills over".
Having now discussed the contribution of spheres of 
influence to international order in the states system as it 
has been, it remains to consider whether spheres of influence 
will continue to have a place in possible future developments 
of that system. After which the possibility of a world 
without states will also be raised.
III.
Spheres of Influence in Future International Order.
The contemporary international system has been marked 
by the preponderance of the two super-powers, and of the 
arrangements which might displace this preponderance the main 
possibilities are a triangular balance, a multi-polar balance, 
and a system of regional groupings. It is proposed to outline 
the place of spheres of influence in relation to each of 
these possibilities.
For an argument to this effect see Pierre Hassner, 'The 
Implications of Change in Eastern Europe for the Atlantic 
Alliance', ORBIS, Vol. XIII, No. 1 (Spring 1969), pp.237-55. 
Also in relation to the contribution of spheres of influence 
both to order and possibly disorder, it should be noticed 
that Professor Falk has drawn attention to what might be called 
"secondary" spheres of influence. "China, India, Indonesia, 
Ghana, and the United Arab Republic each enjoy to varying 
degrees the status of superordinate actor in relation to 
certain subordinate countries, and these patterns both 
resemble and contrast with the dependency relationships 
maintained by Soviet and American behavior". (R.A. Falk,
'Zone II as a World Order Construct', in J.N. Rosenau, V. Davis 
and M.A. East (eds.), The Analysis of International Polities 
(New York, The Free Press, 1972), p.188). It has not been 
the purpose here to examine these secondary patterns of 
control and what has been said above might not hold for them.
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(i) A triangular balance.
It is a commonplace idea that while the relationship
between the Soviet Union and the United States is still
central in international politics, a more complex system of
five or more powers is emerging. In relation to this it is
suggested that until a multi-polar system does emerge the
dominant relationship will be a triangular one formed by
China, the United States and the Soviet Union. Holbraad has
examined the various ways in which these three powers might
combine with or against each other during the seventies. His
argument is that the most likely relationship will be an
"equilateral mixture of cooperation and conflict, of the sort
that obtained between the Soviet Union and the United States
during the sixties.... The overall pattern in such a set of
relationships...might be one in which the three parties try
to respect each other's minimum spheres of interest and avoid
direct clashes by concentrating their rivalries in the grey
areas of the world, such as the Middle East, the Indian
Ocean, etc. , where there are no clear lines to demarcate
28spheres of influence".
In relation to this it is interesting that at the same
time as China denounces spheres of influence and great power
competition for hegemony, it does not appear to want the
United States to relinquish any influence it already has in
29places where the Soviet Union might step into the breach. 
Three points may be made about this. First, that China does 
not want United States influence to diminish if this would 
mean the Soviet Union stepping into the breach, suggests that 
China has at least a rudimentary idea of a balance of power
C. Holbraad, 'The Triangular System', Cooperation and 
Conflict, VIII (1973), pp.71-99.
29 For Chinese statements on spheres of influence and 
hegemony see Peking Review, No. 16 (April 20, 1973), p.14; 
Peking Review, No. 29 (July 20, 1973), p.9; Peking Review,
No. 43 (October 23, 1973), pp.9-11; and see also the Far 
Eastern Economic Review, July 11, 1975 and clauses concerning 
spheres of influence in the joint communiques between China 
and the Philippines, Malaysia and Thailand.
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between the great powers. Not only this, but that it 
conceives of spheres of influence as part of a balance.
Second, that China renounces any claims on its own part to 
spheres of influence is in one way unimportant. It may 
indeed not want a sphere of influence, but this does not mean 
it does not or will not have one. For China to have a sphere 
of influence, it would be sufficient for a lesser state to 
feel constrained to repeatedly act one way rather than 
another out of regard for China's reaction were it to act 
otherwise. Third, whether or not China itself has a sphere 
of influence, it is unlikely that its membership in a 
triangular balance would bring an end to Soviet and United 
States spheres. For these reasons a triangular balance 
between the Soviet Union, the United States and China, is 
not likely to end the place of spheres of influence in 
international order.
(ii) A multi-polar balance.
In January 1971, President Nixon mooted the idea of a
balance of power between the United States, Europe, the
3 0Soviet Union, China and Japan. The following year in his
third report to Congress, Mr Nixon said he had in his two
previous reports ’stressed the fact that the post-war period
of international relations had ended". The end of bipolarity,
he continued, "required a structure built with the resources
and concepts of many nations - for only when nations
participate in creating an international system do they
31contribute to its vitality and accept its validity".
Similarly, Dr Kissinger has spoken of a "radical 
transformation in the nature of power" in the contemporary 
period.
See Time, January 3, 1971.
U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970's. A report to the 
Congress by Richard Nixon, February 9, 1972. USIS Publication 
72-230 (118) .
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It is wrong to speak of only one balance of power, 
for there are several which have to be related to 
each other. In the military sphere, there are two 
super-powers. In economic terms, there are at 
least five major groupings. Politically, many more 
centers of influence have emerged - some 50 new 
nations have come into being since the end of War 
II and regional groups are assuming ever increasing importance.3 2
No doubt Kissinger said this with the pentagonal balance 
proposed by Mr Nixon in mind. This notion of a balance 
between powers endowed with unequal military, economic and 
political strength, represents one of the main recent ideas 
as to what form a multi-polar balance replacing the 
predominance of the central nuclear powers might take. There 
are two things to be said about it at the outset. The first 
is that in military terms there are two super-powers, there 
are five major economic centres, one of them not a state but 
a group of states; and, political multi-polarity is a fact of 
contemporary international politics. But secondly, these 
empirical facts do not mean that a balance of power can be 
based upon them. Indeed, the meaning of the term "balance of 
power" when applied to relations between the United States, 
Western Europe, the Soviet Union, China and Japan, has been 
severely criticised by more than one scholar.
Hoffmann, for example, has argued that the idea of a
pentagonal balance derives from the traditional balance of
power model which is inappropriate to the contemporary 
33world. Apart from anything else, the central mechanism of 
nuclear deterrence is, in the foreseeable future, likely to 
remain bi-polar. No matter what sort of balance between 
other powers develops, the central nuclear balance will 
remain crucial. As long as it does, which it will until one 
or more powers can match the Soviet Union and the United 
States, it is unlikely that spheres of influence will cease 
to be part of international order.
Address before the third "Pacem in Terris" Conference, 
October 8, 1973. D.S.B., Vol. LXIX, No. 1792 (October 29,
1973).
33 Stanley Hoffmann, 'Weighing the Balance of Power', Forezgn 
Affairs, Vol. 50, No. 4 (July 1972). See also: Alistair
Buchan, 'A World Restored?', Foreign Affairs, Vol. 50, No. 4 
(July 1972).
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(iii) Regional groupings.
It is possible that the mixture of universal 
organisation and great power predominance which distinguishes 
the present international system, will give way to a number 
of regional groupings, each under the control of one dominant 
power. Were this to happen the relationship most affecting 
the quality of international order would be the relationship 
between these powers. What is important about this is that 
it may be a relationship very like that between the 
influencing powers with which we have been concerned. Regions 
might in effect be spheres of influence within which there is 
hierarchy and between which there is exclusion. It is 
essentially for this reason that schemes for regional 
groupings have been criticised.
In some schemes for order based on regional groupings
the great powers are assigned a central role, while in other
schemes such groupings are envisioned as diminishing their
role. During World War II, for instance, Churchill favoured
the idea of post-war order being based on a regional
structure led by the great powers, as did Walter Lippmann in
34his War Aims, Unlike Churchill and Lippmann, Dr Rajni
Kothari has more recently proposed the creation of 20-25
regional federations which would form a middle tier of world
organization to safeguard the weaker areas of the world
against domination by the great powers. However, he sees
the organization he proposes as to some extent insulated from
the influence of outside powers and this would leave the
smaller powers in each region vulnerable to the dominant power 
35in each. The ideas of Churchill and Lippmann are open to
See E.J. Hughes, ’Winston Churchill and the Formation of 
the United Nations Organization', Journal of Contemporary 
History, Vol. 9, No. 4 (October 1974), pp.184-87; and 
W. Lippmann, U.S. War Aims (Boston, Little, Brown, 1944), 
passim.
3 5 Rajni Kothari, Footsteps into the Future, Diagnosis of the 
Present World and a Design for an Alternative (New Delhi, 
Orient Longman, 1974). See also H.N. Bull, 'Models of Future 
World Order', India Quarterly (June-November 1975), pp.71-72 
and H.N. Bull, Review Article, Australian Outlook, Vol. 29, 
No. 2 (August 1975).
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the same criticism. There is nothing inherent in either 
regional organizations or federations, and this has been 
borne out on a number of occasions in Latin America, to 
prevent dominant powers from limiting the freedom and 
independence of lesser states in precisely the same manner 
as do influencing powers.
It may be argued then, that any future tendencies to 
regionalism which take the form of an association of separate 
sovereign states, as distinct from the integration of states 
into a single entity, will be susceptible to the most 
powerful among them. Thus regional groupings or federations 
may be no more than nascent spheres of influence. Unless the 
relationship between states within a regional grouping or 
federation is conducted according to the principles of 
sovereignty and equality and can be distinguished from 
relations between an influencing power and the states it 
influences, regionalism might only perpetuate spheres of
r  -I 36influence.
In summary, spheres of influence will continue to be an 
ingredient of international order, whether the central 
relationship in the international system is a triangular 
balance or a multi-polar balance, and probably also if a 
system of regional groupings were to come into being. Each 
of these three possible developments presupposes the 
continued existence of states and what must be mentioned 
finally, is the possibility of a world without states.
(iv) Beyond the states system.
Argument about the future of the states system has taken 
two main forms. On one hand it is argued that the states 
system is, in fact, in decline in virtue of state sovereignty
For further discussion of regionalism and regional 
organizations see J.N. Moore, 'The Role of Regional 
Arrangements in the Maintenance of World Order', in R.A. Falk 
and C.E. Black (eds.), The Future of the International Legal 
Order (New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1971), Vol. Ill 
and J.S. Nye, 'Regional Institutions', ibid., Vol. IV (1972).
316
being undermined by non-state actors such as intergovernmental 
organizations; transnational organizations; multi-national 
corporations; and sub-national groups such as national 
liberation and separatist movements. On the other it is 
argued that even if it is not in decline it ought to be 
replaced because it cannot cope with the paramount ecological 
and resource problems facing mankind as a whole. Apart 
from this, it could be argued that another reason for 
promoting an alternative to the states system would be the 
hope of ending relationships of dominance, such as the one 
between influencing powers and influenced states. But would 
a world without states be one in which there was no hierarchy?
It can be imagined that the states system might give way 
to or be replaced by any one of a number of modes of alternate 
organization. But whatever it might be replaced by, it is 
unlikely that the dominance of some one group or entity over 
one or more other groups, communities or entities would 
disappear. It is more likely than not that in any form of 
social life there will always be some sort of hierarchy. Thus 
it must be left open to speculation that some form of spheres 
of influence may remain as an appendage of the dominant 
political entities.
IV.
International order was said to consist in relations 
between states being conducted so as to contribute to the 
principle of stability of possession, the limitation of 
violence and to stable expectations as the functional
For an argument that it is not in decline see H.N. Bull,
The Anarchical Society, op.cit., Chapter XI.
3 8 See R.A. Falk, 'The Logic of State Sovereignty Versus the 
Requirements of World Order', The Yearbook of World Affairs, 
1973, and R.A. Falk, This Endangered Planet} Prospects and 
Proposals for Human Survival (New York, Vintage Books, 1972).
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equivalent of the sanctity of contracts. Of these purposes 
the first was identified as prior to the other two. With 
reference to this definition, it was argued that contemporary 
spheres of influence contribute to international order mainly 
through promoting order in relations between the super-powers 
as the central influencing powers of the international system.
Within spheres of influence there is order in relations 
between influenced states partly because of their own actions 
and partly because it is maintained by the respective 
influencing power. Influencing powers enjoy hegemonic rights 
in relation to their respective spheres and maintain order by 
their constant presence and periodic intervention. However, 
the violation of sovereign equality and the relative social 
and economic deprivation entailed by this hierarchy between 
influencer and influenced means that spheres of influence are 
unjust, and this is not mitigated by their contribution to 
order.
In terms of their contribution to order between 
influencing powers, which has been our overriding concern, 
spheres of influence remove, as they have in the past, the 
areas within their frontiers from dispute. For the 
influencing powers they serve the principle of stability of 
possession, and as long as they do, violence with respect to 
them is limited and expectations are met. What is special 
about contemporary spheres of influence is that these 
purposes of order in relations between influencing powers, 
and hence the purposes of international order in general, are 
served by tacit understanding. The existing regime of 
recognised norms in international society precludes open 
acceptance of spheres of influence, and in view of this, 
tacit understanding provides the means by which the goals of 
social coexistence are met in relations between influencing 
powers.
With tacit understanding about contemporary spheres of 
influence in mind, this thesis dealt with plans for post-war 
order and the formation of spheres of influence in the latter
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stages of World War II. The United States did not see its 
position in Latin America as being that of an influencing 
power, and because of its vision of post-war order, it 
opposed in principle the establishment of the Soviet sphere 
in eastern Europe. In spite of this, in virtue of its 
actions and inactions it acquiesced in the Soviet sphere, and 
spheres of influence were consolidated as part of the reality 
of contemporary international politics. Because of this 
acquiescence tacit understanding was initiated and then grew 
out of the behaviour of each of the influencing powers with 
respect to each other's sphere. But at the same time as there 
was acquiescence and the growth of understanding, spheres of 
influence were not and have not been openly accepted, and any 
suggestion that they should be is officially denied in the 
capitals of both influencing powers.
In connection with international law it was shown that 
spheres of influence and tacit understanding inhabit a 
twilight zone between law and politics. Law may be seen as 
husbanding the accepted norms of international society, and 
as standing guard against the assault on these norms by the 
patterns of control or practices associated with spheres of 
influence. But these practices have already created their 
own norms and it is through tacit understanding that they are 
known. They are norms which promote order but not justice.
The interesting question, therefore, which must be left open 
here, is whether and by which means what is tacitly 
understood as to spheres of influence should or will be 
admitted to the orthodox norms of international society.
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APPENDIX A
THE ATLANTIC CHARTER 
14 AUGUST 1941
'The President of the United States and the Prime 
Minister, Mr. Churchill, representing H.M. Government in the 
United Kingdom, have met at sea. They have been accompanied 
by officials of their two Governments, including high- 
ranking officers of their military, naval, and air services. 
The whole problem of the supply of munitions of war, as 
provided by the Lease-Lend Act, for the armed forces of the 
United States and for those countries actively engaged in 
resisting aggression has been further examined. Lord 
Beaverbrook, Minister of Supply of the British Government, 
has joined in these conferences. He is going to proceed to 
Washington to discuss further details with appropriate 
officials of the United States Government. These conferences 
will also cover the supply problem of the Soviet Union. The 
President and the Prime Minister have had several conferences. 
They have considered the dangers to world civilisation 
arising from the policy of military domination by conquest 
upon which the Hitlerite Government of Germany and other 
Governments associated therewith have embarked, and have made 
clear the steps which their countries are respectively taking 
for their safety in facing these dangers. They have agreed 
upon the following joint declaration:-
The President of the United States and the Prime 
Minister, Mr. Churchill, representing H.M. Government in the 
United Kingdom, being met together, deem it right to make 
known certain common principles in the national policies of 
their respective countries on which they base their hopes for 
a better future for the world.
1. Their countries seek no aggrandisement, territorial 
or other.
2. They desire to see no territorial changes that do 
not accord with the freely expressed wishes of the peoples 
concerned.
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3. They respect the right of all peoples to choose the 
form of Government under which they will live; and they wish 
to see sovereign rights and self-government restored to 
those who have been forcibly deprived of them.
4. They will endeavour with due respect for their 
existing obligations, to further enjoyment by all States, 
great or small, victor or vanquished, of access, on equal 
terms, to the trade and to the raw materials of the world 
which are needed for their economic prosperity.
5. They desire to bring about the fullest collaboration 
between all nations in the economic field, with the object of 
securing for all improved labour standards, economic 
advancement, and social security.
6. After the final destruction of Nazi tyranny, they 
hope to see established a peace which will afford to all 
nations the means of dwelling in safety within their own 
boundaries, and which will afford assurance that all the men 
in all the lands may live out their lives in freedom from 
fear and want.
7. Such a peace should enable all men to traverse the 
high seas and oceans without hindrance.
8. They believe all of the nations of the world, for 
realistic as well as spiritual reasons, must come to the 
abandonment of the use of force. Since no future peace can 
be maintained if land, sea, or air armaments continue to be 
employed by nations which threaten, or may threaten, 
aggression outside of their frontiers, they believe, pending 
the establishment of a wider and permanent system of general 
security, that the disarmament of such nations is essential. 
They will likewise aid and encourage all other practicable 
measures which will lighten for peace-loving peoples the 
crushing burden of armament.'"
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APPENDIX B
DECLARATION ON LIBERATED EUROPE 
11 FEBRUARY 1945
The following declaration has been approved:
'The Premier of the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics, the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom and the 
President of the United States of America have consulted 
with each other in the common interests of the peoples of 
their countries and those of liberated Europe. They jointly 
declare their mutual agreement to concert during the 
temporary period of instability in liberated Europe the 
policies of their three governments in assisting the peoples 
liberated from the domination of Nazi Germany and the 
peoples of the former Axis satellite states of Europe to 
solve by democratic means their pressing political and 
economic problems.
'The establishment of order in Europe and the re-building 
of national economic life must be achieved by processes which 
vTill enable the liberated peoples to destroy the last vestiges 
of Nazism and Fascism and to create democratic institutions 
of their own choice. This is a principle of the Atlantic 
Charter - the right of all peoples to choose the form of 
government under which they will live - the restoration of 
sovereign rights and self-government to those peoples who 
have been forcibly deprived of them by the aggressor nations.
'To foster the conditions in which the liberated peoples 
may exercise these rights, the three governments will jointly 
assist the people in any European liberated state or former 
Axis satellite state in Europe where in their judgment 
conditions require (a) to establish conditions of internal 
peace; (b) to carry out emergency measures for the relief of 
distressed peoples; (c) to form interim governmental 
authorities broadly representative of all democratic elements 
in the population and pledged to the earliest possible
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establishment through free elections of governments 
responsive to the will of the people; and (d) to facilitate 
where necessary the holding of such elections.
'The three governments will consult the other United 
Nations and provisional authorities or other governments in 
Europe when matters of direct interest to them are under 
consideration.
'When, in the opinion of the three governments, 
conditions in any European liberated state or any former 
Axis satellite state in Europe make such action necessary, 
they will immediately consult together on the measures 
necessary to discharge the joint responsibilities set forth 
in this declaration.
'By this declaration we reaffirm our faith in the 
principles of the Atlantic Charter, our pledge in the 
Declaration by the United Nations, and our determination to 
build in co-operation with other peace-loving nations world 
order under law, dedicated to peace, security, freedom and 
general well-being of all mankind.
'In issuing this declaration, the Three Powers express 
the hope that the Provisional Government of the French 
Republic may be associated with them in the procedure 
suggested.'
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